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A MILITARY HISTORY 
of THE WORLD WAR 

BY 

COLONEL C. R. HOWLAND 

u 

Infantry, U. S. Army 

WITH PREFACE BY 

Major General Hanson E. Ely, 

U. S. Army 


THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS 

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 



THIS HISTORY IS IN TWO VOLUMES 

Volume I Contains the Narrative 
Volu?ne II Contains the Maps 


> y 

> , ) 

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS 

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 

1923 




Copyright applied for 
in name of 

C. R. Howland 


ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



library of congress 

RECEIVED 


F5 


1924 




DOCUMENTS DIVISION 










Preface 


THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 


7 May 1923. 


This work is a summary, in book form, of lectures delivered 
to the General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
by Colonel Charles R. Howland, U. S. Army, during the 
period of my command here. 

These lectures were so well received, not only as a most 
carefully prepared history of the World War, but as showing 
the military principles involved in the various campaigns—how 
their observance made toward victory and their non-observance 
toward defeat—that it was decided to publish this volume in 
order that the great number of officers who are unable to at¬ 
tend these schools, might profit thereby. 

It will place at the disposal of military men a most valu¬ 
able and authoritative statement of facts written in an orderly 
fashion and at a sufficient time since the conclusion of the 
war to give access to information unobtainable at an earlier 
date. 

The immense research involved is evidenced by the 
Bibliography enumerating the 220 sources considered, and the 
appendix of 151 maps showing graphically the various plans, 
operations, and results:—the most valuable collection of maps 
I have ever seen. 

This is the only history of the World War that I have seen, 
which, while setting forth fairly the doings of all other partici¬ 
pants involved, gives proper emphasis to the most important 
and critical part taken by the United States of America. 



Major General, U. S . Army, 


Commanding. 


m 


This ^Military History of The World War 


is dedicated to 


General Pershing 

Who saw clear through the “Fog of War/’ 

And undeterred by Friend or Foe, 

Organized the Force—And delivered the Blow — 
That gained the Victory. 


iy 





In t r o du c t i o n 


THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

September 15, 1923. 

This work represents extensive examination and close 
study of information on the World War as it is available at 
the present time. 

The subject matter as given herein is, in substance, the 
same as has been presented by the author in the form of lec¬ 
tures to the classes at the General Service Schools for the 
past two years. It has been well received generally by the 
experienced officers composing those classes and by the in¬ 
structional staff as well. 

The information available at this time is considered suf¬ 
ficient to present a true outline of the major operations of 
the World War, and the matters of fact as presented in the 
following pages may be accepted with a high degree of con¬ 
fidence as a basis for the study of the stratgey of the war and 
also as a means of exemplification of the comprehensive 
principles of war in general, and of certain operations in 
particular. 

The deductions and conclusions from the facts as pre¬ 
sented are the individual work of the author, and are well 
worthy of serious and thoughful consideration by the stu¬ 
dent of military history and strategy. 

R. H. Allen, 

Assistant Commandant. 

Approved: 

H. A. SMITH, 

Commandant. 


v 













Bib l i o g r ap hy 

1. America in France—Frederick Palmer. 

2. American Army—Benedict Crowell. 

3. American Army in Belgium. 

4. American Army in the European Conflict—De Chambrun and De 

Marenches. 

5. American Effort—Von Ludendorff. 

6. American Guns in the War with Germany—E. S. Farrow. 

7. American II Corps—K. T. Riggs. 

8. Americans in the Great War—Micheler & Co. 

9. American Soldiers Won the War—Interviews with German Crown 

Prince, von Ludendorff, von Gallwitz and von Einem. 

10. America’s Case against Germany—Lindsay Rodgers. 

11. America’s Race to Victory—Requien. 

12. Another Legend of the Marne 1914—(No. 1, Vol. V, The Army 

Quarterly). 

13. Army of 1918—R. R. McCormick. 

14. Artilleryman—Jay M. Lee. 

15. Balkan Problems and European Peace—Buxton and Teese. 

16. Battle of the Marne—von Bulow. 

17. Battle of the Piave—Issued by Supreme Command of Italy. 

18. Battle of the Somme—John Buchan. 

19. Battle of the Somme—Philip Gibbs. 

20. Battle of Verdun—Henry Dugard. 

21. Battle Participation of Organization of the A.E.F. 

22. Behind the Scenes in the Reichstag—Wetterlee. 

23. Breach between the German First and Second Armies at the Battle 

of the Marne, “Revue Militaire Francaise, 1922.” 

24. Brief History of Divisions U. S. Army (W.P.D. G.S.). 

25. Brigade of the Old Army—1914, Sir Ayler Haldane. 

26. British Campaigns in the Near East—E. Dane. 

27. British on the Somme—W. B. Thomas. 

28. British Opponents at the Battle of the Marne—Army Quarterly No. 

2, Vol. IV. 

29. Campaigns of Hindenburg—Ludendorff on the Eastern Front— 

General Buat. 

30. Cannae—Von Schlieffen. 

31. Causes and Consequences of the War—Ypes Guyot. 

32. Causes and Pretexts of the World War—Ferrara. 

33. Cavalry in 1915—Frederick Coleman. 

34. Commendations of 2d Division. 

35. Conduct of War—Von der Goltz. 

36. Dardanelles—C. E. Callwell. 

37. Day by Day with the Russian Army—Bernard Pares. 

38. Deductions from the World War—Baron Freytag—Loringhoven. 

39. Development of Tactics—World War—Balck. 

40. Development of the German Plan of Campaign, August-September, 

1914—Army Quarterly No. 2, Vol. II. 

41. Development of the German Plan of Campaign, August-September, 

1914—Capt. Wynne (in No. 2, Vol. II, The Army Quarterly). 

42. Diplomacy and the War—Andrassy. 

43. Diplomacy of the War in 1914—E. C. Stow r ell. 

44. Direction of War—W. D. Bird. . . 

45. Disclosures from Germany—Reprint of International Conciliation 

No. 127, June, 1918. 

46. Discussion of National Defense—General John J. Pershing. 

47. Eighty-sixth Division (History). 

• • 

Vll 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


48. Elements of the Great War—Hillaire Belloc. 

49. Encyclopedia Brittanica. 

50. Ethnological Maps of Central southeastern Europe and Western 

Asia, April, 1919. 

51. European War—General Information—Compilation G.S.S. Library. 

52. European War—J. W. Burgess. 

53. Evidence in the Case—J. M. Beck. 

54. Evolution of the Unified Command—Tasker H. Bliss. 

55. Face to Face with Kaiserism—Gerard. 

56. Facts about France—E. Saillens. 

57. Father Duffy’s Story—Francis P. Duffy. 

58. Field Orders First Army, A.E.F. (3 to 119) (Library G.S.S.). 

69. Fifth Division (History). 

60. Final Report of General John J. Pershing. 

61. First Division (History). 

62. First Reflections on Campaign of 1918—R. M. Johnston. 

63. First Report of General John J. Pershing. 

64. First World War—Colonel Repington. 

65. Forty Days in 1914—Sir F. Maurice. 

66. Fourth Division—Bach—Hall. 

67. France Facing Germany—Clemenceau. 

68. French High Command in 1916, “Revue Militaire Francaise, Sep¬ 

tember, 1922.” 

69. Gas Warfare—E. S. Farrow. 

70. General Sketch of the European War—Hillaire Belloc. 

71. General Staff and its Problems—Ludendorff. 

72. German Attack of July 15 to 17, 1918 between Dormans and Rheims 

—Hans von Zwehl. 

73. German Campaign in the west 1914—Army Quarterly No. 1, Vol. II. 

74. German Campaign in the West, August, 1914—(No. 1, Vol. II The 

Army Quarterly). 

75. German General Staff—von Falkenhayn. 

76. German Plan of Operations against France—1914, “Revue Militaire 

Francaise, 1922.” 

77. German War Book—J.H. Morgan, M.A. 

78. Governments and Parties in Continental Europe—E.L. Lowell. 

79. Guide to the Military History of the World War—T.G. Frothingham. 

80. Guizot’s History of France. 

81. Handbook of Economic Agencies War of 1917—W. D. Doc. 908. 

82. Handbook of Northern France—W. M. Davis. 

83. Harper’s Pictorial Library of the World War. 

84. Heaven, Hell or Hoboken—R. N. Johnson. 

85. Historical Development of Modern Europe—C. M. Andrew's. 

86. Historical Geography of Europe.—E A. Freeman. 

87. Historical Report of the Chief Engineer, A.E.F. 

88. History of England—Macauley. 

89. History of Germany—E. F. Henderson. 

90. History of the Great War—Briggs Davenport. 

91. History of the Transport Service—Albert Gleaves. 

92. History of the World War—F.A. March. 

93. History of the World War—F. H. Simonds. 

94. Ian Hamilton’s Gallipoli Report—September 20, 1915. 

95. Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue—Goricar and Stow r e. 

96. Inside Story of the A.E.F.—Pattulo. 

97. International Law and the Great War—Coleman Phillipson. 

98. In the World War—Count Czernin. 

99. Invasion and the War in Belgium—L. Van Der Essen. 

100. Iron Division (28th)—H. G. Proctor. 

101. Journal of the Great War—Dawes. 

102. Last Days of Fort Vaux—Henry Bordeaux. 

103. Last Four Months—Sir F. Maurice. 





BIBLIOGRAPHY 

104. Lectures First Army Staff, A.E.F. (Library G.S.S.). 

105. Legend of the Marne—Army Quarterly, No. 1, Vol. IV. 

106. Literary Digest History of World War. 

107. (London) Times History of the War. 

108. Lost Fruits of Waterloo—Bassett. 

109. Louis the XIV—Julia Pardol. 

110. Ludendorflf’s Own Story. 

111. March on Paris—Von Kluck. 

112. Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany. 

113. Menzel’s History of Germany. 

114. Mesopotamia—H. W. Reynardson. 

115. Monograph Blanc Mont (Library G.S.S.). 

116. Monograph, 5th Division (Library G.S.S.). 

117. Monograph, II Corps (Library G.S.S.). 

118. Monographs, V Corps (Library G.S.S.). 

119. Monograph, Soissons (Library G.S.S.). 

120. My Campaigns—General Townsend. 

121. My Memoirs—von Tirpitz. 

122. Napoleon’s Maxims of War. 

123. National Service Magazine. 

124. Nelson’s History of the War—John Buchan. 

125. New International Encyclopedia. 

126. New International Yearbook. 

127. New National Encyclopedia. 

128. New World—Bowman. 

129. New York Times Current History of the European War 

130. Ninetieth Division (History). 

131. Notes by J. R. Davis on 2d Division July 18, 1918. 

132. Notes on Causes of the War—J. F. Morrison. 

133. On War—Von Clausewitz. 

134. Operations of the II U. S. Corps, W. D. Doc. 1016. 

135. Organization of S. O. S., A.E.F.—W. D. Doc. 1009. 

136. Organization of the Service of Supply (Monograph No. 7, W.P.D., 

G.S.). 

137. Origin of the Macedonian 1918 Offensive—Revue Militaire Francaise, 

July, 1922. 

138. Origin of the Triple Alliance—Coolidge. 

139. Origin of the War—Federn. 

140. Our Army in Flanders—G. V. Williams. 

141. Our Army in Palestine—Antony Bluett. 

142. Our Greatest Battle—Frederick Palmer. 

143. Our 110 Days’ Fighting—A. W. Page. 

144. Our War with Germany—Bassett. 

145. Outlines of European History—Robinson and Beard. 

146. Out of my Life—Von Hindenburg. 

147. Pan Americanism—Roland G. Usher. 

148. Pan German Plot Unmasked—Cheradame. 

149. Peace Negotiations—Robert Lansing. 

150. Pomp of Power—G. H. Doran Co. 

151. Principles of Maritime Strategy—Corbett. 

152. Principles of Strategy—W. K. Naylor. 

153. Principles of War—Foch. 

154. Prisoners of the Great War—Carl P. Dennett. 

155. Provocation of France—Bracq. 

156. Psychology of the Great War—Gustave Le Bon. 

157. Recollection of a Chief of Staff—von Moltke (Junior). 

158. Records of the World War—Field Orders of the II Army Corps. 

159. Reference History of the War—I. S. Guernsey, M. A. 

160. Role of Physiography in Military Operation—Kirk Bryan. 

161. Roots of the War—Federn. 

162. Russia and the Great War—George Alexinsky. 


ix 




BIBLIOGRAPHY 


163. Russian Army—Sir Alfred Knox. 

164. Saloniki and After—M. G. Owen. 

165. Scapegoat of the Battle of the Marne—Army Quarterly No. 2, Vol.I. 

166. Second Battle of the Marne—C. H. Lanza. 

167. Second Division (History). 

168. Second Field Signal Battalion. 

169. Short History of the Great War—A. F. Pollard. 

170. Sir Archibald Murray’s Despatches. 

171. Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches—J. H. Boraston. 

172. Six Months on the Italian Front—J. M. Price. 

173. Strategy of Ludendorff—“Revue Militaire Suisse”—March, 1923. 

174. Story of the British Fourth Army, General Montgomery. 

175. Strategy on the Western Front—H. H. Sargent. 

176. Summary of Air Information (Library G.S.S.). 

177. Summary of Information A.E.F. (Library G.S.S.). 

178. Summary of Operations First Army, E.A.F. (Library G.S.S.). 

179. Tabular Views of Universal History—G. F. Putnam—L. E. Jones. 

180. Tactics—A Handbook Based on Lessons of the World War—Rohr- 

beck. 

181. The First Seven Divisions—E. W. Hamilton. 

182. The Great War—Allen. 

183. The Irrevocable Moment—Ferrere in L’Hlustration, August, 1922. 

184. The Kaiser’s Memoirs—Wilhelm II. 

185. The Reckoning—J. M. Beck. 

186. The United States and Pan Germania—Andre Oberadame. 

187. The United States in the World War—McMaster. 

188. The World War—H. A. Drum. 

189. The World War—T. W. Darrah. 

190. Third Division (History). 

191. Thirty-second Division (History). 

192. Thirty Years’ War—Grindely. 

193. Three hundred and sixty-first Infantry. 

194. Three hundred and thirty-second Infantry on the Italian Front. 

195. Three Years of War in East Africa—A. Buchanan. 

196. Topography and Strategy in the War—W. D. Johnson. 

197. Truth about Germany—Facts about the War. 

198. Turks in Palestine—Alexander Aaronsohn. 

199. Turn of the Tide—J. C. Wise. 

200. Twelfth Engineers (History). 

201. Twenty-ninth Division (History). 

202. Twenty-ninth Division at Gallipoli—O. Creighton. 

203. Twenty-seventh Division—John P. O’Ryan. 

204. Upton to the Meuse with the 307th Infantry—W. Kerr Rainsford. 

205. Vauquois Hill to Exermont—Clair Kenmare. 

206. Verdun to the Vosges—Gerald Campbell. 

207. Volume I Official History of British Army of the War 1914-1918. 

208. Von Ludendorff on the German 1914 Plan of Campaign, Army- 

Quarterly No. 1, Vol. III. 

209. War and Humanity—J. M. Beck. 

210. War Minister and his Work—Von Stein. 

211. War of 1914-1918—Lt. Col. Dufour. 

212. War of the Future—Von Bernhardi. 

213. War with Germany—L. F. Ayers. 

214. What every American should know about the War—Montville 

Flowers. 

215. Why Wars Come—Niblack. 

216. Why we went to War—Gauss. 

217. World’s Work, November, 1918 to November, 1919. 

218. World War—Lt. Col. Corda. 

219. World War—W. H. Howell 

220. Yankee Division in France—Frank P. Sibley. 


x 



List of Compliances with or Violations of the 
Principles of War , that Appear at 
the End of Chapters 


1. The Principle of the Objective: 

Chapters II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XVI. 

2. The Principle of the Offensive: 

Chapters III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XIX 

3. The Principle of Mass: 

Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, 
XVII, XIX. 

4. The Principle of Economy of Force: 

Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII, XII, XIV, XV, XVI. 

5. The Principle of Movement: 

Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, XIX. 

6. The Principle of Surprise: 

Chapters I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, 
XVI, XVII, XIX. 

7. The Principle of Security: 

Chapters II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVII, 
XVIII. 

8. The Principle of Simplicity: 

Chapters III, IV, VI, VII, XIII, XV, XVI. 

9. The Principle of Cooperation: 

Chapters II, III, IV, VI, VII, XIII. 


xi 






































List of Maps in Volume II (At 


Description 

No. 

1. The World. 

2. Main Theater of Operations. 

3. Balkan Theater of Operations. 

4. Italian Front. 

5. Western Theater of Operations (large scale). 

6. Western Theater of Operations (reduced scale). 

7. German Plan of Operations against France 1914. 

8. German and Allied Plans, 1914. 

9. Defeat of Belgium. 

10. Battle of the French Frontier. 

11. Allied Defeat at Second Line. 

12. Allied Retreat to the Marne. 

13. Battle of the Marne. 

14. Situation September 5, in front of Paris. 

15. Situation September 9, in front of Paris. 

16. Concentrations on Russian Front. 

17. Railroad net of Northern Europe. 

18. Russian offensive against Germany, 1914. 

19. Battle of Tannenberg. 

20. Battle of Masurian Lakes. 

21. Battle of the Jadar. 

22. Battle of the Drina. 

23. Battle of Mt. Roudnik. 

24. Battle of Lemberg. 

25. Battle of the Aisne. 

26. Battle of Picardy. 

27. Battle of Artois. 

28. Central Powers’ 1914 Offensive against Russia. 

29. Central Powers’ Second Offensive against Russia, 1914. 

30. Battle of Flanders, 1914. 

31. Turkish Concentration 1914. 

32. Operations in Turkey 1914. 

33. Winter Operations on Russian Front, 1914-15. 

34. Winter Battle in Masuria, 1914-15. 

35. Western Front before Italy joined the Allies, 1915. 

36. Italian Front, 1915. 

37. Railroads in Italian Theater. 

38. Central Powers’ offensive against Russia, 1915. 

39. Order of Battle, July 1, 1915—Western Front. 

40. Operations Western Front, Fall 1915. 

41. Defeat of Serbia, 1915. 

42. Situation, January 1, 1916. 

43. Caucasus Operations, 1916. 

44. The Verdun Salient. 

45. Battle of Verdun, 1916. 

46. Battle of the Somme, 1916. 

47. Russian offensive, 1916. 

47-A. Turkish capture of Kut, 1916. 

48. Defense of Suez Canal, 1916. 

49. Italian Front, 1916. 

60. Second Battle of Verdun, 1916. 

61. Balkan Railroads. 

62. Balkan 1916 Concentration. 



LIST OF MAPS 


53. Defeat of Roumania, 1916. 

54. Capture of German East Africa, 1917. 

55. Recapture of Kut-el-Amara, 1917. 

56. First Battle of Gaza, 1917. 

57. Situation, January 1, 1917. 

58. Plans for 1917 Spring Offensive, Western Front. 

59. Nivelle’s offensive, 1917. 

60. Pan German plan of 1911. 

61. American Front in Lorraine. 

62. American Service of Supply. 

63. Location of French Industries. 

64. A.E.F. Lines of Communication on Map of U. S. 

65. Italian Offensive, 1917. 

66. Capture of Messines Ridge, 1917. 

67. British Offensive against Ostend and Zeebrugge, 1917. 

68. Russian Galician Disaster, 1917. 

69. German Capture of Riga, 1917. 

70. Third Battle of Verdun, 1917. 

71. Capture of Malmaison, 1917. 

72. Battle of Caporetto, 1917. 

73. Battle of Cambrai, 1917. 

74. Capture of Jerusalem, 1917. 

75. Situation, January 1, 1918. 

76. Building the A.E.F.—March 20, 1918. 

77. Order of Battle Western Front, March 20, 1918. 

78. Railroad Map Western Front, 1918. 

79. Von Hindenburg’s Plan 1918, First Phase. 

80. Von Hindenburg’s Plan 1918, Second Phase. 

81. German Offensive of March 21, 1918. 

82. German Offensive of April 9, on the Lys, 1918. 

83. Building the A.E.F.—May 27, 1918. 

84. Battle line near Cantigny. 

85. 1st Division captures Cantigny, 1918. 

86. Artillery Barrage Chart, Cantigny. 

87. Theater of Operations in Asia Minor. 

88. Eastern Theater of Operations. 

89. Von Hindenburg’s Plan for May 27 Offensive, 1918. 

90. Order of Battle Western Front, May 25, 1918. 

91. German May 27 Offensive, 1918. 

92. Building the A.E.F. June 3, 1918. 

93. 3d Division prevents German crossing of the Marne, May 31- 

June 3, 1918. 

94. 2d Division stops German advance on Paris, June 1-June 3, 1918. 

95. 2d Division captures Vaux, July 1, 1918. 

96. German Offensive against Compeigne, June 9, 1918. 

97. The Second Battle of the Marne, 1918. 

98. German Plan for Second Battle of the Marne. 

99. The Railroad Situation in the Marne Salient. 

100. 3d Division Infantry Dispositions, July 15, 1918. 

101. 3d Division Machine Gun Dispositions, July 15, 1918. 

102. 3d Division Artillery Dispositions, July 15, 1918. 

103. German Plan of Attack on 3d Division Front. 

104. A.E.F. Situation, July 15, 1918. 

105. Italian Front. Plans for 1918 Operations. 

106. Austrian Offensive against Italy, 1918. 

107. Surrender of Turkish Mesopotamian Army, 1918. 

108. Syrian Situation, 1918. 

109. General Allenby’s Decisive Victory in Syria, 1918. 

110. Balkan Situation, 1918. 

111. General d’Esperey’s Decisive Balkan Victory, 1918. 

112. Allies threaten Central Powers from the Balkans, 1918. 

xiv 


LIST OF MAPS 

113. Italian Decisive Operation against Austria, 1918. 

114. Post War European States. 

115. Russian Railroad to Kola. 

116. Trans-Siberian Railroad. 

117. 1st Division’s Attack, July 18, 1918. 

118. 2d Division’s Attack, July 18, 1918. 

119. Americans at Second Battle of the Marne, 1918. 

120. Allied Plans after Second Battle of the Marne, 1918. 

121. Allied Plan for Reduction Amiens Salient, 1918. 

122. Reduction of Amiens Salient, 1918. 

123. Allied plan for Exploitation of Success in Reducing Amiens Salient, 

1918. 

124. Exploitation of Success in Reducing Amiens Salient to August 29, 

1918. 

125. Allied Offensive to September 8, 1918. 

126. Situation, September 8, 1918. 

127. Germans Forced Back to Siegfried Line. 

128. German Defenses at St. Mihiel. 

129. Order of Battle at St. Mihiel. 

130. American First Army Reduces St. Mihiel Salient, 1918. 

131. Territory recaptured by Marshal Foch’s Offensive (First Period), 

1918. 

132. Order of Battle Western Front, September 25, 1918. 

133. German Lines of Defense, 1918. 

134. Marshal Foch’s Plan for General Offensive, 1918. 

135. American Order of Battle September 26, 1918, October 1, October 13 

and November 4, 1918. 

136. German Order of Battle, American Front on September 25, October 

11, October 31, and November 6, 1918. 

137. German Postitions American Front. 

138. Relation between American Army and French Fourth Army. 

139. General Pershing’s Plan for Attack west of the Meuse, September 

26, 1918. 

140. General Offensive from September 26 to October 13, 1918. 

141. 2d Division Captures Blanc Mont, 1918. 

142. 36th Division Pursues after Blanc Mont Operation, 1918. 

143. II American Corps Penetrates German First Line of Defense, 1918. 

144. General Offensive from October 13 to 20. 

145. General Offensive from October 20 to November 4. 

146. General Pershing’s Plan for November 1 Attack. 

147. Order of Battle November 11, on American First Army Front. 

148. General Offensive from November 4 to 11, 1918. 

149. Allied and American Bridgeheads on the Rhine. 

150. Similarity of Offensives of Exhaustion in World War and in American 

Civil War. 


. xv 


Table of Contents 


Page 

Preface .iii 

Dedication .iv 

Introduction .v 

Bibliography .vii 

List of compliances with or violations of the Principles of 
War .xi 

List of Maps in Volume II (Atlas) .xiii 


Narrative 

Chapters Subject Page 

I—Events leading up to the World War. 1 

II—Plans and operations to include the defeat of Belgium. 20 

III— Western front to include the Battle of the Marne. 37 

IV— All fronts to include 1914. 58 

V—All fronts to include 1915. 88 

VI—Operations on Western and Russian fronts in 1916.113 

VII—Operations in 1916, continued.132 

VIII—Operations in 1917 preceding the entry of America.152 

IX—Events leading up to America’s participation in the War.171 

X—German and American plans.187 

XI—Plans for use of American forces in Europe.203 

XII—All fronts to end of 1917.218 

XIII— Western front to include German offensive, March 21, 1918.240 

XIV— Western front March to June, 1918..259 

XV—German offensive at the Second Battle of the Marne.285 

XVI—All fronts except the Western front to the end of the war.305 

XVII—Allied and American counter offensive at the Second Battle of 

the Marne.328 

XVIII—Allied and American offensive to September 25, 1918...348 


XIX—Allied and American general offensive to the end of the war.369 


XTi 



























CHAPTER I 


Events Leading Up to the 
World War 


Page 

1. Remote Causes ...... i 

2. Policies........ 1 

a. Policies of individual states in the Triple Alliance.. 2 

b. Triple Alliance Policies. 5 

c. Policies of states that later joined the Triple Entente. 8 

d. Policy of the Triple Entente.10 

e. Policies of states not in either group.11 

(1) Turkish policies. 11 

(2) Serbian policies.11 

(3) Luxemburg’s policies.12 

(4) Belgian policies.12 

3. Conflict of Policies.-.12 

a. The Kaiser’s first threat of war—The Boer War.13 

b. The Kaiser’s second threat of war—Algeciras.13 

c. The Kaiser’s third threat of war—Annexation of Bosnia—Her¬ 

zegovina....13 

d. The Kaiser’s fourth threat of war—Agadir.,.14 

e. Italo-Turkish War. 14 

/. First Balkan War.14 

g. Second Balkan War...15 

h. Assassination of Austrian Crown Prince. 15 

4. The Dual Alliance Launches War.16 

a. The First Potsdam Conference.16 

b. Austria declares war on Serbia.17 

c. The Second Potsdam Conference .. 17 

d. The Kaiser declares war on Russia and France.18 

6. Principles of War. The principle of surprise.19 


1. Remote Causes. A simple explanation of the causes 
of the World War is impossible. Some of the causes have their 
roots so far back in the mazes of racial, dynastic, religious and 
territorial complications, that they are too remote for considera¬ 
tion here. We do know, however, that the World War was a 
war between states and between groups of states, and that it 
was initiated by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, July 28, 
1914, and extended to a world war by Germany against Russia 
August 1 and against France and Belgium August 3, 1914. 

2. Policies. In the international relation, war is the 
maintenance of policies by other means after diplomacy fails. 






























2 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

An examination of the policies of the states engaged in the war 
brings out their differences. 

a. Policies of individual states in the Triple Alliance . The 
policies of the states that later composed the Triple Alliance 
will be considered in the following order: 

Policies of Germany. 

Policies of Austro-Hungary. 

Policies of Italy. 

(1) German policies. (a) Preceding and during the 
Napoleonic Wars the Hohenzollern Kings of Prussia initiated 
and fixed certain national policies, the most important of which 
were: 

First: The King rules by Divine Right. 

Second: War is the National Industry. 

Third: National territory must be continually extended. 

Fourth: International obligations or pledges fall before the national 

interest under the “Frederician Tradition.” 

A good illustration of the execution of these policies is 
given by the actions of Bismarck who became prime minister 
of Prussia in 1862 (Map 2). Realizing the great value to Ger¬ 
many of a strategic canal through Schleswig-Holstein, connect¬ 
ing the Baltic and the North Seas, he brought on a war in 1864 
between Prussia and Austria on one side and Denmark on the 
other; defeated Denmark and seized Schleswig-Holstein for 
Austria and Prussia. He soon quarreled with Austria over the 
disposition of Schleswig-Holstein, defeated her in 1866, an¬ 
nexed all of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, and forced Austria 
to recognize the new Prussianized North German Confedera¬ 
tion, from which Austria was excluded. 

He recognized that hatred of France engendered by the 
extreme hardships and devastation imposed by France in the 
Thirty Years War, the wars of Louis XIV, and the Napoleonic 
Wars, was the only attitude in which he could unite the German 
states. Accordingly, he provoked the Franco-Prussian War 
on a question of the eligibility of a Hohenzollern prince to 
selection for the vacant Spanish throne. He accomplished the 
defeat of France in 1871; forced her to give the provinces of 
Alsace and Lorraine to Germany, and to pay Germany an in¬ 
demnity of $1,000,000,000.00. He accomplished his end as 
planned by uniting all the German states into a German Em¬ 
pire, under Prussia’s King as Imperial Kaiser, and with himself, 
Bismarck, as the first Chancellor. When France promptly paid 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 3 

the indemnity, Bismarck sought an opportunity to provoke 
another war with the design of advancing the German frontier 
still farther to the west and of imposing an indemnity of $2,000,- 
000,000.00 on France. He made the attempt in 1875, on the 
excuse that the construction of French fortifications along the 
frontier was a hostile act. However, England and Russia came 
to the aid of France and he desisted. 

His greatest success was in mollifying Austria-Hungary 
and in making an alliance with her, October 7, 1879, which 
united the two as allies in any war with Russia. He thus 
brought all Germans together again as close partners. The 
immediate effect of this alliance was considered to be that 
Panslavism in Europe had been stopped, and that France had 
been made to feel her isolation. 

(b) The further policy of the German Empire in foreign 
affairs was merged in the policy of the Dual (and later Triple) 
Alliance, and will be considered under that heading. 

(2) Austro-Hungarian policies, (a) Austria-Hungary was 
a dual empire, consisting of the two independent states, Austria 
and Hungary, which were united into the Empire in the person 
of the Emperor. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was a state 
but not a nation. Its population was made up of five different 
races that ranked in point of members in the following order: 

Slavs, Magyars, Germans, Italians and Roumanians. 

(b) Austria proper included the northern Slavs, Germans, 
and Italians, and was ruled by the German family of Hapsburg 
as Emperors. 

(c) Hungary proper is peopled by the Magyars, the 
descendents of the followers of Attila the Hun, who founded his 
capital at Buda (now Budapest) 445 A.D., and the descendents 
of another branch of the Hun and Turkish tribes, i.e. the 
Magyars under Arpad who conquered Hungary, 889 A. D. 
It also included some of the Jugo-Slavs and some Roumanians; 
all of whom the Magyars dominated. Hungary was ruled by 
the German family of Hapsburg as Kings. 

(d) The Slavs in the Empire were separated by the 
Magyars and the Germans, who had been friendly with each 
other during and since the time of Attila the Hun. In fact, 
some of the German tribes were allies of Attila until his defeat 
at Chalons. The result was that the Slavs, who were the most 
numerous race in the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, 
were held politically as a subject race and found no way of 


4 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

satisfying their intense national aspirations as the Magyars 
had done in securing the recognition of Hungary as an inde¬ 
pendent state in the Dual Empire. 

(e) The Slavs were a subject race in Austria proper where 
they were dominated by the less numerous Germans. The 
Slavs to the north of the Magyar-German wedge included: 
Slovaks, Czechs (Bohemians), Poles, and Ruthenians. 

The Slavs to the south of the Magyar-German wedge, in¬ 
cluding Croatia and Slavonia in Hungary proper, were domi¬ 
nated by the Magyars. The southern Slavs in the Dual 
Monarchy together with those outside of the empire were 
called Jugo (or southern) Slavs. From the beginning, there had 
existed a racial feud between the Jugo-Slavs and the Magyars. 
The Jugo-Slavs extended their dislike to the German friends 
of the Magyars. 

(f) Each race in the empire, except the Magyars, was tied 
to some external state by sympathy, as follows: 

The Germans to Germany. 

The Roumanians to Roumania. 

The Italians to Italy. 

The Slavs in general to Russia; the 

Jugo-Slavs (i.e. Southern Slavs) to the independent Jugo-Slav 
State, Serbia. 

(g) The original Jugo-Slavs outside of the Dual Monarchy 
(with exceptions) were: 

The independent states of Serbia and Montenegro. 

The provinces of: (Map 3) Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak 
of Novibazar. 

The Slavs in and south of the Dual Monarchy were ex¬ 
ceedingly nationalistic, and the Austro-Hungarian government 
was greatly perturbed over the fact that it could not control 
the Jugo-Slavs who were not in the empire. 

(h) It was agreed, generally, that the situation in Austria- 
Hungary was not stable and that, unless the Slav question 
could be settled, the Dual Monarchy would probably break 
up at the death of the aged Emperor Francis Joseph. 

(i) Briefly, the policies of the Dual Monarchy were: 

First: To suppress in every way the national aspirations of the 
Slavs within the empire. 

Second: By diplomacy or war, to control the Jugo-Slavs not in 
the empire, and, if possible, to add them to the empire. 

Third: To reach the Mediterranean Sea at Saloniki and to extend 
the Dual Monarchy's coast line on the Adriatic Sea. 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 5 

These policies were approved by Bismarck who aided the 
Dual Monarchy in their attainment, by assigning to the Dual 
Monarchy, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the duty of 
occupying and administering the two autonomous Slav states 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of garrisoning strategic places 
in the Turkish Sanjak of Novibazar. She thus acquired con¬ 
trol, militarily, of all the Jugo-Slavs except the two independ¬ 
ent states of Serbia and Montenegro. However, by the occupa¬ 
tion of strategical places in the Sanjak of Novibazar, she held a 
powerful wedge between Serbia and Montenegro and, also, by 
these dispositions, secured free passage to the south. 

(j) The further consideration of the policy of Austro- 
Hungary will be under the Dual (or Triple) Alliance. 

(3) Italian policy. (Maps 2 and 4.) (a) The prevailing 

policies of Italy, after her consolidation into a single state, were 
to secure the transfer to her, from the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, of Italian Trent and Trieste, and to establish a colony 
in Tunis which was only one hundred miles from Sicily. 

(b) France, secure in Algeria, responding to the suggestion 
of Bismarck, who desired to attract her attention away from 
Alsace-Lorraine, invaded and made herself secure in Tunis in 
1881. 

(c) Italy, failing to secure the friendship of any European 
power, was deeply humiliated and, finding herself isolated and 
not yet quite sure of her new status, became obsessed with the 
fear that her ancient racial friend, France, would take further 
action against her and, for protection, rushed into the waiting 
arms of the Dual Alliance. Placing her policies in abeyance, 
she signed a treaty May 22, 1882, at Vienna, and as a member 
of the Triple Alliance accepted a guaranty of the integrity of 
her homeland, and in return assumed an obligation to main¬ 
tain a large army and to assist the Dual Alliance if it should 
be attacked by two powers (i.e. Russia and France). 

(d) Although this temporary policy controlled the 
government while in the Triple Alliance, the national aspira¬ 
tion to regain Trent and Trieste was really the national policy. 

(e) The further consideration of Italian policy will be 
under the head of the Triple Alliance. 

b. Triple Alliance policies . (Map 2.) (1) Bismarck 
desiring to isolate France, took advantage of Italy’s chagrin 
over being crowded out of Tunis by France and succeeded in 


6 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

bringing Italy into an Alliance in 1882, thus changing the 
Alliance from the “Dual” to the “Triple Alliance.” 

William II was crowned King of Prussia and German Em¬ 
peror in 1888. When told that Bismarck had so constructed 
the German Empire that the chancellor could control policies, 
he announced that he would be his own chancellor and dis¬ 
missed Bismarck. He continued the Hohenzollern polices 
in his administration of Germany. He promptly dominated 
Austria-Hungary and Italy, and controlled the international 
policy of the Triple Alliance. He considered the Triple Alliance 
a sufficient force with which to dominate strictly continental 
European questions. 

That did not satisfy him. He, himself, in 1900, stated his 
policy as follows: “I hope to Germany it will be granted * * 

to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as 
authoritative as was once the Roman Empire.” That was the 
dream that had previously lured Xerxes, Alexander, Caesar, 
and Napoleon to attempt world empire. 

As Asia Minor (Map 1) was almost the only territory of 
the world that had not already been monopolized by a great 
power, and was considered the finest field for colonization, he 
planned a great German-dominated empire that should extend 
from the North and Baltic Seas to the Indian Ocean at the 
Persian Gulf. He called it “Mittel Europa,” extended into 
Asia. That Empire would rend Europe asunder, control pas¬ 
sage from Asia to Africa, dominate the Suez Canal, threaten 
India, and dominate Russia’s passage to the Mediterranean 
Sea. 

(2) To build such an empire it was necessary for the Kaiser 
to win Turkey and the Balkan states to his plan. He began at 
once. 

(a) Winning of Turkey. He selected the Sultan of Turkey 
as the first ruler to whom he would pay a visit of ceremony, and 
November 1, 1889, with his Empress, made an official and 
ceremonial call on the Sultan of Turkey—the Kalif of Islam. 
He established friendly relations with the Sultan, and opened 
the way for German commercial expansion into Turkey, and 
the exploitation of Turkey’s raw materials by the Triple 
Alliance. He loaned the celebrated General von der Goltz 
(with many officers as assistants), who reorganized the Turkish 
Army on Prussian lines. He made a second visit to the Sultan 
in 1897, and at Damascus, proclaimed himself the protector of 


7 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 

Turkey and of Mohammedans, although he did not have a 
single Moslem subject, the great majority of Mohammedans 
being subjects of Great Britain and France. The campaign of 
winning Turkey by peaceful means was a great success, and 
Turkey, August 4, 1914 (the day that Germany crossed the 
Belgian frontier) signed a secret alliance with Germany under 
which she agreed to advance the Kaiser's “Mittel Europa” 
project, and to enter the war as an ally of the Kaiser when he 
should direct. 

(b) Winning of the Balkans. (Map 2.) He relied upon 
the tie of royal blood to win the Balkans. Under that plan, 
Germany filled vacant Balkan thrones with German princes 
and supplied royal princesses to marriageable Balkan rulers. 
Thus the reigning family in Bulgaria was from the royal family 
of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha; in Roumania, from the royal family 
of Hohenzollern; and in Greece from the royal family of 
Bavaria, but the Queen, who really ruled, was a sister of 
the Kaiser. The Kaiser was not able to win the Slav states 
of Serbia and Montenegro, so he approved the Austrian 
policy of bringing them under subjection by any means at 
hand. 

(c) Berlin-Bagdad Railway. To knit together that great 
empire, he secured the necessary concessions for the construc¬ 
tion of a railroad; and for harbors, dockage and steamboat 
rights on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. The Deutch Bank 
financed the construction of that great strategic railroad which 
would connect Hamburg with the Persian Gulf, via Berlin, 
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Constantinople, 
Bagdad, and Bashra on the Persian Gulf. It was called 
the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad. 

(d) Other Colonies. (Map 1.) To strengthen the growing 
German-dominated world empire, he sought colonies when¬ 
ever they could be acquired. 

(i) Taking advantage of China's weakness after her de¬ 
feat by Japan in 1894, and as compensation for the murder of 
a German missionary in the Chinese Province of Shantung, he 
forced China to grant a lease of Kiao-Chou for ninety-nine 
years and built there a great German naval base. 

(ii) His effort to acquire the Philippine Islands in 1898 
was frustrated by Admiral Dewey with the assistance of the 
British in Manila Bay. He, however, promptly purchased 


8 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

from Spain all her Pacific island colonial possessions that had 
not been transferred to the United States. 

(iii) In 1899, he seized a part of New Guinea and named it 
Kaiser William’s Land, and the adjoining group of islands 
which he named “The Bismarck Archipelago.” 

(iv) He organized and extended German commercial hold¬ 
ings in Africa into colonies and, in his eagerness to extend 
African colonization, nearly caused war before 1914. 

(3) The 1911 German ultimate plan. (Map 60.) In short, 
the ultimate plan whose final form is known to history as the 
Plan of 1911, in addition to “Mittel Europa” included domina¬ 
tion of the Straits of Gibraltar by control of Morocco, control 
of the Suez Canal, control of the waterway passages between 
Australia and Asia, control of central and southern Africa, 
control of southern South America, and, in addition, it in¬ 
volved the placing of the industrial central and eastern part 
of the United States under “Kultur.” 

(4) Briefly, the German-dominated policy of The Triple 
Alliance was: 

To create a great German-dominated world empire. 

c. Policy of the states that later joined the Triple Entente. 
(Map 2.) 

(1) French policy, (a) After her defeat in 1871, France 
accepted the continental situation, and, fearing another Ger¬ 
man attack, fortified her side of the Franco-German frontier 
and stood strictly on the defensive. However, she sought and 
gained a great colonial empire. After she had partially re¬ 
covered from the effects of the War of 1871, the people greatly 
desired the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. The Govern¬ 
ment, however, did not act on that national aspiration. 

(b) The policy of France may be described as that of 
building a colonial empire; with a national aspiration which 
may be called a national policy of taking advantage of victory 
in a German-initiated war (which was always expected) to 
secure the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. 

(c) The further consideration of French policy will be 
under the head of the Triple Entente. 

(2) Russian policies, (a) Russia, a great inland state, 
was given by Peter the Great the mission of winning a way to 
the sea so that she could trade with other peoples unhampered 
by any foreign restrictions. 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 9 

(b) The fixed direction to the sea from which she never 
wavered was through the Bosphorus, but her several attempts 
to capture Constantinople and the Bosphorus were blocked by 
Turkey and other European Powers. 

(c) Her attempt (Map 1) to establish an open port at 
Port Arthur was defeated in 1905 by Japan. 

(d) Her attempt (Map 2) to reach the sea via the Arctic 
Ocean gave her the port of Archangel which, however, during 
a large part of the year, is ice bound. 

(e) The other direction to the sea was through the Balkans 
to the Mediterranean or to the Adriatic or to both seas. Slav 
people of her own race, and who were friendly and loyal to 
her as the mother Slav state, extended from her borders via 
the west coast of the Black Sea, and via Serbia, Montenegro 
and Bosnia to the Adriatic Sea. 

(f) So Russia, blocked on the west from the sea via the 
Baltic by Germany and Great Britain, via the Bosphorus by 
Turkey, via the Balkans by Austria-Hungary (later the Triple 
Alliance) had the two policies: 

First: Of conducting her foreign affairs so as to reach the sea 
unhampered, primarily, through the Bosphorus; secondarily, across 
the Balkans. 

Second: Of protecting the independence of the Slav states, Serbia 
and Montenegro. 

(g) As her further policy is included in that of the Triple 
Entente it will be considered therewith. 

(3) British policies . (Map 1.) (a) Great Britain had a 

great colonial empire, located on all of the continents, and in¬ 
cluding many of the islands of the sea. It was the greatest 
colonial empire in the world. In connection with her mainten¬ 
ance of that empire, she won the decisive naval victory of 
Trafalgar October 21, 1805, since which time she had control 
of the sea. 

In 1906, Great Britain in the interest of peace, proposed a 
holiday in naval construction to Germany. The Kaiser, 
believing that Great Britain was becoming exhausted in the 
naval race, refused and speeded up his naval building program 
and preparations for war. 

(b) Great Britain's fixed policies which are well known 
were: 

First: To maintain control of the sea. 

Second: To protect Belgian neutrality, as a proper defense of the 
southern coast line of England. 


10 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Third: Since Germany challenged her sea control by an ambitious 
naval building program, to preserve friendly relations with France as 
a proper defense of the southern coast line of England. 

Fourth: To defend the straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal 
in order to guarantee her short route to her great colony—India. 

(c) The further consideration of British polices will be 
under the head of the Entente Cordial or Triple Entente. 

d. Policy of the Triple Entente. (1) (a) After the fall 
of General Boulanger in 1889, Europe accepted the stability 
of the third French Republic and Russia, who was menaced 
by the Triple Alliance, approached France in a friendly way. 
France reciprocated, and, in 1896, it was announced that 
France and Russia had signed a treaty of alliance. That oc¬ 
casioned no surprise as the w^orld had known for several years 
that the treaty was an accomplished fact. 

(b) The exact terms of the treaty were not published. 
But it was generally and authoritatively known that the policies 
of the “Entente Cordial” between France and Russia were: 

First: Russia would assist France if the latter should be attacked 
by Germany. 

Second: France would assist Russia if the latter were attacked by 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. 

Third: The treaty was a strictly defensive alliance and did not 
contemplate any action toward the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. 

(2) (a) Great Britain then realized that in the manage¬ 
ment of European affairs she was isolated. The naval program 
of Germany was a menace to her sea power. The Triple 
Alliance, and the growing “Mittel Europa” was a menace to 
her Suez route to India and, after the Kaiser threatened to 
intervene in the Boer War, to India herself. So Great Britain 
assumed a more friendly attitude toward her ancient enemy— 
France. 

(b) In 1898, Colonel Marchand, a French explorer, 
marched from the French possessions on the west coast of 
Africa across the Sahara Desert, reached the Nile region and 
raised the French flag at Fashoda in the Sudan, over lands 
claimed by the British. A British force compelled Colonel 
Marchand to lower the French flag. War between France and 
Great Britain seemed probable but the two nations came to 
an agreement under which France withdrew from Egypt and 
the Sudan, and Great Britain withdrew from M^orocco, and 
each recognized the other’s right in those respective areas. 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 11 

(c) Under the skillful statesmanship of King Edward 
VII of England, an understanding that was the basis of a 
“Cordial Entente/’ between France and Great Britain was 
reached. The terms of that understanding were, that if either 
state had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a 
third power, or something that threatened the general peace, 
it would at once discuss with the other whether both govern¬ 
ments should act together to prevent aggression and to pre¬ 
serve peace, and, if so, what measures should be prepared in 
common. As a result, the necessary defensive plans for use of 
land and naval forces were prepared. 

(3) By 1907, Great Britain and Russia under the threat 
of the Triple Alliance, recognized the fact that they had a de¬ 
fensive community of interest. As a consequence, they moved 
toward each other in a friendly way and adjusted all their 
disputes over Asiatic boundaries, agreeing to a division of 
Persia into two spheres of influence, Russia to control the 
northern sphere and Great Britain the southern. 

(4) The agreement between Russia and Great Britain 
completed an understanding between France, Russia and 
Great Britain. It was called The Triple Entente. Its policies 
were to preserve the peace in general, and, specifically, to 
defend its members if attacked by the Triple Alliance. 

e. Polices of states not in either group. (1) Turkish 
policies, (a) The Turkish Empire was at the height of its 
power about 1672 A. D. when it occupied all of Asia Minor, 
the northern coast of Africa, and extended across the Bosphorus 
up the Balkans to the frontier of Germany. .Since that date, 
the nations of Europe have made such successful war against 
the Turk that just before the World War the Turkish Empire 
was limited practically to Asia Minor, with a national bridge¬ 
head on the European side of the Bosphorus. 

(b) The Turkish policies were: to dominate the great 
waterway passage of the Dardanelles—thereby making the 
Black Sea a closed sea; to regain her ancient territory; and, 
since 1889, to utilize the Triple Alliance as a means to that end. 

(2) Serbian policies. (Map 2.) (a) Serbia, a small, inland, 

Jugo-Slav state, attained her independence under Stephen Du- 
shan in 1330 at Velbuzhd, lost it when defeated by the Turks 
at Kossova in 1389, and regained it in 1878, under Article 34 
of the Treaty of Berlin. Before The World War, she was 
separated from the other original Jugo-Slavs (except Montene- 


12 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

gro) by the Austro-Hungarian frontier; from the northern 
Slavs (Czechs) who were a part of Austria, by the Magyars 
in Hungary; and from the mother state, Russia, by the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. She had no seaport in her own territory 
but her right of passage to the sea was guaranteed by treaty 
with Greece who gave her corridor rights to and at Saloniki. 

(b) Her policies were to maintain her national independ¬ 
ence, her friendship with the other Jugo-Slav peoples, with the 
Czechs, with Russia the mother Slav state, and to gain a 
national seaport, preferably on the Mediterranean Sea. 

(3) Luxemburg's policy, (a) The Grand Duchy of Luxem¬ 
burg was a small inland state which was a buffer state, as it 
were, between France, Germany, and Belgium. She acquired 
independence by the treaty of London, May 11, 1867. She 
had an area of 999 square miles and a population of about 
250,000. She maintained a so-called army of 150 volunteers 
and a gendarmerie of 150 men. 

(b) Her policy was that of fixed neutrality, as a pacifist 
nation, trusting the honor of larger states not to violate her 
neutrality. 

(4) Belgian policies, (a) Belgium, to the north of the 
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, although much larger than 
Luxemburg, was a small state. She, also, was a buffer state 
between France, Luxemburg, Germany and Holland and had 
an extremely valuable coast line on the English Channel and 
the southern part of the North Sea. She acquired independence 
of Holland April 19, 1839, by another treaty of London which 
provided that “ Belgium forms an independent state of perpetual 
neutrality/' To insure that neutrality, Prussia, France, 
Great Britain, Austria and Russia signed a treaty the same 
date in which those nations guaranteed that “perpetual 
neutrality." 

(b) Resting secure in the terms of that guaranty, Belgium's 
policy was that of strict neutrality, to defend which, in con¬ 
tradistinction to Luxemburg, she was willing to fight. 

3. Conflict of Policies. It is thus seen that preceding 
The World War the great states of Europe were grouped into 
two rival groups: The Triple Alliance composed of Germany, 
the Dual Monarchy, and Italy on the one hand; and the Triple 
Entente composed of France, Russia, and Great Britain on the 
other. The terms, of the alliance in each case were defensive 
in character but it was understood that Germany and Austria 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 13 

would act together in any event. Here, we have a perfect 
illustration by the Triple Entente of an effort to maintain the 
peace of Europe by reliance on the "Doctrine of the Balance 
of Power’ ’ in the adjustment of critical situations created by 
the conflict of policies. The balancing of power developed 
critical situations as follows: 

a. The Kaiser’s first threat of war—The Boer War. (Map 1.) 
When the Jameson raid failed in South Africa, in 1896, the 
Kaiser made his first war gesture against British power, by 
preparing Germany for intervention in favor of the Boers, and 
by personally sending a telegram to President Kruger congratu¬ 
lating him on the fact that the Boers had overcome Jameson 
without appealing to the help of a friendly power. However, 
he did not dare to follow up the gesture with a blow as the British 
Empire was united against him and France and Russia refused 
to antagonize Great Britain. 

b. The Kaiser’s second threat of war — Algeciras. The 
Entente Cordial between France and Great Britain that 
recognized French interests as supreme in Morocco had been 
negotiated without reference to the Kaiser or The Triple 
Alliance. So, taking advantage of the fact that Russia (France’s 
ally) was being defeated by Japan, the Kaiser, March 31, 1905, 
landed at Tangier in Morocco, nearly opposite Gibraltar, and 
threatening war, challenged the whole force of The Entente 
Cordial by stating in reply to the official greetings that he 
regarded the Sultan as an independent sovereign, and that he 
had come to safeguard the interests of Germany in Morocco. 
As a result, a conference of the powers was called at Algeciras, 
a little Spanish town near Gibraltar. Russia and Great Britain 
supported France, and the conference recognized French 
interests as paramount in Morocco. The Kaiser had failed, 
and Italy began the attempt to resume friendly relations with 
France. 

c. The Kaiser’s third threat of war—Annexation of Bosnia — 
Herzegovina. (Map 3.) In 1908, the Kaiser taking advantage 
of the young Turk movement, threatened war with Russia, 
who had not yet recovered from the Japanese War, by having 
Austria convert her protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina into 
annexation. England and France were not willing to declare 
war on that issue. Hence, it resulted that Serbia and Montene¬ 
gro were the only Jugo-Slav states remaining outside of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The increase, thus, of Austrian 


14 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

holdings on the east bank of the Adriatic Sea was exceedingly 
distasteful to Italy, who became still more friendly to France. 

d. The Kaiser's fourth threat of war — Agadir. (Map 1). 
In 1911, the German Crown Prince was received so enthusias¬ 
tically in England, by all classes, that the Kaiser believed that 
the tie of blood between the royal houses and the new friend¬ 
ships exhibited by the British people meant that he could 
resume a hostile attitude toward France. Making the false 
claim that it was necessary to prevent unrest near Agadir, a 
Moroccan seaport on the Atlantic Ocean, and to protect Ger¬ 
mans there, the Kaiser in July, 1911, sent the German Cruiser 
Panther to Agadir. The Kaiser hoped for a land war in 
Europe with a view of inflicting on France the defeat that 
Great Britain had prevented in 1875 and again in 1906. This 
time, Mr. Lloyd George, in a public speech, made it clear that 
Great Britain would support France even in war if the Kaiser 
persisted. The Kaiser was not ready for war with Great 
Britain and retired from his threatening position with much 
loss of prestige in Italy. 

e. Italo-Turkish War (Map 2.) Italy considered Austria's 
extension of her Adriatic Sea coast line, by the annexation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a sacrifice of Italian interests by 
the other two members of the Triple Alliance. She was humil¬ 
iated because the Kaiser had not consulted her before he threat¬ 
ened war over Morocco. So, fearing that the Kaiser might 
treat her claims in Tripoli as he had tried to treat the French 
claims in Morocco, she decided to act alone and on September 
27, 1911, notified the Sultan of Turkey that he must consent 
within forty-eight hours to an Italian occupation of Tripoli. 
The Turkish reply was not satisfactory and Italy declared war 
on Turkey two days later, i.e., September 29, 1911. Italy 
defeated Turkey and by the treaty of Lausanne October 15, 
1912, Turkey evacuated Tripoli in favor of Italy. That action 
by Italy without consulting the other two members of The 
Triple Alliance widened the line of cleavage between Italy and 
her allies. 

/. First Balkan War. M. Venizelos, the Grecian prime 
minister, succeeded in uniting Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Montenegro into a Balkan Confederacy, August 26, 1912, 
which demanded a Christian governor and a local legislature 
and militia for Macedonia. Turkey was defeated and practical¬ 
ly driven out of Europe (Treaty of London, May 1, 1913). In 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 15 

the settlement, the Kaiser kept Serbia off the Adriatic by 
menacing Russia with war. 

g. Second Balkan War 1913. (1) After the First Balkan 

War, there seemed to be bright prospects of the settlement 
of the ancient differences in the Balkans through the permanent 
uniting of the Balkan states into a greater state to be called 
“Balkania.” 

(2) Germany and Austria-Hungary, however, were op¬ 
posed to the proposed new state, because in a new Balkania, 
the Jugo-Slavs of Serbia would have a seaport on the Adriatic 
Sea. Hence, they fanned Bulgaria’s dissatisfaction with her 
accretion of territory under the treaty of London and furnished 
her with every means to make war. As a result, on the night 
of June 29, 1913, when the Balkan allies were fraternizing and 
not suspicious, the Bulgarian General Savoff ordered a surprise 
attack on the Greek and Serbian lines. As a result of Bulgaria’s 
action, Roumania declared war on Bulgaria July 10, 1913. 

(3) While the Balkan Allies were fighting, Turkey reoc¬ 
cupied Thrace to include her sacred city of Adrianople. Bul¬ 
garia was defeated. 

(4) The following peace of Bucharest allowed Turkey to 
retain so much of Thrace as she occupied. The rest of Turkey 
in Europe was divided between Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Serbia, and Montenegro, except that, in order to prevent the 
Jugo-Slavs from securing a port on the Adriatic Sea, the Kaiser 
succeeded in having Albania declared to be an independent 
state with the German Prince, William of Weid as sovereign. 
To compensate Serbia for the loss of a port on the Adriatic, 
Greece guaranteed her corridor rights to and at the Grecian 
seaport of Saloniki, and also agreed to go to Serbia’s assistance 
if Serbia should be again attacked by Bulgaria. 

h. Assassination of Austrian Crown Prince. (1) Crown 
Prince Ferdinand became heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary 
in 1896. Because he had married beneath his royal rank, he 
had been forced by the Emperor to renounce his children’s 
right of succession to the throne. He was hated by the court 
party both at Vienna and at Budapest. He was the leader of 
the party in favor of Austrian annexation of Serbia and Monte¬ 
negro in order to solve the Slav question within the empire. 

(2) June 12, 1914, the Kaiser secretly visited the Austrian 
Crown Prince at the latter’s castle at Konopisht, in Bohemia. 
The Kaiser proposed a plan known as the pact of Konopisht 


16 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

under which the Crown Prince’s sons could rule, as follows: 
The formation of one kingdom composed of Poland, Lithuania 
and the Ukraine (most of which was in Russian territory) for 
the inheritance of the eldest son; the formation of another king¬ 
dom to be composed of Bohemia, Hungary, the Slav districts of 
Austria, Serbia and the Slav coast of the Adriatic as an inher¬ 
itance for the second son. The Kaiser required, however, 
that German Austria with Trieste should be annexed to the 
German Empire; and that there should be a perpetual military 
and economic alliance between the German Empire and the 
two kingdoms. That pact of course could not have been 
carried out, as planned, even after the death of Francis Joseph, 
without breaking the peace of Europe. 

(3) (a) Shortly after, the conference with the Kaiser, the 
Crown Prince of Austria was requested to attend some corps 
maneuvers and then to inspect the troops at Serajevo, the 
capital of Bosnia, one of the discontented Slav provinces in the 
Empire. The police of Serajevo had received orders from the 
military authorities to make no special preparations for the 
visit of the Crown Prince so there were only one hundred and 
twenty police agents on a route of three and one-half miles. 

(b) June 28, 1914, when riding with his wife to the inspec¬ 
tion field, a bomb was thrown into the Crown Prince’s car by 
a young Bosnian named Gabrinovics. The Crown Prince picked 
it up, threw it out and when it exploded, wounding many 
people, exclaimed: “That fellow will be decorated for this.” 

(c) A little later both the Crown Prince and his wife were 
shot to death by a young Bosnian student named Favrile 
Prinzip. 

(d) Whether the Austrian Crown Prince was “wantonly 
sent to his death,” or not, the news of the assassination was 
reported to have produced signs of relief in both Vienna and 
Budapest. 

4. The Dual Alliance Launches War. a. The First 
Potsdam Conference. (1) The Emperor Francis Joseph, 
immediately after the assassination of the Crown Prince, 
secretly sent special representatatives to his ally, the Kaiser, 
for conference. The Kaiser called a secret conference, July 5 
at Potsdam, of the German Ambassadors, the Chief of Staff, 
the Chief of the Navy, the great bankers, railroad directors and 
the captains of industry. The Kaiser solemnly put the question 
to each one “Are you ready for war?” All replied in the affir- 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 17 

mative except the bankers. They said that they must have 
about two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make 
loans. 

(2) The conference decided on war and to give the bankers 
time to readjust their finances for the coming war. 

(3) After the conference, the various members went 
quietly back to their w T ork, and the Kaiser went on vacation. 
The record of the international stock market shows that the 
German bankers at once began to turn their securities into 
gold. Thus, between July 5 and July 22, 1914, Union Pacific, 
dropped from 155J4 to 12734; Baltimore and Ohio, from 9134 
to 81; U. S. Steel, from 61 to 5034? Canadian Pacific, from 194 
to 18534 and Northern Pacific, from lllf to 108. 

(4) The Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria consumed the 
time needed for that financial mobilization in secretly preparing, 
with the Kaiser's approval, a note to Serbia, although the 
assassin and the bomb thrower were both Austrian subjects 
and the crime was committed on Austrian soil. During that 
time, the rest of Europe was told by Austria that the situation 
was not grave. 

b. Austria declares war on Serbia. (1) On July 21, Ger¬ 
many secretly notified all her troops subject to mobilization, 
to hold themselves in readiness. 

(2) On July 23d, an Austrian note was delivered to Serbia 
as an ultimatum with only forty-eight hours allowed for reply. 
The terms of the ultimatum were exceedingly severe and in¬ 
fringed the sovereignty of Serbia. The situation was exceed¬ 
ingly grave. The Kaiser had taken Europe by surprise in 
producing a situation which required that Serbia either should 
yield to his overlordship (through Austrian agency) or accept 
war. Serbia accepted the demands of the Austrian ultimatum 
in the main, and declared her readiness to negotiate the rest. 
The time limit for the reception of Serbia's reply by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government at Vienna was set at 6:00 PM, July 
25. At 6:30 PM, July 25, the Austrian Minister to Serbia at 
Belgrade presented a note to the Serbian Government informing 
it that the Serbian reply was not satisfactory and that Austria 
severed her diplomatic relations with Serbia. 

(3) Austria-Hungary at once mobilized her army, and 
declared war on Serbia, July 28. 

c. The Second Potsdam Conference. (1) All attempts to 
secure a concert of powers to preserve the peace of Europe were 


18 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

prevented by the Kaiser who insisted that the affair was local 
to Austria and Serbia. 

(2) As Austria had mobilized on the Russian frontier, 
Russia mobilized her army, but the Czar informed the Kaiser 
that it was only to meet the Austrian mobilization on Russia’s 
frontier and gave his solemn word that as long as negotiations 
on the Serbian reply should continue, the Russian troops would 
undertake no provocative action. 

(3) On the night of July 29, the Kaiser presided at a second 
secret conference at Potsdam with practically the same officials 
present who had attended the first conference. It was then 
and there decided to launch the war against France and Russia 
for which preparations were complete. After the conference, 
the Kaiser wired a personal demand to the Czar of Russia that 
the Russian mobilization against Austria be suspended. The 
German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, later in the night, 
called on the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared 
if Russia did not yield, it would mean a universal war. That 
same night, the German Chancellor, Bethman Hollweg, re¬ 
turning to Berlin from the conference at Potsdam, called on 
the British Ambassador, at midnight, and asked bluntly that 
England agree to remain neutral in the European war, and 
gave him the conditions which Germany offered to England, 
i.e., that if England would remain neutral Germany would 
agree not to crush France too severely and would not annex 
any of her home territories. 

d. The Kaiser declares war on Russia and France . (1) 

On July 31st, Austria, yielding to an aroused international 
public opinion, for the first time, agreed to discuss the merits 
of the Serbian note with the Russian government. At this 
moment, however, the Kaiser, apparently carrying out the 
decision made at Potsdam, seized the initiative, took charge of 
the European situation and, disregarding the Austrian mobili¬ 
zation on the Russian frontier, sent an ultimatum to Russia 
requiring her to give assurances to the Kaiser’s government, 
within twelve hours, that Russia had ceased her mobilization 
even on the Austrian frontier. Simultaneously, the Kaiser 
sent an ultimatum to France requiring her to state in eighteen 
hours whether she would remain neutral in a Russo-German 
war. 

(2) Russia not replying, the Kaiser declared war on Russia 
August 1, 1914. 


EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 19 

(3) France replied that she “would ”do that which her 
interests dictated.” The Kaiser declared ; war " on France, 
August 3, 1914, and advanced against her at once. 

5. Principles of War. e. The principle of surprise . 
After the Dual Alliance decided, on July 5, that war should be 
made on Serbia, and on July 29, that war shouldjbe made on 
Russia and France, the measures taken to secure secrecy and 
rapidity of action illustrate compliance with the principle of 
surprise. 


CHAPTER II 


Plans and Operations to Include 
the Defeat of Belgium 


1 . 


2 . 

3. 

4. 


6 . 


6 . 


Theater of Operations..... 

a. Theater for naval operations.. 

b. Theater for land operations. 

(1) Central Powers.. 

(a) Location.. 

(b) Advantages. 

(c) Disadvantages..... 

(2) The Allies. 

(a) Advantages.. 

(b) Disadvantages.... 

Objectives.,. 

a. Central Powers.. 

b. The Allies.. 

Plans of Campaign. 

a. Central Powers.. 

b. Allies._. 

Mobilization.. 

a. Central Powers.. 

b. The Allies. 

c. Preparedness of the combatants. 

Conduct of the War in 1914.. 

a. Naval operations.. 

b. Land operations on western front.. 

(1) Theater of operations.. 

(2) Plans of operations...-.. 

(a) German plan... 

(b) French plan...„. 

(c) Belgian plan.. 

(d) Allied plan. 

(3) Operations. 

(a) Defeat of Belgium. 

(b) The French counter offensive.— 

Principles of War... 

a. The principle of the objective.. 

b. The principle of security. 

c. The principle of cooperation. 


.20 

.21 

.21 

.21 

.21 

.21 

.21 

.22 

.22 

22 

.22 

.22 

.23 

.23 

.23 

.23 

.24 

.24 

.25 

.26 

.27 

.27 

.28 

.28 

.30 

.30 

.30 

.31 

.31 

.32 

.32 

.34 


35 

36 
36 


1. Theater of Operations. (Maps 1 and 2.) 

Due to colonial empires on land, and the great question of 
sea control, the theater of war included nearly all of the surface 
of the earth. However, Europe and Asia Minor constituted the 
main theater of operations. This theater will be considered 


20 








































PLANS AND OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BELGIUM 21 

from the point of view that by August 4 the Allied Powers had 
control of the sea, and that the Central Powers had assumed a 
strategical and tactical offensive policy for land warfare. 

a. Theater for naval operations. The North Sea was the 
theater for any German naval attempt to reach the Atlantic. 
The Baltic Sea was the theater for any Russian naval attempt 
to engage the Germans or to reach the Atlantic, or for any 
British naval attempt against the north shore of Germany, east 
of Denmark. The Mediterranean Sea was the theater for any 
Austrian naval attempt to pass out from the Adriatic Sea. 
Of course, small engagements could occur in the waters out¬ 
side of those named as long as Central Powers’ ships could 
keep the sea. 

b. Theater for land operations. 

(1) Central Powers, (a) Location. The northern coast 
was protected by the German fleet, and the neutral states of 
Denmark and Holland. On land, the western neighbors of the 
Central Powers were Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, 
Switzerland and Italy. The southern neighbors were Switzer¬ 
land, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania. The eastern 
neighbors were Montenegro, Serbia, Roumania, and Russia. 

Without violating the sovereignty of a neutral power, the 
Central Powers could attack France only on that portion of her 
frontier which extends from Luxemburg to Switzerland—in 
short, through Alsace-Lorraine. 

(b) Advantages. The territories of the Central Powers 
were contiguous, which gave them the great advantage of 
interior lines. Furthermore, from the fact that the people of 
the Central Powers were partly of similar race and, with the 
exception of Alsace-Lorraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina, for over 
a hundred years had been intimately acquainted with each 
other and had lived under similar conditions, they understood 
each other. It was of the greatest advantage to the Central 
Powers that the governing body throughout was German. 

(c) Disadvantages, (i) One of the disadvantages was, that 
although commercial relations could still be maintained with 
countries beyond the sea through contiguous neutral nations, 
and occasionally by means of ships that could escape the 
Allied sea control, still, due to the restrictions of the Central 
Powers’ passage to the high seas, and due to the high prices 
of supplies arriving via neutral countries, the Central Powers 
were at a disadvantage during the war in trading with countries 


22 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

beyond the sea. It also was a disadvantage to the Central 
Powers that the population of the salient extending into Russia 
should be Slavonian in race whose sympathy was with Russia 
rather than with Germany. 

(ii) Including Belgium in Germany, as of August 24, it is 
seen that the four corners of Germany were extremely sensitive 
areas, and required troops for their guarding. Belgium at 
the northwest corner gave a German coast line on the North 
Sea with control of the great overseas commerce to Antwerp. 
Its occupation required the guarding of the northern line of 
communications through Liege. Alsace-Lorraine, at the south¬ 
west corner, was the symbol of the old victory, and contained 
the two great fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz, which protected 
Germany's bastioned bridgehead west of the Rhine. East Prus¬ 
sia was the original source of Prussian sovereignty. Silesia was 
not enthusiastically German and commanded the divergent 
roads to Berlin and Vienna. 

(2) The Allies. (a) Advantages. The Allies had the 
advantage of marine transport. They also had an advantage 
in the fact that the Russian front was sufficiently long to per¬ 
mit of maneuver. 

(3) Disadvantages. The separation of the territories of the 
Allies by the Central Powers was a serious disadvantage, and 
necessitated communication on exterior lines. Due to Great 
Britain's insular position and reliance on naval protection, she 
was not ready to send a large army at once to the battle front. 
The whole communication system of France centered in Paris, 
involving circuitous routes and unnecessary loss of time in 
transportation between points. Russia was greatly handi¬ 
capped in not having an ice free ocean port. As a result, her 
overseas imports reached the line only after long single track 
hauls from Archangel and from Vladivostock, both ports 
being open only about half of the year. 

2. Objectives. 

a. Central Powers. The objectives of the Central Powers 
were those of the ‘"German 1911 Pan-German Plan” which was 
as follows: (Map 60.) 

First: To defeat France and then Russia. 

Second: To organize a vast German-dominated empire to 
consist of: 

A great middle European German-dominated empire described 
as “Mittel Europa” with Germany as the governing body and con¬ 
federate states as follows: 


PLANS AND OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BELGIUM 23 

West: Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzer¬ 
land. A broad strip from France bounded on the west by a line 
from just south of Belfort to the mouth of the Somme River. 

In the East: Russian Poland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, 
Kovno, Vilna and Grodno. 

In the Southeast: Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States. 
An extension of that “Mittel Europa” into Asia to include Turkey. 

Third: To extend the “Mittel Europa” (already extended 
into Asia) into a World Empire with control of the sea. 

b. The Allies. The objectives of the Allies in the threatened 
war were as follows: 

(1) To defend their respective territories. 

(2) After the entrance of Great Britain as an ally, to retain 
the control of the sea. 

(3) The following special objectives were held in abeyance 
against a possible winning of the war: 

(a) France: To regain Alsace-Lorraine. 

(b) Serbia: To release the Jugo-Slavs from the rule of 
Austria-Hungary. 

(c) Russia: (i) To reconstitute Poland. 

(ii) To win a way to the Mediterranean Sea. 

3. Plans of Campaign. 

a. Central Powers. (Map 2.) The Central Powers' plan was: 

(1) That Germany should seize and maintain control of 
the sea. 

(2) That in land warfare, with the assistance of Austria- 
Hungary, the following plans were to be executed: 

(a) A strategical and tactical offensive against France 
by Germany. 

(b) A strategical and tactical offensive against Serbia 
and Russia by Austria-Hungary. 

(c) A strategical and tactical defensive toward Russia by 
Germany until after the defeat of France, when Germany 
would also assume the strategical and tactical offensive against 
Russia. 

(3) The only change made in that plan of campaign after 
Great Britain joined the Allies, August 4, was to abandon the 
naval offensive and to assume the naval defensive. The Ger¬ 
man navy, however, was to conduct guerilla naval warfare 
against the British fleet with the idea of wearing it down to a 
point where the German fleet would have a chance of victory. 

b: The Allies. (1) (a) France and England had agreed 
secretly, November 23, 1912, that in case either should be 


24 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

attacked by a third party, without provocation, that they would 
then discuss the necessary military cooperation, and that the 
military and naval eventual plans should be drawn. 

(b) The French plan of campaign was to assume the 
strategical and tactical defensive in rear of her frontier in order 
to be sure of complying with the understanding with Great 
Britain. If attacked by Germany, to reoccupy and hold 
Alsace-Lorraine, then, after recovering those provinces to 
resume the strategical and tactical defensive. 

(2) Serbia’s plan of campaign was to assume the strate¬ 
gical and tactical defensive, on the line of the Austrian bound¬ 
ary. 

(3) Russia’s plan of campaign was to assume the strate¬ 
gical and tactical defensive toward Germany and the stra¬ 
tegical offensive against Austria-Hungary. 

(4) When attacked, Belgium also assumed the strategical 
and tactical defensive with a view of defending her great sea¬ 
port Antwerp and of delaying the German advance. 

(5) Great Britain’s plan of campaign was to maintain con¬ 
trol of the seas for the Allies, by a naval strategical and tac¬ 
tical offensive, and to reinforce the French army with a view of 
defending the continental shore of the British Channel. 

4. Mobilization, a. Central Powers. (1) Germany: (a) 
On July 21 (two days before Austria sent her ultimatum to 
Serbia), Germany notified all her troops subject to mobiliza¬ 
tion to hold themselves in readiness. On July 31, one day 
before she declared war on Russia and four days before she 
declared war on France, Germany closed her frontier and began 
the secret mobilization of her Army. 

(b) For her first line, she called out 2,500,000 men, 
organized into: 

25 active army corps, 

21 reserve army corps, 

11 cavalry divisions. 

(c) Of the force mobilized she sent to the western front: 

21 active army corps, 

13 reserve army corps, 

10 cavalry divisions. 


PLANS AND OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BELGIUM 25 

(d) The troops mobilized for use against France were 
organized into: 

7 armies, 

2 cavalry corps, 

1 Army Detachment (upper Alsace). 

(e) Each division had 72 pieces of light artillery. Each 
corps had 160 pieces of heavy artillery, of which 16 were howit¬ 
zers. The reserve corps had complete and trained staffs and 
their troops were from 26 to 30 years of age. With the excep¬ 
tion of having less artillery, the reserve corps were as well 
armed as the active corps and nearly as efficient. 

(f) The mobilization on the Western Front (Map 5) was 
carried out behind the following covering corps: VIII at 
Coblenz, XVI at Metz, XXI at Sarrebruck, XV at Strasbourg 
and XIV at Carlsruhe. 

The Army of the Meuse (General Emmich), made up of 
fractions of the corps of the First and Second Armies, covered 
the mobilization in front of Belgium and had the mission of 
opening the way through Belgium. 

(2) Austria-Hungary: (Map 2.) Under the instruction 
of Germany before the war, Austria had increased and modern¬ 
ized her army and increased its materiel. She called about 
1,500,000 men to the colors at the beginning of the war for use 
against Serbia and Russia. 

b. The Allies. (1) (a) France mobilized at the beginning 
of the war 2,689,000 men for use in fortresses and by the Com¬ 
mander in Chief. These troops were formed into: 

46 active infantry divisions, 

25 reserve divisions, 

12 territorial divisions, 

10 cavalry divisions. 

The infantry divisions were formed into 21 army corps 
Five armies and a cavalry corps were formed. 

(b) The French forces, beginning August 1, mobilized 
behind a covering detachment, i.e., of the 2d, 4th, 6th, 7th and 
8th Cavalry Divisions and the V Army Corps. 

(2) (a) Belgium mobilized at once about 118,000 men and 
organized them into six infantry divisions. Each division 
consisted of 14,000 rifles, 500 sabers and 48 cannon. 

(b) She also organized one division of cavalry and some 
fortification troops. Later the field force was increased by 
19,000 men. 


26 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(3) Serbia mobilized about 250,000 men, most of whom 
were veterans of the Balkan wars. 

(4) The Russian army had recovered somewhat from the 
Japanese War. The officers had been given some instruction, 
the men had been partially trained, and new materiel had been 
secured. Under French instruction, the roads and railroads 
had been repaired with a view to improving their military 
value. The troops of Warsaw and Vilna, and 16 cavalry divi¬ 
sions covered the mobilization of the Russian forces that were 
quickly formed and marched to the frontier. 

(5) The British mobilization of the first 100,000 men was 
rapid. 

c. Preparedness of combatants. (1) (a) The Central 
Powers had prepared a large quantity of arms, ammunition, 
equipment, transportation, and supplies of all kinds for a very 
large force in an offensive war. Germany was better prepared 
for the war than the other combatants. She had been pre¬ 
paring for war for a long time. 

(b) The Kaiser, on ascending the throne, promptly an¬ 
nounced that “Germany's future lies on the sea.” Soon, 
Germans began to drink to “Der Tag,” i.e. “The day” when 
the British fleet should be defeated. The Kaiser's naval 
building program was completed in 1914, before the war. He 
inaugurated the strategic Kiel Canal which gave his fleet a 
second entrance to the North Sea, June 24, 1914, just four days 
before the assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria, at 
Serejevo. That improved considerably his strategical posi¬ 
tion with regard to both Russia and Great Britain. 

(c) Similarly, he had prepared the most powerful army 
known to history up to that time, and had introduced new 
means of combat, for offensive use, such as poison gas and 
fortress reducing artillery. 

(d) The taxpayers in Germany, from time to time, pro¬ 
tested against carrying such a war burden in peace. In 1913, 
they were told that one more effort would complete the pre¬ 
parations for war. As a consequence, the army bill was voted, 
under which an extraordinary war tax of $250,000,000.00 was 
levied on capital as a special effort for an immediate purpose. 

(2) Of the Allies, France had prepared sufficient stores of 
all kinds to defend her frontier. Russia did not have even 
enough arms for her first line troops and lacked much material 
for war. Serbia, having come out of the Balkan war a victor. 


PLANS AND OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BELGIUM 27 

had nearly everything required for her army for a defensive 
war, but her transportation was very inadequate; for instance, 
her cannon were drawn by oxen. 

(3) (a) The officers of the Central Powers had been highly 
trained for the very war in which they were entering. Germany 
had prepared a very large class of reserve officers for all grades. 

(b) The French officers were equally well trained but not 
in such great numbers as those of Germany. The Russian 
officers, except those of the highest grades, were not well pre¬ 
pared for the war. The Serbian officers had nearly all been 
trained in war and although not highly educated, were excellent 
field commanders. 

(4) The First British Army was well equipped, trained, 
and commanded. 

5. Conduct of the War, 1914. a. Naval operations . 
(1) The Central Powers, (a) By 1914, the Kaiser had suc¬ 
ceeded in raising the strength of the German navy to second 
place among the nations of the world. 

(b) Germany had secretly established a naval peace 
policy of stationing single fast cruisers in various parts of the 
world. When war was declared, iheEmden and Karlsruhe of 
that class preyed on allied commerce. Also, the effort of these 
commerce destroyers was aided by auxiliary fast cruisers 
which succeeded in passing through the British fleet to the 
Atlantic. 

(c) The German Navy at once began sowing the North 
Sea with mines and operated against the British fleet with 
submarines. The German fleet had no difficulty in retaining 
control in the Baltic Sea. Not having control however of the 
sea, commerce carriers of the Central Powers were, in general, 
soon tied up at home or interned in neutral countries. The 
Austrian fleet, based on Pola, controlled the Adriatic Sea. 

(d) The German battle cruiser Goeben and light cruiser 
Breslau were in the Mediterranean when the war started. 
Avoiding the French fleet, they broke through to Constan¬ 
tinople and operated against Russia from the Black Sea. 

(e) (Map 1.) Due to Japan's entrance as an ally August 
23, 1914, the German Pacific fleet at Kiao-Chau was menaced 
and started for Germany. 

(f) On November 1, the German squadron under Admiral 
Spee, consisting of two armored cruisers, one protected cruiser, 
and two scout cruisers, defeated a British squadron of two 


28 x MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

armored cruisers and one scout cruiser under Admiral Craadock, 
off the coast of Chile. 

(g) On December 8, Admiral Spee was defeated by Admiral 
Sturdee with two battle crusiers, three armored cruisers and 
one scout cruiser, off the Falkland Islands. 

(2) The Allies, (a) Great Britain had not overlooked the 
Kaiser’s developing plan for sea control, and had assembled, 
in July, 1914,the greatest fleet ever mustered in British waters, 
to pass in review before the King. That fleet consisting of 
216 men of war, one-half of the British navy, was kept in forma¬ 
tion and ready for battle. August 4, the whole British navy, 
easily the most powerful in the world, was ready for action, 
and took its battle position to prevent the passage of the Ger¬ 
man fleet through the English Channel or the North Sea into 
the Atlantic Ocean. The great High Seas Fleet was held in 
readiness at Scapa Flow to the north of Scotland. The English 
Channel was protected by patrols and by mines. 

(b) The French fleet, reinforced by a British squadron 
after the escape of the Goeben and Breslau , carefully policed 
the Mediterranean Sea. 

(c) The Allies maintained control of the sea during 1914. 

b. Land operations, Western front. (1) Theater of oper¬ 
ation. (Map 2). (a) (i) The Western front theater of oper¬ 

ations included France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Alsace- 
Lorraine. This area is somewhat larger than that of Indiana, 
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa, combined and is in about the 
same latitude. In form, the Western front theater of operations 
is roughly a square with most of the upper half of one side as 
German frontier. (Map 5). The terrain limited the routes 
of German invasion to the Belfort Gap between the Jura Alps, 
and the Vosges Mountains; along the Moselle Valley between 
the Vosges Mountains and the Ardennes Forest; along the 
valley of the Meuse and the Sambre; and along the coastal 
plain. 

(ii) Immediately after the Franco-Prussian War, France 
began to solve the problem of defense against German attack. 
She constructed four fortified camps, the central position and 
detached forts in which were permanent fortifications. From 
right to left they were: Belfort, Epinal, Toul and Verdun. 
Belfort guarded the gap between the Jura Alps and the Vosges 
Mountains and the route to Paris via Langres. Epinal, west 
of the Vosges Mountains, guarded all passes through those- 


PLANS AND OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BELGIUM 29 

mountains, the Valley of the Moselle River and the route to 
Paris via the Charmes Gap or Nancy. Toul, also, guarded 
the Moselle Valley, and the route to Paris via Nancy and the 
Meuse River. Verdun guarded the Meuse Valley and the 
route to Paris via Metz. Belfort and Epinal with detached 
forts constituted a large fortified area. Also, Toul and Verdun 
constituted a fortified area. A gap was left intentionally, 
between Epinal and Toul, called the Charmes Gap, in order that 
armies pivoting on Epinal and Toul might strike the Germans 
in flank if they should attempt to penetrate that gap. The 
fortified camp at Belfort was generally believed to be strong 
enough to prevent an invasion through the gap between the 
Jura Alps and the Vosges Mountains. The Vosges Mountains 
were considered a sufficient obstacle to invasion. North of 
the Vosges Mountains, the Germans might try invasion from 
the Moselle Valley. Epinal, Toul, and Verdun were intended 
to block the way. All these fortified camps were completed 
before 1914. 

(iii) (Map 6.) The French realized that the Germans 
might violate the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, and 
planned a series of fortified camps, i.e., Lille—Maubeuge— 
Mezieres, to prevent it. However, the expense involved and 
the increase in efficiency of the offense against fortifications, 
coupled with reliance on the strength of Belgium's position as 
a neutral, stopped the work and that series of fortified camps 
was not completed. 

The Ardennes Forest, a heavily wooded, very difficult 
terrain, with no railroads or main routes leading to Paris, 
extended from near Thionville to near Namur. 

(b) Belgium stands directly across the main route from 
Berlin to Paris. It had provided two fortified camps on that 
route, both of the Brialmont type, one at Liege, which con¬ 
trolled the crossings of the Meuse River, and another at Namur, 
which also controlled the cross route from Brussels to Metz. 
An older fortified camp, also of the Brialmont type, was 
located at Antwerp. This was a flank position to the route 
Liege-Namur. 

(c) The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg had no army and no 
fortifications. Its importance lay in the fact that the main 
railroad line from Coblenz, and indirect lines from other places 
on the Rhine, passed through Luxemburg to France. 




30 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(d) (Map 5.) Alsace-Lorraine, it will be noted, extends 
from Switzerland to Luxemburg, so any offensive by the French 
with a view of recovering Alsace-Lorraine would involve the 
whole Franco-German Frontier. 

(2) Plans of operation, (a) The German plan of opera¬ 
tion. (i) The original German plan of operations against 
France (Map 7) was formulated in 1906 by Count von Schlief- 
fen, Chief of the German General Staff. He planned to defend 
the fortified line: Switzerland—Luxemburg, and, pivoting on 
Metz, to envelop the French left by a strong hammer head 
right flank that, marching through Belgium, would defeat the 
French, force them back to Paris, and decisive^ defeat them 
by whipping the German right flank army around Paris and 
against the left flank of the French field forces. The fortified 
camp of Paris was to be contained by a special force. Von 
Moltke (junior), Chief of the German General Staff, at the 
beginning of the World War was apprehensive of French 
operations against the German left and strengthened the Ger¬ 
man left wing at the expense of the right wing, but adhered to 
the von Schlieffen plan. 

(ii) (Map 8.) The German concentration from north to 
south to carry out that plan was as follows: 

First Army (von Kluck): 4 active and 3 reserve corps, north of 
Aix-la-Chapelle. 

Second Army (von Billow): 3 active and 3 reserve corps, vicinity 
of Eupen. 

Third Army (von Hausen): 3 active and 1 reserve corps, vicinity 
of St. Vith. 

Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemberg): 3 active and 2 reserve corps, 
vicinity of Bitburg. 

Fifth Army (German Crown Prince): 3 active and 2 % reserve 
corps, vicinity of Treves. 

Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria): 3 active and 1 reserve 
corps, vicinity of Bernstraff. 

Seventh Army (von Hefringen): 3 active and 1 reserve corps, 
west of Strasbourg 

Detachment of Alsace (von Deimling): 2 active and 1 reserve 
corps, south of Colmar. 

I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen): 2 cavalry divisions, in front 
of Second Army. 

II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz): 3 cavalry divisions, in front 
of First Army. 

(b) The French plan of operations, (i) (Map 6.) After France 
became aware that she would not be required to defend her 
Italian frontier, her plan of operations was based upon the 
theory that she would be attacked on the Franco-German 
frontier, i.e., that part of her boundary which extends from 


PLANS AND OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BELGIUM 31 

Switzerland to Luxemburg. The plan was, if attacked by 
Germany, to envelop the German left from the direction of 
Belfort, and drive the Germans out of Alsace-Lorraine. 

(ii) The French concentration to carry out that Plan of 
Operations was as follows: 

To dispose the French troops in front of the German 
frontier with the right flank resting on Switzerland and the 
left flank resting on Luxemburg and Belgium, in the following 
order from south to north: 

First Army (General Dubail): 5 corps, vicinity of Belfort-Epinal. 

Second Army (General Castelnau): 5 corps, vicinity of Toul-Nancy. 

Third Army (General Ruffey): 3 corps, vicinity of Verdun. 

Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary): 3 corps in reserve west 
of the Verdun-Toul area. 

Fifth Army (General Lanrezac): 5 corps, vicinity of Sedan. 

I Cavalry Corps (General Sordet): 3 cavalry divisions, on left 
flank, vicinity of Mezieres. 

The flanks were protected by a group of reserve divisions 
in rear of each flank. The Commander-in-Chief directed that 
a strategical reserve of at least four divisions be assembled later, 
upon arrival from the Alps, from Algeria, etc. 

(iii) When the neutrality of Belgium was violated by 
Germany, the French plan was changed as follows: (Map 8.) 

The Fourth Army advanced to the front line, taking its 
place between the Third and Fifth Armies. To accomplish 
that, the Fifth Army was moved to its left. 

The British Army was to take its place on the left of the 
French line in the vicinity of Maubeuge. 

(c) Belgian plan of operations. Belgium’s plan of opera¬ 
tions was to base her defense on Antwerp with the idea of 
covering Brussels. To do that, she purposed to hold Antwerp, 
Liege and Namur as fortified camps, and, with her field force, 
to defend the area between those fortified camps. Under cover 
of her cavalry and two mixed brigades of infantry, the 3d and 
4th Infantry Divisions were thrown quickly into Liege and 
Namur, repectively, on August 4 and 5. The rest of the field 
force was assembled on August 6th, in the form of a quadrila¬ 
teral on the line Antwerp—Namur. 

(d) Allied plan of operations. The rapid march of events 
in the first days of August affected the plans of operations. 
The final hurriedly prepared coordinated plan was a consoli¬ 
dation of the French plan, the Belgian plan and the plan to 
use the British reinforcement on the French left flank. 


32 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

In brief, the Allies' plan was for Belgium and Great Britain 
to hold the line of the Sambre, while France was to hold to 
Switzerland, while awaiting a chance to strike at the German 
left. 

(3) Operations, (a) The defeat of Belgium. (Map 9.) 
(i) The first objective of the German plan of operations was 
to insure free passage past Liege, as the fortified camp at that 
place controlled the Meuse and (with Holland neutral) all 
direct railroad traffic from Germany into France, north of the 
line Luxemburg—Paris. The fortified camp of Liege was of 
the Brialmont type and consisted of circles of major and minor 
forts, each constructed with masonry and armed with turreted 
guns. The garrison consisted of fortress troops and of a rein¬ 
forced division. King Albert placed General Leman in com¬ 
mand with orders to prevent the passage of the German troops. 

(ii) The German supreme command assembled a strate¬ 
gical advance guard from the troops of the First and Second 
Armies, called it the army of the Meuse, and placed General 
von Emmich in command with the mission of covering the 
concentration in front of Belgium and of clearing the way 
through Belgium by taking the fortified camp of Liege by 
surprise. He moved instantly. The advanced element of his 
force crossed the bridge at Vise, at 8:45 AM, August 4, and 
when the Belgian sentinel called “Halt, Belgian Frontier," 
the commander halted, dismounted and said “I know that," 
and read a proclamation in which General von Emmich de¬ 
manded a free road through Belgian for attack on France. 
The Governor of Liege refused to let him pass. 

The next day, General von Emmich assaulted the forti¬ 
fied camp of Liege and was repusled. The German soldiers 
were much disheartened, but General von Ludendorff, present 
as a staff officer for coordination, pursuaded him to renew the 
attack the next day, by penetration between the forts. That 
attack was successful. The field troops were forced to fall 
back to the main Belgian force, August 6. The city of Liege 
was captured August 7. 

General Leman, the Belgian commander, remained with 
the garrison of Fort Loncin, kept the fortification troops in the 
forts and continued the defense until reduced by siege guns 
that were sent up from the rear for that purpose. The last 
fort fell August 17. General von Emmich's force was then 


PLANS AND OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BELGIUM 33 

broken up and its elements returned to their proper commands. 

(iii) While General von Emmich was clearing the way at 
Liege, the right enveloping force was assembling for passage 
through Belgium. 

It was composed of the following troops: 

First Army (von Kluck), right. 

Second Army (von Bulow), left. 

II Cavalry Corps (General von Marwitz), to screen the First Army. 

I Cavalry Corps (General von Richtoffen), to screen the Second 
Army. 

(iv) The two cavalry corps, operating under orders from 
supreme headquarters, skillfully screened the invasion of 
Belgium by the First and Second Armies. The cavalry screen 
maneuver began August 10 when the leading cavalry elements 
crossed the Belgian boundary. The cavalry travelled with¬ 
out supply wagons and used emergency rations only. To secure 
the necessary supplies from the country, the leading scout 
elements, frequently in armored cars, would enter a town, 
seize prominent citizens as hostages, lower the Belgian flag, 
and demand supplies. 

Under cover of the cavalry screen, the First Army on the 
right, and the Second Army on the left, began the advance 
August 13 to an area in the vicinity of Liege, where in a massed 
formation it held itself in readiness for offensive operations. 

(v) The supreme command then placed General von Bulow 
of the Second Army in command of that group and ordered 
him to advance August 18 with the mission of penetrating 
between the Belgian field army and Antwerp; of covering 
Antwerp and of capturing Namur. He advanced on the 18th 
but failed in his mission of preventing the Belgian retreat, 
which reached Antwerp August 20. 

(vi) The First Army reached Brussels August 20 and im¬ 
posed a war indemnity of about $40,000,000.00 on that city 
at once, detailed a corps from the First Army to contain 
Antwerp, and changed the direction of its march to the south¬ 
west toward France. 

(vii) The Second Army, General von Bulow, on the left 
of the line, reached the front of Namur August 19. Namur 
was believed by the Allies to be so strong that it could not be 
taken except by siege. General von Bulow opened fire with 
heavy guns on the forts August 21 with such effect that the 
fortified camp was no longer tenable by the 22d. The Belgian 


34 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

garrison withdrew to the west in great confusion. General 
von Bulow entered Namur August 23 and prepared to continue 
the advance to the southwest to France. The reduction of 
Namur caused the detachment of one corps from the Second 
and one corps from the Third Army. 

(b) The French counter offensive, (i) The Germans having 
violated Belgian neutrality, the French high command pre¬ 
pared at once (Map 8) to defend by extending the line. 

Responding at once to the Belgian call for help, General 
Joffre sent the I Cavalry Corps (General Sordet) from the 
vicinity of Mezieres, August 6, with the mission of establishing 
contact with the Belgian army and of reconnoitering the 
German forces. The corps moved to the northeast and was 
badly treated by patrols and organizations of the German 
Third Army. It was forced to keep pretty close to the woods, 
and, after turning back over half the distance gained, it turned 
north and, after running into the German Second Army, 
joined the Belgians at Namur, August 14, with horses nearly 
ruined and the men over-ridden. It then marched by the 
north bank of the Sambre and covered the concentration of 
the British near Maubeuge. 

(ii) First offensive in Alsace. (Map 5.) For moral effect, as 
much as to secure the flank of the approaching French offen¬ 
sive in Lorraine, General Joffre, August 4, ordered as a second¬ 
ary offensive with limited objectives, a detachment from the 
First Army, consisting of the VII Corps reinforced by one 
infantry division from the reserve and a cavalry division, to 
march into Alsace. The detachment reached Mulhouse 
August 8. The next day, receiving a converging attack by 
two German corps from Strasbourg, the commander believed 
that he was being attacked by a greatly superior force and on 
August 10, retired to Belfort. 

(iii) The second offensive. (Maps 5 and 8.) When 
the Germans invaded Belgium, General Joffre decided to meet 
the German attack (as then developed) by striking it in the 
flank. Accordingly, on August 8, in his General Instructions 
No. 1, he directed the assumption of a strategical and tactical 
offensive to the northeast. On August 12, before the offensive 
had been launched, General Joffre having lost some confidence 
in the Belgian strength, a corps was sent from the Fifth Army 
to guard the bridges across the Meuse south of Namur. At the 
same time, he reinforced the left wing by two new divisions 


PLANS AND OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BELGIUM 35 

from Algeria and a corps from thefright wing. As the; French 
offensive was stopped and turned back in the Battle of the 
French Frontier, we will follow the further progress of events 
from the German side, as the German offensive was successful 
in penetrating French territory. 

6. Principles of War. a. The principle of the objective. 
(Maps 2 and 6.) (1) (a) The frontier between France and Ger¬ 
many was one hundred and fifty miles long. On the German 
side it was heavily fortified from south to north, as follows: 
From Switzerland to Strasbourg, inclusive, the line of the River 
Rhine, easily defendable, was strenthened by fortifications at 
Istein and Neuf Brisach, and by the fortified area at Strasbourg. 
The line from Strasbourg to Luxemburg, on wooded and easily 
defendable terrain, was strengthened by the exceedingly strong 
fortified area: Metz—Thionville and the new fortified area at 
Mohrange. The resulting line from Switzerland to Luxemburg 
was exceedingly strong, and, since it could not be turned by 
France without violating the neutrality of Switzerland or Bel¬ 
gium or both, that line could have been held by a comparatively 
small part of Germany's combatant forces. Von Schlieffen 
estimated that it could be held by nine divisions and certain 
auxiliary troops. 

(b) Neither Germany nor Austria had fully fortified their 
Russian frontier. The Russo-German frontier was about five 
hundred miles long; the Austro-Russian frontier was about 
four hundred miles long. Germany knew that the Russian 
armies could not be mobilized as quickly as the German armies 
but that, finally, Russia would put armies of a total strength 
of several million men into the field. 

The situation, then, was that, while Germany could defend 
against the French from behind a fortified line, she could 
defend against Russia only by war of maneuver. 

(c) Under the principle of the objective , when there is 
more than one hostile army, the main hostile army is the army 
that can do the most damage. 

In the situation which existed before Germany violated 
the neutrality of Belgium, Germany could have defended 
against the French army with a much smaller force than against 
the Russian army. Hence, it followed that the Russian army 
could be expected to do more damage to Germany on the 
eastern frontier than the French army could on the Franco- 
German frontier. 


36 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(d) The Russian army was the main hostile army, and by 
not operating against it Germany violated the principle of the 
objective which requires that the main hostile army must be 
the first objective. Had Germany complied with the principle 
of the objective and operated offensively against Russia while 
defending her French frontier, as planned by the elder von 
Moltke, neither Belgium nor Great Britain would have had 
any cause for entering the war as enemies of Germany. 

(2) (Map 7.) The von Schlieffen plan of operations against 
France sought the destruction of the French field forces, while 
Paris was merely to be contained or invested. The plan, 
accordingly, illustrated the principle of the objective which 
requires the hostile army rather than a locality to be the first 
objective. 

b. The principle of security. The strength of the French 
fortifications on the line: Switzerland—Luxemburg, decided 
Germany to avoid that line and to strike at France through 
the neutral state of Belgium. Contact with the French forces 
was thus delayed, and Great Britain as Belgium’s defender was 
forced to the side of France. So when France fortified her 
German boundary she complied with the principle of security. 

c. The principle of cooperation. (Map 9.) The King of 
Belgium of course knew that his little army could not defeat 
the German armies. When he defended his fortresses to the 
utmost of his ability and then took up a flank position at 
Antwerp, he delayed the German advance and attracted 
detachments of the German armies. By this attitude toward 
his new allies, he illustrated the principle of cooperation. 
If he had also destroyed the railroad bridge at Liege, the 
illustration would have been still better, as it would have 
taken twenty days to repair it sufficiently to carry heavy 
artillery; and without heavy artillery Namur could not be 
taken. Also, until the Sedan—Carignan line of communica¬ 
tions was captured, all supplies for the German armies in 
Belgium and in the north of France passed over that railroad 
bridge. 


CHAPTER III 


Wastern Front to Include the 
Battle of the Marne 


Page 

1. Battle of the French Frontier. 37 

a. French dispositions and plans. 37 

b. The operations.. 38 

2. Allied Defeat at Second Line. 40 

a. French plan. 40 

b. German plan... 41 

c. Operations of the British Army. 41 

d. Operations of the German First and Second Armies. 41 

e. Operations on the Meuse. 42 

/. General Foch’s Army Detachment.. 42 

3. The Battle of the Marne.. 42 

a. French plans. 42 

b. German plans. 43 

c. Narrative of events on French right, September 4 to 8... 44 

d. Narrative of events on French left, September 3 to 10. 46 

4. Principles of War..... 51 

a. The principle of surprise. 51 

b. The principle of mass.. 51 

c. The principle of economy of force.—. 53 

d. The principle of simplicity. 54 

e. The principle of security.... 55 

/. The principle of movement. 55 

g. The principle of the offensive. 56 

h. The principle of the objective. 56 

i. The principle of cooperation. 57 


1. Battle of the French Frontier (Maps 5 and 10). a. 
French dispositions and plans. (1) When General Joffre 
understood that Germany was striking her main blow at France 
through the neutral state of Belgium, he moved the Fifth Army 
to the left and advanced the Fourth Army from reserve to the 
line between the Third and Fifth Armies. In addition to the 
troops originally concentrated, he created an Alsatian army 
detachment (General Pau) of the equivalent of three corps, 
with the mission of protecting the right by holding the Belfort 
fortified camp; a Lorraine army detachment (General Manoury) 
of the equivalent of two corps, with the mission of holding 
the Verdun fortified camp; and a left flank detachment (Gen- 

37 





























38 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

eral d'Amade) of the equivalent of one corps (but soon after 
increased to the equivalent of two corps), with the mission of 
protecting the left of the allied line. 

(2) General Joffre’s general plan to meet the German 
offensive was as follows: 

“With our right resting on the Rhine, we will deliver an attack 
along the whole front against the flank of the enemy who is marching 
from the east to the west in order to outflank us by the north.” 

b. The operations. Under that plan “The Battle of the 
French Frontier” was fought as follows: 

(1) (a) The Alsatian Army (General Pau) advanced and, 
by August 19, held the crossings of the Rhine from Switzer¬ 
land to Colmar. 

(b) The First Army (General Dubail) advanced, was de¬ 
feated by the German Seventh Army (General von Herringen) 
in the Battle of Saarburg, August 20, and retreated to the 
Vosges Mountains. 

(c) The Second Army (General Castelnau), covered Metz 
with its left but was repulsed and defeated, August 20, at the 
Battle of Mohrange, and retreated to the Grand Crown of 
Nancy. 

(d) Under General Joffre's orders, and pursuant to the 
strategical plan of the location of the fortified areas on either 
side of the Charmes Gap, the retiring French First and Second 
Armies laid an ambuscade defensive for the pursuing German 
armies at the Charmes Gap. The maneuver was planned to be 
a double envelopment against the enemy troops attempting to 
force the Charmes Gap. The German Sixth and Seventh 
Armies did not make an aggressive pursuit, but, following the 
lead of the French retreat, they advanced toward the Charmes 
Gap. General Dubail defended in the Vosges with the First 
Army but retired his left under pressure toward the Charmes 
Gap. General Castelnau held the Second Army in concealment 
on the Grand Crown of Nancy. After the enemy was com¬ 
mitted to the maneuver of penetrating the Gap, General 
Dubail and General Castlenau attacked the German armies in 
flank and defeated them in the Battle of Charmes Gap, August 
25, forcing them to retire in considerable confusion. 

(2) (a) The German Fifth and Fourth Armies (com¬ 
manded respectively by the German Crown Prince and the 
Duke of Wurtemburg), after being held in strictest conceal¬ 
ment in Luxemburg for more than two weeks, were marching 


WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 39 

to the west through the Ardennes Forest when they met the 
French Third and Fourth Armies (commanded respectively 
by Generals RufTey and Langle de Cary) in a great meeting 
engagement, August 22 and 23. The battle covered a front of 
seventy-five miles and is known as the Battle of the Ardennes. 

(b) The Germans deployed first and defeated the French, 
but the pursuit was stopped by a surprise attack delivered, 
August 25, by General Manoury with the Army of Lorraine 
against the southern flank of the German Fifth Army. This 
is known as the Battle of Etain. 

(3) (a) General Joffre repeated his order to General 
Lanrezac to attack the German Northern Group and desired 
him to launch the attack August 21, with his right resting on 
the fortified camp of Namur. 

(b) General Lanrezac (Fifth Army) made an estimate of 
the situation in which he concluded that he did not yet have 
his troops well in hand and did not yet have good connection 
with the Fourth Army on his right and the British Army on 
his left, and decided not to attack until the 22d. He ordered 
the army to defend the south bank of the Sambre on August 21. 

(c) While General Lanrezac was preparing his plan of 
attack for August 22, General von Bulow, marching to the 
west, turned the Second Army to the south and, at noon 
August 21, attacked General Lanrezac and bombarded the 
fortified camp of Namur with Austrian 42-centimeter howitzers. 
By night, General von Bulow held the crossings of the Sambre 
and threatened a penetration from the vicinity of Charleroi. 
On August 22, General von Bulow threatened an envelopment 
of General Lanrezac’s left flank, and the latter fell back. 

(d) On August 23, General Lanrezac planned to envelop 
the eastern flank of General von Bulow’s Second Army with 
his I Corps from Dinant, while developing a holding attack 
along the rest of the line. Here, again, he was one day too 
late. On this day, August 23, General Lanrezac felt the con¬ 
tact on his right of the German Third Army (General von 
Hausen). He was threatened. with a double envelopment, by 
the German Second Army (von Bulow) on his left and by the 
Third Army (General von Hausen) on his right. General 
Lanrezac retreated that night without informing his neighbors. 
This was the Battle of Charleroi. The next morning, General 
Joffre coordinated the retreat so that the Fifth Army would 
support itself in connection with the British army on the 


40 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

fortress of Maubeuge and the left of the Fourth Army on the 
west bank of the Meuse. 

(4) (a) The British Army (General French) consisting of 
two corps and a cavalry division, advancing under the gen¬ 
eral offensive desired by General Joffre, was on the line of 
Mons on the evening of August 22. The cavalry could not 
establish connection with the French Fifth Army but was 
meeting an increasing number of German patrols in front. 
General French ordered the line intrenched and defended. 

(b) By August 23, General French, at Mons, was heavily 
attacked in front and an envelopment of both his flanks was 
threatened by the German Second and First Armies when he 
was informed by General Joffre that the French Fifth Army had 
retired, that the Germans held the Sambre River, and that 
the German cavalry was executing a wide turning movement 
around his left flank. 

(c) General French ordered a retirement that night to 
the line: Valenciennes—Maubeuge. He reached that line 
August 24, but, avoiding the old and weak fortress of Maubeuge, 
decided to continue the retreat in the direction of St. Quentin, 
to the west bank of the Somme River. 

(5) The old fortress of Maubeuge was not entered by any 
of the allied retreating troops. Its garrison of 35,000 men was 
left to block traffic on the trunk line railroad Liege—Paris, and 
to attract as many German troops as possible to its front. It 
held out until September 7, and kept one corps from the Ger¬ 
man Second Army out of the Battle of the Marne. 

2. Allied Defeat at Second Line. (Maps 5 and 11.) a. 
French plan. (1) August 25, General Joffre decided that he 
could not defend the frontier north of Verdun, and gave the 
necessary instructions for retreat to the line: the Somme—the 
Oise—the Aisne—Verdun. He stated his general plan as 
follows: 

“Not being able to execute the offensive planned, our future 
operations will be based on the recreation of a mass of maneuver on the 
whig he composed of the French Fourth and Fifth Armies, the 
British Army, and new forces transferred from the southern wing, 
v/ hich mass will resume the offensive while the other armies hold the 
enemy forces in their front.” 

(2) To secure troops for the new mass of maneuver on the 
left, General Joffre discontinued the army detachments of 
Alsace and Lorraine and transferred their troops, respectively, 
to the French First and Third Armies (commanded by Generals 






WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 41 

Dubail and Sarrail, respectively). The new mass was the 
Sixth Army (General Manoury) of an equivalent of about two 
corps, and was to be assembled near Amiens. 

b. German plan. After the Battle of the Frontier, General 
von Moltke estimated that the French left was in full retreat 
toward Paris. He decided to pursue the French armies toward 
Paris so vigorously that they would have no time to reform. 
In publishing the orders, the German supreme command 
stated that: 

“The direction of march will be changed from the southwest to 

the south if the enemy should develop any serious resistance on the 

Aisne or on the Marne." 

c. Operations of the British Army. (1) The small British 
army had fought very bravely at Mons and had stayed on the 
field too long, hence, its retreat began at night and was hurried. 
General French, for lack of roads the next day, August 24, was 
forced to send the Second Corps (General Smith-Dorrien) 
through the Mormal Forest and the I Corps to the east of that 
forest. 

(2) General von Kluck quickly took advantage of General 
French’s embarrassment and attacked the British II Corps 
vigorously. With the assistance of the reserves of the French 
Fifth Army, the British II Corps reached Le Cateau August 25, 
but was exhausted and unable to continue the retreat. Ac¬ 
cordingly, General Smith-Dorrien the next day, August 26, 
without the support of the I Corps, stood and fought all day 
with the assistance of General Sordet’s cavalry corps, and a 
division from General d’Amade’s left flank group. That night 
(August 26-27), he continued the retreat and, on the 28th, the 
British army reunited on the line of the Oise. 

d. Operations of the German First and Second Armies. (1) 
The withdrawal of the British Army behind the line made a 
gap between the French Fifth and Sixth Armies which the 
German right wing attempted at once to pass through. The 
French Fifth Army (General d’Esperey) and Sixth Army 
(General Manoury) closed in and extended their inner flanks 
to cover the gap. 

(2) On August 29, General von Bulow (Second Army) 
attempted to envelop the left flank of the French Fifth Army, 
and General von Kluck attempted to envelop the right flank 
of General Manoury's Army. The German attack was re- 


42 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

pulsed and the morale of the troops of the German right 
enveloping force was noticeably affected. 

e. Operations on the Meuse. (1) On August 26, the French 
Third and Fourth Armies (Generals Sarrail and Langle de 
Cary, respectively) held the line of the Meuse and had not 
begun the retreat ordered. However, the left of the French 
Fourth Army was refused in order to maintain connection 
with the French Fifth Army. On this day, the French Fourth 
Army was attacked by the German Fourth Army (Duke of 
Wurtemberg) from the direction of Sedan; and by the German 
Third Army (von Hausen) from the direction of Dinant. 
The attacks, however, were not able to break or flank the line 
of the French Fourth Army. 

(2) The next day, August 28, the battle along the front 
on the Meuse swayed forward and back according to attack 
and counter attack. That night, General Joffre ordered the 
French Third and Fourth Armies to comply with the orders 
of August 25 for the retirement to the second line. 

(3) The French had remained on the line of the Meuse 
too long; on August 29, the turning of the French Fourth 
Army's left flank, by the German Third Army from Dinant, 
was prevented only by the greatest efforts. 

b. General Foch’s Army Detachment. The French Fourth 
Army, by not retiring to the Second Line as ordered on August 
25, opened up a wide gap of about thirty-five miles between 
its left and the right of the French Fifth Army. To fill that 
gap and to prevent the German Third Army from cutting the 
communications of the French Fourth Army, General Joffre, 
August 29, created an Army Detachment (General Foch), 
of about 75,000 men with the mission of covering that gap and 
with a line of retreat toward Rheims. 

3. The Battle of the Marne. (Map 12.) a. French 
plan. When the maneuver of defending the Second Line 
(Somme—Oise—Aisne—Verdun) failed, General Joffre de¬ 
cided, September 1, to continue the retreat, and not to resume 
the offensive until the troops should be well in hand, when he 
proposed to fight a decisive battle. Accordingly, in order to 
make the troops of the fortified camp of Paris available for 
combat, he invited the government to leave Paris. His general 
plan was to defend with the least possible number of troops on 
the heavily fortified line from Switzerland to Verdun, then, 
pivoting on Verdun, to conduct the retreat between the forti- 




WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 43 

fied camp of Verdun and the fortified camp of Paris, and with 
those fortified camps as points of support, to lay a concave 
ambuscade defensive on the line of the Marne or even on the 
line of the Seine if it should be necessary to retreat that far; 
and, when the German right wing should be well engulfed in 
that pocket or salient, to deliver a decisive convergent attack 
against it. 

b. German plan . (1) General von Moitke accepted the 
reports of his army commanders in the right wing to the effect 
that they had won a great victory over the French, particularly 
the report of von Bulow, commanding the Second Army, 
that the French retreat was like a rout. 

(2) (a) On August 30, he abandoned von Schlieffen’s 
plan which called for a wide envelopment that would pass 
the German First Army to the west of Paris. Discounting the 
British army as defeated (and not knowing of the French 
mass of maneuver gathering near Paris) he announced, Septem¬ 
ber 2, that it was his intention to push the French to the south¬ 
east of Paris, and ordered the change in the direction of the 
march. 

(b) He directed the First Army (von Kluck) to follow the 
Second Army (von Bulow), in echelon, and charged it with the 
duty of covering the west flank of the armies. He directed 
von Kluck to destroy railroads leading from Paris and to con¬ 
tain Paris. He thus planned to commit the German right wing 
to the maneuver of forcing the French army away from Paris, 
of rupturing the allied line at the left of the French Fifth 
Army (General d'Esperey) and of enveloping the new French 
left. This was a reduction in plan from the wide von Schlieffen 
envelopment to a limited envelopment following a penetra¬ 
tion, i.e., a dislocation of the line from Paris. 

(3) (a) (Map 13.) Von Moitke did not consider the defeat 
at Charmes Gap, August 25, as a serious check. He estimated 
that the same method which reduced the Belgian fortifications 
would reduce the fortifications on the French eastern frontier. 
When he estimated, August 30, that the defeat of the French 
left called for in the von Schlieffen plan had already been 
accomplished, he believed that the opportunity had come to win 
a great “Cannae” and destroy the French armies. 

(b) He then conceived the plan of replacing von Schlief- 
fen's single envelopment by a great convergent attack that, 


44 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

pivoting both ways around Verdun, would penetrate the French 
right south of Metz, and the French left east of Paris. 

(c) He ordered the special force of six divisions and seventy 
heavy batteries that had been designated for the investment of 
Paris to go to the Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria) to 
participate in the southern converging blow south of Metz. 

(4) On September 3, von Moltke learned that General 
Joffre was concentrating troops near Paris and estimated that 
the German right flank might be attacked. He then, Sep¬ 
tember 4, changed the plan of operations again. The new plan 
was: 

To defend in front of Paris with the First and Second 
Armies, from the Oise to the Marne, and from the Marne to 
the Seine respectively, with the assistance of the I and II 
Cavalry Corps. Then with the Fourth Army (Duke of Wur- 
temburg), Fifth Army (German Crown Prince); Sixth Army 
(Crown Prince of Bavaria) and the Seventh Army (von Her- 
ringen) to deliver a double convergent attack, September 4, 
against the French forces in their front, while the Third Army 
(von Hausen) was to connect between the offensive and the 
defensive operations. 

(5) Von Moltke’s headquarters were at Luxemburg. 
The Kaiser expected a victory, and took his position on the 
heights of the Seille with a special body guard that was to 
escort him in triumph into Chalons, and from Chalons to Paris. 

c. Narrative of events on French right, September 1+ to 8. 
(1) (a) From Verdun to Switzerland, the French line was 
heavily fortified and prepared for defense in position warfare. 
The great strength of the Grand Crown lay in its complete 
command of the Seille Valley. 

(b) By way of diversion, von Moltke attacked September 
4, astride the Moselle, the north and east slope of the Grand 
Crown. The Germans were not trained in position warfare, 
and did not have sufficient artillery preparation, consequently, 
the attack failed with extremely heavy casualties. 

(2) On September 5, von Moltke tried to penetrate the 
Charmes Gap. He attacked with the Sixth Army (Bavarian 
Crown Prince) and the Seventh Army (von Herringen) along 
the northern and southern edge of the Charmes Gap, respec¬ 
tively. The attack failed for the same reason as that on the 


WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 45 

4th, i.e., insufficient artillery preparation and lack of training 
in position warfare. 

(3) On September 6, von Moltke delivered the double 
convergent attack: the Sixth and Seventh Armies attacked as 
on the 5th, but, on the 6th, the Fifth Army (German Crown 
Prince) and the Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemburg) attacked 
respectively in the direction of Bar-le-Duc and Vitry with 
great violence, while the V Corps, of the Fifth Army, attacked 
from the direction of Metz toward Fort Troyon, to take the 
French Third Army in reverse. As a result, the French Third 
Army was fighting to the front and to the rear. 

(4) (a) On September 7, von Moltke continued the double 
convergent attack with great violence with all four armies, but 
was not able to break through. The German Sixth Army 
captured Pont-a-Mousson, and launched an attack down the 
Grand Crown to the south, with seven battalions of infantry 
in mass formation. The attack was repulsed by one battalion 
of infantry under Major Montlebert. The attack on Fort 
Troyon continued. 

(b) On this day, the Commandant at Verdun, with the 
72d Division, attacked the line of communications of the Ger¬ 
man Fifth Army as a diversion. 

(5) (a) On September 8, von Moltke renewed the attack 
with fresh divisions and the battle reached its highest point 
of violence. Fort Troyon was bombarded with heavy artillery 
and practically destroyed, but the supporting troops, using 
the methods of position warfare, repulsed the German assaults. 
The main German effort on September 8 was to capture the 
southern position of the Grand Crown, i.e., Mont d’Amance, 
near Nancy, but that attack, as all others, failed for lack of 
sufficient artillery preparation and lack of training in position 
warfare. 

(b) General Joffre authorized General Sarrail (Third 
Army) to fall back with his right, thus isolating Verdun, but 
ordered him to maintain contact with the Fourth Army. 
The bridges south of Verdun on the Meuse were prepared for 
destruction, but General Sarrail, fighting to the east and west, 
kept contact with Verdun. General Castelnau (Second Army) 
had the orders for a general retreat from Nancy before him for 
signature, but at the last moment did not sign and succeeded 
in holding his position. 


46 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(6) On the evening of September 8, von Moltke decided 
that the attack against the Nancy position was not practicable, 
discontinued it and gave emergency orders for immediate 
transfer of troops to the Paris front. The Crown Prince, 
however, west of Verdun continued his unsuccessful attack to 
isolate Verdun until the 12th. 

d. Narrative of events on French left, September 3 to 10. (1) 
On September 3, General Joffre learned that the German right 
had changed direction so as to march to the southeast of Paris. 
He decided, at once, not to continue to the Seine but to hold and 
deliver on the morning of September 6, the enveloping attack 
on the German right, planned September 1, with the mass of 
maneuver in the vicinity of Paris. 

(2) This mass consisted of the Fifth Army (General 
d’Esperey), the British Army, the French I and II Cavalry 
Corps (Generals Sordet and Conneau), and General Gallieni’s 
Group in and north of Paris, consisting of the Sixth Army 
(General Manoury) and the garrison of Paris. 

He designated General Foch's army detachment as the 
Ninth Army with a view of leading von Moltke to believe that 
he had a Seventh Army and an Eighth Army. He created a 
cavalry corps (General Espee) of two divisions, which had the 
mission of connecting the right of the Ninth Army (General 
Foch) with the left of the Fourth Army (General Langle de 
Cary). 

He created the II Cavalry Corps of three divisions taken 
from the right wing, and gave it the mission of covering the 
left flank of the Fifth Army. General Joffre brought the IV 
Corps from Alsace, and other troops to Paris, and strengthened 
his left wing by troops from all available sources. He es¬ 
tablished his headquarters at Chatillon-sur-Seine. 

(3) From the foregoing it is seen that while von Moltke 
was defending with his extreme right and attacking with his 
left to secure a penetration, General Joffre proposed to defend 
with his right and attack with his left, to envelop the German 
right. These two great offensives were synchronous and con¬ 
stitute a great battle that extended from Switzerland to Paris 
from September 4 to 9. 

(4) (a) General von Kluck did not obey the order of 
September 2, to follow the Second Army, echeloned to the 
rear and right in the march to the southeast of Paris, but, 
being then in the lead and considering the British Armyde- 


WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 47 

feated, and, being intent on enveloping the left flank of the 
French Fifth Army (General d’Esperey), he continued to lead 
the Second Army. 

@|(b) (Maps 13, 14 and 15.) Considering the French left 
defeated, he did not carry out von Moltke’s order to protect the 
German right from the direction of Paris, as he left only the 
IV Reserve Corps and one cavalry division on that duty. 

(c) Von Moltke’s order of September 4 for the First 
Army (von Kluck) and the Second Army (von Bulow) to 
operate together on the front east of Paris, the First Army 
from the Oise to the Marne, the Second from the Marne to the 
Seine, reached General von Kluck on the morning of September 
5, by radio. Von Bulow (Second Army) obeyed the order and 
halted. Von Kluck, not understanding the whole situation 
and being still intent on enveloping the left of the French 
Fifth Army, disobeyed the order and continued to march to 
the south of the Grand Morin, with the I and II Cavalry Corps 
in front. 

(5) On September 5, the locations of the combatants were 
as follows: 

The German Second Army was north of the Petit Morin 
and echeloned to the east and north. 

The German First Army (von Kluck) at the end of Sep¬ 
tember 5, instead of facing west between the Oise and the 
Marne, faced south and was more than thirty miles from its 
proper position, with headquarters at Rebais south of the 
Petit Morin. 

The French Fifth Army (General d’Esperey) faced the 
left and center of the German First Army. 

The British Army, south of the Forest of Crecy, faced the 
right of the German First Army. 

The II Cavalry Corps (General Conneau) connected the 
British Army with the French Fifth Army. 

North of the Marne, the French Sixth Army (General 
Manoury) and the I Cavalry Corps (General Sordet), echeloned 
to the west from Meaux, faced the German IV Reserve Corps 
and the 4th Cavalry Division. 

The Allied mass near Paris was under orders to attack 
on the morning of September 6, the next morning, with pro¬ 
per direction lines given. The French Sixth Army was to 
attack toward Chateau-Thierry, the British Army to the 
northeast, and the Fifth Army approximately north. 


48 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(6) (a) The IV Reserve Corps and the Sixth French Army 
established contact late on September 5, near Meaux. That 
night, a liaison officer from German General Headquarters 
in Luxemburg arrived and called von Kluck’s attention co the 
menace to the whole German line of communications by an 
attack north of the Marne from the direction of Paris. 

(b) In consequence, General von Kluck ordered for the 
6th, that the II and IV Corps should march back to the line 
of the Ourcq, and that the III and IX Corps should refuse the 
right flank and protect the right of the Second Army. All 
baggage was sent north of the Marne, and headquarters moved 
to Charly on the Marne. 

(7) (a) On September 6, General Joffre called on every 
man to die in his tracks rather than to retire another step. 
General Gallieni sent the Sixth Army (General Manoury) in 
to attack General von Kluck’s First Army on the front of the 
Ourcq, north of the Marne, and began the extension of General 
von Kluck’s right, by sending troops from the fortified camp 
of Paris as rapidly as possible and by all means of transport, 
including the taxicabs of the capital. 

(b) The British Army (General French) attacked and 
easily drove General von Kluck’s First Army rear guard to 
the north bank of the Grand Morin. 

(c) The French Fifth Army (General d’Esperey) attacked 
the German Second Army (von Bulow) and the III and IX 
Corps of the First Army (von Kluck). 

(d) The German II Corps reached its place on the Ourcq. 
The IV Corps reached the north bank of the Marne, and by a 
night march it reached the line of the Ourcq. Von Kluck turned 
the III and IX Corps over to the Second Army (von Bulow) 
provisionally. Later in the night, he ordered them to retire 
to the north bank of the Petit Morin. At the same time, von 
Bulow (Second Army) ordered them into action on September 
7 with the Second Army and directed the III Corps to protect 
the western flank of the Second Army. 

(8) (a) On September 7, the French Sixth Army (General 
Manoury), with additional reinforcements, extended its left 
flank to Betz, and struck heavy blows against the German 
First Army north of the Marne. 

(b) The British army crossed the Grand Morin driving 
the German rear guard before it. 


WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 49 

(c) The French Fifth Army (General d’Esperey), in a 
violent all day action, crossed the Grand Morin. 

(d) Von Kluck, during the day, ordered the III and IX 
Corps to the line on the Ourcq and moved his headquarters 
further north. 

(9) (a) On September 8, the French Sixth Army (Gen¬ 
eral Manoury) continued its effort, but General von Kluck 
now had his troops in hand. His heavy artillery had come up 
and was supporting his counter attacks near Betz. 

(b) General Gallieni called on every man to resist to 
capacity in order to help the French Fifth and British Armies 
to cross the Marne and crush the German right wing. 

(c) The British advance reached the Marne at La Ferte. 

(d) The French Fifth Army (General d’Esperey), while 
supporting General Foch on the right, attempted to penetrate 
in the gap between the German First and Second Armies, 
crossed the Petit Morin, and defeated the right of the German 
Second Army. 

(e) The Lepel Brigade arrived at Verberie, and von Kluck 
gave General Lepel orders to envelop the French left on the 9th. 

Von Kluck moved his Headquarters to La Ferte Milon, 
where later, on the afternoon of September 8, the French 5th 
Cavalry Division raided an airplane station just as the line 
of cars of army headquarters came up. All the members of the 
staff seized rifles, carbines, and revolvers, formed extended 
order and, lying down in a long firing line, awaited the cavalry. 
However, the French cavalry did not discover them. 

(f) Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, the representative of 
General von Moltke, reached headquarters Second Army on the 
evening of September 8. He and General von Bulow both 
agreed that the German Second Army could not maintain the 
front facing Paris between the Marne and the Seine; that Gen¬ 
eral von Kluck’s withdrawal of the III and IX Corps from the 
Marne to the Ourcq left such a gap between the two armies 
that the Second Army (von Bulow) must retreat to the north 
of the Marne; and that the line of the Marne could be held if 
General von Kluck would protect the right flank of the Second 
Army (von Bulow) and prevent the British Army from cross¬ 
ing the Marne. 

(10) (a) On the morning of September 8, the defeated 
right of the German Second Army (von Bulow) was unable to 


50 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

stop the advance of the French Fifth Army (General d’Esperey). 

(b) By withdrawing the III and IX Corps from the right 
of the German Second Army and throwing them in on the right 
of the line west of the Ourcq, von Kluck widened the gap al¬ 
ready existing between his First Army and von Bulow's 
Second Army. The gap then was more than twenty-five miles 
wide with only the I and II Cavalry Corps (reinforced) cover¬ 
ing it. 

(c) The left of the French Fifth Army (General d’Esperey), 
the entire British Army and the II Cavalry Corps (General 
Conneau) all crossed the Marne and pushed north into that 
gap. This allied penetrating force on the 9th advanced ten 
miles as it had done also on the 8th. 

(d) With the Allies crossing the Marne in rear of his left, 
von Kluck staked all on the chance of enveloping the left 
flank of the French Sixth Army (General Manoury) with the 
III and IX Corps and Lepel’s Brigade. The attack made 
progress but was stopped on the line: Meaux—Nanteuil. 

(e) In the forenoon of the 9th, all the reserves of the Ger¬ 
man First and Second Armies (von Kluck and von Bulow) and 
the I and II Cavalry Corps had been used, the German Second 
Army had been defeated, its right flank menaced and it was 
retreating to the north bank of the Marne. The First Army 
failed in its offensive action. There was a gap of more than 
twenty-five miles between the two armies and the French 
Fifth Army (General d’Esperey), the British Army (General 
French) and the French II Cavalry Corps (General Conneau) 
were rushing into that gap. 

(b) General von Kluck decided, after the British crossed 
the Marne, that the First Army must retreat. General von 
Bulow already had arrived at that decision with respect to 
the Second Army. 

Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, the representative of von 
Moltke, arrived at First Army Headquarters at noon, on the 
9th, and gave the orders to retreat to the Aisne. The retreat 
began that afternoon and, by evening, the whole German right 
group that von Moltke had directed to hold in front of Paris, 
from the Oise to the Seine, was retreating to the Aisne. 

(11) On September 10, the Third German Army 
(General von Hausen) and the French Ninth Army (General 
Foch) had the duty of connecting between the operations in 
Lorraine and those in front of Paris then in progress; and they 


WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 51 

fought violently. The Ninth Army (General Foch) was nearly 
defeated several times but prevented a penetration of the line 
at the point of the salient. Responding to action on its left, 
the Ninth Army, on the 10th, succeeded in advancing. 

(12) Von Moltke coordinated the retreat of all armies 
west of the Fifth Army (German Crown Prince). The German 
Crown Prince was the last to cease the offensive effort. He 
continued his attempts to isolate Verdun until the retreat of 
the armies on his right forced him to discontinue the attack, 
September 12. 

4. Principles of War. (Maps 2 and 10.) a. The 
principle of surprise. (1) When Germany, by starting mobili¬ 
zation before France, by a more rapid mobilization than France, 
by concentration under cover of the neutral states of Luxem¬ 
burg and Belgium and of the Ardennes Forest, and by inclusion 
of reserve corps in that concentration, marched through 
Belgium with a greatly preponderating force against the French 
left before General Joffre could prepare to defeat it at the 
Battle of the Frontier, she illustrated the principle of surprise. 

(2) (Maps 13 and 14.) So, also, General Joffre, when he 
secretly concentrated a superior mass of maneuver in the 
vicinity of Paris, with which on September 6, he delivered a 
blow against the German right that forced it back to the x\isne, 
complied with the principle of surprise. 

b. The principle of mass. (1) (Maps 7, 10 and 11.) 
Under the plan of operations against France, Germany con¬ 
centrated for the hammer-head of her enveloping operation a 
preponderating force to defeat the French left and drive it 
back to Paris. This force did defeat the French and British 
at the Battle of the Frontier, August 23-25, and at the second 
line of defense, August 29, and did drive the allied left back to 
the vicinity of Paris. This force, at the Battle of the Frontier, 
was composed as follows: 


First Army (von Kluck).5 corps 

Second Army (von Bulow)...5 corps 

Third Army (von Hausen).3 corps 

I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen).2 cavalry divisions 

II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz)..3 cavalry divisions 


Total: 13 corps and 5 cavalry divisions. 

The Allies, not ready to receive an attack through Belgium, 
had hastily gathered the following troops to oppose that force: 







52 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 


Fifth Army (General Lanrezac).5 corps 

First British Army (General French)...2 corps 

Left Flank Group (General d’Amade).1 corps 

I Cavalry Corps (General Sordet).3 cavalry divisions 


Total: 8 corps and 3 cavalry divisions. 

German superiority: 5 corps and 2 cavalry divisions. 

When General von Moltke succeeded in concentrating at 
the Battle of the Frontier, a preponderance of nearly two for 
one against the Allies' left, against which he was operating, he 
complied with the principle of mass. 

(2) (a) (Map 14.) By September 6, the strength of the 
force in front of Paris, which von Moltke had ordered to con¬ 
duct a defensive operation, was: 

First Army. 

Second Army. 

I Cavalry Corps. 

II Cavalry Corps. 

Total: 9 corps and 5 cavalry divisions. 

This force was reinforced by Lepel’s Brigade, September 9. 

(b) General Joffre, by inviting the French Government to 
leave Paris (thereby gaining the Paris garrison for maneuver), 
and by emergency transportation of troops to Paris, had suc¬ 
ceeded in concentrating, by September 6, the following troops 
for use in a decisive blow against the exposed German right 


flank: 

French 

Army of Paris (General Gallieni). 

Garrison of Paris.2 corps (equivalent) 

Sixth Army (Gen. Manoury).3 corps (equivalent) 

Fifth Army (Gen. d’Esperey).4 corps 

I Cavalry Corps.3 cavalry divisions 

II Cavalry Corps (Gen. Conneau).3 cavalry divisions 

Total French: 9 corps and 6 cavalry divisions. 

British 

First Army (Gen. French).3 corps 


Total: Allied Force: 12 corps and 6 cavalry divisions. 

Allied Superiority: 3 corps and 1 cavalry division. 

(c) Instead of assuming a defensive attitude in connection 
with the Second Army (General von Bulow) and the I and II 
Cavalry Corps as required by von Moltke's order of September 
4, von Kluck assumed an offensive attitude and attempted to 
envelop the allied left (French Sixth Army—General Manoury), 
northeast of Paris, with the German First Army. By that 
action he opened a gap of twenty-five miles between the Ger- 


5 corps 
4 corps 

2 cavalry divisions 

3 cavalry divisions 
















WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 53 

man First and Second Armies, which he tried to hold with the 
I and II Cavalry Corps reinforced, against the British Army 
(General French), and the French II Cavalry Corps (General 
Conneau) and the left of the French Fifth Army. Both of 
his efforts, i.e., to envelop the allied left and to hold the gap, had 
failed definitely by September 9, and to save his army and to 
protect the German right, he was compelled to retreat to the 
Aisne. The German Second Army, threatened with envelop¬ 
ment of its right flank through the gap between it and the 
First Army, began its retreat to the Aisne, September 9. The 
Two German cavalry corps covered the retreat. 

(d) When General Joffre succeeded in concentrating a 
preponderance of force over that of the German exposed right 
flank against which he began a successful operation September 
6, he complied with the 'principle of mass. 

c. The principle of economy of force. (1) (a) (Maps 7, 
10, 11 and 13.) The von Schlieffen plan of operations against 
France required for its successful execution a strong hammer¬ 
head enveloping force on the marching flank that could easily 
defeat the French left at the frontier and force it back to Paris, 
whip around Paris and envelop the left of the French field 
forces. To insure this strength, General von Schlieffen limited 
the force that should hold the German fortified line from Switz¬ 
erland to Luxemburg to nine divisions with certain auxiliary 
troops, and prescribed the strategical and tactical defensive on 
the Russian front. He estimated that France would be de¬ 
feated in six weeks, and that Germany could then assume the 
strategical and tactical offensive against Russia. 

(b) Between the retirement of General von Schlieffen in 
1906 and the World War, the German Army was increased 
by nine divisions. His successor, the younger von Moltke, 
assigned eight of those divisions to the fortified front between 
Metz and Switzerland and only one to the enveloping force 
on the right of Metz. 

(c) The hammer-head of the enveloping force was to con¬ 
sist of the following: 

First Army (von Kluck) 

Second Army (von Bulow) 

Third Army (von Hausen) 

I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen) 

II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz) 


54 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

General von Moltke withdrew from this force: 

2 corps to besiege Antwerp 
2 corps to besiege Namur 
1 corps to besiege Maubeuge 

Total 5 corps. 

(d) By September 2, General von Moltke estimated that 
the Allied left had been decisively defeated at the Battle of 
the Frontier, August 23-25, and at the second line of defense, 
August 29, and that the British army had been so badly de¬ 
feated that it could not appear on the battlefield again for a 
long time. 

(e) He then decided to penetrate the French fortified line 
south of Metz, and, September 4 to 8, attacked that fortified 
line as part of a great double converging maneuver. Expecting 
that penetrating attack to succeed, he had assembled south of 
Metz the six divisions and seventy heavy batteries that had 
been designated to invest Paris, and which under the von 
Schlieffen plan should have followed the right wing. 

(f) As a result, the German hammer-head on the morning 
of September 6, when General Joffre launched his counter of¬ 
fensive, was twenty-five divisions and seventy heavy batteries 
less that it might have been had von Schlieffen’s admonition 
to keep it as strong as possible been followed. So when Gen¬ 
eral von Moltke, by detachments and by conducting opera¬ 
tions from the fortified line: Switzerland—Metz, against the 
French fortified line, reduced the strength of his right hammer¬ 
head below enveloping efficiency, he violated the principle of 
economy of force. 

(2) (Maps 13, 14 and 15.) On the other hand, General 
Joffre, by defending the French fortified line from Switzer¬ 
land to Verdun with a very thin force and by inviting the 
government to leave Paris, gained sufficient troops with which 
to successfully attack the German right and thus complied 
with the principle of economy of force. 

d. The principle of simplicity. (1) (a) (Maps 7, 13 and 
14.) At the beginning of the operation against France, Gen¬ 
eral von Moltke began the execution of the von Schlieffen 
plan which required the line to bend around the pivot (Verdun), 
to extend to Paris, and the First Army, on the right flank, to 
whip around Paris and envelop the left of the French field 
forces. 



WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 55 

(b) September 2, convinced that the Allied left had been 
decisively defeated, von Moltke changed the plan from a single 
envelopment to a great double converging operation that, 
isolating Paris, was intended to crush the Allied field forces. 

(c) September 3, von Moltke learned that General Joffre 
was concentrating a mass of maneuver near Paris. September 
4, he changed the plan again to provide for a defensive battle 
in front of Paris, by the German First and Second Armies and 
I and II Cavalry Corps, and a reduced converging operation by 
the German Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Armies, with 
the Third Army connecting the offensive operation and the 
defensive operation. The defensive operation in front of Paris 
was not successful and the German right was forced back to 
the Aisne. 

(d) When General von Moltke changed the plan under 
which he was operating against France, and two days later 
changed it again, he violated the principle of simplicity. 

e. The principle of security. (1) (a) (Maps 13, 14 and 15.) 
General von Moltke learned on September 3 that General 
Joffre was assembling a mass of maneuver near Paris, and gave 
orders for the First and Second Armies and the I and II Cav¬ 
alry Corps to defend the German right flank, but did not rein¬ 
force that right flank until September 9 and then only with 
Lepers Brigade. The right flank was defeated on September 
9 and forced to retreat to the Aisne. 

(b) When General von Moltke knew, on September 3, 
that his right flank was in the air and must change from the 
offensive to the defensive to meet an approaching hostile 
offensive and did not strengthen that exposed flank, he violated 
the principle of security. 

(2) (Map 13.) On the other hand, when General Joffre 
attracted the enemy to the triangular front: Switzerland— 
Verdun—Paris for the decisive battle of the war, he complied 
with the principle of security by gaining security for his right 
flank on the neutral state of Switzerland, for his left flank on 
the fortified camp of Paris, for his center and pivot of maneuver 
on the fortified camp of Verdun, for his right wing on the forti¬ 
fied line: Belfort—Verdun, and for his left wing by favorable 
terrain, thus gaining freedom of action in the use of his interior 
lines. 

/. The principle of movement. (1) (a) (Map 13.) The 
German First and Second Armies and I and II Cavalry Corps, 


56 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

that had been designated September 4 to hold the Paris front, 
began the retreat to the Aisne on September 9. General 
Joffre did not order a pursuit until September 10 and an aggres¬ 
sive parallel pursuit until September 11. 

(b) When General Joffre failed to initiate and maintain 
an aggressive pursuit against the Germans from the time they 
began to retreat, September 9, he violated the principle of 
movement. 

(2) (Maps 7, 10, 11, 13 and 14.) The success of the von 
Schlieffen plan of operations against France depended upon 
securing a superiority of force against the French left flank, 
that could not be secured except through compliance with the 
principle of movement. As movement in a military sense, 
is approximately what we understand by MV {M — mass and 
V — velocity or motion), the operation against the French left 
at the Battle of the Frontier, August 23-25, and at the second 
line of defense was successful, but at the Battle of the Marne it 
was not successful, due to the relative and also actual decrease 
in the value of M —the mass. 

g. The principle of the offensive. (1) (Map 13.) The 
allied forces west of Verdun were executing a step by step 
defensive when General Joffre learned, on September 3, that 
the German right had changed the direction of its march to 
the southeast and that the German right would pass to the east 
of Paris. General Joffre at once appreciated the fact that the 
German right flank was “in the air” and not secure and decided 
to envelop it. He then by a successful sortie defensive gave an 
illustration of compliance with the principle of the offensive 
when he stopped the retreat, and, attacking along the Verdun— 
Paris front, launched a decisive blow against the German right 
which forced it back to the Aisne. 

(2) The offensive wins by delivery of a determining blow 
along the decisive strategical direction. Von Schlieffen under¬ 
stood that the decisive strategical direction, in an operation 
against the French, was around the French left flank. His 
plan of operations against France is a beautiful illustration of 
a plan for an offensive operation. The operation failed, due 
to the fact that offensive action was not maintained along the 
decisive direction but was frittered away on non-decisive lines. 

h. The principle of the objective. (Maps 7 and 13.) By 
adopting von Schlieffen’s objective of the French army rather 
than Paris, and by adhering to this objective throughout all 


WESTERN FRONT—BATTLE OF THE MARNE 57 

his changes of plans, von Moltke complied with the 'principle 
of the objective which, when there is a choice, requires that 
the hostile army shall be the objective rather than a geograph¬ 
ical locality. 

i. The principle of cooperation. (1) (Maps 10, 13 and 14.) 
When General Lanrezac, in command of the French Fifth Army, 
after his defeat at the Battle of Charleroi on August 23, re¬ 
treated without informing the British Army (General French) 
on his left, at Mons, he violated the principle of cooperation. 

(2) The British line of communications at the beginning 
of the war led back to the channel ports. When the British, 
after the Battle of Mons August 23, gave up their line of com¬ 
munications and cast their lot in with the French, they com¬ 
plied with the principle of cooperation. 


CHAPTER IV 


All Fronts to Include 1914 


1. Russian Front Facing Germany. 59 

a. Theater of operations... 59 

b. Russian and German plans of operation...-. 59 

c. The Battle of Tannenberg. 60 

d. Battle of the Masurian Lakes. 61 

2. Serbian Front, 1914. 62 

a. Theater of operations... 62 

b. Plans of operation. 62 

c. Battle of Jadar. 62 

d. Battle of the Drina... 63 

e. Battle of Mt. Roudnik..._. 63 

3. Russian Front Facing Austria. 63 

a. Austrian and Russian plans of operation. 63 

b. Battle of Lemberg.. 64 

4. Western Front to October 15, 1914. 65 

a. German retreat to the Aisne. 65 

b. Battle of the Aisne. 66 

c. Battle of Picardy. 68 

d. Battle of Artois. 69 

5. Russian Front to End of 1914. 70 

a. Central Powers’ first offensive against Russia. 70 

(1) Plans of Central Powers. 70 

(2) Battle of Augustovo. 70 

(3) Battle of Warsaw. 70 

b. Central Powers’ second offensive against Russia. 72 

(1) Plans of Central Powers. 72 

(2) Battle of Lodz...„. 72 

6 . Western Front to End of 1914. 73 

a. German and French plans. 73 

b. Battle of Flanders. 73 

7. African Theater of Operations. 74 

a. Togoland. 74 

b. British and French operations. 74 

8 . Asiatic and Pacific Theater of Operations. 74 

a. Theater of operations. 74 

b. Plans of operation. 75 

c. Capture of Kiaou-Chau. 75 

d. Capture of German Pacific possessions... 76 

9. Turkish Theater of Operations. 77 

a. Theater of operations. 77 

b. Turkish entry into the war.” 77 

c. Turkish objectives and plans. 78 

d. Turkish mobilization. 78 

e. Operations in Mesopotamia. 79 

/. Operations in the Caucasus.80 

g . Operations at the Dardanelles.* go 

10. Principles of War._. 81 

a. The principle of the objective. 81 

b. The principle of the offensive.82 


58 




















































59 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 


c. The principle of the economy of force. 83 

d. The principle of mass. 84 

e. The principle of surprise. 84 

/. The principle of movement. 85 

g. The principle of security. 85 

h. The principle of simplicity. 86 

i. The principle of cooperation.‘. 87 


1. Russian Front, a. Theater of operations. (1) (Maps 
2 and 88.) The boundary between Russia and the Central 
Powers made a large salient, convex toward the Central Powers, 
with the northern face and the nose of the salient resting against 
Germany and the southern face of the salient resting against 
Austria-Hungary. (Map 16.) Along the northern face of the 
salient, on the German side, is the obstacle of the Masurian 
Lakes which extend between the Vistula and the Niemen 
Rivers. Parallel to and south of the southern face of the 
salient are the Carpathian Mountains. The Pinsk marshes 
and the rivers crossing the salient are serious obstacles. The 
Polish plateau along the southwestern boundary is fertile and 
thickly populated. It is well situated as a base for operations 
against Vienna. 

(2) (Map 17.) The Central Powers had a strategic 
railroad paralleling the frontier from Roumania to the Baltic. 
Trunk lines from Vienna and Berlin meet at Warsaw. Other 
important railroad centers are Konigsberg, Dantzig, Thorn, 
Posen, Breslau, Cracow, and Lemberg. Only one of these, 
i.e., Warsaw, was in Russia. 

(8) Troops in the salient were subject to a converging 
operation from East Prussia and from Hungary. On the other 
hand, troops in East Prussia could be cut off by a penetration 
from the salient to the Baltic. Similarly, a thrust from the 
Polish plateau toward Vienna or Budapest would isolate 
Hungarian troops operating east of those places. 

b. Russian and German plans of operation. (1) (Map 2.) 
The Russian plan to defend against Germany and attack 
Austria was changed after Germany launched her offensive 
against France, so that it provided, as a diversion in favor of 
France, that an offensive should be launched at once against 
Germany with a view of cutting off the East Prussian German 
salient. The offensive against Austria was to be undertaken 
by troops assembled later. 










60 MILITARY HISTORY OP THE WORLD WAR 

(2) The Central Powers' plan was for Germany to carry 
on the strategical and tactical defensive until after the defeat 
of France, and for Austria-Hungary to assume the strategic 
and tactical offensive against Russia at once, as a diversion to 
draw Russian troops away from East Prussia. 

c. The Battle of Tannenberg. (August 26-29.) (Map 16.) 
(1) (a) Germany concentrated in East Prussia about 200,000 
men comprising four regular corps and a certain number of 
reserves. These forces were in two groups—one for the pro¬ 
tection of Konigsberg, and the other for the protection of 
Dantzig. The whole force (called the Eighth Army) was under 
the command of General Priwitz. 

(b) Russia concentrated two armies at once, i.e., the 
First Army (General Rennenkampf) in the region of Vilna-Kov- 
no and the Second Army (General Samsonoff) in the region of 
Warsaw. Each army consisted of four or five corps. The 
group was under the command of General Jilinski, whose 
mission was to cut East Prussia off from Germany, and whose 
plan of maneuver was to deliver a converging attack astride 
the Masurian Lakes with the idea that the First Army (Gen¬ 
eral Rennenkampf) would drive the Germans west, while the 
Second Army (General Samsonoff) would envelop the German 
southern flank. 

(2) (a) (Map 18.) The Russian First Army (General 
Rennenkampf) that originally was to defend against Germany 
completed its concentration, and, crossing the frontier August 
17, defeated General Priwitz’s total field force (less the XX 
Corps) at Gumbinen August 19 and occupied Insterberg. 

(b) The Russian Second Army (General Samsonoff) with¬ 
out waiting to complete its concentration crossed the frontier 
August 21, and advanced toward Allenstein. 

(3) (a) General Priwitz reported to von Moltke that the 
country east of the Vistula must be abandoned. August 22, 
von Moltke detailed von Hindenburg to relieve von Priwitz on 
the Russian front. 

(b) August 22, from his train, General Hindenburg sent 
orders for the retirement of the I Corps to Deutsch-Eylau 
behind the right wing of the XX Corps near Tannenberg. 

(c) General Hindenburg arrived at Eighth Army Head¬ 
quarters on the afternoon of August 23. He estimated that 
General Jilinski's force was greatly superior in numbers; but, 
as the Russian force was in two groups and divided by the 


61 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

obstacle of the Masurian Lakes, he decided to assume the 
offensive and to operate on interior lines by containing the 
First Army while destroying the Second. 

(d) Von Hindenburg contained the Russian First Army 
with the thinnest kind of a screen, i.e., one cavalry division, 
and from August 26, with only two brigades of that division. 
These two cavalry brigades were the only force that stood in 
front of General Rennenkampfs First Army of twenty-four 
infantry and several cavalry divisions. 

(e) August 23 was designated as the day for the German 
concentration in front of the Second Russian Army. The 
plan of maneuver against that army called for a double envelop¬ 
ment by the troops arriving from in front of the Russian First 
Army, and from the fortresses Thorn and Graudenz, while 
the center was to be held lightly by the XX Corps then on the 
line. 

(4) General Rennenkampf (First Army) estimated that 
the German main force was near Konigsberg and continued to 
push the thin German screen back in that direction. 

(5) (Map 19.) General Hindenburg finished his concen¬ 
tration and attacked according to plan, at 4:00 AM, August 27. 
The attack succeeded and by the 29th, the Russian Second 
Army had lost two of its four corps, i.e., the XIII and XV, and 
most of its artillery and transport. The I and VI Corps and 
other remnants of the army escaped to vicinity of Ossovietz. 
General Samsonoff shot himself to escape capture. 

d. Battle of the Masurian Lakes. (1) (Maps 18 and 20.) 
Von der Goltz’s Landwehr Division that had been guarding 
the Kiel Canal arrived in time to participate in the Battle of 
Tannenberg. August 31, von Moltke informed von Hinden¬ 
burg that the XI Corps, Guard Reserve Corps and the 8th 
Cavalry Division on the French front were being entrained 
and were at his disposal. 

(2) Von Moltke ordered von Hindenburg to assume the 
offensive and to drive General Rennenkampf out of East 
Prussia. General Rennenkampf was then on the line of the 
Masurian Lakes and slowly approaching Konigsberg. Gen¬ 
eral Hindenburg advanced September 4 in parallel columns 
with the plan of attacking Rennenkampf in front and envelop¬ 
ing his left flank. He launched the attack on the morning of 
September 8. The frontal attack was repulsed but the envelop¬ 
ing attack advanced through the Masurian Lakes country and 


62 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

threatened General Rennenkampf’s line of communications 
to Kovno. 

General Rennenkampf began a retreat on the night of 
September 9-10, and crossed the Niemen River September 15, 
with a loss of more than 80,000 men. 

2. The Serbian Front. (Map 3.) a. Theater of opera¬ 
tions . Austria-Hungary declared war against Montenegro 
also, August 9,1914, so the theater of operations in the Balkans 
included the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, and the 
contiguous teritory of Austria-Hungary. 

The rivers—Danube, Save and Drina—separated Serbia 
from Austria-Hungary on the north and west. The territory 
of both Serbia and Montenegro is mountainous with very few 
roads. Belgrade, on the Danube, is the capital of Serbia. The 
only bridge across the rivers to Austria-Hungary is at Belgrade. 

b. Plans of operation. (1) (Map 21.) The Austrian plan 
of operation involved a fire attack across the Danube and 
a strategical and tactical offensive from Bosnia. To carry 
out that plan, Austria concentrated the Fifth and Sixth Armies 
under General Potiorek in Bosnia. 

(2) The Serbian plan of operation was to assemble in the 
mountain regions south of Belgrade, in readiness to operate 
to the north or to the west. To carry out their plan, ten incom¬ 
plete divisions, forming a skeleton of three small armies, were 
assembled under the command of General Putnik. 

c. Battle of Jadar. (August 12-20.) (1) Austria, as soon 

as she had declared war on Serbia, July 28, began to bombard 
Belgrade. On August 12th, General Potiorek crossed the 
Serbian frontier, on a front of one hundred and forty miles in 
many columns from Chabatz on the north to Liombowia on 
the south, in a convergent advance. 

(2) General Putnik, with the view of covering Belgrade, 
sent detachments out at once to delay the enemy, while, by 
forced marches, he moved the Serbian army forward to a strong 
position on the Tser mountain overlooking the Jadar Valley, 
with flanks protected by the Save River on the north and the 
Jadar River on the south. 

(3) General Potiorek, before his army had fully concen¬ 
trated, made a frontal attack on August 16 on a front of thirty- 
five miles against the Serbian center, and pushed it back. 

(4) On August 20, General Putnik assumed the offensive, 
regained the lost ground and drove the Austrians in confusion 


63 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

back into the Valley of the Jadar. General Putnik continued 
his offensive and, by penetration between the Austrian columns, 
prevented their junction, thereby cutting the Austrian forces 
into two parts. 

(5) General Potiorek retreated to Austrian territory with 
a loss of more than 50,000 men. 

d. Battle of the Drina. (September 7-November 7.) 

(Map 22.) (1) Stung by the defeat of the Jadar, Austria at 

once prepared a second offensive against Serbia. The Austrian 
plan was to attract the Serbian attention by a diversion, 
carried out by two corps invading from Mitrovitza, while the 
main forces crossed the Drina in the vicinity of Liombowia and 
threatened envelopment of the left flank and the communica¬ 
tions of the Serbian Army. 

(2) General Putnik occupied the strong position from 
Mitrovitza to Liombowia defending the line of the Drina River. 

(3) In the operations which lasted until November 7, 
1914, called the Battle of the Drina, the Austrians were not 
able to turn or force the Serbian position nor were the Serbians 
able to drive the Austrians across the Drina. 

e. Battle of Mt. Roudnik. (December 3.) (1) The fighting 
along the Drina was a stalemate until November 7, when, due 
to shortage of ammunition, and to Austrian reinforcements, 
General Putnik was forced to retreat. He conducted a step by 
step defensive in good order. In a vain effort to save Belgrade, 
he defended the line of Valievo, November 15, and the line of 
the Kolubra, November 20 (Map 23.) Abandoning Belgrade 
November 29, he withdrew to the natural position Dreme— 
Kosmai—Mt. Roudnik, between the Danube and the Morawa 
Serbe, with the First Army on the left, the Second Army on the 
right and the Third Army in the center. 

(2) December 3, in a heavy mist, the Serbian First Army 
descended from Mt. Roudnik, penetrated the Austrian center 
and drove off the southern wing to the southwest. At once, 
the Serbian Second and Third Armies attacked the Austrians 
and, pivoting to the north, drove the northern wing out of 
Serbia. 

(3) The retreat of the Austrians was a rout. The opera¬ 
tion cost them more than 60,000 men and 120 canonn. 

3. Russian Front Facing Austria. (Map 16.) a. 
Austrian and Russian plans of operation. (1) (a) After 
Russia had sent General Jilinski into East Prussia as a diver- 



64 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

sion in favor of France, she functioned on her plan of operations 
against Austria-Hungary, which was to pivot on the north 
boundary of Roumania and attack Austria-Hungary through 
the passes of the Carpathian Mountains, with the view of 
giving independence to the Czechs and Slovaks in Hungary. 

(b) Russia concentrated two armies at once, i.e.: The 
Third Army (General Roussky), in the region of Doubno- 
Rowno and the Eighth Army (General BrussillofT) in the region 
of Podolie. Under their cover, two additional armies were con¬ 
centrated as follows: The Fourth Army (General Everth) in 
the region of Brest-Litovsk, the Fifth Army (General Plehve) 
in the region of Cholm. These four armies were placed under 
the command of General Ivanoff. 

(2) (a) The Austrians’ plan of operations called for a 
penetrating blow west of the Pinsk Swamps from the heavily 
fortified camps of Lemberg and Przemysl, that would cut 
along the base of the Polish salient. 

(b) Austria concentrated five armies as follows: 

First Army (General Dankl), near the frontier in vicinity 
of the Vistula. Fourth Army (General Auffenberg), just north 
of Przemysl. These two armies were to deliver a blow in the 
direction of Warsaw and Lublin. They were covered to the 
east by two other armies, i.e.: Third Army (General Bunder- 
man), to the north of Lemberg and the Second Army (General 
Boehm-Ermolli), toward Stanislau, facing to the east. The 
reserve army for this force, was under command of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand. 

b. Battle of Lemberg. (August 25-September 12.) (Map 
24.) (1) The Austrians did not begin their operation in Poland 
for nearly a month. On August 29, the First Army (General 
Dankl) and the Fourth Army (General Auffenberg) crossed 
the frontier, covered to the east by the Third Army (General 
Bunderman) and the Second Army (General Boehm-Ermolli) 
which also were protecting Lemberg. 

(2) The First and Fourth Armies made headway as the 
Russian Fourth Army (General Everth) and the Fifth Army 
(General Plehve) were not yet ready to operate. 

(3) However, the Third Russian Army (General Roussky) 
and the Eight Army (General Brussilloff) were ready and, 
August 28, attacked the Austrian Second and Third Armies. 
By a maneuver which took four days to execute, General 
Roussky penetrated between the Austrian Second and Third 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 65 

<► 

Armies and General Brussilloff enveloped the right flank of the 
Austrian Second Army. The Austrian Second Army, threat¬ 
ened with a double envelopment, and the Austrian Third 
Army with its right threatened with envelopment, fell back in 
great disorder. The city of Lemburg was abandoned. 

(4) As soon as the Russian Fourth and Fifth Armies heard 
of that victory, they took the offensive, and attacked the 
Austrian First and Fourth Armies. The battle became general 
and continued until September 12 when the Austrian armies, 
threatened with envelopment on the right by General Brussil- 
loff, broke and retreated as rapidly as they could to the Carpa¬ 
thian Mountains, leaving more than 400 cannon and 100,000 
prisoners in the hands of the Russians. The Russians reached 
the Carpathian Mountains and sent their cavalry toward 
Budapest. They besieged the Fortress of Przemsyl, and 
threatened Cracow. More than a million men were engaged in 
the Battle of Lemberg. 

4. The Western Front to October 15, 1914. (Map 
13.) a. German retreat to the Aisne. (1) German retreat. 
When von Moltke realized that he had been defeated at the 
Marne, September 9, he ordered a retreat, pivoting on Verdun, 
to a position in readiness on the heights of the Aisne. 

(2) Allied pursuit . (a) (i) Although on September 9 

there were local pursuits by the armies on the left, General 
Joffre did not issue instructions for a coordinated pursuit 
until the evening of the 10th. His general plan was merely 
for a "follow up” pursuit to the northeast, or, as he said, 
"The victory can now be gained by the feet of the infantry.” 

(ii) His detailed plan for that pursuit was as follows: 

Sixth Army (General Manoury), with right along line of 
the Ourcq. 

British Army (General French), with right on line through 
Chateau-Thierry. 

Fifth Army (General d’Esperey), with right on line 
Rheims (inclusive). 

Ninth Army (General Foch), with right through Chalons. 

Fourth Army east of Ninth Army, to follow German 
Fourth Army. 

(b) (i) The next day, September 11, General Joffre de¬ 
cided to make an aggressive strategic pursuit. His general 
plan was, by attack, to dislocate the German forces west of 


66 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Verdun from the rest of the German line, and to envelop both 
flanks of the dislocated German right. 

(ii) His detailed plan was as follows: 

The First and Second Army (Generals Dubail and Castel- 
nau) were to hold from Switzerland to Verdun. 

The Third Army (General Sarrail) was to penetrate the 
German line northwest of Verdun and operate against the line 
of communications of the dislocated German right wing. 

The Sixth Army (General Manoury) and the British 
Army (General French) were to pursue the German right wing 
and envelop its western flank. 

The Ninth Army (General Foch) and the Fourth Army 
(General Langley de Cary) were to drive the German center and 
left of the dislocated northern wing to the northeast. 

The Fifth Army (General d’Esperey) was to operate with 
the right or left group according to the situation. 

The XIII Corps was sent from Lorraine to reinforce the 
left flank. The pursuit was accelerated but no progress was 
made in the dislocation of the German line west of Verdun, 
or in enveloping it on the west, and, on September 12, the 
pursuit was stopped by the German line on the heights of the 
Aisne. 

b. Battle of the Aisne. (Map 25.) (1) German order of 

battle , September 13, from right to left: 

(a) First Army (General von Kluck), on the plateau 
between the Oise and the Aisne. After the Marne, von Kluck 
was placed under the orders of von Bulow. 

(b) Second Army (General von Bulow), extended the 
line along the Chemin des Dames with two corps while with 
another corps and the Guard corps it closed the gap of Cham¬ 
pagne between it and the Third Army. 

(c) Third Army (General von Einem vice von Hausen), 
extended the line from Rheims to Suippe. 

Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemburg) was retreating in 
the direction of Vouzieres and Buzancy. 

(d) Fifth Army (German Crown Prince)—no change. 

(e) Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria), reinforced 
with detachments, held the line from Metz to Switzerland. 

(f) The gap that existed at the Battle of the Marne be¬ 
tween the First and Second German Armies (von Kluck and 
von Bulow) was not closed on the retreat but was finally 
filled by the following units: 


67 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen). 

II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz) (less one cavalry divi¬ 
sion). 

VII Reserve Corps (arriving September 12, from invest¬ 
ment of Maubeuge). 

Seventh Army (von Herringen), from Lorraine. 

(g) The IX Corps, reinforced by one cavalry division 
from II Cavalry Corps, and later reinforced by a reserve corps, 
covered the right flank. 

(2) Allied offensive (,September 13-16). (a) General Joffre, 
when stopped at the Aisne, decided to assume the offensive at 
once. Although he issued new instructions, the only change in 
previous plans for the strategical pursuit was that the Fifth 
Army (General d’Esperey) should operate with the Sixth 
Army, the British Army, and the XIII Corps as a group; 
while the Ninth, Fourth and Third Armies should operate as 
a group and penetrate the German line by rupture near Verdun. 

(b) In the left group, the attack of the right of the British 
Army (General French) and the left of the French Fifth Army 
(General d’Esperey) reached the Chemin des Dames. 

(c) The right group was not able to dislocate the German 
line near Verdun. 

(d) No progress was made in enveloping the German right. 

(e) The Germans used the methods of position warfare 
successfully in defending in these operations. 

(3) German offensive (September 17-21). (a) Von Falk- 

enhayn’s plan. 

(i) The new chief of the German General Staff, von 
Falkenhayn, estimated that the sensitive German right flank 
should be protected by extension to the sea, and that the ex¬ 
tension should be on the line of the Somme. This would be 
the shortest line to the sea and would also cut the British line 
of communications via Calais. 

(ii) Von Falkenhayn’s plan of operations was to seize the 
initiative at once by a counter attack on the Aisne, to divert 
the attention of General Joffre from the German right by an 
attack in Lorraine, and to gain sufficient troops by withdrawals 
from the Eastern front, from reserves in Germany, and by the 
adoption of siege methods (position warfare) from the Oise to 
Switzerland, with which to extend the German line along the 
Somme River to the sea, and, later, to resume the envelop¬ 
ment of the western flank of the Allies’ armies. 


68 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) German counter offensive on the Aisne (September 
17-21). The plan of maneuver called for the capture of the 
Chemin des Dames with the view of securing the initiative, 
and also, that commanding position. 

The attack was launched September 17 on a ninety mile 
front along the Aisne. The battle reached its height of violence 
September 19 and 20, in an effort to capture the Chemin des 
Dames. 

The Allies, using the method of position warfare in defense, 
repulsed the German attacks, September 21. 

(c) German offensive in Lorraine (<September 19-30). (i) 

The plan of maneuver for the offensive in Lorraine called for 
a converging attack on the Verdun salient. That offensive 
had several objects. They were: 

To divert attention from the exposed German right flank. 

To secure better protection, for the German line of com¬ 
munications through Carignan and for the Briey mining area. 

To shorten the line and gain troops with which to extend 
the line to the sea. 

(ii) The attack was launched September 19. The north¬ 
ern attack by two corps of the German Fifth Army progressed 
in the direction Varennes-Clermont and threatened the Paris- 
Verdun railroad, but was stopped, September 24, by General 
Sarrail’s Third Army. 

(iii) The southern attack by an army detachment (von 
Strantz) was more successful, and, capturing St. Mihiel, 
crossed the Meuse on a foot bridge whose destruction had been 
overlooked. It was stopped, September 22, by a coordinated 
converging attack by the First Army (General Dubail), the 
Third Army (General Sarrail) and the 3d group of division 
reserves, before it had cut the Paris-Nancy railroad, but it 
did cut the Commercy-Verdun railroad. The line thus gained 
made the St. Mihiel salient which was held by the Germans for 
the next four years. 

c. The Battle of Picardy (,September 20-30). (1) General 

J off re's plan. General Joffre, adhering to his plan of envelop¬ 
ing the German right, concentrated a mass of maneuver near 
Amiens, consisting of the Second Army (Map 26) brought 
from Lorraine, the I and II Cavalry Corps (Generals Sordet 
and Conneau) and reserves, all under the command of Gen¬ 
eral Castelnau who was given the mission of enveloping the 


69 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

German right and of cutting their line of communications with 
the idea of driving them from France. 

(2) Von Falkenhayn's plan. Von Falkenhayn replaced 
the Second Army cn the line by the Seventh Army (von Herr in¬ 
gen), and placed von Bulow in command of a mass of maneuver 
consisting of the Second Army, the II Cavalry Corps (von 
Marwitz) and the I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen) with the 
mission of extending the German right to the sea along the 
line of the Somme. 

(3) Operations (September 20-36). The resulting battle, 
in which each side exercised initiative and acted offensively 
to envelop the hostile flank, was a terrific struggle from Sep¬ 
tember 20 to 30. It consisted of a succession of meeting engage¬ 
ments as each new element under cavalry screen cover, took 
its place on the line and attempted envelopment of the hostile 
flank. General Joffre failed to cut the German line of com¬ 
munications but succeeding in bending the German line to the 
north and prevented its extension along the line of the Somme. 
The operation of the forces of General Castelnau and General 
von Bulow, September 20-30, is known as the Battle of Picardy. 
It extended the line to the Somme. 

d. Battle of Artois (October 1-15). (Map 27.) (1) Von 

Falkenhayn's plan. When von Falkenhayn understood that 
he could not seize the line of the Somme, he limited the objective 
to the channel ports of France, to include Calais, and an¬ 
nounced to the troops that the mission was to capture Calais. 

(2) General Joffre’s plan, (a) General Joffre interpreted 
the Battle of Picardy to mean that the Allies' mission was to 
defend the British bases on the north coast of France, and com¬ 
munication with England. 

(b) His plan, which was successfully executed, was as 
follows: 

The Allied line was to be extended to the River Lys via Lille 
by a new Tenth Army (General Maud’huy). 

The Belgian Army to leave the fortified camp of Antwerp 
and march west and take over the sea end of the line. Light 
British troops under General Rawlinson, and French troops 
under General Brugere from Dunkirk and Ostend were to be 
pushed by motor transport to Ghent, as a covering force for the 
Belgian retreat. The British Army, relieved on the Aisne was to 
connect the French and Belgian armies. 


70 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(c) Marshal Joffre dissolved the Ninth Army and detailed 
General Foch as an assistant in charge of coordinating the 
efforts of the French, British, and Belgian Armies from the 
Oise River to the sea. 

(3) Operations (October 1-15). (a) The German line 

was extended to the sea as planned, by the Sixth Army 
(Crown Prince of Bavaria), the Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtem- 
burg), and detachments. As in the battle of Picardy, so here, 
each extension of the line by a new unit met a hostile unit in a 
meeting engagement. Cavalry corps of each side, here, as in 
Picardy, screened the units that were extending the line. This 
series of meeting engagements is known as the Battle of Artois. 

General Joffre was clearly the victor, as he successfully de¬ 
fended the coast to include Dunkirk and thus saved the British 
line of communications. 

5. Russian Front. (Map 28.) a. Central Powers’ first of¬ 
fensive against Russia , 1911+. (1) Plans of Central Powers. 
General von Hindenburg was given the Marshaks baton for 
winning the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes 
and placed in command of the new Ninth Army to be organized 
in Silesia at once. He was given the mission of capturing War¬ 
saw in order to defend Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia. The plan 
was to divert the Russian attention to the north by threatening 
an invasion of Russia along the Baltic by the Eighth Army 
(General Schubert), and then to advance to the capture of 
Warsaw with the new Ninth Army (Marshal von Hindenburg) 
from Silesia, in conjunction with a resumption of the offensive 
by the Austrian forces on his immediate right. 

(2) Battle of Augustova {September 29). General Schubert 
commanding the Eighth Army in East Prussia, was unable to 
cross the Niemen and, September 29, General Rennenkampf 
took the offensive and severely defeated General Schubert at 
Augustova-Mariampol. The Germans retreated in disorder 
with a loss of about 60,000 men and much artillery. As the 
defeated army consisted of troops that had fought at the Battle 
of Tannenberg, the winning of the Battle of Augustova had 
an excellent effect on the morale of the Russian troops. 

(3) Battle of Warsaw (October 16-31). (a) Marshal von 

Hindenburg concentrated the Ninth Army in Silesia and, 
planning the envelopment of the Russian right, advanced in 
five parallel columns, according to the von Schlieffen method: 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 71 

Two columns were directed toward the north and south of Warsaw 

One column was directed toward Ivangorod. 

Two columns advanced astride the Austrian-German frontier 
toward Lublin. 

Also, in cooperation, Austrian reorganized troops advanced 
to relieve Przemysl and to recapture Lemburg on the south 
flank. 

(d) Grand Duke Nicholas, the commander of the Rus¬ 
sian Armies, estimating that his right flank was threatened 
with envelopment, decided to fall back from the line: Cracow- 
Lodz, to the line of the Vistula and the San Rivers, in defense 
of Warsaw; to strengthen that position, await reinforcements, 
and, from a position defensive, to take advantage of any Ger¬ 
man mistakes by assuming the counter offensive. 

(c) Marshal von Hindenburg maintained contact with 
Grand Duke Nicholas' force during the retreat. 

(d) (i) The Grand Duke, learning that the German left 
flank was not well covered, planned to envelop Marshal von 
Hindenburg's left. On October 16, he sent three Russian 
armies to a frontal attack between Warsaw and Ivangorod, 
while he attempted to envelop Marshal von Hindenburg's 
left flank with a fourth army from the valley of the Bzoura 
River. 

(ii) The two German columns on the left fell back at once 
and, October 24, carried back with them the columns on the 
right. On the 27th, the battle was being waged at maximum 
intensity. 

(iii) The Grand Duke, with two armies, then attempted to 
penetrate between the German and Austrian forces and to 
envelop the German right by attacking in the direction of 
Tarnow. 

(e) With both flanks threatened, Marshal von Hinden¬ 
burg fell back at once, and, by November 1, the Grand Duke 
was approaching the German frontier with his right and 
Cracow with his center, and by November 15, had reoccupied 
the Carpathian Mountains. 

(f) Marshal von Hindenburg, in the retreat, used the 
method of creating obstacles by devastation. He destroyed 
much property and damaged the railroads and highway bridges, 
as much as possible, on the theory that the best protection of 
the German frontier, in that situation, lay in the fact that the 
Russian armies could not operate more than seventy-five miles 
in advance of their railheads. 


72 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

b. Central Powers' second offensive against Russia, 1911^. 
(. 1) Plans of Central Powers. (Map 29.) (a) November 1, 

Marshal von Hindenburg was made Commander in Chief of 
the German forces on the Russian front, and was given the 
mission of protecting Silesia which was then threatened by 
Grand Duke Nicholas' pursuit. 

(b) Von Hindenburg estimated that the Austrian offen¬ 
sive spirit was nearty spent, that the situation was serious, and 
that he must rely alone on German troops. Consequently, he 
asked for and received reinforcements to the extent of a new 
army corps and all available trained reserves from Germany 
and the I Cavalry Corps (vonRichtoffen) from the French front. 

(c) Learning that the right flank of the main Russian force 
protecting Warsaw was not well covered, von Hindenburg 
planned to envelop the right flank of that force with the Eighth 
Army (Otto von Below). 

(2) Battle of Lodz, (a) The Eighth Army (Otto von 
Below) rapidly concentrated at Thorn and November 15, 
delivered a surprise attack against the Russian right. The 
attack failed to envelop the Russian flank but it forced the 
Grand Duke to withdraw his extreme right back to the Bzoura 
River where it was covered by the Vistula. 

(b) The Ninth Army (General Mackensen), attacked, 
November 18, on the right of the Eighth, conforming its frontal 
attack to the new Russian line. The Russian line held but 
retreated to conform to the new line on the right. 

(c) Von Woyrsch, with an army detachment (provisionally 
called the Tenth Army), attacked, November 20, toward 
Lodz. The attack forced the Russian line back. The right 
wing of the Russian army, by November 25, was engaged in a 
terrific battle. The Grand Duke was greatly embarrassed by 
lack of roads and railroads in getting reinforcements to the 
line, but succeeded in bringing enough forward to hold the line. 

(d) Marshal von Hindenburg, then, not making headway 
against the Grand Duke, ordered General Mackensen to pene¬ 
trate the center of the Russian right with his Ninth Army. 
T he attack was successful, and General Mackensen pushed two 
army corps through the gap to exploit the penetration. The 
Grand Duke, hov/ever, succeeded in closing the gap to other 
German troops, and although the two corps, by desperate 
fighting, finally succeeded in cutting their way back to the 
German lines, it was at the price of terrible losses. 


73 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

(e) The Grand Duke then retreated to the line of the four 
rivers: Bzoura—Rawa—Pilitza—Nida, a very strong natural 
position in front of Warsaw. Marshal von Hindenburg at¬ 
tacked this position in vain during the month of December, 
1914. Gradually siege conditions obtained, not only in Poland, 
but along the whole line to the Roumanian boundary. 

6. Western Front to End of 1914. (Maps 27 and 30.) a. 
German and French plans. (1) After the Battle of Artois, the 
northern flank of the line rested on the sea west of Ostend. 

(2) Von Falkenhayn estimated that, with the right flank, 
secure, he could force the Allies' line back along the coast 
past Calais; thus cutting the British line of communications, 
and shortening the German line. 

To carry out his project, he enlisted public interest in 
Germany and rapidly increased the German forces in Flanders. 
His plan was to dislocate the Allies' left from the sea and 
envelop it. 

(3) General Joffre estimated that the German offensive 
toward Calais had not yet been defeated. He reinforced the 
left of the line, and on October 20 created a new army (the 
Eighth) called the Army of Belgium (General d'Urbal). To 
forestall the expected German offensive, he directed General 
d'Urbal, in cooperation with General French and the Belgians 
(who agreed), to attack October 23 with the cooperation of the 
British monitors in the English Channel. 

b. Battle of Flanders {October 15-November 15, 191 If ). (1) 

During this battle, both General Joffre and von Falkenhayn 
attempted to exercise initiative and to conduct an offensive 
against the hostile flank on the sea. 

(2) The Belgian attack in the north October 23 was not 
successful and they were driven back. 

(3) The German attack nearly penetrated the line in the 
direction of Peroise and was stopped only by opening the dykes 
October 27 and inundating the country. Dixmude fell Novem¬ 
ber 11. Some call this operation the Battle of the Yser. How¬ 
ever, it was merely a part of the one great effort by the Germans 
in the Battle of Flanders. 

(4) On October 29, von Falkenhayn attacked, farther 
south, the British salient of Ypres. By a converging maneuver 
he forced it back. 


74 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(5) General Joffre went to St. Omer, and from there as an 
advanced headquarters hurried reinforcements to General 
French. 

(6) On October 31, the Germans delivered another power¬ 
ful attack along the whole front, and nearly forced the British 
to fall back. However, a British counter attack, reinforced 
by French battalions, delivered that night on request of Gen¬ 
eral Foch, was successful in checking the German advance. 
General Joffre sent division after division and corps after corps 
to General French and, as a result, the German attempt to 
* penetrate the line failed. This was a great moral defeat to 

the Germans because their best troops were defeated and over 
300,000 men were left on the battlefield. 

(7) At the end of 1914, the method of position warfare 
obtained on the Western front from Switzerland to the sea. 

7. African Theater of Operations. (Map 60.) a. 
Togoland. The German colony of Togoland was about the 
size of Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine. 
It was surrounded by colonies of the Allies' on three sides. 

b. British and French operations. (1) As soon as war was 
declared, its only seaport, Lome, was blockaded by a British 
cruiser. The French invaded from one side and a British force 
in motor cars under Captain Bryant from another. The Ger¬ 
man force of about 3,000 native troops, under about 250 white 
officers, retreated 100 miles into the interior to defend one of 
the great German overseas wireless stations, at Atakpome. 

(2) With Lome as a base, guarded by the British cruiser, 
Captain Bryant, with his own and the French detachments, 
quickly took over all southern Togoland, and by a rapid pur¬ 
suit, forced the surrender of the German forces and destroyed 
the German wireless plant. He was in full control of Togoland 
by August 27. 

8. Asiatic and Pacific Theater of Operations. (Map 1.) 
a. Theater oj operations. (1) The alliance between Great Britain 
and Japan required Japan to assist the former in keeping peace 
in the Far East, if the former should be attacked. Upon the 
request of Great Britain, Japan decided that British interests 
and the far eastern peace were menaced by Germany, and on 
August 15, 1914, sent an ultimatum to the Kaiser demanding 
the departure of German ships from Chinese waters and the 
transfer of Kiaou-Chau to Japan, as a first step in its return to 
Chinese control. The ultimatum gave until August 22 for 


75 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

% 

the reply. The language of this ultimatum is practically the 
same as in that used by the Kaiser which compelled Japan to 
abandon the fruits of victory at Port Arthur. Not receiving 
a reply, Japan declared war against Germany on August 23. 

(2) The far eastern theater of operations included the 
German Caroline Islands, the Ladrone Islands (except Guam), 
the Marshall Islands, a portion of the Solomon Islands, the 
Bismarck Archipelago, a part of New Guinea called Kaiser 
Willhelm Land, and the German leased territory in China 
called Kiaou-Chau. Kiaou-Chau comprised a district of about 
two hundred square miles. It included the German naval 
station Tsing Tau, which had been fortified by land and sea 
at an expense of $100,000,000.00. The harbor was excellent, 
and was connected with Chinese railroad lines. It was near 
Port Arthur, Wei Hai Wei, and Manila, and was an ideal base 
for the German Pacific fleet. 

b. Plans of operation. (1) The German plan of opera¬ 
tions was based upon the theory that the war would not last 
long, and that the Pacific fleet should not permit itself to be 
shut up in Tsing Tau, or hold itself on duty defending the 
German islands in the Pacific but should take the sea as 
commerce destroyers except that Admiral Spee should keep a 
nucleus of a fleet in being. (The operations of Admiral Spee's 
fleet have been previously recorded, and its fate registered.) 
The plan also provided that the naval station should stand a 
siege, and the Kaiser ordered that it should hold out to the 
last breath of the last man. The garrison consisted of about 
5,000 marines, artillery troops, and naval detachments. A 
small naval force of about three cruisers remained in the 
harbor. The whole was under the command of Admiral 
Waldeck. His heaviest artillery was of 8-inch caliber. 

(2) Japan's plan of campaign was to conduct a strategic 
and tactical offensive campaign against Germany in the far 
eastern theater of operations, but not to participate in any 
other theater of operations. 

c. Capture of Kiaou-Chau. (1) (a) The Japanese plan 
of operation was to seize nearby islands for use as a base, to 
blockade Tsing Tau, to invest it, and by siege operations and 
assault to capture it. Japan concentrated for that operation: 


76 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

1 infantry division, reinforced by 3 infantry brigades. 

A siege artillery corps, consisting of: 

2 regiments heavy artillery. 

2 battalions heavy artillery (including 6 and 8 inch guns and 

11 inch howitzers). 

A detachment of engineers. 

A detachment of administrative troops. 

2 railway battalions. 

An aviation detachment. 

A marine artillery detachment. 

The command did not include any cavalry, or any horse, or 
light artillery. The total Japanese force was 23,000. 

(b) A British detachment of 1,500 men from Wei Hai Wei, 
under command of Brigadier General Barnardeston, assisted. 
The Commander-in-Chief of the besieging force was Lieu¬ 
tenant General Kamio, Japanese Army. 

(c) Also, a sufficient British and Japanese naval force to 
escort the expedition, execute the blockade, and to assist in 
the bombardment, participated in the maneuver under the 
command of Vice Admiral Kato. 

(2) (a) August 27, four days after the declaration of war, 
Japan seized adjacent islands for use as a base, and began mine 
sweeping. 

(b) Under cover of a naval bombardment, she landed her 
expedition on September 2. Because of torrential rains which 
flooded the whole country, the operations were much impeded. 
However, the fleet continued the bombardment, and hydro¬ 
planes bombed the German ships and forts and reconnoitered 
the position. 

(c) On September 13, the railroad station at Kiaou-Chau 
was captured and the investment completed. 

(d) On September 28, Prince Heinrich Hill, 1,000 feet 
high, was captured. 

(e) On November 1, the British battleship Triumph silenced 
the Bismarck forts with seven shots. 

(f) By November 4, the waterworks had been seized. 

(g) Most of the forts had been silenced by November 6, 
and, to avoid a general assault, Admiral Waldeck surrendered 
the Naval Base and District and the remaining garrison of about 
3,000 men on November 7. 

d. Capture of German Pacific possessions. (1) (a) The 
Japanese operations against the German islands were rapid and 
effective. October 6, a part of the Japanese fleet blockaded 
Jaluit, the German capital of the German Pacific island empire. 
The Germans surrendered without resistance. A force of 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 77 

marines landed and destroyed all military establishments and 
seized all munitions of war. The same procedure was followed 
at Yap, a local German headquarters. 

(b) In two weeks, Japan had seized and occupied all the 
German Pacific islands north of the equator. The Japanese 
Navy Department at once announced, and conveyed the an¬ 
nouncement especially to the United States, that the landings 
had been made for military purposes and not with a view to 
permanent occupation. 

(2) Soon after war was declared, a New Zealand con¬ 
tingent, under direction of the Australian Navy, seized Ger¬ 
man Samoa without opposition. 

(3) In September, the Australian Navy under direction of 
the British Admiralty, captured and occupied the remaining 
German possessions in the Pacific south of the equator. 

9. Turkish Theater of Operations. (Maps 1 and 31.) 
a. Theater of operations. (1) (a) The Turkish theater of 
operations affords an interesting strategical study. It embraced 
all of Turkey in Asia and so much of Turkey in Europe as could 
be approached from the Black or Mediterranean Seas. 

0 

(b) The theater of operations, being on the immediate 
flank of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, threatened the route 
to India and the line of communication between Japan and 
her Allies in Europe. Lying south of Russia, it menaced the 
Russian forces on the Eastern front, the Anglo-Persian oil 
fields at the head of the Persian Gulf, and the oil fields in the 
Caucasus, which were controlled by England and Russia, 
respectively. 

(c) The Black Sea—Dardanelles route, which was the 
quickest and most available line of communication between 
Russia and her Allies, lay through that theater of operations. 

(d) The Bagdad railroad passed through it and made 
Mesopotamia (a most fertile portion of the earth) a base of 
supplies for the Central Powers. 

b. Turkish entry into the war. (1) At the beginning of the 
war, the Young Turk party, with Enver Pasha at its head, was 
friendly with Germany and had control in Turkey. They 
believed in a German victory and expected that Turkey's 
part in the loot of the war would be the return of Egypt and 
Thrace, the rich oil fields of the Caucasus, and recognition 
of Turkey as a fir st-class power. 


78 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(2) Turkey signed an alliance with Germany, August 4, 
1914, under which Turkey undertook to assist in the creation 
of the Greater German Empire. 

(3) The Kaiser did not intend at that time to call Turkey 
to his side until after the defeat of France and Russia. How¬ 
ever, after the failure of his operation in France, of the Austrian . 
operations at Lemberg, and of von Hindenburg’s first offensive 
in Poland, the Kaiser decided to create a new theater of opera¬ 
tions to which allied troops would be attracted, and with this 
object called on Turkey. 

(4) Turkey responded, October 29, 1914, by invading the 
British Egyptian peninsula of Sinai, and also by attacking 
the city of Odessa and the Russian naval forces on the Black 
Sea with a fleet made up of Turkish ships and the German 
ships Goeben and Breslau. 

c. Turkish objectives and plans. 

The Turkish plan of campaign was: 

(1) To defend the Dardanelles. 

(2) To stop all Russian Black Sea commerce. 

(3) To assume the strategical and tactical offensive 
against Russia in operations to capture the Caucasus oil 
fields, with the object of reducing Russia’s supply of oil, and 
of drawing Russian forces from the Austro-German front to 
the Turkish front. 

(4) To assume the strategic and tactical offensive against 
England in two operations: 

(a) The first operation to be against the British naval oil 
base at the head of the Persian Gulf, with the object of stopping 
that British supply of oil and of drawing British naval and land 
forces from the North Sea and the Western front, respectively, 
to the Turkish front. 

(b) The second operation was to capture or destroy the 
Suez Canal and to occupy the valley of the Nile with the object 
of forcing the Allies’ sea traffic around the Cape of Good 
Hope, and of drawing British naval and land forces from the 
North Sea and the Western front to the Turkish front. 

d. Turkish mobilization. (1) (a) In the Turkish navy, 
the ships were obsolete, and discipline and seamanship were 
poor. The German squadron, consisting of the Goeben and 
the Breslau, however, were modern and efficient. The navy 
was assembled in the Sea of Marmora. 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 79 

(b) The scheme for the defense of the Dardanelles had 
been worked out before the war by German officers, and modern 
coast defense artillery from Essen and Skoda had been installed. 
Soon after hostilities opened, a German mail ship ran the Allies' 
blockade with a cargo of German mines for the defense of the 
Dardanelles. 

(2) Following General von der Goltz, General Liman von 
Sanders of the German army, with a numerous corps of assist¬ 
ants, was placed in command of the Turkish army and her 
coast defense. He had practically the powers of a dictator, 
after the beginning of the World War, as Enver Pasha, the 
Commander-in-Chief (or Secretary of War) did not assert his 
authority. 

(3) General von Sanders mobilized about 800,000 men, 
organized them into fourteen army corps, and concentrated 
them as follows: 

(a) Complete garrisons for all forts defending the Dar¬ 
danelles. 

(b) The Third Army of three corps (IX, X and XI), with 
strong reserves, at Erzerum, with the I Corps (under Enver 
Pasha himself) at Trebizond, to protect that left flank; a total 
of about 150,000 men under the command of Hasan Izzet 
Pasha, for operations against Russia, on the Caucasus front. 

(c) One corps at Bagdad. 

(d) The Second Army of three corps (IV, VIII and XII) 
at Damascus, a total of about 140,000 men, under command of 
Djemel Pasha, for operations against the Suez Canal and Egypt. 

(e) A strong strategical reserve (the First Army), at Con¬ 
stantinople. 

e. Operations in Mesopotamia. (1) The British however, 
were not taken by surprise. General Barrett, in India, had 
been given the mission of protecting the British oil base on the 
Island of Abadan in the Shatt-el-Arab at the head of the Persian 
Gulf. He sent a brigade under General Delemain in advance, 
which, after capturing the Turkish fort and force at Fao by 
bombardment, organized an intrenched camp at Saniyet, 
opposite Abadan, November 7, 1914. General Barrett followed 
with the rest of the 6th Division, reinforced by the 33d Cavalry, 
November 13. 

(2) The Turkish division intrenched at Sahil, with the 
left flank resting on the Shatt-el-Arab and the right refused 


80 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

and covered by groves of date palms. The artillery was in 
rear of the right flank. 

(3) The terrain in front of the Turkish position was level. 
General Barrett defeated the Turkish division by the tactical 
maneuver of dislocation and envelopment of the Turkish left 
by gunboat fire from the river and by an infantry attack 
echeloned to the left, while the 33d Cavalry delivered a holding 
attack against the Turkish right. 

(4) General Barrett pursued by river boats and by land, 
and occupied Bashra November 22. He organized Bashra at 
once as a base and protected the British naval oil base at 
Abadan. 

/. Operations in the Caucasus. (1) The Caucasus, between 
the Black and the Caspian Seas, varies from 1,500 to 5,000 
feet above sea level, with a mountain chain from sea to sea as a 
backbone. The winters are exceedingly cold. General von 
Sanders pushed the Third Army into that theater, after snow¬ 
fall, in the hope of surprising Russia. His general plan was to 
envelop the Russian forces at Kars by a strategic von Moltke 
concentration by the army from Erzerum and the corps at 
Trebizond. The total force was about 200,000 men. His 
detailed plan was for the XI Corps to attract the attention of 
the Russian army at Kars, and draw it toward Erzerum, while 
the X and IX Corps via Oita would envelop the Russian right 
and the I Corps from Trebizond via Ardahan would cut its 
line of communications and retreat. 

(2) The Russian army under General Wozonoff, advanced 
and engaged the XI Corps. When WozonofTs flank was 
threatened by the X Corps, he defended against the XI Corps 
and, December 1, 1914, decisively defeated the X Corps. 
January 3, he decisively defeated the I Corps (Enver Pasha) 
at Ardahan. He returned then and defeated the IX Corps 
at Sarikamish. 

g. Operations at the Dardanelles. As soon as Turkey 
joined the Central Powers, the Allies decided that the im¬ 
portance of communication with Russia required the opening 
of the Dardanelles. Pending the completion of plans, the com¬ 
bined British and French squadrons established an effective 
blockade of the passage, and on November 3 bombarded the 
entrance forts at long range. The only result of this bombard¬ 
ment was to put the Turks on the alert. 


81 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

10. Principles of War. a. The principle of the objective. 
(1) Under the von Schlieffen plan of campaign, Germany 
attempted the defeat of France as her first and main objective. 
In her operations against France, which, in the beginning 
under the von Schlieffen plan (Map 7) contemplated the 
envelopment of the left flank of the French forces by the troops 
of tne German right flank which were to whip around the west 
of Paris for that purpose, while another designated force con¬ 
tained Paris; and which, later (Map 13) under von Moltke’s 
plan, contemplated the dislocation of the Allies’ left from Paris 
and its envelopment by the German right which was to drive 
southeast of Paris, while a detachment contained Paris, Ger¬ 
many selected the hostile French (Allied) army as her objective 
rather than Paris. In this, Germany complied with the princi¬ 
ple of the objective which requires that the hostile army rather 
than a locality be made the objective. Her failure in the 
operations against France is sufficiently explained by errors of 
execution. 

(2) (Map 2.) (a) The operations against France required 
the greater portion of the German forces and Germany did 
not have enough troops with which to attempt the decisive 
defeat of Russia. Her plan called for the strategical and 
tactical defensive against Russia. 

Before the war, Russia’s principal industry was agricul¬ 
ture. Russia lagged far behind the western European countries 
in manufacturing. In fact, she was practically dependent on 
the markets of Western Europe for all her arms and munitions, 
including all such modern implements of war as surface and 
aerial motor vehicles. Hence, as soon as Germany declared war 
on Russia, August 1, 1914, the resources of her allies and the 
markets of the neutral states in Western Europe became the 
Russian base of supplies for arms, munitions, and military 
equipment. Her line of communications to that base was via 
the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. So when Germany suc¬ 
ceeded in cutting the Russian line of communications to her 
arms, munitions, and implement base in Western Europe, by 
closing the Dardanelles, August 4, 1914, through the diplomatic 
act of the neutral state Turkey (her secret ally) and changed 
that interruption to prohibition of Russian traffic through the 
Dardanelles by the armed act of her open ally, Turkey, October 
29, she made Russian resources her objective. 


82 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) (Map 28.) Similarly, after successfully defending East 
Prussia against Russia’s offensive of August, 1914, the decision 
by the German command to operate against Warsaw, the in¬ 
dustrial and distributing center of Poland, was in continuation 
of the German policy of making war against Russia by destruc¬ 
tion of her resources. 

(c) (Map 31.) In pursuit of the same purpose, in her war 
with Russia, Germany gave Turkey the mission of capturing or 
destroying the Russian oil base in the Caucasus. 

(3) Similarly she pursued the same purpose in her warfare 
against Great Britain, by giving Turkey the mission of cap¬ 
turing or destroying the British naval oil base in Mesopotamia, 
and the other mission of capturing, destroying or obstructing 
the Suez Canal, which was the British sea route from Europe 
to Asia. 

b. The principle of the offensive. (1) The offensive is 
the normal expression of the waging of war. (Maps 18 and 19.) 
When General von Hindenburg was placed in command of the 
German Eighth Army in East Prussia, the German force was 
much inferior in numbers to the Russian forces in East Prussia. 
General von Hindenburg, noting that General Jilinski's forces 
were separated by the Masurian Lakes, assumed the offensive 
against the Russian Second Army which was the greater menace, 
and, after defeating it, assumed the offensive against and de¬ 
feated the Russian First Army, thus successfully defending Ger¬ 
man East Prussia by the method of the sortie defensive. 

He thus gave at Tannenburg and at the Masurain Lakes an 
illustration, as General Joffre had done at the Marne, that com¬ 
pliance with the principle of the offensive can be utilized for 
relief from a nearly hopeless defensive situation. 

(2) (Maps 21 and 23.) At the Battles of the Jadar and of 
Mt. Roundnik, General Putnik, also by a similar compliance 
with the principle of the offensive, relieved a nearly hopeless 
defensive situation. 

(3) (Map 32.) General WozonofTs compliance with the 
principle of the offensive in the Caucasus, when he met the 
Turkish enveloping operation that threatened to destroy him, 
is an illustration of how great a demand can be made on the 
troops in sustaining an offensive, and its effectiveness in de¬ 
feating a threatened envelopment. 

(4) (Maps 25, 26 and 27.) In the race to the sea, after 
the German retreat to the Aisne, both the Germans and the 


83 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

Allies assumed and maintained an offensive attitude toward 
each other, in the specific effort to envelop the other's flank. 
The result was a series of meeting engagements in which each 
protected his own line of communications but failed to cut 
the enemy line of communications. The effectiveness of the 
offensive in an enveloping maneuver against an enemy attempt 
at envelopment of the same flank was clearly illustrated. 

c. The 'principle of economy of force. (1) (Map 2.) Be¬ 
fore violating the neutrality of Belgium, Germany had the 
opportunity to economize troops by a defensive attitude on 
the Western front, and thus to gain a great mass of manuever 
with which she could wage war against Russia. She knew that 
German public opinion would not lightly tolerate a Russian 
invasion of East Prussia, and that the failure of the operation 
against France would probably immobilize the greater part 
of her forces in France, with Belgium and Great Britain hostile 
and international public opinion arrayed against her violation of 
the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium. She cast all on the 
gambler's chance of defeating France in six weeks. By not 
defending on the French front in order to gain a “mass of 
maneuver" for offensive war against her other enemies, she 
violated the principle of economy of force . She dearly paid 
for that violation by the immobilization of a great part of her 
forces on the Western front, and by the consequent lack of 
sufficient troops with which to defeat Russia. In fact, her 
initial violation of that principle carried in its train, before 
the year was out, the necessity of conducting simultaneous 
offensive operations on both the French and Russian fronts. 

(2) Austria-Hungary, also, by conducting simultaneous 
offensives against Serbia and Russia, violated the principle 
of economy of force. As a result, she, too, did not secure a 
decision against either enemy. She should have defended the 
Serbian frontier with the minimum force and have used the 
troops thus conserved against the Russian army which, to her, 
was the main hostile army. 

(3) (Maps 18 and 19.) When General von Hindenburg 
contained the Russian First Army with two cavalry reinforced 
brigades, and concentrated the remainder of his force against 
the Russian Second Army and defeated it, he illustrated the 

principle of economy of force. 

(4) (Map 32.) When General Wozonoff defended against 

all of the Turkish columns in the Caucasus except one, and used 


84 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

the troops thus conserved in a vigorous offensive against each 
of those columns in succession, he illustrated the principle of 
economy of force. 

d. The principle of mass. (Map 18.) (1) In August and 
September, 1914, General Jilinski had preponderating forces 
in East Prussia that were operating on converging lines. By 
August 23, they were within short concentrating distance of 
each other. When General Jilinski did not assemble them and 
operate them as a united force, he violated the principle of 
mass and paid the penalty by being defeated in detail. 

(2) (Map 19.) When General von Hindenburg succeeded 
in concentrating, at the Battle of Tannenberg, a force superior 
to the Russian Second Army, and used it offensively, he illus¬ 
trated the principle of mass. 

e. The principle of surprise. (Map 24.) (1) When Gen¬ 

eral Brussilloff, commanding the Russian Eighth Army, suc¬ 
ceeded in attaining secretly a position on the right flank of the 
Austrian Second Army (General Boehm-Ermolli), at the Battle 
of Lemberg, that threatened its line of communications (Maps 
18 and 19) and when General von Hindenburg succeeded in 
concentrating secretly a superior force that threatened both 
flanks of the Russian Second Army (General Samsonoff), at 
the Battle of Tannenberg (Map 20) and later in secretly con¬ 
centrating a superior force that threatened the southern flank 
of the Russian First Army (General Rennenkampf), the 
principle of surprise was illustrated. 

(2) Similarly (Map 28), when Marshal von Hindenburg 
secretely concentrated a superior force that threatened the 
right flank of the Russian forces in front of Warsaw, in October, 
1914, and later the same month, when Grand Duke Nicholas 
in that same general situation secretely concentrated superior 
forces that threatened the left flank of the German forces, the 
principle of surprise was illustrated. 

(3) So, also (Map 29), Marshal von Hindenburg il¬ 
lustrated the same principle at the Battle of Lodz, in November, 
when he concentrated a superior force opposite to the right of 
the Russian forces in front of Warsaw and delivered an attack 
before Grand Duke Nicholas could make adequate prepara¬ 
tions to meet it. 

(4) On the other hand, the Allies (Map 2) by bombarding 
the Dardanelles forts November 3, without following it up with 


85 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 

any other operations, violated the principle of surprise in con¬ 
nection with any future operations to open the Dardanelles. 

/• The principle of movement. (1) Since the World War, 
the term war of movement is frequently used in contra¬ 
distinction to war of position. While that idea, i.e., of free 
maneuver, is helpful in understanding the idea contained in 
the principle of movement , still, it is not an exact description. 
Movement under the principle is more than mere motion. 
With exceptions, it includes the securing of freedom of action 
and the advance of superior force along the decisive direction. 
Ordinarily, the force that illustrates the principle of movement 
may be roughly described as the MV of mechanics, in which 
M is the Mass and V the velocity. Accordingly, when the 
opposing masses are of the same kind, the striking force varies 
approximately with the change of the velocity. 

(2) (Map 7.) The von Schlieffen plan of operations was 
largely built up around compliance with the principle of move - 
ment. The decisive direction in that operation was around the 
Allies’ left flank. As long as the German advance continued 
along that decisive direction, the success of the operation 
seemed assured. However, by detachments made and by 
reason of the change of the direction of the march of the ham¬ 
mer-head force from the decisive line, General von Moltke 
lost freedom of action for his right wing, and, after September 
2, when it turned to the southeast of Paris, its further advance 
ceased to be an illustration of movement and was nothing more 
than motion. 

(3) (Maps 25, 26 and 27.) In the race to the sea, the 
mass on each side was practically the same, i.e., infantry units 
preceded by cavalry as they went into the line. The velocity 
or speed was the same, as the maneuvers were alike, i.e., 
attempts to envelop the hostile flank. The results were: no 
advantage to either side and extension of the flank along the 
line of least resistance, i.e., toward the sea, which was the free 
or exposed flank. 

(4) (Map 29.) In Marshal von Hindenburg’s second offen¬ 
sive against Russia, in November, 1914, the German mass was 
really less than the Russian resisting body, but the velocity 
of the German blow gave it sufficient momentum to drive the 
Russian line back to Warsaw. 

g. The principle of security. (1) (Map 28.) By the 
diverting action at Augustova, September 29, Marshal von 


86 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Hindenburg complied with the principle of security by secur¬ 
ing freedom of action for his major offensive against Warsaw, 
in October. However, by not securing his left flank, he was 
forced to retreat and to give up all the ground that had been 
gained in the advance. 

(2) (Map 2.) By fortifying her German frontier in time 
of peace, France complied with the principle of security, in 
that she thereby could defend successfully against Germany 
along her German frontier, whereas, if Germany should attack 
through neutral countries, a shocked international public opin¬ 
ion would (and did) give her allies. 

(3) (Map 30.) By opening the dykes and letting in the 
sea during the Battle of Flanders, the Allies stopped the Ger¬ 
man advance and complied with the principle of security. 

(4) (Map 32.) The British navy was quite dependent 
on the Mesopotamian oil base, with the result that the British 
operations in Mesopotamia, in 1914, were to protect that base 
and were in compliance with the principle of security. 

(5) (Map 2.) Great Britain’s defense of Belgium and the 
north coast of France, under this principle, secured her south¬ 
ern shore. 

h. The principle of simplicity. (1) The simplest concep¬ 
tion of simplicity, in connection with command, is ‘‘Unity of 
Command.” In a single operation by one nation, this principle 
is always illustrated when there is “Unity of Command.” 
When there are allies, reliance is generally placed on that other 
principle—“Cooperation.” However, it may be accepted as 
an axiom, from the point of view of military efficiency, that 
unity of command under the principle of simplicity should be 
applied to all military operations. 

(2) (Map 2.) So, in the realm of command, the principle 
of simplicity required, in 1914, that in their war against the 
Allies, the Central Powers should have had one supreme com¬ 
mander of all operations, and under him, one commander in 
chief for each front or detached operation. 

(3) Similarly, the Allies at the beginning of the war, 
should have selected a supreme commander of all allied military 
operations, and under him, a commander in chief for the West¬ 
ern front, one for the Russian front, and one for the Serbian 
front. 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1914 


87 


i. The principle of cooperation. (1) It takes two or more 
to cooperate, so unity of command, which means one, must be 
included under the principle of simplicity. 

(2) In 1914, both the Central Powers and the Allies, from 
the command point of view, functioned under the principle 
of cooperation. Efficient command under this is much more 
difficult than under the principle of simplicity. No de¬ 
cisive result was secured during the year by cooperation. 

(3) (Map 2.) When Russia changed her plan from de¬ 
fensive on the German front to offensive, in order to attract 
German troops away from the French front, she effectively 
illustrated the principle of cooperation. 

(4) (Maps 18 and 19.) When General Rennenkampf did 
not go to the assistance of General Samsonoff, at the Battle 
of Tannenberg, he violated the principle of cooperation. 
General Samsonoff was decisively defeated by General von 
Hindenburg, who, later, defeated General Rennenkampf. 


CHAPTER V 


All Fronts to Include 1915 


Page 

1. Situation at End of 1914...„.. ; . 88 

a. Military and naval conditions ..._. 88 

b. Economic conditions... 89 

2. Plans of Campaign for 1915. 89 

a. Central Power’s plan.— 89 

b. Allied plan. r . 90 

3. Naval Operations... 90 

4. African Theater of Operations. 90 

a. German Cameroons. 90 

b. German Southwest Africa. 91 

5. Turkish Theater of Operations. 91 

a. Syrian operations. 91 

b. Mesopotamian operations. 91 

6. Russian Front to End of April... 93 

a. Situation January 1, 1915. 7 . 93 

b. Central Powers’ winter offensives. 93 

c. Russian offensive (March-April). 94 

7. Western Front Before Italy Joined the Allies. 95 

a. Situation at the beginning of 1915. 95 

b. Plans. 95 

c. Allied operations with limited objectives. 95 

8. Italian Front to End of Year. 96 

a. Italian objective. 96 

b. Italian theater of operations. 97 

c. Italian plan of campaign. 98 

d. Italian concentrations. 98 

e. Italian offensive. 99 

9. Russian Front to End of Year. 99 

a. Situation at end of April, 1915.. 99 

b. Battle of Dunajec.100 

c. Capture of Warsaw. 101 

d. Operations until the end of the year..101 

10. Western Front to End of the Year.101 

a. Situation, July 1, 1915.101 

b. Order of battle, July 1, 1915.102 

c. Operations, fall 1915.103 

11. Balkan Theater of Operations.105 

a. Dardanelles front.105 

b. Serbian front.107 

12. Principles of War.109 

a. Principle of the objective.109 

b. Principle of economy of force...Ill 

c. Principles of surprise, mass, and movement...Ill 


1. Situation at End of 1914. (Maps 1 and 2.) a. 
Military and naval conditions. (1) By the end of 1914, the 

88 















































89 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 

Allies had defeated Germany in the far eastern and in the 
Pacific theater of operations, on land and sea and had captured 
all her territory in those theaters. 

(2) In the African theater, they had captured Togoland. 

(3) In the Asia Minor theater, the British still held the 
Suez Canal and the oil base in Mesopotamia, and the Russians 
still held their oil base in the Caucasus. 

(4) In the European theater, the German plan to defeat 
France in six weeks and then to turn on Russia with all her 
force had failed, with the result that Germany was maintaining 
on her east and west fronts, by the method of position warfare, 
& total frontage of about 1,000 miles, while Austria was main¬ 
taining against Russia, by the same methods, a frontage of 
about 500 miles. 

(5) In the Balkan theater, Serbia and Montenegro were 
defending their frontier lines against Austria. The principal 
sea line of communications between Russia and her Allies 
had been cut by Turkey at the Dardanelles. 

b. Economic conditions. (1) Russia, although she had 
180,000,000 inhabitants, had practically no machinery, tools, 
or trained personnel for the manufacture of munitions. She 
had but one factory to each one hundred and fifty possessed 
by Great Britain. Without supplies from her Allies after war 
was declared, she could not have maintained war for more 
than one year. 

(2) The Central Powers' access to neutral markets was 
much restricted by the strategical siege imposed by the Allies 
on the Western, Serbian, and Russian land fronts and on the 
Adriatic, North, and Baltic Sea fronts. The result was that 
the Central Powers' access to neutral markets was limited to 
those of Scandinavia, Holland, Switzerland, Italy and Rou- 
mania. 

2. Plans of Campaign for 1915. Neither the Central 
Powers nor the Allies were ready for unity of command and 
their respective plans for combined action were evolved and 
executed through cooperation. 

a. The Central Powers’ plan. (1) On the sea, the German 
plan called for raids and submarine action with the view of 
wearing down the Allies' fleet to a point where the German 
fleet would have a fair chance in action. 

(2) The three remaining German colonies in Africa were 
to defend with their own resources. 


90 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(3) Turkey was to assume the offensive in Syria and in 
Mesopotamia in order to attract Allies’ detachments to those 
fronts. 

(4) In Europe, the Central Powers were to defend on the 
Western and Serbian fronts and to deliver a strategical and tac¬ 
tical offensive against Russia, with the view of securing a 
decision. 

b. The Allied plan. (1) The Allies planned to capture Ger¬ 
many’s remaining three colonies in Africa, and to defend the 
Suez Canal and the oil bases in Mesopotamia and in the 
Caucasus. 

(2) In the European theater, Serbia was to defend. Rus¬ 
sia’s other allies planned to assist a Russian offensive against 
Hungary by operations on the Western front that would at¬ 
tract German troops to that front and by operations to re¬ 
establish communication with her by forcing the sea route 
from the Mediterranean, through the Dardanelles, to the 
Black Sea. 

(3) However, the Allies, taken by surprise, at the magni¬ 
tude and possible length of the war, devoted their principal 
attention at the beginning of 1915 to the munition and supply 
situation, to organizing and training troops, and to the driving 
of German ships off the seas and the cutting of the Central 
Power contraband trade lines with neutral countries. 

3. Naval Operations. The Allied Powers maintained 
control of the sea during 1915, and very considerably restricted 
Germany’s receipt of contraband of war from overseas. Ger¬ 
many was not ready to risk a decisive naval action, but on 
February 18, announced unrestricted submarine warfare in 
British waters. The United States and many other neutral 
states protested. Among other ships sent to the bottom with¬ 
out warning was the Lusitania , with over one hundred Ameri¬ 
cans, including women and children, on board. The United 
States protested again and Germany promised that liners 
not resisting or trying to escape would not be sunk. 

4. African Theater of Operations. (Maps 1, 54 and 60.) 
a. German Cameroons. Allied forces under command of the 
English General Dobell and the French Colonel Mayer invaded 
the Cameroons soon after war was declared. The German 
forces adopted the step by step defensive in a retreat to the 
interior by defending the river crossings. However, not being 
able to replace losses, they finally surrendered, June 30, 1915. 


91 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 

b. German Southwest Africa. (1) The outbreak of war 

found General Botha, a veteran of the Boer War, in control 
of British South Africa. He, at once, proclaimed the loyalty 
of the colony to the British Empire. An insurrection friendly 
to Germany having broken out, he proclaimed martial law and 
arrested the leader, Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Maritz. The 
Boer veterans, General Beyers and General De Wet, with a 
rebel army, took the field in cooperation with troops of German 
Southwest Africa. Several battles were fought. General 
Botha finally defeated General De Wet in the decisive battle 
of Marquard, November 12, 1914. 

(2) General Botha then invaded German Southwest 
Africa, January 5, 1915. The Germans adopted a retreating 
defensive and guerilla warfare policy. Not having a replace¬ 
ment system for men or supplies, the German forces sur¬ 
rendered, July, 1915, and the colony was added to British 
South Africa. 

5. Turkish Theater of Operations. (Map 31.) a. 
Syrian operations. February 2, Djemal Pasha with the Turk¬ 
ish Second Army reached the Suez Canal opposite Ismailia. 
The troops secretly took positions along the canal. After dark, 
they launched their small boats and rafts under cover of artil¬ 
lery fire. The Turkish attempt to cross was checked by. rifle 
and machine gun fire. At dawn, the artillery of Egyptian 
batteries and of six gunboats, prevented any further attempts. 
The British pursued with Mohammedan troops only far 
enough to protect the canal. The British defensive attitude 
was dictated by the desire of not offending the Mohammedan 
population. Djemal Pasha, in a vain effort to preserve Turkish 
confidence, proclaimed that: 

“The canal has been reached, British men-of-war sunk, and the 
Englishmen routed, with a loss of only five men and two camels to 
the Turks, which were afterwards recovered; but a terrible sand storm 
having arisen, the glorious army takes it as the wish of Allah not to 
continue the attack and has, therefore, withdrawn in triumph.” 

b. Mesopotamian operations. (Map 32.) (1) (a) The 

British Expedition captured Basra November 22, 1914, or¬ 
ganized it at once as a base port and covered it with advanced 
elements at Korna. The Turks began to harass the expedi¬ 
tion and, in April, it was increased in strength to a corps. A 
strong Turkish attack down the Euphrates was defeated April 
14, 1915, and thrown back to Nazrijeh. 


92 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) The British commander, General Nixon, then operat¬ 
ing on interior lines, defeated a Turkish division at Ahwaz, 
northeast of Korna on the Kersha River, and secured protection 
for the oil pipe line. 

(c) He then, by improvisation, prepared a river fleet of 
rafts and small boats and, effecting a strategical surprise by 
the audacity of the maneuver, moved up the River Tigris to 
Amara. There, twenty-two daring men, May 28, 1915, pene¬ 
trated the town and demanded and received the surrender of 
the Turkish garrison of seven hundred men. 

(d) The next day, the Turkish division retreating hurriedly 
from Ahwaz with visions of pursuing British (who were not 
pursuing) arrived, and found British troops in front. The 
vanguard surrendered, and the rest of the division dispersed. 

(e) Still operating on interior lines, General Nixon, sent 
his improvised river flotilla against Nazrijeh, which was 
captured, July 25, with its garrison, seventeen cannon, and a 
great quantity of war material. 

(2) (a) General Townsend relieved General Nixon, and 
also operating on interior lines, captured Kut, September 29, 
with its garrison, thirteen cannon, and a great quantity of 
war material. Asidejah was held by his cavalry. 

(b) The British were now at the end of the radius of 
activity of the flotilla. General Townsend favored passing to 
the defensive. General Nixon remaining with the expedition 
as second in command, believed Bagdad could be captured. 
The authorities in India ordered an advance. 

(3) (a) The Turks, reinforced and under command of 
German officers, were met at Ctesphon, November 22, in an 
organized defensive zone. The Indian soldiers attacked and 
effected a tactical penetration of the first and second lines, but 
when counter attacked by a superior force withdrew to the 
first line. 

(b) General Townsend, then largely outnumbered, with¬ 
drew to Kut, November 25-December 3. This retreat, in the 
face of a much superior force, succeeded only because of the 
river craft and the superiority of the British cavalry, which, by 
charges, several times stopped the pursuing Turkish forces. 
The Turkish Army quickly began siege operations against 
Kut, which was held by General Townsend during the rest of 
the year. 


93 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 

6. Russian Front to the End of April. (Maps 2 and 
33.) a. Situation, January 1, 1915. (1) The situation at the 

beginning of the year was about the same as after stabiliza¬ 
tion following the Battle of Lodz. Each side was using the 
method of siege warfare on the long line: from near Libau— 
west of Warsaw—east of Cracow—south of Przemysl—to the 
Roumanian boundary. 

(2) During the winter, the Russians again advanced in 
the region of the Masurian Lakes. They also continued the 
advance in the Carpathians in spite of the rigors of weather and 
the resistance of the Austrians. 

(3) The menace to East Prussia and Hungary was acute 
and there was more than a possiblity that if the Russians 
should debouch from the Carpathians in the spring, in an ad¬ 
vance on Budapest, that the Czecho-Slovaks would desert 
the Central Powers and join Russia, the great Slav mother 
country. In view of these conditions, Austria requested the 
assistance of German troops. Germany agreed that the situa¬ 
tion was acute and decided to relieve it for all time by a major 
offensive that would defeat Russia and force her to sue for 
peace. 

b. Central Powers winter offensive. (1) Plan of operations. 
(a) The plan arranged by cooperation between Germany and 
Austria called for a converging maneuver. Marshal von 
Hindenburg was to deliver the northern converging blow with 
a group of German armies that would drive the Russians out 
of East Prussia and cut the Russian line of communications 
to Warsaw. 

(b) General von Hotzendorf, the Austrian Chief of Staff, 
was to deliver the southern converging blow with a group of 
Austrian armies, reinforced by German detachments and corps, 
with the view of driving the Russians out of Hungary and of 
raising the siege of Przemysl. 

(2) The winter battle in Masuria. (Maps 33 and 34.) (a) 
By a railroad concentration of troops from the Polish front, 
from Germany, and from the Western front, Marshal Hinden¬ 
burg concentrated the Tenth Army (General von Eichorn) and 
reinforced the Eighth Army (General Otto von Below). His 
plan was to concentrate a strong force in East Prussia with the 
view of destroying by a converging maneuver the Russian 
Tenth Army (General Silvers) which was greatly dispersed 


94 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

on a frontage of more than one hundred miles along the east 
frontier of East Prussia. 

(b) The attack was launched February 7, 1915. The 
German plan was that while the center, opposite the Russian 
XX Corps attracted and held the Russians in its front, the 
left of the Tenth Army (General von Eichorn) was to dislocate 
the Russian right near Tilsit and envelop it by advancing on 
the direction line: Tilsit—Mariampol—Grodno, and the 
Eighth Army (General Otto von Below) was to penetrate the 
thin Russian line and envelop the left flank of the Russian 
Tenth Army (General Silvers) by advancing on the direction 
line: Johannisburg—Grodno. 

(c) This double enveloping maneuver was executed 
brilliantly, in winter weather that included violent snow storms 
alternating with thaws. It was executed along the general 
lines of the Battle of Tannenberg and ended, February 21, 
by the practical destruction of the Russian Tenth Army in the 
vicinity of Augustova. 

(d) However, Grand Duke Nicohlas sent the Twelfth 
Army (General Plehve) north from Warsaw to assist the Tenth 
Army (General Silvers). The Twelfth Army attacked the 
southern flank of the German Eighth Army (General Otto 
von Below), and in a bloody winter battle, February 26-27, 
defeated the German Eighth Army. 

(3) The southern winter battle. General von Hotzendorf 
conducted the operation of the southern converging force. 
His mission was to raise the siege of Przemysl and to drive the 
Russians out of Hungary. Heavily reinforced with German 
troops, he launched the operation simultaneously with Marshal 
Hindenburg's winter battle in Masuria. He succeeded, in 
the east, in recapturing Czernowitz and Kolomea and pushing 
the Russians nearly to the Dniester River, but in the moun¬ 
tainous center and in the west, he lost many prisoners and 
made practically no progress. 

c. Russian offensive (March-April ). (1) Grand Duke 
Nicholas estimated that the Russian victory north of Warsaw 
and the spring thaws in Poland would protect the Russian 
right and decided to resume the major offensive against Hun¬ 
gary. 

(2) Accordingly, he advanced against and captured the 
great fortified camp of Przemysl March 22, with more than 150,- 
000 men and 1,050 cannon, of which 300 cannon were of large 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 95 

caliber. This success released to him 200,000 men, made him 
master of the railroads of Galicia, and gave him maneuvering 
space for the advance across the Carpathian Mountains, a 
maneuver in which he had been engaged since October. This 
maneuver involved winter operations of the most difficult 
kind, but by the end of April he had defeated the Austrian 
armies, crossed the passes and was ready to debouch into 
Hungary. 

7. Western Front Before Italy Joined the Allies. 

a. Situation at the beginning of 1915. (Map 35.) After the 
Battle of Flanders, the line on the Western front rested on the 
French fortified camps from Switzerland to include Verdun. 
From Verdun, it extended almost due west to near Compiegne, 
only ninety miles from Paris. From the latter point, it turned 
nearly due north and extended to the sea, north of Ypres. Thus 
the part west of Verdun composed a huge German salient in 
France, pointed towards Paris. Each side used the method 
of position warfare. 

b. Plans. (1) German. General von Falkenhayn, in 
order to gain troops for the major offensive operations against 
Russia, prescribed a strategical and tactical defensive attitude 
for the German forces on the western front in 1915 and directed 
them to use methods of siege warfare. 

(2) Allies. Immediately after the Battle of Flanders, 
General Joffre prescribed the policy of local offensives with 
limited objectives, by the Allied armies, in order to maintain 
the initiative and an offensive attitude, and in order to divert 
troops from the Russian front. 

c. Allied operations with limited objectives. (1) Winter 
1911^-1915. The only success of the Allies in gaining terri¬ 
tory was by the Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary) in 
Champagne, where the German line was pushed back nearly 
three miles, December 20-January 13. The operation was 
really a reconnaissance. 

(2) Spring, 1915. (a) Champagne. From February 16 

to March 17, the Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary) 
resumed the offensive after an artillery preparation, captured 
the enemy first line on a front of seven miles, and captured 
2,000 prisoners. The German reserves counter attacked and 
restored the line. The operation was really a reconnaissance 
in force. 


96 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) St. Mihiel {April 5-1 If). The First Army (General 
Dubail) executed a surprise converging attack against the 
St. Mihiel salient, with three corps as the western force and one 
corps as the eastern force. 

The maneuver was stopped by the violence of a sudden 
rain storm April 5, and when renewed, April 9, the element of 
surprise was gone and it failed because of insufficient artillery 
preparation and lack of previous knowledge of the depth of 
the organization of the German defenses. 

(c) Ypres Salient. On April 22, the Germans attempted 
the reduction of the Ypres salient by use of asphyxiating gas. 
The Second British Army (General Smith-Dorrien) which had 
relieved the Tenth French Army (General d’Urbal) recoiled 
in terror, then counter attacked and saved Ypres, but with a 
smaller salient. 

(3) Summer , 1915. Artois {Maij-June 25). (a) General 

Joffre next directed an attack by the Tenth Army (General 
d’Urbal) and the British First Army (General French), in 
the general direction of Lens. 

(b) A six days’ artillery preparation preceded the attack 
on the French front, which was launched at 10:00 AM, May 9. 
The attack advanced on a five mile front to Vimy Ridge, nearly 
four miles, in less than two hours, but the army commander, 
not expecting so rapid and deep an advance, did not have his 
reserves ready, and the German reserves by counter attack, 
closed the gap in the line. 

(c) The British attack failed for lack of sufficient artillery 
preparation. The operation was practically a reconnaissance 
in force. 

(4) There were other local attacks in the Argonne and 
in Alsace-Lorraine and along the whole line to secure better 
observation points, to correct the line and to secure information. 

8. Italian Front to End of Year. (Maps 2 and 36.) 
a. (1) Italian objective. Italy was a member of the Triple 
Alliance, but observing that the Central Powers were the aggres¬ 
sors in the war, Italy, under the terms of the Triple Alliance, 
declared her neutrality August 3, 1914, thus releasing French 
troops from the Alps. 

(2) April 26, 1915, the Italian government signed a secret 
treaty with the Allies in London, under which, for the promise 
of sovereignty over the Trentino, Trieste, the littoral of Dalma¬ 
tia south of Fiume, Valona, a sphere of influence on the south 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 97 

side of Asia Minor, and financial support, she promised to 
join the Allies. 

6. Italian theater of operations . (1) (a) The boundary 

between Italy and Austria was roughly a letter S, and extended 
from the Adriatic Sea, west of the Isonzo River to the Carnic 
Alps, along these mountains to and along the Dolomite Alps, 
and the loop to the south along mountains called the Trent 
Salient, making a line a little less than five hundred miles long. 

(b) This front divides itself into three parts as follows: 

The Isonzo front, from the sea to Plava. 

The Alpine front, to include Cortina d’Ampezzo. 

The Trent front, to Switzerland. 

(c) The Isonzo front was along low ground of a width of 
about twenty miles, with the Isonzo River on the Austrian side, 
backed by high ground. Above Goritza, it was practically a 
ravine. 

(d) The Alpine front, along the crest of the Carnic and 
Dolomite Alps, gave the high points with observation and con¬ 
trol to the Austrians. On this front the main pass which was 
controlled by the Austrians, is near Pontebbe (altitude 2,615 
feet). Through it runs the railroad to Vienna. Another im¬ 
portant pass is the Cortina d’Ampezzo (altitude 5,000 feet), 
through which runs the road to Toblac. A pass of nearly 
equal importance pierces the mountains near Monte Croce. 
There are other passes important as foot paths. 

(e) The Trent front was a great salient of which the sides 
are mountain buttresses extending down into Italy. The 
front of the salient is pierced by the rivers Brenta and Adige. 
The principal entrance to the Trent salient is via the Adige, 
along which runs a railroad. The fortified camp of Trent 
faced any possible invader from Italy. The frontier makes 
two great salients; the Trent salient extending into Italy, and 
the Udine salient extending into Austria. 

(2) (a) (Map 37.) Italy had a double line of railroads 
paralleling the frontier, i.e., from Mantua to the head of the 
Gulf of Venice, and from Verona to Udine (with six cross lines 
connecting). From the latter line, she had spurs going up 
valleys to the foot of the Alps. The two main lines pierced 
the mountains at Pontebbe and along the Adige. The lines 
thus were so constructed that cutting them at any point would 
accomplish only a local result. 


98 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) The Austrians were not so well situated. Their rail¬ 
road lines paralleled the frontier, also, but were in mountain 
valleys of the Alps. 

There were several important sensitive railroad points on 
the Austrian side. Thus, the capture of the railroad junction 
southwest of Trieste would cut the Austrian line of communica¬ 
tions to her naval base, Pola. The capture of the railroad 
junction east of Pontebbe would seriously cripple the whole 
Austrian operation. Also, the capture of the railroad junction 
at Franzenfeste would cut the Austrian line of communications 
to the Trent salient. 

(3) (a) From a railroad point of view, Italy had a great 
advantage over Austria. However, considering the whole 
subject of military geography of the theater, the Austrian line 
was almost impregnable, and, in the Trent salient, she had a 
place of departure for operations against the rear of any 
Italian force threatening Trieste, Pola, or Vienna, and the dis¬ 
tance from the frontier to Venice was only fifty miles. 

(b) Thus the terrain lent itself to an Austrian defensive 
attitude. For an offensive attitude, the terrain and railroads 
fixed three places for the Austrian concentrations, i.e., Goritza, 
Villac, and Trent. 

(c) Similarly it fixed those places with one other, i.e., 
Franzenfeste, as the Italian first objectives. 

c. Italian plan of campaign. The Italian plan of campaign 
was to capture the mountain crests, thus obtaining the ad¬ 
vantage of their good observation along the whole line; to 
reduce the Trent salient; to capture the Carso and the Istria, 
beyond the Isonzo River. There were to be three operations 
on the three fronts. 

d. Italian concentration. (1) The Italian army had been 
trained under the Prussian system. Its infantry and cavalry 
were excellent. Its artillery was fair. It was equipped with 
the rapid fire 75s, but had practically no heavy artillery. 

(2) Italy took advantage of the lessons of the war to equip 
and train her army before joining the Allies. Her army totaled 
800,000 men, organized into twelve army corps of the first 
line, with three more lines of reserves ready to be called. The 
Commander-in-Chief, General Cadorna, organized the forces 
into four armies as follows: 

First Army: Trent front. 

Fourth Army: Alpine front. 


99 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 

Third Army: Isonzo front. 

Second Army: Reserve near Venice. 

e. Italian offensive. (1) (a) General Cadorna launched 
the attack along the whole frontier May 24. 

(b) The operation against the Trent salient by the First 
Army was converging. The western blow was delivered near 
the Tonale Pass. The eastern blow was delivered along the 
Adige and the Brenta, but was not able to pass Roveredo or the 
fortified camp of Trent. 

(c) The Fourth Army captured Monte Croce and Cortina 
d'Ampezzo. This opened up the pass to Toblac, and the 
operation against Tarvis reached the stage of bombarding the 
fort at Malborgetto which commands the pass from Pontebbe 
to Tarvis. 

(d) The Third Army, with its right protected by an Italian 
fleet, had the mission of capturing Goritza. It reached Mon- 
falcone—Plava—Monte Nero, but did not capture Goritza. 

(2) (a) The Austrians intrenched at once, and promptly 
tranferred the equivalent of twenty divisions from the Russian 
front to the Italian front and organized them into three armies, 
i.e.: 

Isonzo Front: General Boroevic’s Army. 

Alpine Front: General Rohr’s Army. 

Trent Front: General Dankl’s Army. 

(b) Thereafter, the operations on the Italian front were 
waged by the method of position warfare until the end of the 
year. 

9. Russian Front to End of Year. (Map 38.) a. 
Situation at end of April, 1915. (1) The success of Russia’s 

offensive against Austria in April, accentuated by the fact that 
the Central Powers were defending at the time on the Serbian 
and Western fronts, thoroughly alarmed the Central Powers. 
As a consequence, Austria-Hungary agreed that Germany 
should direct the operations. 

(2) General von Falkenhayn estimated that Russia had 
expended most of her ammunition and equipment in 1914 and 
that, the Dardanelles being closed and the port of Archangel 
ice bound from early fall to late spring and with almost no 
manufacturing arsenals, Russia was practically dependent on 
the Siberian railroad as a means of supply for arms and equip¬ 
ment. He further estimated that, in this situation, Russia 
would have no way of defending against an offensive that 



100 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

ay 

advanced at the rate of its heavy artillery. He decided, there¬ 
fore, to shoot Russia out of Poland with heavy artillery 

(3) His general plan called for a preliminary operation that 
would drive the Russians out of Hungary, followed by a great 
converging maneuver against the Russian armies in the Polish 
salient. 

(4) His detailed plan for the converging maneuver was 
for Marshal Hindenburg with a group of three armies to attack 
from the north, in the general direction: Ossovietz—Warsaw. 
Von Mackensen group of two armies and the Bavarian Crown 
Prince’s group of three armies was to advance south of War¬ 
saw to the line Brest Litovsk—V/arsaw. Two armies on the 
right were to operate against the fortified camps of Przemysl 
and Lemberg. An army on the right and left, respectively, 
was for flank protection. General headquarters was to move 
from the Western front to Pless, west of Cracow on the Eastern 
front, from which the operations over a front of more than 1,000 
miles were to be directed. 

(5) The plans and concentrations of German troops for 
this great battle were prepared and executed so secretly that 
the opening of the operation was a surprise to Grand Duke 
Nicholas, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, and the only in¬ 
formation the Austrians had of German troop movements 
was by seeing their arrival at the designated destinations. 
The troops on the trains were in equal ignorance of their destina¬ 
tion and of the reason for their movement. 

b. Battle of Dunajec. (1) General Mackensen, in the pre¬ 
paratory operation, drove the Russians out of Hungary, and 
then advanced in the direction south of Tarnow, with a com¬ 
pact massed force of 200,000 men. 

(2) An artillery preparation on May 2, for four hours, by 
pieces of all calibers, of an intensity theretofore unknown, 
opened the battle of Dunajec and destroyed many thousands 
of Russians. The Russians, taken by surprise, fought bravely, 
but, attacked also by the armies to the right and left, fell back 
from the line of the Dunajec to the line of the San, between 
Warsaw and Przemysl. 

(3) Four million men fought on that line for more than a 
month. At last, battered by heavy artillery, the Grand Duke 
evacuated the fortified camp of Przemsyl on June 3, and, 
giving up Lemberg, continued the retreat to the line of the 
Vistula and the Bug, which was occupied July 30. 


J 


101 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 

c. Capture of Warsaw. (1) Von Falkenhayn had driven 
the Russians out of Hungary by July 15. He then began the 
converging maneuver. The southern force turned north be¬ 
tween Warsaw and the Bug River, and on July 30 attacked 
Lublin and Cholm. 

(2) Marshal von Hindenburg on the north, driving to 
turn Warsaw, captured Prasnysz and forced the Russians across 
the Narew River. At the same time, exploiting the success 
with his left, he drove the Russians back along the Baltic. 

(3) In the center, the group of armies commanded by the 
Crown Prince of Bavaria advanced, guiding on the group of 
armies commanded by General Mackensen, and on July 30, 
attacked Ivangorod. Grand Duke Nicholas evacuated War¬ 
saw, on August 5, and began a general retreat to the interior 
of Russia. 

(4) At the end of September, the Russians held, by siege 
methods, a line nearly straight, from the Gulf of Riga to the 
neutral country of Roumania. 

(5) The major offensive of the Allies on the Italian and on 
the Western fronts, operating as a diversion, and the call of 
Turkey for immediate emergency assistance, stopped the 
operation against Russia. 

d. Operations until the end of the year. (1) Siege operations 
obtained on the Russian front during the rest of the year except 
that General Ivanoff, on the left, counter attacked across the 
Styr and Stripa Rivers and recaptured Tarnopol, and General 
Roussky, on the north, successfully defended on the line of the 
Dwina against the many terrific German attacks that were 
intended to force the Russian right off the Gulf of Riga and 
into “the air.” Pie was assisted in the defense of Riga by the 
Russian fleet which gave him fire superiority. 

(2) September 7, 1915, the Czar assumed personal com¬ 
mand of the armies at the front and sent Grand Duke Nicholas 
as Viceroy to command the Russian forces on the Caucasus 
front with a view of cooperating in the allied operations at 
Gallipoli. 

10. Western Front to End of the Year. (Maps 2 
and 39.) a. Situation , July 1 , 1915. (1) The success of the 

Central Powers offensive, then advancing in Russia, alarmed 
the Allies and General Joffre called a conference of representa¬ 
tives of the allied powers at his headquarters at Chantilly, 
July 7, 1915. 


102 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(2) At this conference it was agreed that a general offen¬ 
sive should be launched on the French front as a diversion in 
favor of Russia and with the hope that it would be decisive. 

b. Order of battle, July 1, 1915. (1) Allies’ order of battle 
from the north, (a) Belgian Army (General Willmans), six 
infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions from the sea to 
the Lys (exclusive), supported by the French XXXVI Corps, 
which held the right and left flanks of the Belgian Army. 

(b) British Armies. The Second Army (General Smith- 
Dorrien), from the Lys (inclusive) to Armentieres (exclusive). 

First Army (General Haig), from Armentieres (inclusive) 
to Vermelles (exclusive). 

(c) French Armies. Tenth Army (General d'Urbal), from 
Vermelles (inclusive) to the Somme. 

Second Army (General Petain), from the Somme to the 
Oise. 

Sixth Army (General Dubois), from the Oise to the Vesle. 

Fifth Army (General d’Esperey), from the Vesle to Rheims 
(inclusive). 

Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary) in Champagne. 

Third Army (General Sarrail), in the Argonne and north 
and south of Verdun. 

First Army (General Roques), Heights of the Meuse and 
in the Woevre. 

Detachment of Lorraine (General Humbert), in Lorraine. 

Seventh Army (General Maud'huy), in the Vosges and in 
Alsace. 

The French forces were disposed in three groups from north 
to south, as follows: 

The Group of the North (General Foch), to the Oise. 

The Group of the Center (General Castelnau), to the 
Fourth Army (inclusive). 

The Group of the East (General Dubail), to Switzerland. 

Thirty-six infantry divisions and six hundred pieces of heavy 
artillery were held in reserve. In July, the arrival of the Third 
British Army permitted the passing of the French Second 
Army to the Reserve. 

General Headquarters: Chantilly. 

(2) The German order of battle from the north was: 

Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemberg), region of the Yser 
and Ypres. 

Sixth Army (General von Bulow), region of the Somme. 


103 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 

First Army (General von Kluck), region of the Aisne. 

Seventh Army (General von Herringen), region of Rheims. 

Third Army (General von Einem), region of Champagne. 

Fifth Army (German Crown Prince), region of Argonne 
and Verdun. 

Army Detachment (General von Strantz), region of heights 
of the Meuse. 

Army Detachment (General von Falkenhausen), region of 
Lorraine. 

Army Detachment (General von Gaede), region of Alsace. 

General Headquarters, Pless, on Eastern front. 

c. Operations, fall 1915. (Map 40.) (1) Allied plan, (a) 
General Joffre’s general plan for the operation called for a 
great converging maneuver against the German salient in 
France with pivot near Compeigne and with the object of 
crushing the German armies west of Verdun. 

(b) General Joffre’s plan was: (i) The northern force, 
in Artois, consisting of the First British Army (General Haig) 
and the Tenth French Army (General d'Urbal), to attack in 
the d rection of Vimy Ridge, with the idea of breaking through 
and exploiting the success in the direction of Valenciennes. 
The First British Army to attack with 13 infantry divisions, 
600 pieces of light and 270 pieces of heavy artillery. The 
Tenth French Army to attack with 17 divisions, 700 pieces of 
light and 380 pieces of heavy artillery. 

(ii) The eastern force, in Champagne, consisting of the 
Second Army (General Petain) and the Fourth Army (General 
Langle de Cary), to attack on a front of twenty-two miles from 
the Aisne on the east, in the direction of Mezieres, with the 
object, after the penetration of all the German lines, of cutting 
the German line of communications. 

(iii) The eastern force was to be assisted by two second¬ 
ary attacks; the Third Army (General Sarrail) on the right 
attacking in the direction of Sedan; and the Fifth Army (Gen¬ 
eral d’Esperey) attacking on the left), converging toward 
Mezieres. 

(iv) The Second and Fourth Armies were to attack with 
30 divisions and 1,200 pieces of 75s and 850 pieces of heavy 
artillery. 

(v) The Fifth Army was to attack with 6 infantry divi¬ 
sions and 270 pieces of 75s and 250 pieces of heavy artillery. 
Seven cavalry divisions followed the eastern force. The total 


104 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

of the two forces was 53 French and 13 English divisions, 
supported by 2,000 pieces of heavy artillery and 3,000 pieces of 
75-mm. guns. 

(2) The attacks, (a) (i) The Second and the Fourth 
Armies after an intensive artillery preparation, "‘jumped off” 
September 25, at 9:15 AM, during a violent rain storm. The 
center elements advanced rapidly, but the flanks were stopped 
by hostile flank fire. 

(ii) The first German position was completely overrun 
on a front of twelve miles. 

(iii) The second German position located, on a reverse 
slope, had escaped all observation and accordingly had not 
been marked for destruction by the artillery. Its wire was all 
in place, and the position stopped the attacking line. 

(iv) The next day, September 26, a penetration one mile 
wide was effected in the second position, but the attempt to 
pass reserves through the lines to exploit the success was stopped 
by the prompt counter attack of German reserves. The opera¬ 
tion was then stopped, pending the forward displacement of 
the artillery to prepare the attack on the German second posi¬ 
tion. 

(v) The attack was resumed October 6 with some success 
but since the element of surprise had been lost, there seemed to 
be no chance of a decision and October 30 the action was 
stopped. 

(vi) The Third and Fifth Armies did not advance. 

(b) (i) The British First Army and the French Tenth 
Army “jumped off” together about noon, September 25. 

(ii) The British First Army, after an intensive artillery 
preparation, advanced on a front of nine miles but soon met 
strong German counter attacks. It fought until the end of 
October, but could not advance. 

(iii) The Tenth French Army reached Vimy Ridge where 
itffought until October 14. Its right however was thrown back 
to its line of departure. 

(3) Results of the operations, (a) The operation came so 
nearly to success that it is probable that the failure can be 
charged to not having discovered the German second position 
on a reverse slope in front of the Second and Fourth French 
Armies. In fact, General von Falkenhayn sent all available 
reserves to the imperiled sectors at once. 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 105 

(b) The German Third Army staff considered the advisa¬ 
bility of withdrawing the Army from the front. The Chief of 
Staff of the Fifth Army advised holding until the arrival of 
General von Falkenhayn. 

(c) General von Falkenhayn, with his staff, started from 
the Eastern front by emergency transportation, as soon as he 
learned of the bombardment, and arrived at noon, September 
25. 

(d) In the emergency General von Falkenhayn threw one 
of the last reserve divisions into the Champagne, and the X 
Corps and the Guard Corps against the northern converging 
force. The reserves of the Seventh Army on the Aisne were 
ordered at once to join the Third Army, and fresh divisions 
were drawn from quiet sectors to relieve exhausted divisions. 
In addition, he stopped the Central Powers offensive on the 
Eastern front and transferred troops therefrom to reinforce the 
western line. 

11. Balkan Theater of Operations. (Maps 2 and 41.) 
a. Dardanelles front. (1) The Situation. Germany effected 
a strategical penetration between Russia and her European 
allies by the accretion of Turkey, and was able to operate 
against the Eastern and Western fronts in detail. Russia was 
short of everything required for major operations except men 
and horses. The Allies were in need of Russian cereals and oil. 
Communication between them for coordination of plans was 
greatly limited. We have seen that Germany equipped the 
forts on the Dardanelles with modern artillery and prepared 
plans for their defense. Von Sanders, after the Allies' naval 
demonstration November 3, 1914, against the head of the 
straits, estimated that the Allies would try to force the straits, 
and made great preparations to defend them. 

(2) Naval descent, (a) As soon as Turkey entered the 
war, England and France decided that under the changed 
situation it would be necessary to reestablish communica¬ 
tion with Russia in order to keep her in the war. Great Britain's 
plan to force the Dardanelles by a naval descent to be followed 
by exploitation with land troops accompanying in transports 
was adopted. 

(b) An Allied fleet bombarded the forts February 19, and 
then swept the straits for mines. The results appeared 
to be satisfactory and, on March 18, the Allies' fleet entered 
the straits to force their way to Constantinople. However, 


106 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

their losses were so great from floating mines that the opera¬ 
tion was abandoned on March 22. 

(3) Land Operations, (a) The Allies then, on the recom¬ 
mendation of General Hamilton, the British commander of 
the land forces, decided to reverse the plan and to reduce the 
forts by land operations on the Gallipoli peninsula. 

(b) The troops and supplies had been loaded rapidly 
without regard to a possible landing against resistance, hence, 
under the new plan of landing them in face of opposition, 
General Hamilton found it necessary to return all the transports 
from Mudros to Alexandria for sorting and reloading men and 
supplies. By this delay, a month was lost during which time 
the Turks were busily preparing to defend Gallipoli. 

(c) (i) The expedition comprising about 65,000 men 
made up of one French and four British divisions, after a 
thirty minute bombardment of the defenses, landed and es¬ 
tablished themselves with heavy loss on April 25; the French at 
Seddul-Bahr, and the British at Gaba Tepe. The heights 
Krithia (472 feet), Atchi Baba (709 feet), and Seri-Bair (1034 
feet) which gave observation and control of the straits, became 
the objectives of the expedition. 

(ii) The Turkish forces, under the direction of German 
officers, had prepared these heights and the peninsula for 
defense. The allied operation at first was a frontal attack 
against Krithia and Atchi Baba, but passed later to a slow and 
methodical siege operation, interspersed many times by 
courageous and costly assaults. As these methods were un¬ 
successful, General Hamilton altered the plan to include a 
northern envelopment of the Turkish line from Suvla. That 
plan also failed and the condition of siege warfare obtained all 
along the line, with the Turks in control of all good observa¬ 
tion points and the allied line too short and too thin for man¬ 
euver. 

(4) (a) When it was seen in October, that the German 
invasion of Russia had spent itself, and that the Central 
Powers had undertaken a major offensive against Serbia, the 
Allies decided that the great emergency requiring the forcing 
of the Dardanelles had for the moment passed, that their 
position was not secure, and that a base for operations against 
the Central Powers' southern flank should be located at Salon- 
iki, where the new conditions could be met by extending a 


107 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 

friendly hand to Serbia and by laying a restraining hand on 
Greece. 

(b) The Dardanelles expedition was accordingly aban¬ 
doned. The final evacuation was successful as a surprise 
between December 20 and January 8, and a part of the expedi¬ 
tion established an Allies’ base at Saloniki. 

b. Serbian front. (1) Situation. The Dardanelles opera¬ 
tion practically exhausted Turkey’s munitions. She was en¬ 
tirely dependent on Germany for munitions. Neutral Rou- 
mania, secretly very friendly to the Allies after Germany’s 
failure in 1914, was opposed to the passage of German muni¬ 
tions through her territory to Turkey. Turkey appealed to 
Germany for help. 

(2) Plans. (a) The Central Powers ’ plan. (i) Von 
Falkenhayn estimated that the prevention of Russian resupply 
would greatly simplify the defeat of Russia and decided that 
Germany must go to the assistance of Turkey in keeping the 
Dardanelles closed. 

On July 17, Germany signed a treaty with Czar Ferdinand 
of Bulgaria under which Bulgaria, in consideration of the 
promise of accretion of Serbian Macedonia, held herself in 
readiness to join the Central Powers on call. 

General von Falkenhayn’s plan was to execute a double 
envelopment against the Serbian armies, the northern envelop¬ 
ment (General Mackensen) to be by German and Austrian 
forces, while the eastern envelopment was to be by the Bul¬ 
garian forces. 

(ii) He effected a railroad concentration of troops, mostly 
from the Russian front, for the northern envelopment as follows: 

One Austrian corps, on the Drina front. 

A German-Austrian Army (General Kowes), on the Save Front. 

A German Army (General Gallwitz), on the Danube front. 

A total of 250,000 men. 

For the eastern envelopment, Bulgaria, early in September, 
ordered mobilization and concentration along the Serbian 
frontier, and on October 5, by refusing a reply to their ulti¬ 
matum, informed the Allies that she had cast her lot in with the 
Central Powers. Her concentration was as follows: 

First Army (General Bojadieff), south of Roumania. 

Second Army (General Theodorof), astride the Bagdad railroad. 

Third Army (General Jeeoff), on the Vardar front. 


108 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

The Bulgarian Army totaled about 300,000 men, organized 
into twelve divisions. Its arms were modern, and the cannon 
were rapid fire 75-mm. and Krupp batteries. 

(b) The Serbian plan, (i) After the fall of Warsaw, 
August 5, General Putnik, Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian 
forces, estimated that Bulgaria was concentrating against 
Serbia and, accordingly, disposed a part of his troops on the 
Bulgarian front to meet that concentration. 

General Putnik's general plan was to assume the strategic 
and tactical defensive on both fronts and to attempt to pre¬ 
vent the junction of the Central Powers and the Bulgarian 
forces, and to cover the railroad—Saloniki—Nish—Belgrade. 

(ii) He disposed his forces from right to left as follows: 
To defend against Bulgaria: 

A detachment, to establish connection with the Allied forces at 

Saloniki. 

Second Army, to defend the line of the Morava. 

Army of Timok, to defend against Bulgaria south of the Danube. 

A detachment in the angle of the Timok and the Danube, to pre¬ 
vent junction of Bulgarian and German forces. 

To defend against the Central Powers: 

Third Army, on the Danube front to the Morava. 

Belgrade Army, on the Danube front west of the Morava. 

First Army, between the Save and the Drina. 

On the left, the Montenegrin detachment. 

A total of about 175,000 troops. 

(c) Plan of Saloniki detachment. (i) Two divisions 
(20,000 men) from Gallipoli, one French and one British, 
landed at Saloniki the first week in October, under command of 
the French General, Sarrail. 

(ii) This force moved north, October 14, with the double 
mission of guarding the Saloniki railroad and of establishing 
contact with the Serbians. The deployment was without 
incident and the first contact with the Bulgarians was favorable. 

(3) Operations. Battle of the Frontier. (1) After an ex¬ 
ceedingly effective artillery preparation by heavy artillery, 
the Central Powers' northern enveloping force, under cover of 
heavy artillery fire, crossed the Danube, the Save, and the 
Drina. Each invading army advanced covered by an advance 
guard. 

(b) The Serbian resistance, by means of local counter 
attacks, was so effective that from the west, to include the 
Second Bulgarian Army, none of the advance guards covered 
ten miles in the first week. 


109 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 

(c) The Third Bulgarian Army, however, met little 
opposition on its right and crossed the Morava near Vrania, 
October 20. Its extreme left was held up by the Saloniki Army. 

(d) The Third Bulgarian Army captured Uskub and 
Veles, October 25, thus cutting the line of communications 
of the Serbian armies which were already outnumbered three 
to one in their fronts. General Putnik’s line of retreat to Sal¬ 
oniki thus being blocked, he decided on a general retreat to the 
Adriatic Sea. 

(e) On November 10, General Mackensen's left joined 
Czar Ferdinand's right near Nish. 

(f) The Serbians defended the passes and, assisted by the 
successful defense of the Saloniki position by General Sarrail, 
the pursuit was checked and several days were gained for the 
retreating Serbian army. At the end of November, the whole 
Serbian force was retreating clear to the Adriatic via Elbason, 
Dibra, Prizrend, and Ipek. 

(4) Salvage of the Serbian Army. France and Italy sent a 
mission commanded by General Mondesir to receive, clothe, 
and feed the Serbian Army as it emerged from the mountains 
to the coast. They were collected and sent to the Italian port, 
Valona. From there, 120,000 were sent to Corfu where, under 
the wardship of France, they were reorganized, armed, equipped, 
and supplied. 

(5) Montenegrin Army. The small Montenegrin Army, 
about 3,000 men, surrendered to the Austrians. 

(6) Saloniki force. The Saloniki force, having no further 
mission to the north, retired early in December to Saloniki, 
where it held itself in readiness, as the Allies had decided to 
build up an army at that point for use at an appropriate time 
in resumption of the maneuver of penetration between Berlin 
and Constantinople. It attracted and held in its front, from 
east to west, the First Bulgarian Army (General Bojadieff), 
the Eleventh German Army (von Gallwitz), the Second 
Bulgarian Army (General Todorow), and the German Alpine 
Corps, in reserve. 

12. Principles of War. a. Principle of the objective. 
(Maps 2 and 41.) (1) It is well to approach the consideration 
of operations in 1915 from the point of view of the objective. 
Germany had failed in 1914 to force a separate peace from 
France and a very considerable part of her forces were immobil¬ 
ized on the French front. Russia, with a much larger man 


110 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

power than Germany, began operations against Germany as 
early as August, 1914, and against Austria in September, 1914. 
The Russian supply of munitions was inadequate and continued 
effective operations by Russia were dependent on the receipt 
of munitions from her Allies and from the markets of Western 
Europe. 

(2) (a) The German war plan made the defeat of France 
the first objective of the war, and to reach that objective, 
Germany operated against the French (allied) armies rather 
than against the city of Paris or other localities. It made the 
defeat of Russia the second objective with the expectation 
of using the whole German force against Russia after the esti¬ 
mated defeat of France, in six weeks. 

(b) Pending the operations against France, the German 
objective in aggressive effort against Russia was to destroy her 
resources. In the pursuit of that objective, she succeeded by 
closing the Dardanelles at the beginning of the war, in cutting 
the Russian main line of munition supply. On the Russian 
front, she succeeded by August, 1915, in capturing the Russian 
main industrial area, with Warsaw, which was the Russian 
industrial and distributing center. 

(c) After the capture of Warsaw and the defeat of the 
Russian forces, Germany did not continue the direct operations 
against the Russian armies to a decision, but, instead, she di¬ 
rected her effort through the Balkans to the insuring of the 
continued blocking of Russia's munition supply line through 
the Dardanelles which the Allies were trying to open. 

(3) (a) Thus, preceding her initiation of operations in 
the World War, Germany decided that her first and main 
objective was to force a separate peace from France through 
defeat of her armies, and that, following the elimination of 
France as an enemy, her next objective w T as to force a separate 
peace from Russia, through defeat of the latter's armies, and 
that, pending the decisive operations against France, the ob¬ 
jective of her operations against Russia was the reduction of 
Russian resources below battle efficiency. 

(b) Because of Germany's failure to defeat France, a 
situation arose, unexpected by Germany, under which the greater 
part of her armed forces were immobilized in defending the 
long line from Switzerland to the sea on the Western front. 
As a result, Germany did not have a sufficient force with which 
to decisively defeat the Russian armies. Accordingly, she 


ALL FRONTS TO INCLUDE 1915 111 

retained the “reduction of Russian resources below battle 
efficiency” as the objective of her operations against Russia 
up to and including the end of 1915. 

b. Principle of economy of force. (1) (Map 2.) When von 
Falkenhayn, with the cooperation of allies, defended on all 
other fronts, while he successfully operated first on the Russian 
front and then on the Balkan front, he complied with the 
principle of economy of force. 

(2) At the beginning of 1915, the forces of the Central 
Powers comprised two groups; those of Germany and Austria 
composed the main group, while those of Turkey composed the 
second and minor group. The main Central Powers’ army was 
the German-Austrian group. When Great Britain and France, 
in the pursuit of the objective of reopening communication 
with Russia, selected the direction line for the operation 
through the minor Central Powers’ group, i.e., Turkey, there 
resulted a detachment of allied troops from the presence of the 
main hostile army, without any detachment whatever from 
that main hostile army, to the minor group. Thus the Dar¬ 
danelles operation as executed by the Allies violated the princi¬ 
ple of economy of force. 

(3) In 1915, Roumania was so friendly with the Allies 
that Germany considered it not unlikely that she might join 
them at any tine and prepared plans for such a contingency. 
If, in pursuance of the objective of reestablishing communica¬ 
tion with Russia, the Allies, after Italy joined, had reinforced 
the Serbian front, they would have insured rail communication 
through the Balkans with Russia, and, while keeping Bulgaria 
away from the Central Powers would probably have drawn 
Roumania to them. In this manner this would have com¬ 
pleted the strategical investment of the main Central Powers 
group. Under such conditions, the detachment of allied 
troops from the Western front to the Balkan front would not 
have been taking troops away from the presence of the main 
hostile army, and, while accomplishing the same objective as 
the Dardanelles operation, i.e., resupply of Russia, it would 
not have violated the principle of economy of force. 

c. Principles of surprise, mass, and movement. (Map 38.) 
When General von Falkenhayn concentrated General Macken- 
sen’s force on the Austrian front so secretly that neither the con¬ 
centrating troops, the Austrians, not the Russians understood 
the event, and when, in that concentration, he secured a great 


112 MILITARY HISTORY OF TH3 WORLD WAR 

preponderance of numbers and of artillery fire, and when he 
launched that force against the unprepared Russians and ad¬ 
vanced it at the rate of march of heavy artillery (of which the 
Russians had practically none'' and won the great Battle of 
Dunajec, he illustrated the principles of surprise, mass, and 
movement. 


CHAPTER VI 


Operations on JV<astern and 
Russian Fronts in igi6 


1. General Situation at End of 1915.113 

2. Naval Warfare.114 

3. Aerial Warfare.114 

4. General Plans for Land Warfare.114 

a. The Allies.114 

b. The Central Powers.115 

5. Caucasus Front.115 

a. The situation.115 

b. Russian plan.115 

c. Turkish dispositions.115 

d. Operations.116 

6. Western Front..117 

a. Plans.117 

b. Battle of Verdun.117 

c. Battle of the Somme.122 

7. Russian Front. 126 

a. Plans...126 

b. Operations.127 

8. Principles of War.129 

a. Principle of the objective..129 

b. Principle of the offensive.129 

c. Principle of movement.129 

d. Principle of security.130 

e. Principle of simplicity.130 

/. Principle of cooperation.131 


1. The General Situation. (Map 42.) By January 1, 
1916, Germany, cooperating with her associates, had failed to 
force a separate peace from any of the Allies except from the 
little state of Montenegro. By the accretion of Bulgaria and 
the defeat of Serbia, the Central Powers had completed a 
penetration between Russia and her Allies and had established 
direct communication with Turkey. The result was that, 
exclusive of colonial warfare, the Allies were conducting eight 
separate operations against the Central Powers, on the Western, 
Russian, Italian, Albanian, Grecian, Syrian, Mesopotamian 
and Caucasian fronts, while the Central Powers from the Bag¬ 
dad railroad line were operating on interior lines against those 
various fronts. 


113 





























114 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

2. Naval Warfare, a. The opening up of the Balkan 
and Mesopotamian sources of supply through the creation of 
“Mittel Europa” gave the Central Powers some relief from the 
blockade maintained by the Allies, but the people of Germany 
and Austria were still suffering from privations, and demanded 
that something be done to raise the blockade. Some, including 
General von Falkenhayn, demanded a resumption of unre¬ 
stricted submarine warfare. This was overruled, as the sub¬ 
marine building program had not yet been completed. 

b. Spurred on by the demands of public opinion, the Ger¬ 
man Government decided that, without waiting longer to 
wear down the British fleet, the High Seas fleet should seek an 
engagement near the coast of Denmark under the conditions 
of poor visibility in an afternoon, and, later, in a night action, 
for which it was prepared, lead the British fleet into the Ger¬ 
man mine fields. 

c. The Kaiser relieved Admiral von Tirpitz and appointed 
Admiral Scheer to the command of the fleet. Under the new 
policy, Admiral Scheer frequently took the fleet to sea. On 
May 31, 1916, the desired conditions existed, and the great 
naval battle of Jutland was fought between the German and 
British fleets. The battle progressed as planned by the Ger¬ 
mans except that Admiral Jellicoe, the British commander, 
whose ships were not equipped for night action, did not follow 
the retreating German fleet, after dark, into the German mine 
fields. The action did not raise the blockade. The Allies 
continued to control the sea during 1916. 

3. Aerial Warfare. German aerial operations were not 
limited to efforts auxiliary to the land and naval forces, but 
were extended by Zeppelin and airplane raids on the London 
and Paris areas, with the view of holding Allied forces in those 
areas. These operations did not affect the result of the war. 

4. General Plans for Land Operations, a. The Allies. 
At the First Interallied Council of War, held at General Joffre's 
headquarters on December 6,1915, the Allies decided to operate 
against the enemy by simultaneous strategical and tactical 
offensive operations on all fronts, thereby neutralizing the 
advantage of interior lines possessed by the Central Powers. 
Due to the climate of Russia, this offensive was scheduled to 
begin in June or July. It was further decided that, should the 
Central Powers launch a major offensive against one of the 


WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 115 

Allies before that time, all the Allies immediately would launch 
offensives by way of diversion. 

b. The Central Powers. (Map 42.) General von Falkenhayn 
assigned missions in the main theater of operations as follows: 

(1) Turkey was to operate in her own territory. 

(2) Bulgaria was to operate between Turkey and the 
Danube. 

(3) Germany and Austria were to operate north of the 
Danube. His general plan for German and Austrian operation 
was: 

(a) To change to the strategical and tactical defensive on 
the Russian front. 

(b) Austria to change to the strategical and tactical offen¬ 
sive against Italy. 

(c) Germany, by a strategical defensive and tactical offen¬ 
sive, was to forestall and break the expected Allied major offen¬ 
sive on the Western front and then pass to the strategical 
and tactical offensive with a view to forcing a decision and a 
separate peace from France. 

5. Caucasus Front. (Maps 32, 42 and 43.) a. The 
situation. On September 7, 1915, after the Central Powers' 
offensive had forced the Russians out of Poland, the Czar took 
personal command of the Russian forces, and sent Grand Duke 
Nicholas, as viceroy, to command on the Caucasus front, where 
the army totaled about 150,000 men. At that time, Russia 
believed that had she obtained the arms and ammunition that 
would have come to her through an open Dardanelles, she could 
have defeated the Central Powers. The Russian estimate of 
the situation led to the conclusion that the opening of the 
Dardanelles was essential to her efficient continuance in the 
war. 

b. Russian plan. Grand Duke Nicholas planned to reach 
the coast by a surprise winter maneuver, and, from Trebizond 
as a base, to conduct a joint naval and land action westward 
toward Constantinople, connecting on the south with the 
British Mesopotamian Expedition. 

c. Turkish dispositions. The Turkish Third Army was 
in the vicinity of the great fortified camp of Erzerum, and held 
a line to the Black Sea. This fortified camp was on a mountain 
6,000 feet above the sea. Due to its natural strength, it had 
been held to be unapproachable in winter and impregnable in 
summer. During the war, the Germans had strengthened it 


116 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

by a line of forts on the eastern hills, and by an armament of 
over four hundred modern Krupp guns. The Turkish Third 
Army and its commander, Kiamil Pasha, were under the in¬ 
struction of German officers. The Germans estimated that 
the assignment of the Grand Duke to command the Russian 
forces on the Caucasus front meant a Russian offensive in 
Turkey in the spring, and they decided to forestall it at once by 
local action. 

d. Operations. (1) Grand Duke Nicholas established his 
headquarters at Tiflis and placed General Yudinitch in com¬ 
mand of the field operations along the southern shore of the 
Black Sea and General Baratoff in command of the detach¬ 
ment whose mission was to connect with the British in Mesopo¬ 
tamia. 

(2) (a) (i) General Yudinitch’s plan was to capture 
Erzerum by a surprise winter double enveloping maneuver. 
On January 16 (just one week after Gallipoli’s evacuation), 
he advanced in three columns from Kars on a hundred mile 
front and effected a strategical surprise on Kiamil Pasha, the 
Turkish Third Army commander, and a tactical surprise, 
January 19, on the Turkish garrison of Keupri-Keni, which 
fled in rout to Erzerum. 

(ii) The central column, on January 26, in intensely cold 
weather, began the ascent of the Kargabazar mountain ridge. 
They were required to drag their mountain and field guns. 
The ammunition and food was carried up by camels. 

(iii) The northern column defeated the Turks in its front 
and connected with the central column at Fort Tafta on 
February 14. 

(iv) The left (southern ) column drove the Turks back on 
Moosh and forced the 10,000 foot ridge Palandoken on Febru¬ 
ary 15. That day, nine of the inner forts were stormed and 
captured. The next day, the Turks evacuated Erzerum. The 
southern column captured Moosh on February 19, Bitlis on 
March 2, and thereafter crossed the Armenian Taurus Moun¬ 
tains and threatened the Berlin—Bagdad railroad. 

(v) The right (northern) column, cooperating with the 
fleet, captured Trebizond April 16. 

(vi) The central column captured Erzingan June 26. 

(b) In the first part of August, the Turks under the com¬ 
mand of General Gresman, a German officer, counter attacked 
with a view of cutting Erzerum’s line of communications. They 


WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 117 

recaptured Bitlis and Moosh on August 8, but lost Moosh the 
next day. 

(3) Grand Duke Nicholas, in an unsuccessful effort to 
cooperate with General Townsend, sent a reinforced brigade 
under General Baratoff south in Persia to Hamadan. General 
Baratoff reached Kermansha and sent a sotnia of Cossacks to 
connect with the British column of General Lake’s relieving 
forces, in the third week of May, after General Townsend had 
surrendered Kut. The sotnia reached the British lines and 
returned but the connection was not maintained. General 
Baratoff retired from Hamadan in August. 

6. Western Front, a. Plans. (Maps 39, 44 and 45.) 
(1) The Allied plan of operations on the Western front, which 
was adopted February 16, 1916, at the Second Interallied 
Council, was to launch a major Franco-British offensive July 
1, 1916, with the idea of penetrating the German line on the 
Somme, cutting the German line of communications in the 
valley of the Sambre, and forcing the Germans out of France. 

(2) Von Falkenhayn had been much alarmed by the major 
offensive launched by the allies in the fall of 1915 and the very 
narrow margin by which it failed of success. He was so appre¬ 
hensive of the danger of the (then) coming 1916 Allied offensive, 
and the possiblility of not stopping it if he merely awaited it, 
that he decided to forestall it with an attack. A careful 
estimate showed that even by taking the last available man 
from other fronts, he could not reinforce his forces on the 
Western front with more than twenty-six divisions. Even 
with that reinforcement, the Allies would still have a preponder¬ 
ance and von Falkenhayn estimated that, in order to really 
seize and exercise the initiative, he must find a vulnerable 
place for delivery of the blow. He estimated that Verdun was 
such a place and was so sacred to the French that they would 
spend their last drop of blood in its defense. After a very 
careful estimate of the situation along the whole front, he 
decided to operate against the Verdun salient. The German 
Crown Prince was selected to carry out the execution of a 
first phase, which called for penetration of the French line at 
Verdun. The second phase called for exploitation of such a 
success by an attack on the north flank and in the rear of the 
presumed dislocated French east front. 

b. Battle of Verdun. (1) The situation, (a) The Verdun 
salient was about forty-five miles wide across the neck. The 


118 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

apex and the greater part of the salient was on the eastern side 
of the Meuse. It really formed a bridgehead from which an 
attack might be launched by the Allies against Metz or against 
the German line of communications, i.e., the Metz—Mezieres 
railroad line. 

(b) Usually, the rainy season causes the Meuse to over¬ 
flow its banks to a width of about one mile. It did so over¬ 
flow in February, 1916. There were not more than seven 
bridges of all types crossing the Meuse between St. Mihiel and 
Verdun. 

(c) For about eight miles to the north and to the east of 
Verdun there is a succession of hills about 400 feet high. 
Beyond those hills, to the east and extending to the south, are 
the plains of the Woevre, which in the spring are too soft for 
any operations. Excluding the impassable terrain, an attack 
east of the Meuse is limited to a frontage of about eight miles. 

(d) (i) Before the war, Verdun had been served by two 
trunk line railroads. Traffic on the line Paris—Verdun had 
been interrupted by the Germans and the road was subject 
to interdiction fire at all times. The other trunk line from 
Paris, via Commercy, was unavailable as the Germans were 
astride of it at St. Mihiel. 

Besides the two trunk line railroads to Verdun there was 
a one-meter, narrow gauge, single track road from Bar-le- 
Duc via Souilly. This road was wholly inadequate, in itself, 
to supply the troops in the Verdun salient. 

(2) Plans of maneuver, (a) (i) French plan. The French 
Third Army (General Sarrail) held the Verdun salient, defen¬ 
sively, from north of St. Mihiel to the Argonne Forest, inclu¬ 
sive. Inside of the salient was the fortified camp of Verdun, 
consisting of the fortress at Verdun and a ring of forts of the 
Brialmont type, such as were the forts at Liege and Namur. 
At the beginning of the war, the forts were all reinforced with 
concrete and steel. Profiting by the lessons of Liege and 
Namur, the French organized the salient as a deep defensive 
zone. 

The first position extended along the line: Avocourt— 
Malancourt—Forges—Brabant—the northen edge of the woods 
of Haumont—Caures—Ville-IIerbevois—village of Ornes. 

The second position ran along the line: north of Hesse 
Woods—hill 304—Dead Man's Hill—Goose Hill—Samogneaux 
—hill 344—north of Foss Woods—south of Ornes. 



WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 119 

The third position extended along the line: Talou Hill— 
Pepper Hill—hill 378—north edge of Caurieres Woods—Bezon- 
Vaux. 

The fourth position consisted of the line of forts from the 
woods of Bourrus to Moulainville. 

(ii) The French government informed General Joffre, on 
December 16, 1915, that it understood that Verdun was not 
properly wired and trenched for defense. He replied, on 
December 18, that orders had been given for the organization 
of the defense as set forth above. General Joffre discovered in 
January, 1916, however, that the defensive measures at Ver¬ 
dun were wholly insufficient, and ordered a regiment of en¬ 
gineers there to do the necessary work, but it was too late. 

(b) German 'plan . (i) Since the battle of the Marne, the 
German High Command had contemplated action against 
Verdun in order to gain greater security for Metz, the Briey 
mining basin, and the line of communications near Carignan. 
By February, 1916, it had built a railroad net that reached for 
Verdun like the arms of an octopus. 

(ii) General von Falkenhayn estimated that the French 
salient east of the Meuse was unstable, because, with the 
Chalons railroad line interdicted, it could not be supplied. 
Hence, he believed an attack from the north, based on the slow 
movement of heavy artillery, like Mackensen’s in Russia, in 
1915, could not be stopped. Because of the limited number of 
bridges over the Meuse, and the possibility of destroying or 
interdicting them effectually, he estimated that such an attack 
from the north would push the French bridgehead salient 
south along the Meuse, like a loose knee cap, uncover Verdun, 
and destroy or capture the major portion of the French troops 
therein by driving them against the anvil of the St. Mihiel 
salient. 

(iii) The German plan of maneuver for this first phase was 
to attract the attention of the Allies to other parts of the line 
in France by local army attacks with limited objectives, then, 
by means of superior artillery fire, to drive the forces of the 
Verdun bridgehead south, past Verdun and its bridges, to a 
surrender against the St. Mihiel salient. The operation was 
to occupy eight days. The right flank was to be protected by 
a later advance on the west bank of the Meuse, which was also 
to cut off the French retreat across that river. The local 


120 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

success was to be exploited at once by penetration of the French 
line. 

(iv) The German Crown Prince, commanding the Fifth 
Army, was placed in command of the operation by verbal 
secret orders, about Christmas. 

For the whole operation the following troops were placed 
under his command: 

The Fifth Army (his own command), 

Von Strantz’s detachment in Lorraine (Woevre), 

Von Falkenhausen’s detachment on the right bank of the Moselle 
in Lorraine and in Lower Alsace, 

Von Gaede’s detachment in Upper Alsace. 

In addition to the foregoing troops, nine thoroughly 
rested and specially trained shock divisions were sent to the 
Crown Prince. Also, three other picked divisions were sent 
to the west bank of the Meuse for use there if necessity arose. 
Five other fresh divisions were added to the Crown Prince's 
reserve, and many other divisons of the general reserve on the 
Western front were held in readiness for immediate transporta¬ 
tion to Verdun. His total available force was nearly half a 
million men. 

(v) An extraordinary amount of heavy artillery, with an 
unlimited ammunition allowance, was located on the front of 
attack. This permitted the maintenance of an effective fire 
while a part of the batteries were moved forward following the 
attack. Every request for labor and equipment was complied 
with. D day was postponed because of impassable wet terrain 
and poor visibility. 

(3) Operations, (a) The artillery preparation began with 
unprecedented violence, at 7:00 AM on February 21, and con¬ 
tinued until 4:00 PM, when the infantry attack was launched 
upon a front of six kilometers from Haumont woods to Herbe- 
vois woods (both inclusive). 

(b) (i) During the first period (February 22-March 4), 
the Germans, in a slow advance covering thirteen days, covered 
by tremendous artillery fire, captured the 1st, 2d, and 3d 
positions east of the Meuse by the 4th of March. 

(ii) General Joffre relieved the Tenth Army at once from 
the Arras sector and sent it to Verdun, asking General Haig 
to take over the sector of that army. 

He directed General Langle de Cary, commander of the 
Center Group, to hold his ground between the Meuse and the 
Woevre, and to advance to the north as opportunity presented. 


WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 121 

He selected General Petain, of the Second Army, to com¬ 
mand at Verdun and allowed him to take his staff. 

(iii) General Petain arrived at Verdun, on February 26, 
and ordered a counter attack at once along the whole line. 

General Petain at once divided the front into corps zones 
as follows: 

General Bazelaire (VII Corps), west bank from Avocourt to the 
Meuse. 

General Guillaumat (I Corps), east bank from the Meuse to 
Douamont. 

General Balfournier (XX Corps), east bank from Douamont to 
Eix. 

General Duchesne (II Corps), east bank from Eix to vicinity of 
St. Mihiel. 

He assigned the artillery, which was arriving in great 
numbers, to the zones. 

He ordered the occupied ground to be organized and held, 
and the forts to be reoccupied and re-armed. 

lie ordered the number of bridges between Verdun and 
St. Mihiel to be increased from seven to forty-one. 

He saw, at once, that the railroad line of communications 
was insufficient and that unless the line of communication was 
improved, the salient would have to be evacuated. 

He organized a truck line of communications from Bar-le- 
Duc to Verdun. 3,000 auto trucks passed over this line every 
day. This truck line met the need, and, as it saved the supply 
situation, the French call the road “The Sacred Way.” 

As a result, on March 4, the French were holding the 
fourth position, i.e., the line of forts, except Fort Douamont, 
which had been reduced to a pile of dust. 

(c) During the 2d period (March 5-22), the Germans at¬ 
tempted, without success, to advance their right wing west of 
the Meuse to hill 304 and Dead Man's Hill, and their left 
wing on the east bank of the river to Fort Vaux. 

(d) During the 3d period (March 22-April 30), the 
German Crown Prince suffered such losses that, by March 22, 
fresh troops were required. On April 9-10, he delivered a gen¬ 
eral attack along the whole line and captured the crest of 
Dead Man's Hill. However, the French retook it April 20. 
During this period, there were many local attacks by both sides. 

(e) (i) During the 4th period (May and June), General 
Nivelle, who, on May 2, had succeeded General Petain in com¬ 
mand of the Second Army and of the defense of Verdun on the 
latter's assignment to the command of the Central Group of 


122 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Armies, carried out his predecessor's policy of counter attacking 
wherever possible. The violence of the German attacks and 
the stubbornness of the French defense may be judged by the 
fact that although the Germans attacked hill 304 from May 
4-7, with more than one hundred batteries of heavy artillery, 
they captured only the north part of the hill. General Nivelle 
recaptured Douamont on May 22-23. 

(ii) On May 23, the German Crown Prince captured 
Dead Man's Hill and retook Douamont. In June, he concen¬ 
trated on the attempt to capture Forts Vaux and Souville. 
Between June 1 and 7, he destroyed Fort Vaux by the program 
of shooting 10,000 projectiles a day at it. 

(iii) The struggle for Souville (the key to Verdun) then 
became most desperate. However, General Joffre ordered the 
east bank of the Meuse held at all costs and forbade any 
retreat. He ordered an offensive attitude to be taken by 
counter attack. The final crisis came on June 22 and 23 when, 
after an unparalleled bombardment, including asphyxiating 
gas, the German attack reached the edge of Fort Souville. 

(iv) On June 24, General Nivelle began counter attacks 
and by June 30 had driven the Germans beyond Fleury. The 
next day, July 1, General Joffre and General Haig launched 
the battle of the Somme, with such force that General von 
Falkenhayn was forced to withdraw troops from Verdun for 
the Somme, and to abandon the idea of an immediate capture 
of Verdun. 

c. The Battle of the Somme ( July-November ). (Maps 39 
and 46.) (1) Plans, (a) The German dispositions. Under 

General von Falkenhayn's general plan for the defense of the 
Western front, that portion of the line which is under considera¬ 
tion (from the Ancre on the north to Chaulnes on the south) was 
organized as a deep defensive zone on the hills of Picardy 
which constitute the watershed between the Somme and the 
rivers of Belgium. The line was held by General Fritz von 
Below with a part of the Second Army. He held the first 
position with eight divisions, five north of the Somme and three 
south of it. Three divisions were held in reserve in the second 
position, and another division which had just arrived from 
Verdun occupied the third position. Other positions to the 
rear were organized and in process of organization. The zone 
was very strong. The first position was on the forward slope 
of high ground. The second position was from 3,000 to 5,000 



WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 123 

yards behind the first position. Woods and villages had been 
organized for special defense and the whole zone had been 
intrenched, bomb proofed, and wired to perfection. 

(b) The Allies’ dispositions and plans, (i) The Allies' 
general plan for the maneuver, after changes because of Ver¬ 
dun, was that the British and French should attack side by 
side from the Ancre to Chaulnes, the British north and the 
French south of the line: Maricourt—Sailly—Sallisel, with 
the idea of penetrating the German line on the axis: Albert— 
Bapaume, and then, as a second phase, to pass a mass of maneu¬ 
ver through the breach and with it attack the German line of 
communications in the direction: Cambrai—Valenciennes— 
Maubeuge. 

(ii) General Haig and General Joffre agreed on the ma¬ 
neuver with the following objects in view: 

To relieve pressure on Verdun. 

To assist Russia and Roumania by preventing transfer of German 
troops from the Western front. 

To wear down the German strength. 

(iii) The Allied dispositions and plans in detail were as 
follows: 

British. The new British Fourth Army (General Rawlin- 
son) occupied the front from Maricourt to Serre. The new 
British Third Army (General Allenby) was north of the Fourth 
Army. General Haig planned to deliver the main attack by 
the Fourth Army from the front: Maricourt—Ancre River; 
to support the main attack by an assisting attack, also by the 
Fourth Army (north flank) which, by a simultaneous attack 
from the Ancre to Serre, was to occupy the attention of the 
German artillery and to hold the German reserves. The 
British Third Army, at the same time, was to protect the north 
flank by an attack from Serre to Gommicourt. 

.French . The French Sixth Army (General Fayolle) oc¬ 
cupied the front from Maricourt to Foucaucourt. The French 
Tenth Army (General Micheler) extended to the south. The 
French Sixth Army, astride the Somme, was to support the 
main British attack by attacking on its front. The French 
Tenth Army was to hold itself ready to protect the south 
flank and also for any eventuality. 

(2) Operations, (a) The 1st period — i.e., launching of the 
attack (July 1-10). 


124 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(i) On the morning of July 1, after an intense preparation 
by heavy artillery which commenced June 24, the last hour of 
which was at the maximum rate, and immediately after the 
explosion of mines under the German front trenches on the 
British front, the troops advanced to attack. With the excep¬ 
tion of the line north of the Albert—Bapaume road, they ran 
over the German first position in many places and made good 
headway all along the line. 

(ii) That night, General Haig changed his plan of maneu¬ 
ver as follows: 

The British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), less two 
corps, was to continue the advance between the French on the 
south and the Albert—Bapaume road on the north. 

A new British Fifth Army under General Gough composed 
of the two northern corps from the Fourth Army was to main¬ 
tain pressure on the Germans north of the Albert—Bapaume 
road to Serre, and to act as a pivot on which the main attack 
would swing towards the north. 

(iii) After the first day, the attack progressed more slowly, 
with local attacks, counter attacks, and much artillery bom¬ 
bardment. This continued until July 10, when there was a 
slight pause for tired troops to be relieved and artillery to be 
displaced forward. The attack had then reached the line: 
Foucaucourt—Estrees—Belloy—La Maisonette—Biache—the 
Somme—Longueval—Orvillers. The Germans had relied on 
artillery and machine gun fire to stop the advance and had 
taken a heavy toll from the British. 

(iv) General von Falkenhayn at once sent troops from 
Verdun to the Somme and organized a new First Army, with 
General von Gallwitz in command. General von Gallwitz took 
over the sector of the Somme, and, as group commander, was 
placed in charge of the defense on the whole front of the Somme 
Battle. 

(b) The 2d period—Struggle for Picardy Ridge (July' 11- 
September 28). (i) The Allies' objective now became the 

Picardy ridge which gives observation over the plains beyond, 
even to the rivers flowing to Belgium. General Haig planned a 
night attack by the Fourth Army to capture the enemy posi¬ 
tion on the crest. He fixed the line of departure about 1,000 
to 1,400 yards in front of his line, and only 300 to 500 yards 
from the German trenches. He required division, brigade, and 
subordinate commanders to reconnoiter the position before 



WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 125 

issuing their orders. The deployment was made under cover 
of strong patrols after dark on the night of July 13-14. White 
tape was laid on the ground to enable troops to reach their 
proper places. The whole movement was carried out unob¬ 
served by the Germans and without touch being lost in any case. 
When it was just light enough to distinguish friend from foe, 
the Fourth Army, at 3:25 AM, advanced to the attack pre¬ 
ceded by an effective artillery barrage, and swept right over 
the enemy trenches and into the defenses beyond. 

(ii) From July 20 to 25, the attack was resumed along the 
whole line from Orvillers on the north to south of Foucaucourt. 
It made some progress on the north and on the south, but none 
toward Peronne. 

(iii) The French in a severe struggle, between August 12 
and 24, penetrated the German third line and captured Maure- 
pas. 

(iv) The foregoing attacks were really preparatory to the 
new offensive which was to begin early in September with the 
view not only of capturing Picardy Ridge but of preventing 
German troops from going to the Roumanian front. To secure 
the Picardy Ridge, the new objectives were: for the British, 
Martinpuich—Gueudecourt—Morval; for the French north of 
the Somme, they were Raucourt—Bouchavesnes. South of 
the Somme, a separate French operation had as its objective 
the ridge: Villiers—Carbonnel—Chaulnes. 

(v) After an intense artillery preparation, the attack was 
launched, September 3, from the Ancre to the Somme. The 
British and the French Sixth Army captured the German 
second position for which they had been fighting for six weeks. 

The French Tenth Army covered the southern flank and 
captured some ground. 

(vi) The Germans counter attacked until September 10, 
but without effect. 

(vii) The French Sixth Army, September 12, after a four 
days’ artillery preparation, attacked and captured Boucha¬ 
vesnes, on the 13th. 

(viii) On September 15, the British attacked with tanks, 
a new and surprise weapon and captured Courcelete—Martin¬ 
puich—Fleurs. 

(ix) On September 17, the French Tenth Army captured 
Vermandevillers and Berny. 


126 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(x) On September 25, the French and British attacked 
all along the line north of the Somme. By the 28th, the Allies' 
line had reached Thiepval—Gueudecourt—Bouchavesnes— 
La Maison ette—Berny—Vermandovillers—Chilly. 

(c) Third Period. Exploitation oj success (October-Decem¬ 
ber). The Allies, by September 28, had complete control of 
Picardy Ridge except at two points, i.e., north of Thiepval 
and at Sailly-Sallisel. During the rest of the year until the 
weather stopped operations, the Allies organized the captured 
positions and by local attacks advanced the line to Serre-le 
San—Sailly-Sallise—Biache—Pressoir—Chilly and controlled 
the ridge between the Somme and the rivers flowing to Belgium. 

7. Russian Front. (Maps 38, 42 and 47.) a. Plans. (1) 
Russian plans, (a) The defeat in 1915 did not injure the 
Czar's morale in the slightest, and instead of listening to in¬ 
triguing plans for a separate peace, he held with the Allies and 
was loyal to the policy of all going to the help of the one at¬ 
tacked as adopted at the First Interallied Council of War. 

(b) The Czar, as soon as possible after the 1915 defeat, set 
about the reorganization of the army, with the result that in 
the spring of 1916, he held the whole Central Powers' front of 
more than one thousand miles extent with three groups of 
armies as follows: 

Northern Group: General Kuropatkin, 

Central Group: General Evert, 

Southern Group: General Brussilloff (Brussilov). 

(c) The general plan of the Czar called for a divergent 
double penetration to be initiated about July 1. One thrust 
was to be made along the Neimen and the other south of the 
Pripet Swamps, with a view of folding the dislocated wings 
back, the northern one into Courland, and the southern one 
across the Carpathians, while the center should force the 
enemy's center straight back into Germany. 

(d) The foregoing plan was not carried out as formulated, 
because, under the obligation assumed at the first Interallied 
Council of War, the Czar responded to the demand of the Allies 
to initiate operations immediately to cause a diversion to 
relieve the French situation at Verdun. Accordingly, the Czar 
decided to sacrifice the benefits of a cooordinated attack all 
along the line to take place in July, and to begin operations at 
once under almost impossible weather conditions. The plan 
as changed provided for the immediate delivery of the north- 





WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 127 

ern penetrating operation, because, due to a better railroad net, 
the preparations were further advanced in the north. No 
change was made in the southern operation, which was held 
to be the main operation. 

(2) German plans, (a) General von Falkenhayn believed 
that the Russians could not recover from the defeat of 1915 for 
a long time, and, as a result had called away a great number of 
men and nearly all of the heavy artillery from the Russian 
front for use in the German offensive at Verdun and the 
Austrian offensive from the Trent salient. He also had re¬ 
called all the arms and troops that he had lent to the Austrians 
on the front from the Pripet Swamps to Roumania. 

(v) The total force of the Central Empires on this 1,000 
mile front was 127 infantry divisions and twenty-one cavalry 
divisions, in four groups as follows: 

North Group: Marshal von Hindenburg, 

Central Group: Prince Leopold of Bavaria, 

Between the Pripet and the Bug: General Linsingen, 

Southern Group: Archduke Frederick. 

b. Operations. (1) Operation against Germany (March 16). 
After a two days' artillery preparation, the Russian attack was 
launched March 18, in the general direction of Kovno, with a 
supporting attack on a broad front extending to the north of 
Dvinsk. The attack continued with great intensity until 
March 26, when Marshal von Hindenburg succeeded in stop¬ 
ping it. But it had accomplished its purpose, as it attracted 
attention again to Russia and troops and guns were sent to 
Marshal von Hindenburg's part of the line. It convinced 
Marshal von Hindenburg that a greater attack would be 
delivered against him later. The action of Russia was con¬ 
sidered a serious menace and the Kaiser personally inspected 
Marshal von Hindenburg's part of the line at the end of May. 
The Germans were much alarmed by the operations along the 
line of the Niemen. 

(2) Operations against Austria (June 4). (a) (i) After a 

thirty hour artillery preparation, General Brussilloff's four 
armies advanced against the Austrian lines on June 4, on a 
front of over three hundred miles between the Pripet Swamps 
and Roumania. The principal effort was made by the two 
wings, against Loutsk on the north by General Kaledine’s 
army, and against Bukowina on the south by General Letch- 
insky's army. 


128 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(ii) The Austrian line was penetrated in many places and 
fell back on the north and south. 

(iii) By June 7, General Kaledine crossed the Styr, and 
the Army of Letchinsky crossed the Dneister and the Pruth. 

(iv) Violent supporting attacks were delivered by the 
two army groups to the north and strong reinforcements were 
sent south to General Brussilloff, who it was hoped would 
decisively defeat the Austrians. Austria stopped her offen¬ 
sive against Italy and sent all available troops to Russia. 
She demanded help from Germany. 

(b) In June, Marshal von Hindenburg and General 
Ludendorff were called to General Headquarters to report to 
the Kaiser on the situation. They reported it as ‘Very grave.” 
As a result, many troops were sent east from the Western front. 

(c) In July, the Russians attacked all along the line, and 
with great violence from the Riga region. 

(d) In the south, however, the Austrian General Count 
von Bothmer stood like a rock and defended his zone. 

(e) July 27, because of the loss of Brody, Marshal von 
Hindenburg and General Ludendorff were called again to 
General Headquarters to report to the Kaiser. Marshal von 
Hindenburg was placed in command of the line from the 
Baltic as far south as Brody. He established his headquarters 
at Brest-Litovsk. He immediately reorganized the Austrian 
commands, distributed German units among the Austrians, 
issued definite orders for the operations and prepared at once 
to counter attack with dependable troops. He organized army 
zones, service of supply, and installed an exceedingly compre¬ 
hensive system of instruction and inspection by German officers 
over Austrian units. 

(f) General Brussiloffs advance was retarded and by the 
end of August it had been stopped on the line: Stokod River— 
south to the crests of the Carpathians. He held the passes 
of Iablonica and Kalibaba and had uncovered the Roumanian 
frontier. Brussilloff tried to continue to Lemberg and Kovel, 
but without success, as the defense under von Hindenburg had 
been stiffened. Also, intrigue had begun at Petrograd and 
German socialistic propaganda had begun to affect the Russian 
soldiers’ morale. As a result, Brussilloff was forced to halt 
and adopt siege methods of warfare. 

(g) On August 27, Roumania declared war against Austria. 
On August 28, von Hindenburg reported to the Kaiser at 


WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 129 

General Headquarters, was told that the whole situation was 
serious, and was informed that he would relieve General von 
Falkenhayn, at once, as chief of the German General Staff. 

8. Principles of War. a. Principle of the objective. 
(Maps 38, 41 42 and 47.) When the Czar sent Grand Duke 
Nicholas to the Caucasus to cooperate with the Allies in open¬ 
ing the Russian line of communications through the Dar¬ 
danelles, he illustrated the principle of the objective with an 
objective other than the hostile main army, but when he con¬ 
tinued that operation with 150,000 men after the Gallipoli 
operation had been abandoned, the possibility of the Grand 
Duke’s opening the Dardanelles was so remote that it was no 
longer a possible objective. His further offensive operation in 
Turkey was without any proper objective and was a violation 
of the principle of the objective. When the Dardanelles 
operation was abandoned, the Caucasus army, with the excep¬ 
tion of a small defending force, should have been sent north 
and used in the operations against the hostile main army. 

b. Principle of the offensive. (Maps 45 and 46.) (1) 

The Battle of Verdun was finally won at the Somme. General 
von Falkenhayn did not have enough troops on the Western 
front with which to maintain two major operations, so when the 
Allies attacked on the Somme he, operating under the control 
of the principle of security and of economy of force , was 
forced to discontinue the offensive against Verdun in order to 
maintain a successful defense on the Somme. 

(2) When General Joffre estimated that General von 
Falkenhayn had reduced his reserves too low on other parts 
of the line in order to conduct an offensive at Verdun, he 
obtained security at Verdun by launching a great major 
offensive on the Somme against a weakened portion of the 
German line. 

c. Principle of movement. (1) When General von Falken¬ 
hayn estimated that the French could be “shot out” of the 
Verdun salient as von Mackensen had shot the Russians 
out of Hungary, in 1915, and told the infantry that all they 
would have “to do would be to mop-up and occupy the positions 
reduced by the artillery” and fixed a rate of advance ac¬ 
cordingly, he violated the principle of movement. 

(2) The artillery preparation at Verdun should have ended 
at dawn, and the infantry should have advanced at once as 
rapidly as the situation permitted, in order to reach the fur- 


130 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

thermost point possible before French reserves could arrive. 
By not reaching the furthermost point before the French re¬ 
serves came up, the German advance was slowed down and the 
chance of an almost certain victory was lost. 

d. Principle of security. (1) When, at the Battle of the 
Somme, General Otto von Below with only eight divisions 
on a frontage of more than thirty miles organized his defense 
so effectively that he prevented the Allies' group of armies 
from penetrating the German lines, he illustrated the principle 
of security. 

(2) On the other hand, when General Joffre did not keep 
the defenses at Verdun perfectly organized and in readiness to 
receive an attack, and was attacked and driven back there 
before those defenses were put in order, he violated the princi¬ 
ple of security. 

(3) Von Falkenhayn estimated that the French lines of 
communication to the Verdun salient could not supply a 
sufficient force in the Verdun salient to defend it against a 
major offensive attack, and that, being thus insecure, a slow 
movement offensive that would not cost so many lives, would 
be successful. The French promptly corrected that violation 
of security by the surprise introduction of a new weapon, 
i.e., a continuous truck train over the road from Bar-le-Duc, 
which by means of 3,000 trucks a day, furnished sufficient 
supplies to secure the defense of Verdun. 

e. Principle of simplicity. (Maps 38, 41, 42 and 47.) 
When the Czar planned two divergent simultaneous operations 
on the Central Powers' front and a simultaneous operation 
on the Caucasus front, he violated the principle of simplicity. 
Under the control of the principle of economy of force , he 
should have left in the Caucasus only the troops necessary to 
protect the oil base. Then, in illustration of the principle of 
the offensive , he should have selected the direction line that 
was believed to be the decisive strategical direction, and while 
defending everywhere else, he should have launched his offen¬ 
sive on that line under the control of the principle of mass, 
surprise, and movement. By failing to do this, he failed to 
secure a decision. 


WESTERN AND RUSSIAN FRONTS, 1915 131 

/. Principle of cooperation. When the Czar advanced 
the date of the operation along the Niemen, in order to attract 
German troops from in front of Verdun to the Russian front 
and succeeded in doing so, he illustrated the principle of 
cooperation. 


CHAPTER VII 


Operations in igi6 

Continued 


Page 

1. Turkish Theater of Operations, 1916..-.132 

a. Mesopotamian front..—.132 

b. Syrian front.134 

2. Italian Front.135 

a. Plans.135 

b. Austrian offensive, May, 1916.135 

c. Italian offensive—.136 

3. Western Front—Second Battle of Verdun .136 

a. Situation at end of August.136 

b. Change of German attitude.136 

c. Battle of attrition.137 

d. French counter offensive.137 

e. Results of the battle..—.138 

4. Balkan Theater of Operations, 1916.138 

a. Situation.138 

b. The Roumanian theater.139 

c. Plans and dispositions.141 

d. Defeat of Roumania. 143 

e. Abdication of Greek King.145 

6. Central Powers Seek Peace.145 

a. General situation.145 

b. Central Powers’ proposals.146 

c. Suggestions of “peace without victory”.146 

6. Principles of War-...146 

a. Principle of security.146 

b. Principle of mass.:.148 

c. Principle of economy of force ._.148 

d. Principle of the objective.149 

e. Principle of simplicity.150 


1. Turkish Theater of Operations, a. Mesopotamian 
front. (Maps 32, 43, 47A and 48.) (1) General Townsend was 
defeated at Ctesiphon, November 25, 1915, and retreated to 
Kut-el-Amara, a small town of about 7,000 people which is 
situated in a bend on the Tigris River, at the junction of that 
river with the Shat-el-Hai which connects the Euphrates 
River with the Tigris. He could have continued the retreat 
easily, but decided to hold Kut-el-Amara as a further with¬ 
drawal would endanger the British Mesopotamian oil base and 


132 

































OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 133 

because of his estimate that the siege would be raised in a 
short time. He organized a shallow defensive zone at once 
across the narrow neck of land. He sent the cavalry brigade, 
the sick and wounded, and all but 3,000 of the transport 
animals down stream at once, but held all the heavy artillery 
transportation. 

(2) (a) On December 5, General von der Goltz, the Ger¬ 
man Turkish commander, besieged Kut-el-Amara with four 
divisions. After a severe bombardment and after receiving 
a refusal to surrender, the Turkish forces assaulted unsuccess¬ 
fully, on December 10 and 11. On December 24, the Turks, 
reinforced by another division, delivered another (and the 
last) determined but unsuccessful assault. Kut-el-Amara was 
completely invested and thereafter subjected to alomst con¬ 
tinuous artillery bombardment, to airplane bombing from time 
to time, and to the starving out process. General von der 
Goltz organized a deep defensive zone from the Tigris to the 
Suweiki Marsh on the east, and on the west side of the Tigris, a 
long shallow defensive zone, strengthened with blockhouses 
and redoubts, to defend against the British relieving force then 
approaching. 

(b) (i) General Townsend reduced the ration, conserved 
ammunition and held on. The Turks had removed all the 
millstones, and the grinding of cereals was impossible until 
airplanes from the relieving force dropped millstones into the 
inclosure. 

(ii) The relieving force, under the command of General 
Lake, was made up of Indian troops from France, Egypt, and 
India. General Lake sent General Aylmer up the east bank 
of the Tigris with a hurriedly gathered relief expedition. 
General Aylmer defeated advanced Turkish forces in several 
delaying actions, and, on January 21, after an insufficient 
artillery preparation, delivered an unsuccessful attack against 
the front of the Turkish deep defensive zone at the Hanna 
position, east of the Tigris, and then intrenched in front of the 
Turkish line. 

(iii) Reinforcements were then requested from Egypt. 
The second relief expedition, 20,000 strong, operated on the 
west bank of the Tigris. The plan of maneuver called for a 
fifteen mile night march and surprise attack from Sheik Saad 
against the Es-Sinn line at the redoubt Dujailah, with a con¬ 
verging penetrating attack between this redoubt andShat-el- 


134 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Hai. The attack was delivered on March 9. The main attack¬ 
ing column under Major General Keary effected a surprise, 
but time consumed in deployment and waiting for the pene¬ 
trating attack gave the Turks sufficient notice for a successful 
defense of the redoubt Dujailah. The penetrating force (in¬ 
cluding a brigade of cavalry) under General Kimball, did not 
reach its place of deployment until after broad daylight. That 
night, the attack was abandoned and the force withdrew to 
the position in front of the Hanna position. 

(iv) A third relief attempt was made by General Maude, 
operating on both sides of the Tigris river. On April 5, he 
captured the Hanna position, and similar positions west of the 
river. By an attack that night, he captured an intermediate 
position between the Hanna and Sanna-i-yat positions. The 
next day, he was operating successfully against the Sanna-i-yat 
position when the Tigris overflowed its banks and swamped 
the trenches. On April 17, the attack was renewed on both 
sides of the river, with some success, but the Turks could not 
be dislodged. 

(3) General Maude, lacking armored water craft, then 
made an unsuccessful attempt to send a fast steamer to Kut- 
el-Amara by night. After that failure, he began to drop sacks 
of flour within the besieged lines from airplanes, but could not 
furnish enough supplies in this manner. 

(4) After all the food had been eaten and all the arms, 
equipment, and ammunition destroyed, General Townsend 
surrendered Kut-el-Amara, April 29, 1916. 

(5) In August, General Maude was placed in command of 
the Mesopotamian force, and estimating that the Turks had 
assumed a defensive attitude in his front in order to exploit 
defenseless Persia, he decided to prepare and deliver a resolute 
offensive against Bagdad, the most sensitive Turkish area in 
Mesopotamia. 

b. Syrian front. (1) (a) (Map 48.) After threatening for 
a long time from Arish, a specially organized expedition under 
the command of the German General von Kressenstein, with 
many German and Austrian officers and equipped for desert 
operations, moved along the Mediterranean coast line in July 
and established contact on August 4, with the British bridge¬ 
head east of the Suez Canal in the vicinity of Romani. 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 135 

(b) The Turkish plan was to deliver a strong holding 
attack in front and envelop the southern flank of the British 
bridgehead force. 

(2) (a) General Lawrence, the British commander, al¬ 
lowed the Turkish enveloping attack to spend its force against 
the front line of his organized bridgehead zone, and then de¬ 
livered a counter enveloping attack against the left flank and 
rear of the Turkish attack. He followed up his counter attack 
with a cavalry charge and a pursuit which continued for three 
days and developed the repulse into a decisive victory. 

(b) In these operations, monitors along the coast, cavalry 
and camel corps in the desert, and attack planes were all used 
to good advantage. 

2. Italian Front. (Maps 36, 37, 42 and 49). a. Plans. 
(1) The Central Powers' general plan for operations in 1916, 
called for an Austrian major offensive to be launched against 
Italy from the Trent salient. 

(2) General Cadorna's general plan for 1916 was to con¬ 
tinue the 1915 operations with the principal offensive blow on 
the Isonzo front. 

b. The Austrian offensive (May 15-30). (1) General Con¬ 
rad von Hotzendorf's plan of maneuver was to penetrate the 
Italian line between the Brenta and the Po Rivers, with a view 
of cutting off the Udine salient. The first objective was the 
plateau of Seven Communes which dominated the plain of 
Vicence. The Austrian Army, for this operation under the 
command of Archduke Eugene, was strengthened to about 
400,000 men by divisions called from the Balkans and from 
Russia. It was well equipped with modern arms, including 
heavy artillery. 

(2) The Austrians attacked on May 15, and, securing an 
initial success, advanced rapidly. By May 30, the Italian 
situation was critical. But the Italian line on either side of the 
salient held and allowed General Cadorna to move the reserve 
army from the vicinity of Vicence to the threatened front and 
confine the new Austrian sailent, June 20, to a depth of not 
over sixteen miles, where the lines were stabilized. 

(3) The Allied offensives on the Somme and in Russia 
forced the Austrian General Headquarters to withdraw divi¬ 
sions and artillery from the Archduke's army. He decided at 
once to retreat, and pressed by General Cadorna, evacuated 
his positions progressively until, at the end of June, he had 


136 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

fallen back about ten miles to a mountain defensive zone which 
he held by the method of position warfare. 

c. Italian offensive. (1) General Cadorna did not permit 
the Archduke’s offensive from the Trent salient to stop his 
offensive on the Isonzo, the object of which was the capture of 
Goritzia and the important heights north of Monfacone which 
mark the beginning of the Carso. 

(2) The Duke of Aosta, commanding the Third Army, 
launched an attack, August 4, at the southern end of the line, 
against the heights of the Carso. Then General Cadorna began 
a powerful artillery preparation, August 6, against Goritzia and 
farther to the north. August 7, the assault captured the Aus¬ 
trian bridgehead west of Goritzia, and on August 9, the Italian 
troops entered Goritzia, from which only a part of the popula¬ 
tion had fled. Farther south, the advance reached and held 
the plateau of Doberdo, which was the first step in the Carso, 
on the route to Trieste. 

(3) The Austrian resistance then stiffened and the attack 
slowed down. The Austrian line was organized as a deep 
defensive zone and was made exceptionally strong on the route 
to Trieste. 

(4) The Duke of Aosta, after a fifteen days’ rest and reor¬ 
ganization of the army resumed the attack, and by the middle 
of November, by the method of attrition and at heavy cost, 
had advanced his whole line about two miles. 

3. Western Front—Second Battle of Verdun. (Maps 
42, 44, 45, and 50). a. Situation to end of August. (1) Al¬ 
though General von Falkenhayn withdrew troops from Verdun 
to defend at the Somme, he did not abandon his offensive 
attitude against that point and the German people still ex¬ 
pected, daily, to hear of the capture of Verdun. 

(2) General Nivelle, as soon as he observed that the Ger¬ 
man pressure had slackened, planned a local counter offensive 
to relieve Verdun of the Souville menace. He initiated that 
counter offensive by a system of local attacks and counter 
attacks with a view of recovering the Cold Ground and Fleury. 
These operations were in the sector of General Mangin and 
were executed brilliantly under the tactics of limited objectives. 
By the end of August, Fleury, all of Cold Ground, and Fort 
Thiaumont had been recaptured. 

b. Change of German attitude. Marshal von Iiindenburg 
relieved General von Falkenhayn as chief of staff on August 28. 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 137 

He saw the futility of continuing the Verdun offensive and or¬ 
dered that a defensive attitude be taken up in front of Verdun. 

c. Battle of attrition. During September and the greater 
part of October, General Nivelle, taking full advantage of his 
opportunity to return the compliment of a battle of attrition 
to the Germans, used his artillery with such good effect as 
to make a slaughterhouse of the German advanced positions 
in front of Verdun. 

d. French counter offensive. (1) On October 24, at 11:40 
AM, the French launched a surprise attack with three divisions 
on a six mile front to take the limited objective: Hardaumont 
—Douamont. In this attack, General Nivelle introduced a new 
feature by not using the long continued artillery preparation 
that had preceded attacks up to that time. The artillery 
preparation was very short but was carried out by a great 
assemblage of guns, all of which fired at their maximum rate 
preceding the infantry attack. More than 400 pieces of heavy 
artillery, alone, were engaged. The infantry advanced under a 
dense smoke screen. At 4:00 PM, Douaumont had been cap¬ 
tured. The seven front line German divisions in that sector 
broke and retreated in a rout. Full advantage, however, 
could not be taken of the opportunity as the Germans in Fort 
Vaux,by flank fire, were exacting a terrible toll from the French. 

(2) General Nivelle treated the reduction of Fort Vaux as 
a separate local maneuver, and, after an artillery preparation, 
launched an attack against it on November 2. By November 5, 
the French had occupied the town and fort of Vaux. 

(3) General Nivelle decided to take full advantage of the 
improved situation at Verdun and planned a new attack for 
December with its objective—the recapture of the line: Hardau¬ 
mont—Bezonville—Pepper Hill. This line had been organized 
thoroughly by the Germans as a deep defensive zone. Gen¬ 
eral Mangin, who was to command in the local attack, prepared 
for the maneuver for six weeks with four specially selected 
divisions. A tremendous amount of ammunition and material 
was accumulated and the troops, in back areas, rehearsed the 
part each unit was to play, down to the detail of the duty^of 
each man. The artillery was brought as far forward as possi¬ 
ble in order to increase the depth of its support. 

(4) Although the weather was wintry and observation 
poor, the artillery preparation began on December 11 and con¬ 
tinued to the 15th, when the four divisions advanced toJ:he 




138 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

attack on a front of eight miles. The battle was violent, par¬ 
ticularly on the right, where the plan called for a deeper 
advance. 

e. Results of the battle . On December 18, General Mangin 
held the line: Pepper Hill—Louvemont—Bezonvaux, which 
was practically the original French third position. It was also 
the line reached by the Crown Prince in the launching of his 
attack in February, 1916. Thus ended the struggle at Verdun, 
which consisted of the German offensive and the French counter 
offensive, with a total loss, including prisoners, dead, sick, and 
wounded of 350,000 for the French and 600,000 for the Germans. 

4. Balkan Theater of Operations, 1916. (Maps 42, 
51, 52 and 53). a. Situation. (1) At the beginning of the war, 
Serbia and Montenegro were on the side of the Allies. All the 
other Balkan states, i.e., Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Rou- 
mania were neutral. 

(2) The Allies, in 1915, with the purpose of opening 
Russia’s line of communications with her munitions base in 
Western Europe, selected the Dardanelles as the direction 
line for the operation. The Allies, however, were unable to 
defeat Turkey in that restricted theater and from it they were 
unable to help Serbia, which was threatened by a Central 
Powers’ major offensive. If Serbia did not repulse this Central 
Powers’ offensive, it would threaten the Allies’ rear. Hence, 
the Allies, while still maintaining the objective of connecting 
with Russia, changed their line of direction from the Dar¬ 
danelles to the railroad lines across the Balkans to Russia, and, 
with two divisions from Gallipoli, established a base at Sal¬ 
onika in October, 1915. 

(3) The people of Bulgaria, as Slavs, were loyal to Russia 
and pro-Ally, but Czar Ferdinand was a German, and, on July 
12, 1915, signed a secret treaty with the Central Powers under 
which, in consideration of the promise of Serbian Macedonia, 
Saloniki, and Epirus, he pledged Bulgaria to enter the war when 
called upon. The Central Powers, with their new ally, Bul¬ 
garia, defeated Serbia, and the Central Powers and Turkey 
established communication. 

(4) When Roumania joined the Allies, in August, 1916, 
the Central Powers were defending against allied offensives on 
the French front at the Somme, on the Italian front, and on 
the Russian front. The situation was exceedingly grave for 
the Central Powers. By common consent, supreme command of 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 139 

a ‘ 1 the Central Powers' forces was given to the Emperor of 
Germany. In the great emergency then confronting the Cen¬ 
tral Powers, he authorized his new Chief of Staff, von Hinden- 
burg to issue orders to all Central Powers' forces in all tactical 
and strategical situations “By order of his Majesty." The 
Central Powers thus secured the great advantage that comes 
from Unity of Command. 

(5) The Greek situation was complicated and was as 
follows: (a) Under the treaty which assured Greek inde¬ 
pendence, France, Great Britain, and Russia were made the 
Guardian Powers of Greece's constitutional government. 
Under the constitution of Greece, in order to protect the 
liberties of the people, the King of Greece was required to 
follow the advice of the Prime Minister. When, due to the 
influence of Germany and Austria (who when Serbia was 
mentioned always saw Russia), Serbia was denied a port on 
the Adriatic Sea after the Balkan wars, Greece obligated her¬ 
self by treaty to give Serbia a corridor to the sea at Saloniki 
and to go to Serbia's assistance as an ally if Serbia should be 
attacked by Bulgaria. 

(b) In 1915, the Greek Prime Minister was M. Venizelos, 
who, observing that Bulgaria was mobilizing on the flank of 
Serbia, acted at once under the terms of the Serbian treaty, by 
calling on the Guardian Powers, September 21, 1915, to send 
a force of 150,000 men at once to the Serbian corridor at 
Saloniki. The Guardian Powers agreed September 24, and 
Greece, amid great enthusiasm (as the people were pro-Ally) 
began to mobilize at once. Under that authority and in their 
own right as Guardian Powers, Great Britain and France began 
to land troops at Saloniki, October 3, 1915. King Constantine 
who was hostile to the Allies soon dismissed M. Venizelos and 
concentrated the army in Thessaly, with strong detachments 
holding the northern frontier. 

(6) The Allies, by promising Transylvania, won Roumania 
and she signed a secret treaty, August 17, pledging herself, as 
one of the Allies. Her army had been mobilized for some time, 
her crops had been harvested, and she could begin operations 
as soon as officers and men could be recalled from leave. 

b. The Roumanian theater. (1) Roumania was bounded 
on the east by the Black Sea and Russia, on the north by 
Russia and Austria-Hungary, on the west by Austria-Hungary 
and on the south by Bulgaria. The boundary between Aus- 


140 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

tria-Hungary and Roumania from the north followed the 
crests of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian 
Alps. From Orsova, the boundary of Roumania coincided 
with the Danube, which separates that country for a short 
distance from Serbia, and then, turning eastward, from Bul¬ 
garia, as far as a point southeast of Bucharest. From that 
point the boundary line with Bulgaria runs across the Dobruja 
plain to the Black Sea. There are many passes through the 
mountains into Transylvania, but no bridges across the Danube 
into Bulgaria. 

(2) The Dobruja is that part of Roumania which lies be¬ 
tween the Danube and the Black Sea. It is a treeless, arid 
plateau, to which the rest of Roumania has access by crossings 
at Turtukai, at Silistria, and over the modern bridge at Cer- 
navoda. It constitutes a bridgehead for operations to the 
south, and is a very sensitive area in Roumania, as the great 
railroad line from Bucharest to Constanza crosses it. 

(3) That part of Roumania which is called Wallachia 
formed a great salient between Austria-Hungary on the north 
and Bulgaria on the south. The salient was about one hundred 
miles wide at the neck, and about two hundred miles deep from 
that line. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary, following the 
mountain line, dented a big salient into Roumania from the 
northern end of Moldavia to the western end of Wallachia. 
That salient was about one hundred and fifty miles across at 
the base and about one hundred miles deep. 

(4) (a) The railroad situation greatly favored the Central 
Powers. Their roads were nearly ail main line roads and cross- 
connected to expedite troop movements for concentration at 
any point on the Roumanian salient or for side movement. 
The railroads of Roumania, on the other hand, v/ith one or 
two exceptions, were not main line roads, and did not provide 
for cross traffic. Also, their capacity was small and side 
movement difficult. The Bagdad railroad passed about sixty 
miles from Roumania, and about one hundred miles from the 
Saloniki army. 

(b) Roumanian railroads touched the Danube at six 
places. Bulgarian railroads, branches of the Bagdad railroad, 
touched the Danube at three places. Neither were well 
supplied with strategical cross lines at the boundary. No 
railroads led from the Saloniki army line to Bulgaria, except 
by extending the east flank to Dedegatch, and on the left 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 141 

flank by an advance to Kustendi. The best line of advance 
from Saloniki was along the Saloniki—Nish railroad. 

(5) The people of Roumania and of Transylvania were 
largely of the same race and many, for a long time, had held the 
aspiration of coming together under the Roumanian Govern¬ 
ment. The people of Roumania were exceedingly pro-Ally 
and greatly desired to enter the war. 

c. Plans and dispositions . (1) Allies' plan, (a) By August 
17, the Allies had stopped the Central Powers' offensives 
on the Western and Italian fronts, and had forced the Cen¬ 
tral Powers to the defensive on all fronts; the Battle of the 
Somme was at its height; General Brussilloff’s offensive had 
reached the crests of the Carpathians to the north of Rou¬ 
mania and was still advancing. The Allies believed that they 
were holding the Central Powers east and west and now had 
a chance to end the war by striking a decisive blow against 
the Central Powers’ unprotected southern flank. 

(b) Their general plan for operations in the Balkans was 
that Roumania, without uncovering her Bulgarian frontier, 
should conduct an offensive across Transylvania towards 
Budapest; that Russia, while continuing to act as energetically 
as possible on the Austrian front, should send two infantry 
divisions and one cavalry division into the Dobruja to cooper¬ 
ate with the Roumanians against the Bulgarians; and that the 
Saloniki army should deliver a determined offensive against 
Bulgaria not later than eight days before the launching of the 
Roumanian offensive, with the mission of cutting the Bagdad 
railroad and attracting Bulgaria’s army from Roumania. 

(2) The Central Powers' plan, (a) General von Falkenhayn 
had realized for more than a year that Roumania would event¬ 
ually join the Allies and had been restrained from a surprise 
offensive against her only by the fact that the Central Powers 
were receiving great quantities of food supplies from her. 
However, to be ready for Roumania and to brace Bulgaria, he 
had left a German force under von Mackensen in Bulgaria 
after the Serbian defeat. 

(b) His general plan for the operation, which was later 
adopted by von Hindenburg, was to cut the Roumanian line 
of communications with Russia in the Dobruja and then to 
destroy Roumania by a converging operation on the Roumanian 
troops in the Wallachian salient and by the capture of Bucha¬ 
rest. He also planned to destroy the Saloniki army by a con- 


142 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

verging operation, associated, if possible, with a surprise 
offensive against its rear by the Greek army in Thessaly. 

(3) Dispositions, (a) Allies, (i) Roumanian force. Rou- 
mania mobilized about 500,000 men, organized them, in the 
beginning, into four armies, and concentrated them as follows: 

The First Army, from Orsova to the pass of the Red Tower. 

The Second Army, from the Red Tower pass to the pass of Oitoz. 

The Army of the North, from the pass of Oitoz to Dorna Watra. 

The Army of the South (which was weak), to observe the Bulgarian 
frontier from Orsova to the Black Sea. 

The enlisted personnel and the junior officers of the 
Roumanian army were excellent material but were not trained 
for modern war. 

There were enough rapid fire 75-mm. guns for peace 
strength, but not enough for war. Practically no heavy artil¬ 
lery or mountain artillery, only six machine guns per regiment, 
and no air service, were on hand. 

The stock of ammunition was very insufficient. The 
munitions and material of all kinds that France and England 
had sent by way of Vladivostock and Archangel were stored at 
those places, and their movement forbidden by the Russian 
Foreign Minister, M. Sturmer, who was later discovered to 
have been a tool of Germany. 

The Roumanian Armies were directed by the Chief of the 
General Staff, General Iliescu. 

(ii) Saloniki force. By the end of 1915, General Sarrail 
had organized a very large intrenched camp in front of Sal¬ 
oniki, from the Vardar to the sea, and a base of sufficient capaci¬ 
ty for the operations of a large force. 

In April and May, the Serbian Army, which the French 
had salvaged, rearmed, re-equipped and reorganized, in 
strength 120,000, arrived. Soon, Italian, Greek, Russian, and 
British contigents arrived and carried the total force to more 
than 300,000 men, which General Sarrail organized into an 
army, and which he named the Army of the Orient. Its order 
of battle from right to left was: British—Italian—French— 
Serbian. 

(b) Central Powers, (i) Against Roumania. Marshal von 
Hindenburg, now Chief of the German General Staff, conducted 
the Balkan operations from General Headquarters at Pless, 
on the Eastern front. He concentrated two groups for opera¬ 
tion against Roumania as follows: 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 143 

The southern group, consisting of German, Austro-Hun¬ 
garian, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops, south of the Danube, 
in the Plevna area, was to strike the first blow in the Dobruja, 
and then to cross the Danube near Sistova, constituting the 
southern converging force against the Wallachian salient. 
This group was placed under von Mackensen who had remained 
in the Balkans after the defeat of Serbia as Germany's special 
representative in that theater. 

The northern group, consisting of the German Ninth 
Army (General von Falkenhayn) opposite the Vulcan Pass 
and the Austrian Army of Archduke Francis Joseph farther 
north in Transylvania, were constituted the northern con¬ 
verging force which was to strike at Wallachia through the 
mountain passes. It was placed under command of the Aus¬ 
trian Archduke Charles. 

(ii) Against the Saloniki force. The Bulgarian General 
Jekoff commanded the group of armies in front of General 
SarraiPs Army in Macedonia. 

The order of battle from east to west was: 

Bulgarian Second Army (General Teodorov), 

German Eleventh Army (General von Winckler), 

Bulgarian First Army (General Gneshov). 

(c) Greece. The Greek Army, mobilized at war strength, 
had been concentrated in Thessaly, with detachments holding 
the frontier. It had been well trained and equipped under the 
Prussian system. Its action was completely controlled by 
King Constantine. 

d. Defeat of Roumania. (1) (a) General Sarrail was pre¬ 
pared to advance August 19, which was eight days before 
Roumania declared war, but von Hindenburg forestalled him. 
General Jekoff, the Bulgarian commander, delivered a double 
enveloping attack against General SarraiPs two wings. The 
Greeks opened the passes and allowed the Bulgarians to enter. 
On the eastern flank, the Greek IV Corps merely looked on 
while the Bulgarian troops marched past, and, with their own 
consent, were interned by the German liaison officers. 

(b) General Sarrail, fearful lest the Greek army in Thessaly 
should surprise him by a blow in the back, delayed his opera¬ 
tions until the Allies, by an ultimatum and a naval economic 
blockade, forced a demobilization of the Greek army. As a 
result, General Sarrail did not advance until September 12, 
which was sixteen days too late. 


144 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(2) On August 28, General Iliescu, the Roumanian com¬ 
mander, sent the First, Second and North Armies through the 
passes. They surprised and easily pushed back the Austrian 
covering troops and by September 10 had reached the line: 
Dorna Watra—Sibin—Orsova, on a 550 mile front. 

(3) On September 11, von Mackensen sent three divisions 
into the Dobruja. Although defeated, on September 16, by 
Russian and Roumanian forces, they held the line of the 
Trajan Wall, thus cutting the Roumanian line of sea communi¬ 
cation with Russia and protecting von Mackensen’s right flank. 

(4) (a) On September 16, Archduke Charles began his 
counter offensive, by concentrating against the Roumanian 
First Army, which he defeated September 26-29, at the battle 
of Harmanstatt or Sibin. The Roumanian First Army re¬ 
treated and carried the line back with it to the frontier along 
the mountain crests on which the armies stopped, October 15, 
with the intention of defending. 

(b) Archduke Charles was not able to enter the Red 
Tower or the Tomos passes as planned. Accordingly, he dem¬ 
onstrated violently against the northen (Moldavian) part of 
the line, at the northern end of which the Roumanian Northern 
Army connected with General BrusillofTs armies, and then 
launched his principal offensive against the Vulcan pass. 

(c) The Archduke Charles forced the Vulcan pass on 
November 14, and severely defeated the Roumanian First 
Army at Turgu-Jin on November 15-16. After marching 
more than seventy-five miles in four days, he occupied Craiova, 
November 21. On November 24, changing direction to the 
east, his cavalry established contact with von Mackensen’s 
armies west of Bucharest. 

(5) Von Mackensen waited south of the Danube until 
the northern force had passed the Alps, then on November 25, 
under the diversion of offensive action by his detachment in 
Dobruja, he crossed the Danube on numerous ponton bridges 
at Sistova and farther to the west. On the 27th, at Giorgevo, 
he established contact with his detachment in Dobruja. 

(6) Marshal von Hindenburg then placed von Mackensen 
in charge of the whole operation to capture Bucharest. The 
latter planned a double envelopment with his own column to 
the south and von Falkenhayn’s columns to the north. The 
columns from the Red Tower and the Tomos passes were to 
cut the Roumanian line of retreat to Moldavia. The Rouman- 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 145 

ian General Averescu, tried to defend Bucharest for three days 
with five divisions, but his line of communications was threat¬ 
ened by von Mackensen's turning maneuver, and he abandoned 
the capital, December 6. 

(7) The Roumanian armies, by retreating very rapidly, 
escaped from the von Mackensen enveloping maneuver and 
gained the line: Carpathains—Sereth—Danube, where they 
were met with Russian reinforcements and reorganized. 

(8) Von Mackensen's new southern group then joined 
hands with Archduke Francis Joseph's army, which sent 
detachments through Oitoz pass, and, together, they captured 
Foscani, on January 7. 

(9) The Bulgarian detachment in the Dobruja then ad¬ 
vanced to the Danube and connected with the rest of the Cen¬ 
tral Powers' line at Braila. 

(10) (a) General Sarrail in Macedonia attacked September 
12, from the Vardar to Lake Ostrowo with Serbians as advance 
guards of all the columns. The Serbians on the left of the line, 
in steady mountain fighting, slowly captured hill after hill and 
reoccupied Monastir on November 19, and thereafter extended 
the line to Valona, on the Adriatic Sea. 

(b) General Sarrail then decided that the operation could 
not be carried farther that year, and organized the line as a 
deep defensive zone from the Struma to Monastir, and as a 
shallow zone along the rest of the line. 

e. Abdication of Greek King. (1) In the meantime, M. 
Venizelos had been dismissed as Premier of Greece. The 
northeastern provinces and the islands of Greece seceded, 
joined the Allies, elected M. Venizelos President of their 
Provisional Government, and organized a Greek Army of 
80,000 men which reported to General Sarrail for duty with 
the Allies. 

(2) In December, France, Great Britain, and Russia acting 
under the treaty of 1863 in their capacity as Guardians of 
Constitutional Government in Greece, forced Constantine to 
abdicate the throne. He was succeeded by his second son, 
Alexander, who shared the people's friendly attitude toward 
the Allies, and, complying with constitutional methods, re¬ 
called M. Venizelos to the control of the government as Prime 
Minister. 

5. Central Powers Seek Peace. (Map 57.) a. General 
situation. At the end of 1916, the Central Powers had failed 


146 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

to force a separate peace from any of the Allies except Mon¬ 
tenegro. They had overrun the little countries of Belgium, 
Serbia, and Roumania, and had attained the objective of a 
“Mittel Europa,” extended to include Turkey. The status of all 
the Balkan States had been fixed by the end of 1916, with 
regard to the war and there was no prospect of any more allies 
for the Central Powers in that section. In fact, the Central 
Powers had reached their point of culmination from the point 
of view of accretion by allies in Europe, and were defending on 
a total frontage of about 2,640 miles. Apparently, the re¬ 
sources and strength of the Central Powers would thereafter 
decline. From the point of view of the Central Powers, who 
were being subjected to a strategical siege by the Allies, the 
psychological moment had arrived for peace. Austria-Hun¬ 
gary, after the Trent defeat, proposed negotiations for peace, 
but Germany was not then ready. 

b. Central Powers' proposal. December 12, just six days 
after the fall of Bucharest, the Kaiser, representing all the 
Central Powers, communicated with the Allies, through the 
United States, and requested them to meet the Central Powers 
in conference with the view of formulating terms of peace. 
The Allies, having nothing to gain and everything to lose by 
a peace at that time, declined the offer. 

c. Suggestion of “peace without victory.” (1) On December 
18, the President of the United States, Mr. Wilson, asked 
each of the belligerents for a statement of its objectives in the 
war, and, on January 22, 1917, suggested a “peace without 
victory.” 

(2) The Kaiser, in reply, suggested a peace conference. 

(3) The Allies, in reply, declined to discuss peace until 
Germany should agree to make restitution and reparation, 
and to give guarantees. 

6. Principles of War. a. Principle of security. (Maps 
1, 41, 42, 51, 52, 53 and 57.) (1) (a) When Roumania joined 
the Allies August 27, 1916, she was not properly prepared, 
from point of view of weapons and munitions to wage war. 
She had no air service, very few machine guns, no heavy artil¬ 
lery, and only enough light artillery for the peace strength of 
her army. Roumania was dependent on her Allies in Western 
Europe for all arms and munitions. The blockade which the Cen¬ 
tral Powers had established against the Russian supply line 
across the Balkans, after the defeat of Serbia, in 1915, became 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 147 

effective against Roumania, also, as soon as the latter declared 
herself on the side of the Allies. Thereafter, the only supply 
line was the Russian supply line via Vladivostock on the 
Pacific Ocean and via Archangel on the Arctic Ocean. These 
supply lines were not sufficient for the needs of Russia alone, 
and their use to meet the needs of Roumania were entirely 
dependent on Russian courtesy in placing the supply of her 
own needs in abeyance while she met the necessities of her Ally. 

(b) From the point of view of supply, Roumania was 
undertaking to make war without having first complied with 
the principle of security. Her insecurity was later proven by 
decisive defeat. 

(2) (a) The Allies' plan called for an offensive operation 
by General Sarrail against the Central Powers' forces which 
were between his army and Roumania. This offensive was 
to be launched eight days before Roumania should declare war 
with the view of drawing the Central Powers' forces away from 
the southern boundary of Roumania. 

(b) M. Venizelos, who was friendly to the Allies, had been 
dismissed from the position of Prime Minister of Greece, and 
the Greek forces that had been mobilized by M. Venizelos to 
help the Allies were under the direct command of King Con¬ 
stantine, who was hostile to the Allies. The Greek army, well 
equipped and trained, was concentrated in Thessaly in rear of 
General Sarrail's army. Greek detachments held the mountain 
passes on the boundary in front of General Sarrail's army and 
thus executed the duties that ordinarily would have been ex¬ 
pected of covering detachments from General Sarrail's army. 
Greece insisted that she was neutral, but when General Sarrail 
was ready to advance under the plan, the Greek detachments 
opened the mountain passes to the Bulgarian forces, which, 
under the principle of surprise, forestalled General Sarrail's 
advance and prevented his compliance with the principle of 
cooperation in the combined Allied operation in the Balkans, 
as he was afraid to advance until the Greek army in his rear 
was immobilized. 

(c) In the preparation for the 1916 campaign in the 
Balkans, when General Sarrail did not, in advance, take the 
necessary measures to protect his rear, his flanks, and the 
mountain passes to the front with troops under his own com¬ 
mand, he violated the principle of security , which requires 


148 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

that an independent commander shall take such measures as 
are necessary to insure his freedom of action. 

b. Principle of mass. (1) Although the Central Powers, 
after their defeat at the Marne, had expected the final accre¬ 
tion of Roumania to the Allies, and had prepared plans for 
use in such a contingency, they were not actually ready to 
meet that contingency when Roumania effected a surprise 
declaration of war against them, August 27, 1916. On that 
day, the Central Powers were conducting a dubious defensive 
on all fronts and there were practically no Central Powers’ 
troops on the Austro-Roumanian frontier. 

(2) The Roumanian and Saloniki forces totaled more than 
800,000 men which was a preponderance of more than two to 
one against the Central Powers’ forces intervening between 
those Allied armies. 

(3) The center of gravity of the mass of Central Powers’ 
forces (excluding Turkey) was well north of Vienna. All 
Central Powers’ forces to the north of Roumania were superior 
in training, equipment, and fire power to the Roumanian 
forces. Any advance by the Roumanian forces north along 
the decisive direction that threatened invasion of Austria 
and Hungary would necessarily attract to its front a force also 
superior in numbers. 

(4) On the other hand, the Central Powers’ troops in 
the Balkans were almost entirely Bulgarians, who were not 
superior to the Roumanians in training or morale, and whose 
superiority in fire power was not so pronounced as that of 
Central Powers’ troops north of Roumania. 

(5) The Allies had the advantage of mass for operations 
against the Bulgarians’ forces between Roumania and the 
Saloniki army, but did not have that advantage for operations 
by Roumania against the Central Powers’ forces to the north, 
with the result that the opportunity to take advantage of 
compliance with the principle of mass in opening a supply 
line through the Balkans under the principle of security was 
lost when Roumania frittered away her superiority in an 
unaided, hopeless, attack against the tremendously superior 
Central Powers’ forces to the north. 

c. Principle of economy of force. (1) The whole frontier 
between Roumania and Austria was buttressed in the strongest 
way by the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian 
Alps. Roumania held the passes through those mountains. 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 149 

The Transylvanians on the Hungarian side of those mountains 
were racially and in national point of view the friends of the 
Roumanians. Roumania could have held those passes with a 
comparatively small force. She thus could have gained for 
maneuver along her supply line to Salonild, practically her 
total mass. Without regard to the direction of the Roumanian 
blow it would have taken a considerable time for the Central 
Powers to assemble a sufficient force in the Balkans to gain 
mass. If the Central Powers should have attempted to force 
the Roumanian mountain frontier, which is extremely unlikely, 
the advantage of mass would have continued with the Allies 
still longer in the operation against the Bulgarians. 

(2) In an analysis of the situation existing on August 27, 
1916, it must be concluded that the Allies did not appreciate 
the fact that by complying with the principle of economy of 
force , Roumania would have been able to illustrate the prin¬ 
ciple of mass in an operation that should have opened a supply 
line from Saloniki, and thus have produced a supply situation 
in Roumania that would have illustrated the principle of 
security. 

d. Principle of the objective. (1) When Roumania de¬ 
cided to cast her lot with the Allies, her first duty was to 
select the first and main objective which she should endeavor 
to attain. Her supply situation was not satisfactory and 
rendered her insecure in the maintenance of war until she 
should secure a means of supply. 

(2) If she had assumed a defensive attitude, her supplies 
would have become more and more attenuated and eventually 
she would have been forced to make peace because of inability 
to make war. If she had assumed an offensive attitude, she 
could have directed her operations against the main Central 
Powers’ armies to the north. That, however, would not have 
helped her supply situation. In fact, her supplies would have 
been consumed more rapidly than if she had assumed the 
defensive attitude. 

(3) In addition, if she had operated to the north, while 
in that insecure supply condition, she would have been further 
handicapped by the fact that her enemies, day by day, would 
have illustrated an increasing compliance with the principle 
of mass. This would have resulted, at no distant date, in the 
arrival of the point of culmination, when the enemy would 


150 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

have had the ascendency and, in an aggressive offensive, 
would have defeated her. That is just what happened. 

(4) On the other hand, if Roumania had launched her 
offensive on the decisive supply line toward Saloniki, she could 
have gained the advantage of compliance with the principles 
of surprise and mass, and if successful, as she probably would 
have been, she would have won compliance with the principle 
of security. Having become secure from a supply point of 
view, and having helped Russia to become secure from that same 
viewpoint, she could have undertaken operations with the 
cooperation of her Allies, Russia and the Saloniki force, against 
the unprotected southern flank of Austria-Hungary, with a 
greater hope of success. 

(5) It thus appears that inasmuch as Roumania, from a 
supply point of view, was not secure when she entered the 
war against the Central Powers on August 27, 1916, her first 
and main objective should have been to win that security, which 
meant, in the then existing situation, defeating the Bulgarian 
army and opening a supply line from Saloniki. 

e. Principle of simplicity. (1) (a) On August 27, 1916, 
the day that Roumania declared war against them, the Central 
Powers, under the principle of cooperation were defending 
on the Russian, the Italian, and the Western fronts. The 
Central Powers situation was exceedingly grave, and, saving- 
mistakes by the Allies, had the elements of disaster in it. 

(b) To meet that situation the Central Powers at once 
abandoned compliance with the principle of cooperation and 
turning to the great principle of simplicity as illustrated in 
unity of command, they conferred “Supreme Command" 
on the Emperor of Germany. 

(c) In his new position of “All Supreme Commander" of 
all Central Powers’ forces, the Kaiser conferred on von Hinden- 
burg (whom he had just selected as Chief of the German Gen¬ 
eral Staff) the power to make decisions and issue the neces¬ 
sary instructions in all strategical and tactical situations. 

(2) (a) Von Hindenburg at once recognized the principle 
of the offensive as the controlling principle in that dangerous 
situation, and complying with the principle of economy of 
force, he stripped still further the already thin lines in front 
of the Allies and thus gained sufficient troops with which to 
illustrate mass on the Roumanian front. 


OPERATIONS IN 1916—CONTINUED 151 

(b) Then in an illustration of the principle of surprise 
and movement , he advanced along the strategically decisive 
direction around the Roumanian left and rear and defeated the 
Roumanian armies, giving thus an illustration of compliance 
with the principle of the offensive in meeting and defeating an in¬ 
secure enemy offensive. 

(c) Von Hindenburg gives here a good illustration of the 
fact that in the combined operations of allies, the controlling 
principle is not cooperation but simplicity as illustrated by 
unity of command. 


CHAPTER VIII 


t 


Entry of America 


Page 

1. African Theater of Operations, 1917....152 

a. Situation.152 

b. Allied plans.153 

c. Operations.153 

2. Turkish Theater of Operations...154 

a. Mesopotamian front..154 

b. Syrian front.155 

3. Situation in European Theater, January 1, 1917.158 

a. Central Powers’ growth.158 

b. Encircling policy of Allies.158 

c. Change in French High Command.158 

4. Plans of Campaign.159 

a. Central Powers.159 

b. Allies.... 159 

6. Submarine Warfare. 159 

a. Method of waging.159 

b. Method of defense.160 

c. Effect on neutral world.160 

6. Western Front.161 

a. Situation.161 

b. Order of battle, January 1, 1917.161 

c. Plans.162 

d. German retreat.163 

e. General Nivelle’s spring offensive.163 

(1) Plans.163 

(2) Operations.164 

(a) Marshal Haig’s operation.164 

(b) General Michler’s operation.165 

7. Principles of War._.168 

a. Principle of the objective.168 

b. Principle of security.169 

c. Principle of the offensive.169 


1 . African Theater of Operations. (Maps 1 and 54.) 
a. Situation. (1) German East Africa was the most important 
of the German colonies and maintained its defense for three 
years. In extent, it was equal to Germany, Italy, Switzerland, 
Holland, and Denmark. 

(2) The terrain rose in terraces from the eastern coastal 
plain to a central plateau which descended steeply towards the^ 

152 




































OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 153 

central African lakes. The frontier on the north was a chain 
of mountains. The western border between the lakes was also 
mountainous and impassable. On the southwest, an impassable 
mountain range closed the gap between Lakes Tanganyika 
and Nyasa. 

(3) The Germans had two railroads. One ran from Dar- 
es-Salaam, on the coast, across the colony to Lake Tanganyika. 
The other ran from Tanga, on the coast, to the base of Mt. 
Kilimanjaro. The Allies had one railroad that ran fron Mom¬ 
basa, on the coast, up into the Uganda country. The terrain 
limited an Allied offensive practically to operations from 
Uganda. 

(4) The German forces consisted of native troops, with 
many German officers, under the command of the General 
von Lettow-Vorbeck. The Allied troops were native Africans 
and East Indians. 

(5) In November, 1914, General von Lettow-Vorbeck 
defeated the Allies under General Aitken at Tanga, and again, 
in January, 1915, at Jassin. From then until 1916, when Gen¬ 
eral Smuts was made Commander-in-Chief of Allied operations 
in East Africa, General von Lettow-Vorbeck maintained his 
colony intact and raided Uganda. He had organized a deep 
defensive zone at all the northern passes. 

b. Allied plans. (1) General Smuts arrived at Mombasa, 
February 19, 1916, and decided to assume the strategical and 
tactical offensive at once. His general plan for the operation 
was to conduct a major offensive from the north, and synchron¬ 
ous minor offensives from all the neighboring colonies and from 
the sea, i.e., a policy of encirclement. 

(2) His detailed plan was for the major offensive to pene¬ 
trate the frontier in the vicinity of Mt. Kilimanjaro, and, 
operating on the higher and cooler land, to penetrate the colony 
to the Rufiji River, cutting both German railroads. The minor 
offensives were to penetrate from Lake Victoria, from Lake 
Kivu, from Lake Tanganyika, and from Lake Nyasa. 

c. Operations. (1) (a) The operations began at dusk, 
March 5, 1916. General Smuts captured the railroad terminus 
near Mt. Kilimanjaro, March 13. He then reorganized his 
force into three divisions, two composed of African troops, and 
one of Indian and British troops. 

(b) He then, on April 3, started the minor offensives, and 
also sent the second division by a forced march to the high 


154 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

ground at Kondoa Irangi. The detachment easily lived off the 
country and defeated a counter attack from Dodoma. 

(2) Shortly thereafter, he moved down parallel to the Tanga 
railroad, and concentrated at Handeni, June 18. A detachment 
with assistance from the navy captured Tanga on July 7, and 
thus secured a closer base. The columns then advanced to 
the south and cut the central railroad and the minor offen¬ 
sives closed in. 

(3) When, on September 3, with the assistance of the 
Navy, Dar-es-Salaam was captured, General Smuts had de¬ 
prived his opponent of both railroads and had secured for him¬ 
self a new base. 

(4) On January 26, 1917, General Smuts left for the 
Imperial War Conference, and General Hoskens and, later. 
General Van Deventer continued the operations. 

(5) On November 26, General von Lettow-Vorbeck, with 
his remaining troops, crossed into Portuguese East Africa. 
The control of German East Africa then passed to Breat Britain. 

2. Turkish Theater of Operations. (Maps 43, 47A, 
48, 55 and 56.) a. Mesopotamian front. (1) (a) General 
Townsend surrendered Kut-el-Amara, April 29, 1916. The 
relieving columns remained in place and, in August, General 
Maude was placed in command. He reorganized the expedition, 
accumulated a large amount of supplies, increased the radius 
of activity of his land and river transportation sufficiently to 
reach Bagdad, and added river gunboats to his fleet of steamers. 
Functioning under the Allied plan of campaign, which required 
him to assume the offensive, he decided to recapture Kut-el- 
Amara. 

(b) General von der Goltz had died of fever, but his 
successor, Ahmed Bey, had strengthened the Kut position. 
The deep defensive zone north of the Tigris had been made 
very strong and the bridgehead south of Kut had been or¬ 
ganized into a very strong deep defensive zone. The Germans 
and Turks believed that the place could not be captured and 
had sent a reinforced corps into Persia to menace India. 

(2) General Maude’s general plan for the operation was 
to deliver a holding attack, very strong in artillery fire, north 
of the Tigris at Sanna-i-yat, and to turn the Kut position by 
an attack south of the Tigris with a view of cutting the enemy 
line of communications. 


OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 155 

(3) (a) The holding attack was delivered December 13, 
1916. The next day, the turning attack was delivered with 
infantry east of the Hai River and with cavalry west of it. A 
line was attained from which artillery fire could be delivered 
against Kut. Siege methods then were adopted. 

(b) By maneuver, the attack was carried to the west and 
Dahra Bend captured, February 15, 1917. 

(c) General Maude then, under cover of a successful at¬ 
tack at Sanna-i-yat, crossed the Tigris at Shumran Bend on 
the night of February 23-24. The enemy at once evacuated 
Kut. General Maude pursued with gunboats on the river and 
with cavalry north of the river. 

(4) (a) On February 27, General Maude halted at Azidizeh 
to reorganize and to establish an advanced base. Then, using 
his cavalry as a screen, he resumed the advance on March 5. 
Orders were given for the return of all Turkish troops in Persia 
but it was too late. 

(b) (i) General Maude arrived opposite Bagdad, on March 
8, and decided to deliver a feint and holding attack by cavalry 
from the south and west, and to turn the city by the main 
attack which should cross the Diala River and cut the enemy 
line of communications. 

(ii) The main attack attempted to cross at four places. 
Three of the attempts failed. A part of the northern column 
crossed before daylight, March 9, and maintained itself all 
day with the assistance of artillery fire from across the river. 

(iii) The feint by the cavalry on March 9, under cover of 
a dust storm, advanced, and drove the enemy out of Bagdad 
to the north. On the night of March 9-10, the main body 
crossed the Diala, and entered Bagdad, March 11. 

(c) General Maude then made his position secure by 
taking up advance positions on the Diala, the Tigris, and the 
Euphrates. 

b. Syrian front. (1) Situation, (a) When the Sultan of 
Turkey joined the Central Powers in 1914, he, as the head of the 
Mohammedan faith, proclaimed a Holy War against the Allies 
and called on all true believers to make war against them. 
However, his proclamation lacked full effectiveness, inasmuch 
as the holy city of Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed and 
the depository of the Kaaba and other sacred relics of Islam, 
was in the actual possession of the Sherif of Mecca, over whom 
he had little control. 



156 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Great Britain met the Holy War proclamation by an an¬ 
nouncement that she would not interfere with the Mussulman 
pilgrimages to Mecca as long as Turkey did not interfere. 

(b) December 17, 1914, the Khedive of Egypt, Abbas II, 
cast in his lot with Turkey. Great Britain at once proclaimed 
Egypt a British protectorate, forced Abbas II to flee to Constan¬ 
tinople, and placed the eldest living male descendant of Ma¬ 
homet Ali on the throne of Egypt with the title of Sultan. 
Mussulmen, other than Turks, approved of that action. 

(c) Both the Turks and the Arabians are Mohammedans, 
but they have never affiliated except on the basis of “the con¬ 
querors” and “the conquered.” At the beginning of the war, 
Turkey greatly strengthened the garrison in the vicinity of 
Mecca, an action which was interpreted by the Arabians to 
mean that the supremacy of Turkey and not of Islam was 
desired. On June 9, 1916, the Grand Sherif of Mecca declared 
the independence of Arabia from Turkey, was crowned King 
of Hedjaz, and assumed the title of “Commander of the Faith¬ 
ful,” and “Keeper of the Holy Places.” At once, he organized 
an army and began operations against the Turks. 

(d) In the preliminary operation incident to ejection of the 
Turkish garrisons, the Turks committed the fatal mistake of fir¬ 
ing on the Holy Places and thus furnished the King of Hedjaz 
with evidence that he was actually defending Islamism against 
the Sultan of Turkey. In pursuance of a broad strategical 
policy, the Allies did not send any troops or an Allied com- 
mander-in-chief to Mecca. 

(2) Theater of operations, (a) Physical features. The 
district of Palestine, along the eastern coast of the Mediter¬ 
ranean Sea, is a long narrow plain, bounded on the east by a 
tableland, scored with defiles toward the coast which, with the 
exception of the Jaffa—Jerusalem route, are practically im¬ 
passable after rains. To the east, is the valley of the Jordan 
and the Dead Sea, nearly 1,300 feet below sea level. The drop 
in some places is a 2,000-foot precipice. Farther to the east, is 
the great plateau of Moab. To the south, the valley continues 
to the Gulf of Akaba on the Red Sea, dividing the high ground 
of Arabia from..that of Sinai. The coastal plain is narrowest 
at Gaza, which is the gateway to the north from the Sinai 
peninsula and from Egypt. The Germans built a modern 
road from Gaza to Beersheba. Rivers, streams, and oases in 
the desert were scarce. Troop movements were dependent on 


OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 157 

the laying of water pipe lines and other methods of water car¬ 
riage. 

(b) Railroads. The Turkish railroad lines were based on 
Constantinople, 1,300 miles away. They were frequently 
single track and had two breaks, one at the Taurus Mountains, 
and one just north of Aleppo, where transfers by trucks were 
required. The railroad system extended south to Beersheba 
from near Nazareth, and south to Medina in the Hedjaz, 
from Damascus. Three branches to the coast at Bierut, 
Haifa, and at Jaffa were of little value, as the Allies controlled 
the sea. On the Allies' side, the railroad extended along the 
Nile, along the Suez canal, and forward to El Arish after 
General Murray's capture of that place, in January, 1917. 

(3) Forces and plans, (a) (i) A strong fortress was built 
at Gaza, as the central work of a deep defensive zone that 
covered the whole coastal plain. A German General, Kress 
von Kressenstein, was in actual command of the troops on the 
Syrian front. The Turkish defensive line against operations 
from Egypt extended from Gaza to Beersheba with an advance 
position at El Audja; against operations from Hedjaz, there was 
to be a defense from Fort Akaba to the Medina railroad at 
Ma'an. 

(ii) General von Falkenhayn decided that, the defensive 
attitude should be maintained, and, in the event of a British 
attack on Gaza, that a decision should be sought by counter 
attack from the east with a view of enveloping the British 
right flank and cutting their line of communications between 
El Arish and Rafa. 

(b) General Murray was in command of the Allied forces. 
He held the line of El Arish, with advance detachments at 
Rafa, which was the railhead for advanced operations. His 
force was in two columns, one a heavy column, was along the 
railroad to Rafa; the other an exceedingly mobile force for 
desert w T ork, was on the right. He planned to attack Gaza 
in front, and, with the light cavalry and camel corps on the 
right, to penetrate the thin line between Gaza and Beersheba 
in order to turn Gaza. 

(4) Operations. General Murray delivered the attack as 
planned, but the main attack did not capture Gaza, and, 
although the turning movement succeeded as a tactical maneu¬ 
ver, it could not maintain itself on account of lack of water. 
The Turkish counter attack, on March 27, forced General 


158 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Murray to abandon the attack and to retreat. This opera¬ 
tion is known as the first battle of Gaza. 

3. Situation in European Theater, January 1, 1917. 
(Map 57.) a. Central Powers’ growth. (1) From the beginning 
of the war to the end of 1916, the Germans and Austrians had 
increased their control over territory in the “Mittel Europa” 
theater by conquest and by alliance until, by the end of 1916, 
they and their allies were maintaining a frontage of 2,640 miles. 
This frontage required so many troops that the problem of 
holding out a strategical reserve for use as a mass of maneuver 
seemed to be nearly impossible. 

(2) With the removal of Constantine, the brother-in-law 
of the Kaiser, from the Greek throne, the last contiguous state 
that might have joined the Central Powers cast in its lot with 
the Allies. “Mittel Europa” had then reached its point of 
culmination in growth by accretion of allies. Thereafter, 
unless they could force a separate peace from one of the Allies, 
the Central Powers could expect to decline relatively, in re¬ 
sources and in strength. 

b. Encircling policy of Allies. (1) The Allies, with no loss 
except Montenegro, had continued the execution of their 
strategic plan of encircling the Central Powers. The blockade 
of the Central Powers' coast lines and of their approaches to 
the sea, had been carried out so effectively that the people 
of the Central Powers considered that they were being sub¬ 
jected to a siege. In fact, the encircling policy of the Allies 
was an effort to enforce a great strategical siege against the 
Central Powers. 

(2) It was effective in that, by the end of 1916, the Central 
Powers felt a great shortage of essential supplies needed for 
modern war, such as rubber, and a great shortage of essential 
foodstuffs, such as sugar and fats. 

(3) The purpose of the Allies in enforcing that great siege 
was to produce a public opinion among the people of the Cen¬ 
tral Powers in favor of peace. Hence, it is interesting to note 
that the first reaction in Germany to those privations was an 
intense national hatred of Great Britain whose fleet was en¬ 
forcing the blockade, and a national desire to starve England 
by cutting off her food supplies by the use of submarine war¬ 
fare. 

c. Change in French High Command. (1) General Joffre's 
failure to prepare Verdun for defense against an attack, his 


OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 159 

failure to win a great victory at the Somme, and the quite 
general belief that as commander-in-chief of all French armies 
on all fronts, he was really responsible for failure in the Balkans 
in 1916, caused his relief from command December 3, 1916. 
He was given the honorarium of Marshal of France. 

(2) General Nivelle was appointed Commander-in-Chief 
of French forces on the French front. 

4. Plans of Campaign, a. Central Powers. Marshal 
von Hindenburg, estimating that Russia would be able to take 
the offensive again in 1917, secured the Kaiser’s approval to 
the plan that on the land the Central Powers, while defending 
on all fronts, should assume the strategical attitude of “in 
readiness,”—reserves for this purpose to be secured by a retire¬ 
ment on the Western front to a shortened, stronger line; that 
a decision should be sought on the sea by launching a strategical 
and tactical unrestricted submarine offensive against the Allied 
sea lines of communication, especially against Great Britain’s 
vital merchant marine food line, with the view of forcing that 
country to a separate peace, by July, 1917. 

b. Allies. The Allies’ plan of campaign was to continue 
the policy of encirclement against the Central Powers by 
blocking all Central Power approaches to the sea, and, on the 
sea, to make the blockade still more effective. On land, they 
planned to seek a decision by launching the maximum stra¬ 
tegical and tactical offensives on all fronts as nearly simultane¬ 
ously and as early in the year as possible. The Allied offensives, 
under this plan, on the Mesopotamian and the Syrian fronts 
have already been considered. 

5. Submarine Warfare, a. Method of waging. (1) On 
January 31, 1917, the Kaiser announced that beginning Febru¬ 
ary 1, 1917, wide zones around Great Britain and France and 
all of the Mediterranean, except a narrow passage to Greece, 
were blockaded areas, in which, without any further notice or 
warning, all sea traffic would be prevented by all available 
weapons, including submarines. 

(2) As announced, after January 31, 1917, submarines 
did begin to sink ships, both Allied arid neutral, in these zones. 
The submarine campaign was based on Wilhelmshaven, 
Ostend, and Zeebrugge, and was coordinated by means of radio 
and sea post offices (great buoys anchored in certain known 
places). 


160 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(3) Sea lanes were observed and ships enticed to places 
of submarine ambuscade by false radio messages. Eventually, 
the attack by gun or torpedo was delivered without warning 
and without providing for the safety of the crew or passengers. 
By October, 1917, the menace to the sea control of the Allies 
was acute. Many ships had been sunk and it looked as though 
the sinkings might reduce the amount of sea tonnage below 
that required to meet the minimum demands of Great Britain’s 
living scale and force her to a separate peace. 

b. Method of defense. (1) The Allies and the neutral 
world were taken by surprise and had no defense measures 
ready. Arming merchantmen was tried but was found to 
be insufficient. 

(2) In seamanship, the following methods were found to 
be valuable in defense, i.e., leaving the regular sea lanes and 
sailing on unexpected courses; high speed and the zigzagging 
of the course, so that an officer in the submarine’s chart room 
could not plot the ship’s course. 

(3) The craft found most efficacious for attacking the 
submarine were fast torpedo boat destroyers and very fast, 
high power, motor boats. Ships were found to be safest in 
convoy, under escort of torpedo boat destroyers. 

(4) The best weapons were rapid fire cannon and heavy 
depth charges. The latter were merely mines with plungers 
adjusted to be released by water pressure, at any desired depth. 

(5) So, in the latter part of the war, vessels moved in 
convoys off the regular lanes and on zigzag courses. They were 
escorted by torpedo boat destroyers, armed with depth bombs, 
and by aircraft which observed the sea. 

(6) A mine barrage laid by the American and British 
fleets across the North Sea from the Orkney Islands to Norway, 
and the defense methods already mentioned became more and 
more effective. The result was that, although the submarine 
made the sailing of the sea dangerous, the Allies maintained 
control of the sea during the year and did not relax the efficiency 
of the blockade. In addition to lowering the aggregate of 
losses through increased efficiency of defense measures, the 
net loss of shipping through submarine operations was con¬ 
siderably reduced by the building of ships on the part of the 
whole neutral world. 

c. Effect on the neutral world. The unrestricted submarine 
warfare launched by Germany was such a departure from the 


OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 161 


rules of international law and such an invasion of the sovereign 
rights of neutral powers that, after Germany refused to heed their 
protests, the following states declared war against Germany: 


The United States.. 
Panama and Cuba. 

Bolivia. 

Honduras. 

Siam. 

China. 

Brazil.. 

Ecuador. 

Guatemala. 

Nicaragua. 

Costa Rica. 

Haiti. 


April 6, 1917 
April 7, 1917 
April 9, 1917 
May 17, 1917 
July 22, 1917 
Aug. 14, 1917 
Oct, 26, 1917 
.Dec. 8, 1917 
April 21, 1918 
May 7, 1918 
.May 24, 1918 
.July 15, 1918 


In the case of the United States, there was the additional 
cause that Germany plotted, under cover of ambassadorial 
privilege in the United States, to attack the United States 
through the agency of two proposed new allies, Mexico and 
Japan. 

6. Western Front. (Maps 5, 39, 57, 58 and 59.) a. 
Situation. The possession by the Allies of high ground between 
the rivers running to the west and those running to the north¬ 
east gave them excellent observation of the German lines and 
an excellent area from which to launch an offensive. 

b. Order of Battle, January 1, 1917. 

(1) Allies. 

French XXXVI Corps: on left of line. 

Belgian Army (The King): to Ypres salient (exclusive). 

British Armies (Marshal Haig): Second, First, Third, 
Fifth, and Fourth: from Ypres salient to the Somme, 

French Forces: 

Northern Group (General d’Esperey), Third and First 
Armies (First Army designated for reserve in the Reserve 
Group): to the Aisne. 

Reserve Group (General Micheler), Sixth and Fifth Armies, 
with Tenth Army in reserve: to south of Rheims. 

Central Group (General Petain), Fourth and Second 
Armies: to St. Mihiel. 

The Eighth Army (General Gerard): to Epinal (exclusive). 

The Seventh Army (General Debeney): to Switzerland. 

A total of 204 divisions. 

General Nivelle’s Headquarters were at Beauvais, north 
of Paris. After February 26, he was in command of all Allied 














162 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

troops on the Western front, for the purpose of executing 
a major offensive to reduce the Noyon salient. 

(2) Central Povjers. 

Crown Prince of Bavaria's Group, Fourth, Sixth and 
Second Armies: from the Channel to the Oise. 

Crown Prince of Germany's Group, First, Seventh, Third, 
and Fifth Armies: from the Oise to St. Mihiel (exclusive). 

Duke of Wurtemberg's Group, three army detachments: 
to Switzerland. 

A total of 154 divisions, i.e., fifty less than the Allied force 
on that front. Headquarters were at Kreuznach. 

c. Plans. (1) General Nivelle's general plan for a major 
offensive early in April was to reduce the Noyon salient by 
successive attacks from north to south. General Haig was to 
attack in the direction of Cambrai, then General d'Esperey, 
commanding the Northern Group, was to attack in the direction 
of St. Quentin; both attacks being intended merely to attract 
Marshal von Hindenburg's attention. The Germans' attention 
being held to the north, General Micheler, commanding the 
Reserve Group, was to attack with the Fifth, Sixth and Tenth 
Armies (First Army in reserve) with the mission of penetrating 
the German line between Rheims and the canal from the Oise 
to the Aisne. The whole line involved in the battle was to 
force the attack with all disposable means to secure a decision. 

(2) (a) Marshal von Hindenburg estimated that the Allies 
would operate against the Noyon salient in the spring of 1917. 
By February, he had definite information of General Nivelle's 
plan for the unlimited offensive early in April. Von Hindenburg 
estimated that it was not advisable to be drawn into battle on 
the Western front pending the submarine campaign against 
Great Britain which was to begin February 1, and which he 
hoped would force Great Britain to sign a separate peace by 
July, 1917. 

(b) He considered that the Allies, on high ground, had a 
great advantage in launching and maintaining an offensive, 
and that their preponderance of force was so great that he 
could not defend his then existing line. He, therefore, decided 
to avoid the coming offensive by a voluntary strategical re¬ 
treat from the Noyon salient. 

(c) For the new line, he selected a chord of the Noyon 
salient whose trace was: from near Arras—west of Cambrai— 
via St. Quentin—La Fere—west of Vailly. He named it the 



OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 163 

“Siegfried Line.” It was generally known as the “Hindenburg 
Line.” The Siegfried line was a nearly perfect type of a deep, 
wide, defensive zone, in which the maximum advantages of 
the defensive features of the terrain were made use of and 
strengthened with concrete construction for the use of weapons, 
for defense, and for shelter. The line was to be ready by 
March 1. 

(d) The ends which he desired to attain in the retreating 
maneuver were to avoid a battle; to save all equipment and 
supplies; to destroy all roads, towns, villages, and wells to a 
depth of ten miles in front, in order to prevent the Allies from 
readily establishing themselves near the Siegfried line; to gain 
reserves; to secure a stronger line. Generally speaking, his 
purpose was to avoid land warfare, as he expected that the 
submarine campaign, through the elimination of Great Britain, 
would end the war. 

d. German retreat . On February 4, Marshal von Hinden¬ 
burg gave the order to carry out the retreat plan. On February 
9, the removal of impedimenta and the destruction of terrain 
features began. The retreat began March 16, and was com¬ 
pleted on April 9. The Allies followed up closely with small 
detachments but did not interrupt the execution of Marshal 
Hindenburg’s schedule. 

e. General Nivelle’s spring offensive. (1) Plans. (a) 
German, (i) After retreat to the Siegfried line, Marshal von 
Hindenburg withdrew many divisions to the Western front 
reserve and to the strategical reserve in Germany. His gen¬ 
eral plan for the defense of the Western front was to make the 
whole front a deep defensive zone, with each position strength¬ 
ened in defense and shelter by concrete. 

(ii) The troops were not to be disposed on a continuous 
line but in a complex system of nuclei distributed in breadth and 
depth. All forces were to be mobile and to be withdrawn be¬ 
yond range during hostile artillery preparation. Afterwards, 
the abandoned line was to be regained by counter attack. The 
lines were to be held very lightly, but with increasing strength 
to the rear. The machine gun was to be used as the principal 
weapon for local defense of the front lines. The whole system 
of defense depended upon tactical cooperation between neigh¬ 
bors until a major counter attack should restore the situation. 

(b) French. General Nivelle’s general plan for the spring 
offensive was changed very little after the German retreat. 


164 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

It provided for successive attacks from the north to the south, 
beginning April 9. These attacks constituted a great converging 
maneuver against the Laon salient as follows: 

(1) The British First and Third Armies (Marshal Haig) 
were to penetrate the German line between Givenchy and 
Queant and exploit in the direction of Maubeuge. 

(ii) The French Reserve Group (General Micheler), in 
forty-eight hours, was to penetrate the line between Rheims 
and the Aisne Canal to the west with the Fifth and Sixth Armies 
and to exploit with the Tenth Army in the direction of Hirson 
with the view of cutting the German line of communications. 

(iii) The Northern Group (General d’Esperey), with the 
Third Army, assisted by the British Fourth Army, was to cooper¬ 
ate with General Haig to the north and with General Micheler 
to the east, by attacking the nose of the salient and holding the 
enemy on its front. 

(iv) The Central Group (General Petain) was to assist 
General Micheler with the Fourth Army, by attacking in the 
direction of Vouzieres. 

(v) The Belgian Army and the British Second Army were 
to attack in the general direction of Ghent. 

(vi) The French First Army was sent to strategical reserve 
in the rear of General Micheler's main effort. 

(2) Operations, (a) Marshal Haig's operation {April 9-16). 
(i) Marshal Haig prepared for the maneuver by a long con¬ 
tinued aerial offensive which gave him air supremacy over the 
proposed zone of action, by a three weeks' program of wire 
cutting artillery fire, by interdiction of back areas, and, for 
a few days preceding the attack, with a terrific destruction 
fire accompanied by extensive gas discharges, put down by 
4,000 cannon along this whole front. Tanks were assigned to 
each corps to lead in the assaults. It was prescribed that 
halts for reorganization would occur only after the capture of 
each successive position. 

(ii) On April 9, at 5:30 AM, under cover of a rolling bar¬ 
rage, the First Army (General Horne) north of the Scarpe, and 
the Third Army (General Allenby) south of the Scarpe, ad¬ 
vanced to the attack with seventeen divisions, including re¬ 
serves, on a twenty-mile front. In forty minutes, Marshal 
Haig captured the German first position and some artillery was 
displaced forward. He reorganized and, at 7:30 AM, advanced 


OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 165 

against the second position. Here greater opposition was met 
with, but the position was captured by 12:00 noon. 

Very shortly after noon, the reorganized line moved for¬ 
ward to attack the third position. The w 7 ire of this position, 
because of the long range at which the artillery fire against it 
had been delivered, w^as not well cut. Local counter attacks 
were met and repulsed. By the end of the day, Marshal 
Haig had penetrated the third and last heavily organized 
position. 

(iii) The Cavalry Corps intended for the exploitation was 
concentrated east of Arras. Marshal Haig decided not to 
make the effort then to push it through for exploitation, sent 
it back to the w 7 est of Arras, and gave instructions for the gap 
in the third line to be widened. That night, when Marshal 
von Hindenburg realized that Marshal Haig was not pushing 
an exploiting force through the gap, it is said that he grasped 
von Ludendorff by the hand, as reinforcements were coming 
by emergency trains and the crisis was over. 

(iv) Marshal Haig continued widening the gap during the 
night of April 9-10. The next day he completed the capture of 
the German third position in his front. His artillery was not 
up, however, and his further advance was stopped by the 
machine gun fire of German reinforcements. 

(v) German counter attacks protected their line of com¬ 
munications. The battle soon degenerated into one of attri¬ 
tion in w 7 hich Marshal Haig forced Marshal von Hindenburg to 
double the number of troops in front of the British line and to 
withdraw twenty-three divisions from that front for rest and 
reorganization. 

(vi) Marshal Haig's operations had secured high ground, 
but the great opportunity to strike at the enemy line of com¬ 
munications on the evening of April 9 had not been grasped. 

(vii) The operations of the Fourth and Fifth Armies 
(Generals Rawlinson and Gough), to the south, held the enemy 
in front by advancing and threatening the Siegfried line. 

(viii) By May 5, Marshal Haig had advanced five miles 
on a front of twenty miles and siege conditions again obtained. 

(b) General Micheler’s operation {April 16-May 5). (i) 

General Micheler (Commander of the Reserve Group) prepared 
for his penetrating maneuver as follows: 

He assembled 1,800 pieces of light artillery (75’s); 1,700 
pieces of heavy artillery; 1,650 trench mortars; 24,000,000 


166 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

shells for 75's; 9,000,000 shells for heavy artillery, and 200 
tanks. Besides the accumulation of these munitions, he built 
150 miles of railroad for supply. 

He disposed his troops with the Fifth Army (General 
Mazel) and the Sixth Army (General Mangin) on the line, 
side by side, from right to left, with eighteen divisions on a 
thirty-six-mile front, and with ten divisions in local army 
reserve. 

The Tenth Army (General Duchesne) of four infantry and 
one cavalry corps, in reserve on the boundary line between the 
Fifth and Sixth Armies, was disposed as follows: 

Infantry corps were in double column. From right to left, 
the II and XVIII Corps, abreast, were in the first line, south of 
the Aisne; the IX and III Corps, abreast, were in the second 
line, south of the Vesle. The I Cavalry Corps was to the left 
of the III Corps, in the second line. 

The First Army (General Fayolle) was massed and in 
readiness in the Chateau-Thierry—Epernay region. 

The four armies made a total of 1,400,000 men. 

(ii) General Micheler’s plan for the maneuver was that, 
after an intense and prolonged artillery preparation, the 
Fifth and Sixth Armies, at dawn, April 16, were to advance and 
penetrate the German line and fold back the inner flanks of the 
dislocated wings. The Tenth Army, advancing as formed, was 
then on April 16, to pass through the gap and by night reach 
the line: Laon—Amifontaine. The I Cavalry Corps, also, 
was to reach the line of the Serre River, by the evening of 
April 17, with the Tenth Army advancing under its screen and 
cover. 

(iii) Marshal von Hindenburg had learned, from a French 
order captured during a local offensive in Champagne about 
the middle of February, of General Micheler's plan and had 
specially prepared that part of the front to receive the threat¬ 
ened attack by strengthening the defenses and by assembling 
strong local reserves behind that part of the line. A special 
protective measure taken was to prepare lines on reverse slopes 
and in hollows where they were safe from the artillery prepara¬ 
tion. 

(iv) On April 16, at 6:00 AM, after a ten days' artillery 
preparation, the Fifth and Sixth Armies advanced to the at¬ 
tack from Courcy to Soupir. From the start, the infantry 
was subjected to fire from machine guns located at the last 


OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 167 

moment in the open field, and from guns under shelter that had 
not been destroyed by the artillery. 

The Fifth Army, on the right, captured lodgment in the 
first German position in the vicinity of Courcy, but was 
practically ejected by counter attacks. Farther to the left, 
lodgment could not be secured in the German first position and 
the French attacking troops were forced back to the line of 
departure. 

The Sixth Army captured a lodgment in the German first 
position on the Chemin des Dames, at Heurtebise Farm, but 
could not advance farther. 

On the rest of the line, the Army was unable to capture 
the German first position. The tanks were not able to tie the 
infantry groups together, or to lead them in the attack, and 
abandoned the attempt to force a way through to Juvincourt. 

(v) General Micheler was defeated April 16, but General 
Nivelle decided to continue the attack and seek the desired 
penetration by the method of attrition. That night, he directed 
the Sixth Army to consolidate and organize its position, and 
that the effort of the Reserve Group be to the northeast to 
spread out the lodgment secured by the Fifth Army in the 
enemy position. 

On the 17th of April, the Fourth Army (General Anthoine) 
with the mission of capturing the observation position at 
Moronvillers and of assisting in the general offensive, and after 
a six days' artillery preparation, advanced to the attack with 
five divisions on a ten-mile front but was stopped by machine 
gun fire and by little islands of resistance. The Fourth Army 
continued the battle, largely with hand grenades and artillery 
fire, and, by May 20, captured the high ground of Moronvillers, 
and thus secured excellent observation over the plains of 
Champagne. 

To the west, the Fifth Army continued its operation, and, 
after April 21, on the front from Rheims to Berry-au-Bac only, 
operated in cooperation with the Fourth Army. By May 20, 
it had captured the German first position and secured a lodg¬ 
ment on the second position on a front of ten miles. 

The Sixth Army, after organizing the ground, reduced the 
small Vailly salient, by a converging attack, by April 21. 

(vi) On April 20, General Nivelle abandoned the hope of 
exploiting a penetration and placed the Tenth Army in the 
line, from Berry-au-Bac to Cerny. 


168 MILITARY HISTORY OP THE WORLD WAR 

The Tenth and Sixth Armies, in cooperation, thereafter 
continued the maneuver against the heights of the Chemin des 
Dames. After an intense but short artillery bombardment, the 
French 36th Division, on the night of May 4, captured the 
village of Craonne, a key point on the Chemin des Dames. 

The next day, May 5, the Tenth and Sixth Armies at¬ 
tacked from Californie to Vauxaillon and on the west reduced 
the new small salient Moulin Lauffaux and captured the crest 
of the Chemin des Dames to the west as far as Cerny and to the 
east captured the plateau of Craonne. 

The Crown Prince counter attacked for three days and 
three nights but was stopped by a terrific artillery interdic¬ 
tion fire. 

(vii) The French troops, after the initial defeat April 16, 
considered success on the Aisne impossible. Units up to 
divisions in size, although asserting themselves to be loyal and 
ready, if necessary, to die for France, refused to continue the 
attack on the Aisne, on the ground that it was a useless loss of 
life. 

7. Principles of War. a . Principle of the objective . 
(Maps 2,13, 39, 45, 46, 58 and 59.) (1) At the beginning of the 
war, Germany made the French (after August 4, the Allied) 
armies her first and main objective. She was repulsed at the 
Battle of the Marne, in September, 1914. Again, in 1916, 
Germany made the French armies, her first and main objective. 
She was again repulsed at Verdun. At the end of 1916, the 
Russian armies had been so badly defeated that they were 
apparently no longer a menace to the Central Powers. Serbia 
and Roumania had been defeated and for the moment, at least, 
there was no menace to the Central Powers in the Balkans. 
With Russia and Serbia defeated, it seemed probable that 
Austria could defend against Italy without German assistance. 

(2) On the Western front, however, the Allies had not been 
defeated. They were stronger than they had been at any time 
during the war, and at the Battle of the Somme, in 1916, had 
nearly defeated Germany. The Allied forces on the Western 
front clearly were the greatest menace to Germany, and that 
force was Germany’s proper objective. That Allied force was 
composed mainly of French and British troops. The defeat 
of either, if such were possible, would accomplish the defeat of 
the Allied force on the Western front and win the war. Marshal 
von Hindenburg decided to operate against the British. As 


OPERATIONS—PRECEDING ENTRY OF AMERICA 169 

Germany, therefore, had failed to defeat decisively Allied 
forces on the Western front, she decided to accomplish the 
defeat of the British by destroying their resources. She 
estimated that the British armies were dependent for supplies 
on England and that England, in turn, was dependent on sup¬ 
plies received by means of ships. She estimated that by use of 
unrestricted submarine warfare she could, by July, 1917, so 
reduce supplies in England that the latter would be compelled 
to make peace. Beginning February 1, 1917, Germany began 
submarine warfare and carried it on so successfully that, in 
April, 1917, England estimated that, unless the rate of sinking 
was reduced or production of new ships increased, she would be 
forced to sue for peace, by October, 1917. Thus Germany, in 
the spring of 1917, selected British resources as her first and 
main objective. 

b. Principle of security . After Germany decided to seek 
a decision by destruction of British resources, Marshal von 
Hindenburg decided, pending the issue of that submarine 
operation, to avoid battle. The British, by the Battle of the 
Somme, secured favorable ground for launching an offensive 
operation. Practically all the Central Powers’ troops were 
immobilized in holding the long lines of the different fronts. 
Marshal von Hindenburg knew that the Allies would seek a 
decision on the Western front early in the spring of 1917. By 
avoiding that battle, through shortening his line, Marshal 
von Hindenburg illustrated compliance with the principle of 
security by establishing a more easily defendable line and by 
gaining enough reserves to give him freedom of action. 

c. Principle of the offensive. (1) It is not possible to 
completely illustrate the principle of the offensive without 
reference to other principles of war, as without complying with 
them, according to the situation, the offensive must fail. 

(2) (a) Marshal Plaig launched the northern converging 
blow of General Nivelle’s great offensive, on April 9, 1917, with 
the objective of cutting the German line of communications 
near Cambrai. That night, he had penetrated all the German 
defense positions and the road lay practically open from the 
gap which he had made to the railroad German line of communi¬ 
cations near Cambrai. He had cavalry troops ready to push 
through that gap and exploit the success. He had superiority 
of force, had complied with the principle of mass and surprise 
but, by not hurling his mass against the German line of com- 


170 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

munications at the decisive time and place, he failed to comply 
with the principle of movement and his offensive failed. 

(b) General Micheler launched the southern blow of that 
great converging operation on April 16, with the mission of 
penetrating the German line and cutting his rail line of com¬ 
munications near Mezieres. He had a tremendous superiority 
over the German forces in his front, but through his failure to 
comply with the principle of surprise his offensive operation 
also failed. 

(3) Compliance with the principle of surprise appears to 
be an essential element of the success of any offensive under 
modern war conditions, hence, failure to effect a surprise 
should cause an unpromising offensive to be abandoned at 
once. This procedure should have been followed at the Aisne, 
in 1917, where, when General Nivelle ordered the offensive 
continued, the French soldiers up to include the division unit, 
refused to fight further in an operation in which they believed 
there was no chance of success. 


CHAPTER IX 


Events Eeading up to America s 
Participation in the tVar 


Page 


1. American Policies.171 

a. Origin and reason...;.171 

b. No entangling alliances.172 

c. The freedom of the seas.173 

d. The Monroe Doctrine.174 

e. A small army.177 

f. Attitude of the United States in 1914.177 

2. German Policies.177 

a. Ancient policies.177 

b. Modern policies.178 

c. Attitude of Germany in 1914.179 

3. Conflict of Policies.179 

a. No arbitration treaty with Germany ...179 

b. Invasion of Belgium.'.179 

c. Germany violates American neutrality.179 

d. Germany denies the freedom of the seas.;.180 

4. The Declaration of War.184 

a. Germany’s action in Mexico......184 

b. Germany’s estimate of the United States.185 

c. Action of the government of the United States......185 

d. Text of the Declaration of War.186 

5. Principles of War.—P rinciple of surprise.186 


1. American Policies. (Maps 1 and 2.) a . Origin and 
reasons . (1) Before the day of rapid transit and rapid com¬ 

munication, the Atlantic Ocean separated America from Europe 
by six weeks' or two months' travel, depending upon the winds. 
This isolation developed the self-government idea in the minds 
of the American colonists until, by its exercise, they finally 
attained an attitude of independence. They declared in 1776 
that: “These United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, 
free and independent states." This declaration of inde¬ 
pendence, with the assistance of France, and, to a lesser degree, 
of Spain and Holland, was made good by force of arms, and 
the United States of America came into being as an independent 
and sovereign state in the family of nations. 


171 


























172 


MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 


(2) The policies which have governed many of her rela¬ 
tions with other nations were conceived in the womb of that 
same isolation already referred to and grew out of and were 
adopted on account of the necessity of guarding the indepen¬ 
dence of the, then young, United States. These policies are: 

No entangling alliances. 

The freedom of the seas. 

The Monroe Doctrine. 

A small army. 

b. No entangling alliances. (1) The first and greatest 
President of the United States, George Washington, decided to 
retire to private life at the end of his second term as President. 
He announced that decision on September 19, 1796, in a “Fare¬ 
well Address to his Fellow Citizens/' in which he, like a father, 
advised them as to policies that would strengthen the govern¬ 
ment of the young United States. Among other policies, he 
announced one with regard to alliances with foreign states. 
He stated that policy in part as follows: 

“Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have no, or a 
very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent con¬ 
troversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. 
* * * Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to 

pursue a different course. * * * Why forego the advantages of so 

peculiar a situation? * * * 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of 

permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world. * * * 

Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, in 
a respectably defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary 
alliances for extraordinary emergencies. * * * If we remain one 

people under an efficient government, the period is not far off (* * *) 

when we may choose peace or war as our interests, guided by justice, 
shall counsel.” 

(2) It is perfectly plain from a reading of the whole of 
his Farewell Address that Washington did not intend to commit 
this country for all time to a policy of political isolation, but, 
rather, advised taking advantage of its then strategical distance 
from Europe until it should progress to that degree of strength 
under which it could take “command of its own fortunes." 
In the course of time, the exact language of Washington was 
forgotten, and, based upon what he was presumed to have said, 
in the minds of the people of the United States there crystallized 
the policy of no entangling alliances, meaning thereby, at first, 
no alliance with any European country and, later, with any 
country foreign to the two Americas. 

(3) In 1793, France, emerging as a republic from a bloody 
revolution, found herself at war with all her neighbors. She 


AMERICA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR 173 

sent a minister, Citizen Genet, to the United States with the 
mission of claiming American assistance on the ground of 
reciprocity for French assistance given during the American 
Revolution. Citizen Genet, proceeding upon the assumption 
that of course the United States would ally herself with France, 
delivered public speeches, worked up a tremendous enthusiasm 
in favor of the war, and went so far as to commission privateers 
and recruit men for them, in order to conquer Spanish Louisiana 
for France. Washington proclaimed the neutrality of the 
United States. Citizen Genet continued his activities and 
made outrageous demands on the American government. 
Washington then demanded and secured his recall. 

(4) The action of Washington in this instance has been 
used as an illustration of what Washington meant in his 
Farewell Address with respect to the permanent future policy 
of the United States. This conclusion is not justified, for the 
reason that the Genet incident occurred three years before the 
delivery of the Farewell Address, and further because it appears 
that Washington was guided in the Genet incident by the belief 
that the United States then was not strong enough to maintain 
her independence in the then terrific European war. In other 
words, the time described in his Farewell Address had not yet 
arrived “when we may choose peace or war as our interests, 
guided by justice, shall counsel.” 

(5) The policy, however, of no entangling alliances, be¬ 
came firmly grounded in the American mind, and, as a result, 
the United States would not participate in the Algeciras Con¬ 
ference in 1906 until it was expressly understood that her 
interest in the Moroccan complication was and would remain 
purely academic.” 

c. The Freedom of the Seas. (1) The United States has 
always been a seafaring nation. The sea has been of vital 
interest to it since the time when the colonies from which the 
nation was formed were but scattered communities along the 
seacoast. This interest, coupled with the expectation of neu¬ 
trality in most wars, has led to the adoption of the policy called 
“Freedom of the Seas.” In support of this principle, the nation 
has resorted to arms on occasio is. For instance, in 1801,to insure 
the freedom of the seas to American merchantmen, the United 
States made war on the Barbary States in North Africa, who 
were treating the Mediterranean as a closed sea. Again, in 
1812, in order to maintain the freedom of the seas for America 


174 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

against British aggression through searching American ships, 
both public and private, and the impressment of American sea¬ 
men, the United States declared war against England. Al¬ 
though impressment of seamen was not mentioned in the peace 
treaty, Great Britain since that war has not stopped any Ameri¬ 
can ships for the purpose of impressing seamen. In fact, 
since the War of 1812, she has abandoned the old doctrine of 
indelible allegiance. 

(2) The policy of the United States before the World 
War with regard to rights of commercial vessels in war was 
well established on the recognized principles of international 
law, and well maintained at the various conventions which 
considered that subject. That policy was as follows: 

“A belligerent may with the knowledge of the world and with 
visible vessels blockade an enemy port or coast line; he may stop a 
neutral and confiscate any contraband found, and also he may stop, 
seize, confiscate, sink or burn an enemy commercial vessel; but before 
sinking or burning any commercial vessel, he must secure the lives of 
all persons on the commercial vessel, and put all such persons in a 
safe place.” 

d. The Monroe Doctrine. (1) The Monroe Doctrine is 
the next great policy that has controlled our foreign relations. 
This policy was born under the following circumstances: 
James Monroe, President of the United States, when confronted 
with the fact that the Holly Alliance meant to aid Spain in 
bringing her revolted South American colonies to obedience, 
announced in his message to Congress, December 2, 1823, that 
“We could not view any interposition for the purpose of 
oppressing the South American States or controlling in any 
other manner their destiny by any European Power, in any 
other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposi¬ 
tion toward the United States.” 

(2) Monroe’s policy was adhered to by following adminis¬ 
trations and finally crystallized as follows: 

“The United States insists that America forms a separate system, 
wherein still existing European possessions may be tolerated, but on 
the understanding that no extension of them and no establishment of 
foreign control over a nominally independent American State, will be 
allowed.” 

(3) (a) In pursuance of that policy the United States 
forced France, in 1867, to abandon her attempt to colonize 
Mexico. 

(b) A dispute having arisen between England and Vene¬ 
zuela concerning the boundary between Venezuela and British 


AMERICA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR 175 

Guiana, and the British having attempted to exercise juris¬ 
diction in the disputed area, the President of the United States 
(Mr. Cleveland) stated in a message to Congress, that he would 
consider any attempt by Great Britain to enforce its boundary 
claim on Venezuela without resort to arbitration to be a cause 
of war by the United States. 

(4) (a) An important outgrowth of the Monroe Doctrine 
is the Pan-American Union. Its history and policy is as follows: 

On the inspiration of James G. Blaine, the American 
Secretary of State, the Latin Republics in the Americas were 
invited, in 1888, to a conference in Washington to consider 
measures for preserving the peace, etc. The first conference 
was followed by others at various places, with resulting im¬ 
provement in the relations between the American Republics. 
In 1910, a permanent building for the home of the executive 
officers of the Pan-American Union was dedicated in Washing¬ 
ton. The same year, the fourth conference met in Buenos Aires. 

(b) The policy of the Pan-American Union has been to 
preserve the peace by submitting disputable differences to 
arbitration. This policy is well illustrated by the action of 
the third conference in 1906, at Rio de Janeiro, when a resolu¬ 
tion was adopted which instructed the delegates from the 
American Republics to the second conference at the Hague 
“to endeavor to secure there the celebration of a general arbi¬ 
tration convention so effective and definite that, meriting the 
approval of the civilized world, it shall be accepted and put 
in force by every Nation.” 

(5) The policies of non-entanglement in foreign alliances 
and of denying foreign states the right to colonize in the Amer¬ 
icas finally were joined and are generally so stated; as for in¬ 
stance, in the reservations read into the minutes of the pro¬ 
ceedings of both conferences on arbitration at The Hague in 
1899 and 1907, as follows: 

“Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to 
require the United States of America to depart from its traditional 
policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in 
the political questions or policy or internal administration of any 
foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be 
construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of^America 
of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.” 

This combination of policies has frequently been called 
the “American Policy.” 


176 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(6) Those who are not friendly to the Monroe Doctrine 
sometimes affirm that it is at the best only a claim to a sphere 
of influence, and is not the result of any treaty. They compare, 
as an equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine, the Roman policy 
which forbade any Asiatic King entering Europe and acquiring 
any part of it. However, it is clear that the Pan-Americanism 
which grew out of the Monroe Doctrine has consistently 
sought peace rather than war. 

(7) The principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine have 
been held by the people of the United States as of prime im¬ 
portance, and this esteem has inclined them powerfully to an 
attitude of sympathetic benevolence toward any other American 
group of people who desired independence. 

(a) March 2, 1836, the representatives of the people of 
Texas declared Texas independent of Mexico. A republican 
form of government similar to that of the United States was 
adopted, and in September, 1836, a president was elected. 

In 1837, the independence of the Republic of Texas was 
recognized by the United States, Great Britain, France, and 
Belgium. Mexico, however, did not recognize the indepen¬ 
dence of Texas and made various attempts to put down what 
she termed a rebellion. An application by Texas to enter the 
the Federal Union was acted on favorably by the people of the 
United States, in the presidential election of 1844, when they 
elected as President, James K. Polk who had made his campaign 
on this issue. Texas was admitted to the Union under a joint 
resolution of Congress. In the war that ensued, the larger 
part of Mexico, including the capital, was occupied. The war 
was terminated by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 
2, 1848, under which the present boundary between the United 
States and Mexico was established. 

(b) (i) As long ago as 1820, a considerable portion of the 
Cuban people were desirous of a much greater degree of self- 
government than Spain was willing to give. The problem of 
discontent in Cuba had become acute by 1850. Many people 
in the United States sympathized with that national aspira¬ 
tion. From 1849 to 1851, three filibustering expeditions were 
organized in the United States to aid the Cubans in their 
fight for independence. In 1868, a revolution was proclaimed 
and war was waged against Spain (almost entirely in the eastern 
provinces) until January, 1878, when the revolution was ended 


AMERICA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR 177 

by the convention of Zanjon. Later the “Little War” of 1879- 
1880 was easily repressed. 

(ii) In 1895, another revolution covering the entire island 
was launched. In the conduct of operations incident to repress¬ 
ing this revolution, Spain inflicted many hardships (including 
physical suffering and much starvation) on the people of Cuba. 
The attitude of the people of the United States was exceed¬ 
ingly friendly to the revolutionists in Cuba, and when the 
American battleship Maine was blown up in Havana harbor 
in February, 1898, the American people rose and demanded the 
expulsion of Spain from Cuba. On April 20, the United States 
demanded the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Cuba. 
War followed at once. By the treaty of Paris, December 10, 
1898, Spain relinquished the island of Cuba to the United 
States in trust for its inhabitants. 

e. A small army. Preceding the World War, the military 
policy of the United States was largely shaped by the Anglo- 
Saxon prejudice against standing armies as a dangerous menace 
to liberty, with the result that the Regular Army had always 
been small. The National Guard units of the various states 
could not be used as such beyond the continental limits of the 
United States. The United States was not prepared for war 
and the attitude of a large proportion of her citizens is fairly 
reflected by the statement once made by a noted secretary of 
state to the effect that she did not need to prepare as she could 
“raise a million men between sunrise and sunset.” 

/. Attitude of the United States in 1911^. Early in 1914, the 
United States maintained the Monroe Doctrine and the policy 
of no entangling alliances, insisted upon the fredom of the 
seas, looked with favor upon the exercise of national self-determ¬ 
ination, and, still relying upon her strategic ocean-isolated 
position, maintained a very small army, with the expectation 
of calling for volunteers to wage any war that might be forced 
upon her. In short, her Government, based upon the consent 
of the governed, respected the sovereignty of all other nations 
and expected them, in return, to respect her sovereign powers. 

2. German Policies, a. Ancient policies. The German 
nation has ancient national attitudes that profoundly affect 
her policies to this day. The German Empire was an out¬ 
growth of Prussia and inherited many of her policies; among 
others, the following: 


178 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

The Emperor rules by Divine Right. 

War is Germany’s national industry. 

Germany must continually extend her boundaries. 

Germany must have a larger and better army than any other 
nation. 

Under the “Frederican Tradition,” Germany’s interest is para¬ 
mount to all international obligations. 

b. Modern policies. (1) The German Empire, after the 
reconstruction of 1871, adhered to all her ancient policies. For 
this reason and through the creation of the Triple Alliance in 
1878-1881, and through committing herself to the plan for a 
German-dominated world empire, Germany’s policies lay 
almost perpendicular to those of the United States. 

(2) (a) The Pan-German plan was fully crystallized by 
1911. The coveted territory is shown on a map (Map 60) 
taken from Tannenberg’s work, “Greater Germany—the Work 
of the 20th Century,” which was published at Leipsic, in 1911. 
This work is evidence of first importance as to the German 
policy at that time. It gives as German objectives the very 
lines that Germany tried to seize and hold in the World War, 
i.e., Berlin—Calais; Berlin—Riga; Hamburg—Saloniki; Ham¬ 
burg—Persian Gulf. 

(b) This same book, published three years before the war, 
not only gives the German general plan, but also contains the 
following statements: “Germany will take under her protec¬ 
tion the Republics of Argentina, Chili, Uruguay, Paraguay, the 
southern third of Bolivia, so far as it belongs to the basin of the 
Rio de la Plata, and that part of southern Brazil in which 
German culture prevails,” and, “German South America will 
provide for us, in the temperate zone, a colonial region where 
our emigrants will be able to settle as farmers.” 

(3) The registration of all Germans in every part of the 
world was begun in 1895. The result of that registration was 
published in the Pan-German Atlas, published by Justus 
Perthes, at Gotha, in 1900. According to the data published, 
15,000,000 Americans of German birth had settled in the in¬ 
dustrial and commercial regions of the eastern part of the 
United States and of the Great Lakes and were carrying on 
German culture. 

(4) The plan to extend Pan-Germania into the Americas 
was greatly strengthened by the German law of 1913, called 
Delbruck’s Law, under which a German could obtain permis¬ 
sion to become a citizen of a foreign state while secretly re¬ 
taining his German nationality. 


AMERICA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR 179 

c. Attitude of Germany in 191 4-. It may be said that 
early in 1914, the German Government was autocratic, did not 
respect the sovereignty of other nations, and sought oppor¬ 
tunities to enlarge German territory at their expense. 

3. Conflict of Policies, a. No arbitration treaty with 
Germany. (1) The United States had consistently carried out 
her policy of peaceful adjustment of differences between 
nations by negotiating arbitration treaties with Great Britain 
and nineteen other nations. Germany, however, declined to 
negotiate such a treaty. At both conferences at The Hague, 
the German delegates were the most active in blocking all 
projects for the pacific settlement of disputes between nations. 

(2) The policies of European nations were not well under¬ 
stood in the United States. The conflict of those policies, 
accordingly, was not seen, and, as a result, the people of the 
United States were greatly shocked by the war. To them, the 
war was incomprehensible. Its first effect was to disillusionize 
those who had believed that there would be no more war. 

(3) On August 3, Mr. Wilson cabled an offer of his services 
as mediator. It was not acceptable to Germany. 

b. Invasion of Belgium. The invasion of Belgium by Ger¬ 
many, one of the guarantors of its neutrality, greatly shocked 
the American people. The subsequent treatment of Belgium 
by Germany caused the people of the United States to believe 
that the latter country was not waging war fairly. Soon 
Belgium's helpless condition made such an appeal that the 
American people generally contributed to its relief, a com¬ 
mission for the purpose being formed with Mr. Herbert C. 
Hoover in charge. 

c. Germany violates American neutrality. The German 
Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, returned from Germany to 
the United States, August 25, 1914, and brought back with 
him a Doctor Dernburg who promptly organized and carried 
on press activities with a view of inclining public opinion in 
the United States to the German side. In addition to influenc¬ 
ing them through profitable contracts on paid advertising, 
great pressure was brought to bear by Germanophiles on 
newspapers to induce them to print the news furnished by the 
Dernburg Press Bureau. Also, newspapers were purchased 
outright. Dr. Dernburg’s violations of American neutrality 
were continued until May, 1915, when his defense of the sink¬ 
ing of the Lusitania and the killing by Germans of women and 


180 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

children became so callous and brutal that, upon the initia¬ 
tive of the American press, the Government requested Ambas¬ 
sador Bernstorff to send him back to Germany. 

(2) During the first year of the war, a feeling of resent¬ 
ment was stirred up in Germany on account of the insistence by 
the United States of its right as a neutral state to trade in 
munitions with belligerents. As a neutral, Germany had always 
asserted and practiced that right and did not question the legal 
right of the United States to engage in that trade. The German 
appeals were not for the observance of the rule of international 
law involved, but rather with a view to its revision in Germany’s 
interest. The United States maintained her right to engage in 
the trade and pointed out that, not being a militaristic nation, 
she would be quite dependent on the purchase of munitions 
from neutrals should she unhappily become engaged in a war. 

d. Germany denies the freedom of the seas. (1) (a) As a 
reply to the blockade of Germany by Great Britain, Germany 
announced February 4, 1915, that beginning February 18, 
1915, the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland would 
be a “War Zone” and any enemy merchant ships found in 
those waters would be destroyed. She warned neutrals to 
keep out of those waters because of the danger of being sunk. 

(b) On February 10, 1915, the President protested against 
such illegal acts, reminded Germany that, except in blockades, 
the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on 
the high seas is limited to visit and search, and warned Ger¬ 
many that the United States would hold her to strict account¬ 
ability for the acts of her navy and that the United States 
would take the necessary steps to safeguard American lives 
and property, and secure to American citizens the full 
enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas. 

(c) On February 16, 1915, the German Government re¬ 
plied to the effect that she proposed to plant mines in the 
British waters and that neutral vessels entering those waters 
would do so at their own risk. 

(2) (a) In defiance of the American protest, a German 
submarine sunk the British merchantman Fa'oba on March 
28, 1915, without placing those on board in safety and Mr. 
Thrasher, an American citizen, was drowned. The American 
press, with the exception of papers controlled by Dr. Dernburg, 
condemed that act in the most vigorous manner. 


AMERICA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR 181 

(b) April 28, 1915, the American steamer Cushing was 
bombed in the North Sea by a German seaplane. 

(c) May 1, 1915, the American oil tank steamship Gulf- 
light, off the coast of France, was torpedoed without warning 
by a submarine. Her captain died from shock and ten of her 
crew who jumped overboard were drowned. 

(3) (a) Captain Schwieger, commanding the German 
submarine U 20, acting under direct orders of the German 
Government, fired two torpedoes without warning at 2:15 PM, 
May 7, 1915, at the great Cunard Liner Lusitania. They 
struck her on the port bow, and she sunk, within sight of the 
south coast of Ireland, in twenty minutes. There were 1,198 
lives lost, of whom 124 were Americans and 35 were infants. 
The sinking of the Lusitania stirred the United States as noth¬ 
ing else had done since the sinking of the Maine, and many 
Americans at once demanded war against Germany. 

(b) Before any diplomatic action had been taken, and 
while the question of war or peace hung in the balance in the 
the public mind, Mr. Wilson on May 10, delivered an address 
at Philadelphia, in which he said: 

“There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There 
is such a thing as a Nation being so right that it does not need to con¬ 
vince others by force that it is right.” 

Although uttered with no apparent reference to the 
Lusitania, and disclaimed by Mr. Wilson as having any bearing 
on the subject, that language was interpreted in Germany to 
mean that Mr. Wilson had decided that the United States 
would not enter the war. 

(c) On May 13, three days later, Mr. Wilson sent the first 
Lusitania note to Berlin in which he said: 

“The Imperial German Government will not expect the Govern¬ 
ment of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to 
the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the 
United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise 
and enjoyment.” 

(d) The press of the country compared that Lusitania 
note with Mr. Wilson’s strict accountability note. Theodore 
Roosevelt, who had assumed leadership of those who desired 
to take more aggressive action against Germany, demanded 
that all trade and diplomatic relations with Germany be sus¬ 
pended within twenty-four hours. 

(e) Germany repeated her previous statements and claimed 
that she had not sunk the Lusitania without warning and cited 


182 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

an advertisement that she had published in American papers 
which read as follows: 

“NOTICE 

“Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are re¬ 
minded that a state of v/ar exists between Germany and her Allies and 
Great Britain and her Allies; that the Zone of War includes the waters 
adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice 
given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag 
of Great Britain, or of any of her Allies, are liable to destruction in 
those waters and that travellers sailing in the War Zone on ships of 
Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk. 

Imperial German Embassy, 
Washington, D. C., April 22, 1915.” 

(f) (i) Mr. Wilson personally prepared the second Lusi¬ 
tania note in which he informed Germany that the advertise¬ 
ment in the press was not the kind of a warning that the 
Lusitania was entitled to under the rules of international 
law, but that rather it was a denial to the United States and 
other neutrals of the freedom of the seas and he demanded that 
Germany give assurances that she would safeguard American 
lives and American ships. 

(ii) At that time, when public opinion was moving straight 
toward v/ar, a group in the United States centered about Mr. 
Bryan, the Secretary of State, who unofficially contended that 
any question between Germany and the United States should 
not be considered a cause for war until a year had been spent 
in investigation, and that American citizens should be formally 
warned by the Government not to travel on the ships of belli¬ 
gerents. 

(iii) Mr. Bryan considered the second Lusitania note too 
drastic and resigned his position as Secretary of State. 

(g) Not receiving satisfactory guarantees from Germany, 
the President, July 21, 1915, instructed his Ambassador at 
Berlin, Mr. Gerard, to deliver a note to the German Govern¬ 
ment which contained the warning that a repetition of acts 
in contravention of American right to free use of the seas would 
be regarded as deliberately unfriendly. For a period of time 
thereafter, ships were warned before being sunk, and crews 
and passengers were given a chance to escape. 

(4) (a) On August 9, 1915, however, the steamship 
Arabic was torpedoed without warning and without placing 
the crew and passengers in safety. As a consequence, two 
Americans were drowned. 


AMERICA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR 183 

(b) The American public considered this sinking to be “a 
deliberate unfriendly act” and the press demanded the sever¬ 
ance of diplomatic relations with Germany. 

(c) The German Ambassador, on August 26, prevented a 
crisis by informing the Government of the United States that 
thereafter no liner would be sunk by submarines “without 
warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, 
provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.” 
This pledge was formally confirmed by the German Govern¬ 
ment in October. 

(5) (a) On March 24, 1916, the unarmed steamer Sussex, 
while crossing the English Channel, was torpedoed without 
warning by a German submarine and two Americans were 
injured. 

(b) After careful investigation of the facts, the Govern¬ 
ment of the United States sent a note to Germany, April 18, 
1916, which contained the following ultimatum: 

“If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute 
relentless warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, 
without regard to what the Government of the United States must 
consider the sacred and indisputable rules of International Law and 
the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of 
the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but 
one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should 
now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present 
methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying 
vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but 
to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.” 

(c) May 4, 1916, the German Government declared that 
it sincerely regretted the Sussex case, that it was ready to 
indemnify the injured Americans, and that it disapproved of 
the conduct of the submarine commander who already had been 
punished. 

(d) Mr. Wilson's Sussex ultimatum was a diplomatic 
victory which gave him great prestige, and his party con¬ 
ducted the campaign in 1916 for his reelection on the slogan of, 
“He kept us out of War.” He was reelected by a small plurali¬ 
ty. His reelection was misinterpreted in Germany. 

(6) (a) On December 18, 1916, Mr. Wilson, disclaiming 
any connection with the German peace proposals which had 
recently been forwarded to the Allies, sent identical notes to all 
the Allies asking them to make unequivocal statements of their 
war aims. That note created great agitation in the United 
States and caused a sharp break in the stock market. It was 


184 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

criticized by the Allies and praised by the Central Powers 
because, in spite of the President’s denial, it was understood to 
support the German peace proposals. 

(b) After carefully considering the replies to his note of De¬ 
cember 18, 1916, Mr. Wilson went before Congress, January 
22, 1917, and advocated that the United States declare her¬ 
self ready to join a League of Nations consisting of all the 
Powers, which would apply a sort of Monroe Doctrine to the 
entire world. In order to accomplish this, he said, there must 
be “A peace without victory.” 

(c) The Senate considered that joining such a League in¬ 
volved a reversal of the traditional policy of the United 
States with respect to entering in entangling alliances, and on 
January 30, 1917, laid the President’s proposition on the table. 

(7) (a) The next day, January 31, 1917, Germany pre¬ 
sented a note revoking her pledges to the United States and an¬ 
nouncing unrestricted submarine warfare beginning February 1, 
the following day, against all enemy and neutral shipping 
within a described area around the British Isles. The United 
States was to be allowed only one passenger liner a week 
sailing from New York to Falmouth, England, on a schedule 
designated by the German Government, carrying only such 
freight as the German contraband list admitted and marked 
as follows: 

“On ship’s hull and superstructure three vertical stripes, one 
meter wide each, alternately white and red. Each mast to show a large 
flag checkered white and red, and the American National Flag at the 
stern.” 

(b) Such orders to the Republic of the United States were 
considered as unprecedentedly arrogant and insulting. Presi¬ 
dent Wilson at once handed passports to the German Ambas¬ 
sador, recalled the American Ambassador from Berlin, severed 
all diplomatic relations with Germany, and on February 3, 
1917, addressed Congress reporting the action taken. He 
stated that if Germany should actually commit the overt acts 
threatened against Americans and American shipping he would 
ask Congress for authority to protect Americans in the prose¬ 
cution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. 
The Senate approved the President’s course by a large majority. 

4. The Declaration of War. a. Germany’s action in 
Mexico. February 28, 1917, Mr. Lansing, the American Secre- 


AMERICA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR 185 

tary of State, made public the following note from the German 
Foreign Secretary to the German Ambassador in Mexico: 

“ Berlin, January 19, 1917. 

.“On February 1st, we intend to begin submarine warfare unre¬ 
stricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral 
the United States of America. 

“If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the 
following basis with Mexico. 

“That we shall make war together and together make peace. 

“We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that 
Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and 
Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement. 

“You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above 
in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an out¬ 
break of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of 
Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggest¬ 
ing adherence at once to this plan. At the same time, offer to mediate 
between Germany and Japan. 

“Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the 
employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel 
England to make peace in a few months. 

“Zimmerman.” 

b. Germany’s estimate of the United States. It developed 
that Germany estimated, because of America's non-entangle¬ 
ment policy and the reputed pacifism of her people, that she 
could not be forced into the war; or that, if she should enter the 
war, her small army and non-militaristic attitude rendered her 
in any event but a negligible quantity as a combatant power. 

c. Action of the Government of the United States. (1) Ger¬ 
many's denial of American freedom of the sea and her challenge 
of the effectiveness of the Monroe Doctrine carried the defense 
of those policies past the diplomatic stage and forced the United 
States to defend them by force of arms. 

(2) In his address to Congress, February 3, 1917, Mr. 
Wilson stated that he would wait for an overt act by a sub¬ 
marine before he would believe that Germany meant to make 
war openly on the United States. For over a month no overt 
submarine act was committed, but on March 2, Germany sunk 
the American steamship Algonquin without warning, and on 
March 18, off the English coast, she sunk three American ships 
without warning. 

(3) On March 21, Mr. Wilson summoned Congress to 
meet April 2. On April 2, 1917, Mr. Wilson appeared before 
the special session of Congress and, after a recital of German 
aggression and acts of war against the United States, asked 
the Congress to declare that a state of warfare existed with 
Germany. 


186 


MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 


d. Text of the declaration of war. Four days later, Congress 
passed this resolution: 

“TEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF WAR 
Joint Resolution Passed by: 

The United States Senate and House of Representatives. 
(Effective April 6, 1917, at 1:18 PM.) 

“Whereas, The Imperial German Government has committed 
repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the 
United States of America; therefore, be it 

“Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 

“That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial 
German Government, which has thus been thrust upon the United 
States, is hereby formally declared; and 

“That the President be, and he is hereby authorized and directed 
to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and 
the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial 
German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termina¬ 
tion, all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Con¬ 
gress of the United States.” 

5. Principles of War. — Principle of surprise. The 
German estimate of the situation in the United States was that 
the Government of the United States could not be forced into 
a war with Germany. When the United States declared war 
against Germany, on April 6, 1917, Germany was surprised. 
This surprise was not effected through any intention of the 
United States, but rather was due entirely to the German in¬ 
correct estimate of the situation. This surprise became effec¬ 
tive later in 1918, when American forces in France gave mass 
to Germany's enemies. 


CHAPTER X 


German and American Plans 


Page 

1. Situation, April, 1917.187 

a. The Central Powers.187 

b. The Allies.189 

c. The United States.190 

2. Aims of Belligerents.190 

a. German aims.190 

b. American aims.191 

3. German Plan.192 

a. General plan.192 

b. Plans affecting the United States.192 

4. American Plan .193 

a. Immediate measures to counteract effects of submarine warfare 193 

b. The Council of National Defense.194 

c. Coordination of American effort with that of Allies.195 

d. Financing the war.196 

e. Production and distribution of foodstuffs.197 

/. Anti-submarine warfare measures.197 

(1) Shipbuilding program.197 

(2) Naval action.199 

g. Mobilization of army.199 

h. American expeditionary force._.201 

;5. Principles of War .201 

a. Principle of surprise.201 

b. Principle of mass.202 


1. The Situation, April, 1917. The situation when the 
United States associated herself with the Allies was as follows: 
(Maps 1, 2, 57, 58, 59, and 60.) 

a. The Central Powers. (1) Germany had three objects 
in view when she enlarged the local Austro-Serbian conflict 
into a World War by declaring war against Russia, August 1, 
1914. Those objects were: 

First: The defeat of France and Russia. 

Second: The creation of a great German-dominated empire 
through the center of Europe, across the Bosphorus, and through 
Turkey to the Persian Gulf. 

Third: The eventual defeat of England and tranfer of control 
of the sea to Germany. 

(2) By the spring of 1917, she had made the following 
progress in attaining those objects: 


187 



























188 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(a) The first object: (i) The effort to defeat France had 
failed but she had defeated all attempts to expel her from 
France. Her effort to defeat Russia had been more successful 
and the Czar’s autocratic government had been overthrown, 
in March, 1917, by a socialistic revolution which in a feeble 
way was still maintaining the Russian front. 

(ii) Thus, although she had not attained the first end in 
forcing treaties of peace from France and Russia, she had 
extended her front well into the territory of each and forced 
the ravages of war upon them. 

(b) The second object: (i) She had succeeded, by alliance 
or the sword, in creating a great German-dominated empire 
that extended her control to the east in Russia as far as Riga 
(exclusive), to the west through Luxemburg and Belgium to 
Dunkirk (exclusive), and to the south through Austria-Hun¬ 
gary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and 
Turkey to Mesopotamia. 

(ii) As a result, she had secured much needed mines of 
coal and metals in France, oil in Roumania and Russia, and an 
exceedingly rich territory for the supply of agricultural pro¬ 
ducts in Russia, in the Balkans, and in Mesopotamia. Al¬ 
though suffering from the sea blockade enforced by Great 
Britain and her Allies, Germany had secured, by thus extend¬ 
ing her territory, sufficient supplies with which to continue the 
war. 

(iii) Strategically, her position on land was as follows: 

By the occupation of the Dardanelles and the Balkans, she 

had penetrated between Russia and the latter’s Allies. By 
winning a coast line on the English Channel west of Holland, 
she acquired the ports of Bruges and Ostend for use as sub¬ 
marine bases in maritime warfare against British control of 
the sea. Also, the territory in “Mittel Europa,” extended, was 
all contiguous, which gave her the full benefit of the great 
Hamburg—Bagdad Railroad, and permitted operations on 
interior lines. 

(c) The third object: Failing to win control of the sea by 
the action of surface ships, Germany revoked her pledge to 
the United States, given after the submarine attack on the 
Sussex, and on February 1, 1917, resumed unrestricted sub¬ 
marine warfare. At the time when the United States entered 
the war, the sinkings through submarine warfare were occurring 
at the maximum rate. 


GERMAN AND AMERICAN PLANS 189 

b. The Allies. (1) Although Montenegro was the only- 
one of the Allies who had made a separate peace, the small 
states of Belgium, Serbia, and Roumania had been defeated 
and their troops practically forced out of national territory, 
i.e., Belgium troops into France, Serbian troops into Greece, 
and Roumanian troops into Russia. 

(2) Russia, which held nearly the whole East front 
against Germany and Austro-Hungary in Europe and Turkey 
at the Caucasus, had been practically separated from her allies 
since the closing of the Dardanelles and the Balkans. Her only 
routes of communications w^ere via the ports of Vladivostock 
and Archangel which were closed by ice during several months 
of the year. To improve her communications, she had built 
a railroad to the ice free port at Kola, on the Arctic Ocean, by 
the winter of 191G. But it was too late. Unable to fight 
effectively without sufficient arms, ammunition, equipment, or 
supplies, Russia revolted, and, in March, 1917, replaced the 
Romanoff Dynasty as autocratic rulers of Russia by a German- 
suggested socialistic provisional government. The new govern¬ 
ment did not maintain discipline in the army or navy and did 
not want to continue the war. 

(3) The Western front, from north to south, was broken 
by Switzerland, and the Adriatic Sea. North of Switzerland, 
France and her allies faced Germany. South of Switzerland, 
Italy and her allies faced Austria-Hungary. In the Balkans, 
Serbia with Allied troops in Grecian territory, faced Bul¬ 
garia and her allies. In Asia Minor, Great Britain faced 
Turkey in Syria and in Mesopotamia. 

(4) (a) Of these fronts, the only two that could com¬ 
municate with each other by land were the Western and Italian 
fronts. Communication with the other fronts was entirely by 
sea. Also, communication between Great Britain and all of 
these fronts was by sea. 

(b) Inasmuch as the Allies were operating on exterior 
lines whose means of communication were by sea, the control 
of the sea was essential—loss of control of the sea meant to 
the Allies, in 1917, the loss of the war. 

(c) The unrestricted submarine warfare resumed by Ger¬ 
many February 1, 1917, was exceedingly effective. In April, 
1917, she sunk 874,576 ship tons. At that rate of sinking, unless 
the rate of shipbuilding was increased, England would reach 


190 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

the irreducible minimum by November, 1917, and would be 
forced to make peace. 

(d) The withdrawal of England would reduce the sea 
power of Germany’s enemies so much that Germany, whose 
naval strength was exceeded only by that of Great Britain, 
could control the sea and break up the Allies’ communication 
between the different fronts and cause their defeat. 

c. The United States. (1) The President had faithfully 
followed, in thought and in act, the policy of neutrality which 
he proclaimed, in August, 1914, for the conduct of the American 
people. As a result, when Germany began to wage unre¬ 
stricted submarine warfare against the United States, on 
February 1, 1917, the people of the United States were sur¬ 
prised, and neither they or the Government were prepared to 
proceed at once to the assistance of the Allies as an associate 
or to wage war in any way without the protection of the 
Allies. 

(2) Although the Central Powers had agreed to make 
war together and to make peace together and were united in 
adherence to the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, the 
United States limited her Declaration of War to Germany as 
the acts of war so far committed against the United States 
had been by nationals and ships of Germany. 

2. Aims of Belligerents, a. German aims. (1) In the 
spring of 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine war¬ 
fare with the object of forcing England, who was dependent 
on supplies received by ship, to a separate peace, as the Ger¬ 
man General Staff estimated that the withdrawal of Great 
Britain from the Allies would give Germany control of the 
sea, and end the war. 

(2) The greater part of Great Britain’s supplies came from 
the United States, and before February 1, 1917, much of it was 
carried in American bottoms. The German General Staff 
believed that under the restrictions which the United States 
had imposed on submarine warfare, sufficient supplies would 
reach England to keep her in the war, and estimated that 
unrestricted submarine warfare would force a peace from 
England within a few months and long before Germany need 
fear any blow from the United States. 

(3) So Germany’s aim in beginning unrestricted sub¬ 
marine warfare against the United States, on February 1, 


GERMAN AND AMERICAN PLANS 191 

1917, was to reduce the supplies reaching England to such a 
point that Great Britain would be forced to make peace. 

b. The American aims . (1) Freedom of the Seas. The 

American military mission was to defend the freedom of the 
seas for Americans and American shipping by the defeat of 
Germany who was, by unrestricted submarine warfare, denying 
that freedom of the seas to America. 

(2) To make the world safe for democracy, (a) The Presi¬ 
dent, Mr. Wilson, was a man of peace who abhorred the use of 
force in international relations. However, finally regarding 
war as necessary to win back freedom of the seas for America, he 
then also considered it a war to insure peace. During the war, 
he had progressively crystallized his ideal of a new international 
system which should perpetuate peace between the nations. 
Thus, in his second inaugural address, he declared: “We are 
provincials no longer. The tragical events of the thirty months 
of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made 
us citizens of the World. There can be no turning back/' 

(b) The four Central Powers, i.e., Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey all had the monarchial form 
of government which was administered in an autocratic way. 
On the other hand, the Allies, excepting Russia, had republican 
or limited monarchial governments, which were administered 
in a democratic way. 

(c) After the Russian autocratic government, through 

revolution, had been supplanted by one representative in 
nature, when asking for the Declaration of War, Mr. Wilson 
said: “The great, generous Russian people have been added 
in all their majesty and might to the forces that are fighting 
for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a 
fit partner for a League of Honor. * * * We have no 
selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. 
We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensa¬ 
tion for the sacrifices we shall make. We are but one of the 
champions of the rights of mankind. * * * The World 

must be made safe for Demorcacy.” 

(d) Throughout America, by the spring of 1917, there was 
widespread sympathy with the Allies, due to the similarity of 
their political principles and systems of government to those 
of the United States, and a conviction that Germany was the 
enemy of all that America stood for and had to be defeated. 


192 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

3. German Plan. a . General plan. Marshal von Hin- 
denburg’s plan of campaign for 1917, approved by the 
Kaiser as Supreme Commander of the Central Powers’ 
forces, was as follows: That on the land the Central Powers, 
while defending on all fronts, should assume the strategical 
attitude of “in readiness/’ for which reserves were to be secured 
by retirement on the French front to a shortened stronger line, 
and that a decision should be sought on the sea by launching 
a strategical and tactical unrestricted submarine offensive 
against England’s sea lines of communication, and against 
her vital merchant marine food supply line. 

b. Plans affecting the United States. The German 
General Staff estimated that the unrestricted submarine cam¬ 
paign against the merchant marine food and supply line to 
Great Britain would be successful and would force a separate 
peace from that country long before the United States could 
strike an effective blow against Germany. Accordingly, the 
German plan of campaign against the United States was in 
two parts. 

(1) The first part of the plan was to continue the waging 
of unrestricted submarine warfare against Americans and 
American shipping in accordance with her submarine ultima¬ 
tum to the world, January 31, 1917, with the addition, that 
the unrestricted submarine warfare after April 6, 1917, should 
be waged against Americans and American shipping wherever 
found without regard to the barred zones described in her 
ultimatum of January 31, 1917. 

(2) The second part of the plan contemplated delaying 
effective American participation in the war, by propaganda 
and by sabotage, (a) The propaganda had as its mission: 

First: To confuse the American public on the causes of the original 
outbreak of the war in 1914. 

Second: To confuse the American public on the causes of American 
participation in the war against Germany. 

Third: To encourage pacifism, socialism, and slackerism in 

America. 

Fourth: By means of incorrect news articles, that indicated the 
near failure of the Central Powers, to superinduce the idea that the 
Allies would win without aggressive action by the United States. To 
strengthen that superinduced idea, Germany published much by pro¬ 
paganda and by offers to indicate that she desired peace. 

Fifth: To produce dissatisfaction with their wages among Ameri¬ 
can workers. 

Sixth: To superinduce the idea that Great Britain intended to 
crush German industry and sea power so that she, Great Britain, after 
the war, could dominate the industry and sea traffic of the world. 


GERMAN AND AMERICAN PLANS 193 

Seventh: To hold so-called German-Americans to loyalty to 
Germany and disloyalty to the United States, and to create dissension 
between the United States and the Allies. 

(b) The sabotage campaign had as its mission: 

First: Interference with the production of raw materials by 
destruction of standing crops, etc. 

Second: Prevention of movement of raw or manufactured ma¬ 
terials in the United States by destruction of railroads, bridges and tun¬ 
nels, canal locks, etc. 

Third: The destruction of raw and manufactured materials in 
the United States by burning, etc. 

Fourth: The destruction of raw and manufactured materials on 
the sea by tampering with machinery, by bombs in the coal, etc. 

4. American Plan. The President having been true to 
the neutrality which he had proclaimed in 1914, the United 
States came into the World War absolutely unprepared, 
literally without a plan of campaign. As a result, the United 
States, behind the protection of the Allies on land and sea, 
took action progressively to meet the necessities of the rapidly 
changing situation. 

a. Immediate measures to counteract effects of submarine 
warfare. (1) Seizure of German ships. Unrestricted sub¬ 
marine warfare was the weapon with which Germany had been 
waging war against the United States since February 1, 1917. 
By April 7,1917, the situation had become so acute as to threat¬ 
en a German victory. Hence, the first war measures taken by 
the administration were to meet the submarine warfare situa¬ 
tion. As soon as the President decided to ask Congress 
for a declaration of war, as a measure of protection, he took 
charge of all German vessels interned in ports controlled by the 
United States. As soon as war was declared, he seized ninety- 
one German vessels of more than 600,000 gross tons. When 
Austria-Hungary severed diplomatic relations with the United 
States on April 9, 1917, the President removed the crews of 
fourteen interned Austro-Hungarian ships of 120,000 gross 
tons. These measures increased American shipping by 720,000 
gross tons. 

(2) Neutrals invited to join in an armed neutrality. When 
the President asked Congress to declare the then existing war, 
he invited all neutral countries to follow his lead and declare 
an armed neutrality against Germany. All European neutrals 
excused themselves. Liberia and China, towards whom the 
American attitude has always been benevolent, and most of 
the countries associated with the United States in the Pan- 


194 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

American Union, declared neutrality with benevolence to the 
United States, severed diplomatic relations with or declared 
war against Germany, and took charge of German ships in 
their respective harbors aggregating more than 1,000,000 gross 
tons. 

b. The Council of National Defense. (1) An important 
item of the Defense Act of August 29, 1916, provided for 
the creation of a Council of National Defense to consist of the 
Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, 
and Labor. The Council was to be an administrative labora¬ 
tory where national needs would be studied. It was authorized 
to set up the necessary administrative organizations to meet its 
ends. It was provided that it should function under the advice 
of an “Advisory Commission” to be composed of not more than 
seven persons, each of whom should have special knowledge 
of some industry, public utility, or the developments of some 
natural resource or be otherwise specially qualified. 

(2) The original organization of the Advisory Commission 
with the functions under their supervision was as follows: 

Daniel Williard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio 
R. R., to have charge of transportation and communication . 

Howard E. Coffin, a consulting engineer with experience 
in the construction of automobile engines, to have charge of 
munitions and manufacturing to include standardization , and 
industrial relations. 

Julius Rosenwald, President of the Sears Roebuck Co., 
to have charge of supplies including clothing. 

Bernard M. Baruch, a financier and member of the New 
York Stock Exchange, to have charge of minerals, metals, and 
raw materials. 

Dr. Hillis Godfrey, an engineer and President of the 
Drexel Institute, to have charge of engineering and education. 

Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation 
of Labor, to have charge of labor, including the conservation of 
the health and the welfare of the workers. 

Dr. Franklin H. Martin, Regent and General Secretary 
of the American Society of Surgeons, to have charge of medicine, 
surgery, and general sanitation. 

The Director was Mr. Gifford, a leading official of the 
telephone and telegraph industry. 

(3) 1 he Council of National Defense had no important 
work until after the breach with Germany, February 3, 1917, 


GERMAN AND AMERICAN PLANS 195 

between which date and the declaration of war, April 6,1917, 
it sat in continuous session upon the problems of the procure¬ 
ment agencies of the Government. During the war, it organ¬ 
ized a great many boards and committees. It really was the 
agency upon which the President, at first, placed his greatest 
reliance in the conduct of the war against Germany. 

c. Coordination of American effort with that of Allies. (1) 
In the latter part of April, 1917, a War Council consisting of 
large missions of British and French military, naval, and 
economic experts (headed respectively by Mr. Balfour and 
Monsieur Viviani, assisted by Marshal Joffre) and correspond¬ 
ing American officials met in Washington. Their mission was 
to coordinate the American effort with that of the Allies, to 
advise as to what was necessary, and to assist American 
officials in the preparation of the necessary plans. 

(2) The Allied Mission had information that General 
Nivelle’s spring offensive on the Western front had not suc¬ 
ceeded and that the Allies estimated that a decision could not 
be secured over Germany before 1918, at the earliest. Marshal 
Joffre and the other representatives insisted that French and 
British morale was low and stated that their reserve man power 
was much reduced. 

(3) As the United States was fighting Germany only, in 
view of transportation difficulties and the Russian revolution, 
it was agreed that the American battle effort should be made on 
the Western front. All members of the mission were agreed 
that the United States could not prepare forces for effective 
participation on the Western front before 1918. It was agreed 
that plans for American participation should be drawn with 
that understanding. 

(4) The Commissions further advised that the order of 
urgency in which American assistance was needed was as 
follows: 

First: money. 

Second: food. 

Third: help against submarines. 

Fourth: men, except, however, that to brace the morale of the 
British and French, some troops should be sent to the Western front as 
soon as possible. 

(5) Commissioners from other allied countries came later 
but gave no contrary advice. The heads of the commissions 
returned to their respective countries but left a large number 
of assistants to help formulate plans. 


196 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(6) (a) As a result of the conference with the Allied 
Missions, any idea that may have been held that America 
would help with money alone, or with money and food alone, 
or even with money, food, and ships alone, was at once aban¬ 
doned, and American effort was coordinated by the plan (which 
was never fully formulated) that the United States would 
make war against Germany as an associate of the Allies: 

First: with money. 

Second: with food. 

Third: with assistance in the fight against the submarine. 

Fourth: by organizing and sending to France a large force for 
participation in the 1918 campaign. 

Fifth: by sending, at once, a small expeditionary force to France 
to hearten the Allies. 

(b) Further, although the United States declined to bind 
herself as an ally, she made it clear to the Allied Missions that 
she committed herself to the war until the common cause for 
which they were fighting was won. 

d. Financing the war. (1) On April 24, 1917, the Con¬ 
gress passed a War Finance Act authorizing the Secretary of 
the Treasury to raise $7,000,000,000.00 to meet the cost of 
the war and granting authority to lend the Allies $3,000,000,- 
000.00 of that sum. As early as April 25, 1917, the Secretary 
of the Treasury handed a treasury warrant for $200,000,000.03 
to the British Ambassador. 

(2) The other Allies soon asked for money and by the 
end of June, 1917, more than $1,000,000,000.00 had been lent to 
the Allies. The total amount lent, as of August 15, 1920, 
with some deductions because of payment, tabulates as follows: 


Borrower 

Great Britain. 

France. 

Italy. 

Belgium. 

Russia. 

Czecho-Slovakia 

Greece. 

Serbia. 

Roumania. 

Cuba. 

Liberia. 


A mount 
$4,277,000,000 
3,047,974,777 
1,666,260,179 
350,428,793 
187,729,750 
67,329,041 
48,236,629 
26,780,465 
25,000,000 
10,000,000 
5,000,000 


Total. ..$9,711,739,636 

(3) The money lent to the Allies, together with money 
expended by the United States on its own account, was raised 
by Liberty and Victory Loans, by the issue of certificates of 
indebtedness, and by an increase in taxation. These loans 















GERMAN AND AMERICAN PLANS 


197 


gave new life to the governments of the allied states as they 
had nearly reached the limit of their financial strength. The 
last British loan which had been floated in the United States 
bore interest at the rate of although it was managed by 

American bankers, J. P. Morgan & Co., was secured by 
collateral, and called for only $60,000,000.00. 

e. Production and distribution of foodstuffs. (1) The 

Council of National Defense on April 11, 1917, created a Com¬ 
mittee on Food Supply and Prices, with Mr. Herbert C. 
Hoover as Chairman. After the meeting of the Allied Missions 
in Washington, the President, on May 20, 1917, named Mr. 
Hoover as Food Commissioner. Mr. Hoover, inspired by the 
allied appeal, at once concentrated his efforts on two great 
missions; i.e., first, to produce food and, second, to prevent its 
hoarding and to secure its effective distribution. 

(2) To carry out the first mission, he appealed to all to 
increase the 1917 crop and created a great volunteer agricul¬ 
tural crop producing campaign under the slogan, “Food will 
win the war.” 

(3) To carry out the second mission, under executive 
authority and enabling acts of Congress, he initiated food 
control with the following objects: 

First: to increase American exports of breadstuffs, meats, fats, 
and sugar. 

Second: to maintain such stability of prices as would encourage 
the producer and protect the consumer. 

Third: to regulate exports so that none would go to the Central 
Powers, the minimum to neutrals, and the maximum would be properly 
divided among the Allies. 

(4) Under these policies, Mr. Hoover, between July, 1917, 
and July, 1919, furnished food commodities to the Allies and 
to countries liberated from the Central Powers to the total 
value of $3,670,000,000.00. The British have frankly stated 
that although the American program for shipment of food to 
the Allies ran badly behind because of lack of ship tonnage 
and because of railway congestion in the United States, yet 
the food which Mr. Hoover did send saved the situation during 
the winter of 1917-1918. 

/. Anti-submarine warfare measures . In the fight against 
the submarine, the United States decided to help not only with 
her fleet but also by building new ships. 

(1) Shivbuilding program. (a) Immediately after the 
beginning of the World War, in 1914, ship building became pro- 


198 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

fitable and private enterprise in the United States launched 
many ships. It was apparent, after war was declared, that 
building ships was one of the means of defeating submarine 
warfare, and when the Allied Missions urged the crucial im¬ 
portance of rapidly creating a great amount of ship tonnage, 
it was agreed with them that the United States should assume 
the obligation of building 6,000,000 dead weight tons or more, 
before the end of 1918. 

(b) On September 7,1916, the Congress created a Shipping 
Board with the view of developing an American Merchant 
Marine, primarily for trade with South America, with which 
the regular routes of communication had hitherto been via 
Europe. After war was declared, the peacetime establishment 
actually functioned as a War Board with emergency powers, 
and on April 16, 1917, it created and had incorporated in the 
District of Columbia, “The United States Shipping Board 
Emergency Fleet Corporation” with a capital stock of $50,- 
000,000.00, all of which was subscribed by the Shipping Board 
on behalf of the United States. This capital stock was in¬ 
creased by October to nearly $2,000,000,000.00. The mission 
of the Corporation was to purchase, construct, equip, lease, 
charter, maintain, and operate merchant vessels in the com¬ 
merce of the United States. 

(c) (i) Major General George W. Goethals, the builder 
of the Panama Canal, was appointed manager of the Cor¬ 
poration. However, he favored steel ships over wooden ships 
and, as a result of the ensuing controversy, the shipping pro¬ 
gram was delayed and General Goethals resigned. 

(ii) The ships built by the Corporation were standardized 
at 8,000 tons so that the parts could be made in quantity in 
factories and sent to various shipyards for assembly. 

(iii) By October 1,1918, the United States had constructed 
384 steel ships with a total tonnage of 1,547,824 tons, and 289 
wooden ships with a total tonnage of 504,108 ton. The aggre¬ 
gate tonnage thus created was 2,051,932 tons. The United 
States thus was nearly 4,000,000 tons below its obligation to 
the Allies and more than 5,000,000 tons below its program of 
November 15, 1917. 

(d) Another source of securing tonnage was the requisition¬ 
ing of ships under construction in American yards. October 15, 
1917, the Corporation requisitioned all ships of 2,500 tons or 
more under construction and thus secured an additional 


GERMAN AND AMERICAN PLANS 199 

3,000,000 tons. Most of the ships requisitioned had been 
ordered by foreign ship owners. Thereafter, all ships of above 
2,500 tons were built on government account. 

(2) Naval action, (a) In 1914, the American Navy, in 
relative strength, compared with those of other powers, ranked 
third; the Navy of Great Britain being first, and that of Ger¬ 
many, second. 

(b) On the recommendation of the President, the Con¬ 
gress, in 1915, decided to increase the Navy in a three-year 
building program and appropriated $502,482,214.00 for the 
construction of: 

10 dreadnaughts. 

6 battle cruisers. 

10 scout cruisers. 

50 destroyers. 

15 fleet submarines. 

85 coast submarine and various other ships. 

(c) As soon as war was declared, the Navy patrolled the 
American coast. Within two months, American destroyers re¬ 
ported to Admiral Sims, Commander of American Naval Forces 
in Europe, and were cooperating with the British fleet against 
German submarines. 

(d) The great Northern Mine Barrage, extending from 
Norway to the Orkney Islands, was laid by the British and 
American Navies together. The American Navy had some 
part in blockading the Austrian coast, on the Adriatic, and 
participated in maintaining the Allied command of the sea. 

(e) The principal accomplishment of the American Navy 
in the war was the development of a convoy system whereby 
over 2,000,000 troops were earned safely over the 3,000 miles, 
to France. 

g. Moblization of army. (1) When Germany declared war 
against Russia and France, the Regular Army of the United 
States consisted of a small General Staff, 31 regiments of infan¬ 
try, 15 regiments of cavalry, 6 regiments of field artillery, a 
coast artillery corps, and certain supply and administrative 
troops. The whole force totaled only 86,000 officers and men. 
The National Guard consisted of less than 9,000 officers and 
120,000 men. 

(2) A fair idea of equipment on hand can be formed from 
the fact that there were only: 


200 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

21 airplanes. 

634 modern guns, 6-inch or less in caliber. 

2 days’ fire of ammunition. 

1000 machine guns, mainly of the obsolete Gatling and Colt models 

• 

(3) After the sinking of the Lusitania and because of a 
preparedness movement which had taken a strong hold on the 
public mind, the Congress enacted "The National Defense 
Act of 1916” which increased the Regular Army to 185,000 
with a further possible increase in war, increased the National 
Guard to the ratio of 800 men for each Representative and 
Senator in Congress, provided for a Reserve composed of those 
discharged from the Army and National Guard, created an 
Officers’ Reserve Corps and made provision for a Reserve 
Officers’ Training Corps at colleges and universities. 

(4) When the United States declared war, it was generally 
agreed that eventually American troops would be sent to 
France, if needed. But it was doubted whether they ever would 
be needed and the General Staff believed that no men should 
be sent until the United States had equipped and trained a large 
army. 

(5) (a) The revelation by Marshal Joffre and the Allied 
Missions that France and England were nearly exhausted 
brought about a realization that active participation in the 
war on the continent of Europe was necessary. Before the 
Allied Missions had left the United States, the Congress enacted 
a Selective Service Draft Law (May 18, 1917), which increased 
the Regular Army to 287,000 men, authorized mustering the 
National Guard into the Federal Service, and to the amaze¬ 
ment of the rest of the world and of Germany in particular, 
authorized the President to enroll all males between 21 and 
31 years of age, and from them to raise a force of 500,000 men, 
and, if necessary, a later force of 500,000 more. 

(b) By June 5, 1917, 9,586,508 men were enrolled, and on 
July 20, names were drawn to make up a force of 687,000 men, 
which the President directed to be assembled, September 18, 
1917. This force was named the National Army. 

(c) Based on the foregoing Selective Service Draft Law, 
the Army of the United States was to be built up of: 

The Regular Army: Divisions 1 to 25. 

The National Guard (Federalized): Divisions 26 to 50. 

The National Army: Divisions 50 to 100. 


GERMAN AND AMERICAN PLANS 201 

(ii) The organization was to be in three phases: 

First: the immediate recruitment of the Regular Army. 

Second: the federalization of the National Guard, in July. 

Third: the organization of the National Army, in September and 

October. 

(iii) The Regular Army furnished the senior officers for 
the National Army, for all units from regiments up to and in¬ 
cluding divisions. Junior officers were obtained through 
fifteen training camps, organized and conducted on the Platts- 
burg Plan, each of a capacity of 2,500 men. Graduates from 
these camps were recommended for temporary commissions, 
to include the grade of major. 

(6) Sixteen cantonments were constructed for the train¬ 
ing of the National Guard, and sixteen for the National Army. 
The courses of training prescribed by the War Department 
for National Guard and National Army divisions training in 
the United States covered sixteen weeks. 

h. American Expeditionary Force . (1) Marshal Joffre's 
request for the appearance of American troops in France to 
hearten the French people and the French Army, appealed to 
the American people and created a popular demand that Mr. 
Theodore Roosevelt, who, for a long time, had aggressively 
espoused the Allied Cause, be permitted to recruit a division 
at once and take it to France. In fact, the Congress in the 
Act of May 18, 1917, authorized the President to send four 
volunteer divisions abroad as soon as they were ready. The 
President, however, was opposed to the volunteer system on 
account of its inadequacy in a war of unlimited effort and did 
not take action under this authority. 

(2) Mr. Wilson had been much impressed by the loyal 
and efficient manner in which his very unpopular policy, with 
its exceedingly difficult duty, had been carried out in Mexico, 
and on May 26, 1917, selected Brigadier General John J. 
Pershing who had commanded the American forces on the 
border and in Mexico, to be the Commander-in-Chief of 
American Forces in Europe, and directed the sending overseas 
of the first detachment of the American Army. 

5. Principles of War. a. Principle of surprise. When 
the United States, contrary to the German estimate, adopted 
a selective service law and began the drafting of a great army, 
the effect on Germany illustrated the principle of surprise. Here 
again, the surprise was not through any intention of the 


202 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

United States but was due wholly to an incorrect estimate of 
the situation by the Germans. 

b. Principle of mass. The raising of a large force by the 
United States, and its later transportation to France, made 
possible the illustration of mass on the French front in 1918, 
when American troops turned the tide at the Second Battle 
of the Marne, and delivered the decisive blow November 1-5, 
1918, near Dun-sur-Meuse. 


CHAPTER XI 


Plans for the Use of American 
Forces in Europe 


1. The President’s Instructions to General Pershing .203 

2. General Pershing’s Arrival in Europe.204 

3. Situation, June 13, 1917.204 

a. The Central Powers.204 

b. The Allies. 205 

4. General Pershing’s Estimate of the Situation and General 

Plan.206 

a. Estimate... 206 

b. General plan.206 

5. Organization of a General Staff.....206 

a. Basis of organization. 206 

b. Description of organization.207 

6. General Organization Project for an Army. 207 

a. Basic considerations. 207 

b. Composition of units.. 208 

7. Selection of Front for the American Effort. 210 

a. Basie considerations.^.210 

b. Available front.210 

c. The front selected.211 


8 . 


9. 


Project for Organization of a Service of the Rear 

a. Base of supplies...... 

b. Base ports in France. 

c. Lines of communication. 

d. Main depots of supply.... 

e. Sections. 

/. Service of supply troops. 

Schedule for Priority of Shipments. 


.211 

.211 

211 

212 

213 

213 

.213 

.214 


10. Training Project. 214 

a. General Pershing’s training doctrine.214 

• b. Division training areas.215 

c. Schools.216 

11. Principles of War. —Principle of security.217 


1. The President’s Instructions to General Per¬ 
shing. The President’s instructions to General Pershing 
dated May 26 , 1917 , contained the following important direc¬ 
tion : 

“5. In military operations against the Imperial German 
Government, you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the 


203 



































204 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

other countries employed against that enemy; but in so doing 
the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the 
United States are a separate and distinct component of the com¬ 
bined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This 
fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particu¬ 
lar circumstances as your judgment may approve. The decision 
as to when your command, or any of its parts, is ready for action 
is confided to you, and you will exercise full discretion in deter¬ 
mining the manner of cooperation. But until the forces of the 
United States are in your judgment sufficiently strong to war¬ 
rant cooperation as an independent command, it is understood 
that you will cooperate as a component of whatever army you 
may be assigned to by the French Government.” 

2. General Pershing's Arrival in Europe. General 
Pershing, while still in Washington, assumed the duties of 
Commander-in-Chief of American troops in Europe. He 
selected a small staff of 53 officers and, with it and 146 en¬ 
listed men, departed May 28, 1917, on the S.S. Baltic , for 
London where he arrived June 9, 1917. After spending 
some days in consultation with British authorities, he 
reached Paris, June 13, 1917. He was received with great 
enthusiasm in England and France. His military bearing 
and confidence made such an impression on the French that, 
in his capacity as America's representative, they regarded 
him as the master who would lead the way out of an 
already lost war to an almost unbelievable victory. At 
Napoleon's tomb, they expressed their hopes by according 
to him the unique honor of bearing the sword of that great 
master which had remained sheathed behind plate glass for 
more than sixty years. 

In compliance with the wish of Marshal Joffre, the 1st 
American (Regular) Division arrived in France June 26, 
1917. One battalion of the 16th Infantry paraded in Paris 
on July 4, 1917, and escorted General Pershing to the tomb 
of the great French hero of the American Revolution, where 
General Pershing pronounced those words which electrified 
France and revivified her hopes of ultimate victory, “Laf¬ 
ayette, we are here!" 

# 8 - The Situation June 13, 1917. (Map 57.) The sit¬ 
uation when General Pershing arrived in France was as 
follows: 

a. The Central Poivevs. (1) The Central Powers were 
in actual possession of a Central European empire that ex- 


AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE 205 

tended from the North and Baltic Seas, across the Bosphorus 
to include most of Turkey. 

(2) The second German attempt to defeat France had 
failed at Verdun in 1916. The German 1917 plan, to assume 
the strategical attitude of in readiness on the land and to 
win a victory through starving England into a separate 
peace by means of unrestricted submarine warfare, appar¬ 
ently might succeed. 

b. The Allies. (1) Great Britain attracted attention 
to Turkey in March by capturing Bagdad in Mesopotamia, 
and by the attempt to capture Gaza in Syria. 

(2) The Allies also had attracted attention to the 
Balkans by forcing the abdication of Constantine as King 
of Greece, in June, and allowing Greece to follow her nation¬ 
al desire of entering into an alliance with the Allies. 

(3) General Cadorna had incorrectly estimated that 
Austria was planning to attack Italy, and so did not carry 
out the Inter-Allied plan to assume the offensive early and 
synchronously with the Allied offensive in France. His 
hurried offensive was too late for coordination with the 
Allied offensive in France and resulted merely in an ordin¬ 
ary victory with a limited objective. 

(4) The Russian Government had been overthrown by 
a socialistic revolution. 

(5) The great offensive on the Western front under 
General Nivelle in April (generally called the Second Battle 
of the Aisne) which was intended to decisively defeat the 
Germans and force them out of France had failed and had 
resulted in a serious lowering of French morale. 

(6) After the failure of General Nivelle, the Allies 
altered their plan for operations on the Western front 
as follows: General Haig with the assistance of the Allies 
was to capture the German submarine bases at Ostend and 
at Zeebrugge by a major offensive that would give some 
relief against submarine warfare, while General Petain 
(the new French commander), to the south, was to retain 
the initiative by minor offensives with’limited objectives. 

(7) Allied reserves of men at the front and at home 
were low and there was little prospect of materially increas¬ 
ing their armed strength even in the face of the probability 


206 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

of having practically the whole military strength of the 
Central Powers against them in the spring of 1918. 

(8) Briefly, the changed Allied plan called for the 
strategic defensive on the whole front pending arrival of 
American forces. 

4. General Pershing’s Estimate of the Situation 
and General Plan. a. Estimate. (1) General Pershing 
at first established his headquarters in Paris and there near 
the great Allied nerve center, formulated plans for the 
organization of the American forces in Europe. The Allied 
commanders in chief and their staffs placed their experience 
at his disposal and, through consultation, the most effective 
means of cooperation of effort were considered. 

(2) General Pershing noted the fact that the Allies in 
France based their organization and training on the theory 
that their forces would be used in the so-called “War of 
Position.” He clearly saw that victory could not be secured 
otherwise than by maneuver after the hostile defensive 
positions had been penetrated. He estimated that the United 
States was the only power that could furnish a sufficient 
force to end the war and decided that the American forces 
should be organized and trained basically for offensive war 
of maneuver. 

b. General plan. In conformity with the estimate he 
had formed, he cabled Washington on July 6, 1917: 

“Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 

men by next May.” 

This decision finally fixed the United States in the 
policy of participating in battle action in Europe and with 
a sufficient force to win the victory. 

5. Organization of a General Staff, a. Basis of 
organization. General Pershing understood that a well or¬ 
ganized general staff is an essential element of a modern 
army and at once began the organization of a general staff 
for the American Expeditionary Force. As the American 
army had not previously contained a general staff broadly 
organized and trained for war, he selected from the French 
and British general staff systems certain features which 
had stood the test of experience. To these features, he added 
certain ideas of his own and molded the whole into a gen¬ 
eral staff system for his force. His problem was different 


AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE 207 

from that of either the French or the British. The 
former were conducting war at home; the latter, although 
their general staff was organized on an overseas basis, 
were within easy reach of their base of supplies, England. 
The American troops in Europe, on the other hand, would 
be 3,000 miles from their base of supplies and their line of 
communications therewith would be subject to all the handi¬ 
caps incident to the use of water transportation exposed to 
the dangers of submarine warfare and of the elements. 

b. Description of organization . The general staff, as 
finally organized, was divided into five groups, as follows: 

The Administration Section, usually called “Gl.” 

The Intelligence Section, usually called “G2.” 

The Operations Section, usually called “G3.” 

The Supply Section, usually called “G4.” 

The Training Section, usually called “G5.” 

The titles of the sections are indicative of their func¬ 
tions. The same allotment of duties was made to the 
staffs in the lower echelons of command down to include 
divisions. In corps and divisions, however, the “G4” or 
Supply Section was merged with the “Gl” Section and the 
“G5” or Training Section, with the “G3” Section. 

6. A General Organization Project for an Army. 
a. Basic considerations. (1) General Pershing, after 
he had made a careful study of the French and British ex¬ 
perience on the Western front, furnished his conclusions to 
the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Force 
and directed that they be used as the basis for a general 
organization project covering, as far as possible, the per¬ 
sonnel of all combat, staff, and administrative units for one 
army, the idea being that other armies would be organized, 
as it became necessary, on the same basis. The project was 
prepared by the General Staff and forwarded by General 
Pershing to the War Department on July 11, 1917. 

(2) The project called for, initially, one army of about 
1,000,000 men, consisting of from three to five corps, each 
corps to consist of corps troops and four combat divisions 
with one replacement and one depot division. Each corps 
was intended to be capable of taking over a corps sector 
with two divisions in line and two in reserve while losses in 
the ranks were to be filled from the replacement and depot 


208 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

divisions. In forwarding this project, General Pershing 
stated: 

“It is evident that a force of about 1,000,000 men is the 
smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well 
balanced, and independent organization. However, it must be 
equally clear that the adoption of this size force as a basis of 
study should not be construed as representing the maximum 
force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France. 
It is taken as the force which may be expected to reach France 
in time for an offensive in 1918, and as a unit and basis of 
organization. Plans for the future should be based, especially in 
reference to the manufacture of artillery, aviation, and other 
material, on three times this force, i.e., at least 3,000,000 men.” 

b. Composition of units. The project furnished the 
War Department with a model upon which it organized 
troops intended for service abroad and, with a few minor 
exceptions, the tables thereof controlled in the American 
Expeditionary Force to the end. The following is a resume 
of the project: 

(1) (a) An army was to consist of an army head¬ 
quarters, certain army troops, and five corps. 

(b) The army troops were to consist of the necessary 
artillery, aviation, engineer, signal, and sanitary troops, and 
a remount and veterinary service, traffic police, and trains 
in amount sufficient to reinforce the operations of the in¬ 
cluded corps. 

(2) (a) A corps was to consist of a corps headquar¬ 
ters, certain corps troops, four combat divisions, one re¬ 
placement division, and one depot division. 

(b) The corps troops were to consist of the necessary 
cavalry, artillery, aviation, engineer, pioneer infantry, and 
signal troops and a remount service and trains, in amount 
sufficient to reinforce the operations of the included divi¬ 
sions. 

(3) The division organization in the project differed 
considerably from that in vogue among the Allies. Its 
strength was about 28,000 men, practically double that of 
a French or German division. It was adopted because of 
its suitability for offensive rather than defensive warfare 
in the situation as it then existed on the Western front. 
In detail, the organization recommended was as follows: 


209 


AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE 

(a) Each combat division was to consist of: 

A division headquarters. 

1 squadron cavalry (attached from corps). 

1 regiment of engineers. 

1 machine gun battalion. 

1 tank company. 

1 field signal battalion. 

The division trains. 

1 artillery brigade. 

2 infantry brigades. 

(b) The composition of the major units of the division 
was to be as follows: 

(i) Artillery brigade. 

Brigade headquarters. 

2 gun regiments, 75-mm. 

1 howitzer regiment, 6-inch. 

1 trench mortar battery. 

Each 75-mm. gun regiment was to consist of: 

Regimental headquarters. 

1 headquarters battery. 

1 supply battery. 

2 battalions (with headquarters and 3 batteries, each). 
The 6-inch howitzer regiment was to consist of: 

Regimental headquarters. 

1 headquarters battery. 

1 supply battery. 

3 battalions (with headquarters and 2 batteries, each). 

The trench mortar battery was to be an independent 
unit dependent upon brigade headquarters. 

(ii) Infantry brigade. 

Brigade headquarters. 

2 infantry regiments. 

Each infantry regiment was to consist of: 

1 regimental headquarters. 

1 headquarters company. 

1 supply company. 

3 battalions. 

Each infantry battalion to consist of: 

1 battalion headquarters. 

1 machine gun company. 

4 rifle companies of 250 men each. 

(iii) The division trains. 

1 train headquarters. 

2 military police companies. 

1 ammunition train. 

1 supply train. 

1 engineer train. 

1 sanitary train. 

(4) The plan for replacement and depot divisions was 
nearly the same. Their names indicate their respective 


210 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

functions. Two ambulance companies and two field hos¬ 
pitals from both the replacement and depot divisions, and 
all the artillery from the replacement division, except one 
regiment of 75s and the trench mortar battery, were to 
be withdrawn for use with corps troops. Also, all of the 
artillery of the depot division, except one regiment of 75s 
and the trench mortar battery, was to be withdrawn for 
use with army troops. 

7. Selection of Front for the American Effort. 
(Maps 5, 6, 61 and 63.) a. Basic considerations. (1) The 
minimum size of force needed for offensive use in France in 
1918 and the basis for its organization having been indi¬ 
cated to the War Department, General Pershing’s next task 
was the selection of the probable front for the American 
effort. Always remembering that he was the commander 
of the American forces whose mission was offensive, it was 
necessary for him to select a front from which a decisive 
blow, that would end the war, could be delivered against the 
Germans. 

(2) He found all France organized for resistance to 
the invader. The zones of operation of the French and 
British Armies were not fixed, but varied with the fortunes 
of war. Behind the zones of operation their communica¬ 
tions zones and zone of the interior were organized to 
serve and maintain the combat troops in the zones of oper¬ 
ations. These zones fluctuated in size according to the 
fortunes of the Allied armies. 

(3) He observed that while the Allies had endeavored 
to maintain the offensive, the British, in order to guard 
the channel ports, were committed to operations in Flan¬ 
ders and the French, to the portion of the front protecting 
Paris; also, neither had sufficient troops for operations on 
a large scale elsewhere. 

b. The available front. (1) The French line from 
Verdun to Switzerland and the German line from Metz to 
Switzerland were permanently fortified. The best oppor¬ 
tunity for maneuver lay to the west of Metz and to the 
east of the French line directly defending Paris. 

(2) The great hostile fortified district east of Verdun 
and around Metz menaced central France, protected the 


AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE 211 

most exposed portion of the German line of communica¬ 
tions; i.e., between Carignan and Sedan, and covered the 
Briey iron region, from which the Germans obtained the 
greater part of the iron required for munitions and mater¬ 
ial. Also, the coal fields east of Metz were covered by 
these same defenses. A deep advance in the general direc¬ 
tion of Metz would cut the German line of communications, 
capture the Briey iron basin, and force Germany to with¬ 
draw her troops from Northern France. 

c. The front selected. The strategical and economical 
situation of the enemy indicated Lorraine as the field in 
which the blow of the American armies would be most 
effective. So General Pershing, with Allied approval, 
decided to prepare to deliver the American blow in Lorraine. 

8. Project for the Organization of a Service of 
the Rear. — (Maps 17, 61, 62, 63, and 64.) After the 
preparation of a project for the organization and prelim¬ 
inary training of combat troops and the selection of the 
probable front for the operations of the American Army, 
the next project in order of urgency was for the Service of 
the Rear, later called Service of Supply. General Pershing 
approached the solution of the formulation of a project for 
this purpose as follows: 

a. Base of supplies. Inasmuch as Great Britain and 
France were unable to furnish all their own supplies and 
were dependent on America for large quantities of many 
important articles, General Pershing saw at once that he 
could not rely on a French or British base of supplies for 
the American Expeditionary Force and that for all prac¬ 
tical purposes his forces were based on the American 
continent, more than 3,000 miles away. 

b. Base ports in France. (1) Base ports in France 
were needed for the reception of the three and perhaps 
four million men, their replacements, and the enormous 
amount of supplies required to maintain the American effort. 

(2) Examination showed that the northern ports 
were crowded by British shipping and supplies and that the 
available southern ports did not have adequate port facil¬ 
ities. Also, the railway system behind the active front 
in northern France was already overtaxed and would not 


212 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

be available for American use for lines of supply, while 
the railways leading from the southern ports to north¬ 
eastern France, although available, were not of sufficient 
capacity to meet American needs. 

(3) General Pershing did not hesitate, but, having 
in mind the fact that he was to command the great Ameri¬ 
can forces that were deemed essential to win the war, he 
decided, at once, to use the southern ports of France, at 
Bordeaux, La Pallice, and St. Nazaire, and the railway 
systems leading to the northeast; and to commit the United 
States to the mammoth essential program of shipbuilding in 
America, and dock, railway, and storage depot building in 
France which were necessary in order to create a reliable 
line of communication supply service. 

c. Lines of communication. The American front and 
the base ports having been determined, there remained the 
problem of establishing lines of communication between 
them. The railroad lines of France were meeting the heavy 
demand of 3,500,000 combatants there engaged, and it was 
apparent that if the American armies were to have an 
independent and flexible railroad system, neither the rail¬ 
roads behind the British front nor those in rear of the 
French front covering Paris could be used. Specifically, 
General Pershing’s problem was to superimpose the Ameri¬ 
can Expeditionary Force’s rail communications on those of 
France where there would be the least possible disturbance 
to the arteries of supply of the two great Allied armies 
already in the field. This required the utmost use of those 
lines of the existing French railroad system that could 
hear an added burden. Double track railroad lines from 
the ports of the Loire and the Gironde Rivers unite at 
Bourges, running thence via Nevers, Dijon, to Neufchateau 
with lines radiating therefrom toward the right wing of 
the Allied front. It was estimated that those railroads 
with the available collateral lines, after considerable im¬ 
provement, could carry the additional 50,000 tons that would 
be required daily for an army of 2,000,000 men. So Gen¬ 
eral Pershing decided, with Allied approval, that his lines 
of communication should be from the comparatively unused 


AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE 213 

French South Atlantic ports to the American front to the 
northeast. 

Superimposing the map of France on that of the United 
States, it can be seen that the American base ports, from 
Brest to Bordeaux, would cover the approximate distance 
from Charlestown, South Carolina, to Richmond, Virginia, 
and that the length of the lines of communication would 
correspond roughly with the distance from Louisville, Ken¬ 
tucky, to the South Atlantic seaboard. 

d. Main depots of supply. It was important that the 
main depots of supply should be easily accessible yet at a 
safe distance from the front, as the Germans were capable 
of taking the offensive in any one of several directions. 
The area embracing Tours, Orleans, Montargis, Nevers, 
and Chateauroux, meeting these requirements, was chosen 
for location of the main depots as it also was centrally lo¬ 
cated with regard to all points on the arc of the Western 
front. 

e. Sections. — (1) For the purpose of local admini¬ 
stration, General Pershing divided the line of communica¬ 
tions into base sections , which included the territory im¬ 
mediately surrounding the various base ports; an inter¬ 
mediate section , which embraced the region of the great 
storage depots; and an advance section within which the 
billeting and training areas of the earlier arriving divisions 
were located and which extended to the probable zone of 
operations. 

(2) In providing for the storage and distribution of 
reserve supplies, the original plan called for forty-five days’ 
supplies in the base sections, thirty days’ in the intermediate, 
and fifteen days’ in the advance section. 

f. Service of Supply troops. (1) General Pershing 
forwarded, on July 11, 1917, a plan of organization for 
combat troops for the Zone of Operations. A project for 
the organization and construction of the Service of the Rear, 
including docks and railways, was cabled to Washington Au¬ 
gust 5, 1917, followed, September 18, 1917, by a complete 
schedule of the troops considered necessary for the Service 
of Supply. This list of troops comprised the necessary 


214 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

aviation, engineer, supply, labor, and transportation troops,, 
and sanitary, remount and veterinary services. 

(2) Later, General Pershing transferred all of the 
Administrative and Supply Service Staff except the Ad¬ 
jutant General's, Inspector General's and Judge Advocate 
General’s Departments, from his headquarters to Tours, 
where they functioned under a Commanding General, Ser¬ 
vice of Supply, who was responsible to General Pershing 
for the supply of the army. 

9. Schedule for Priority of Shipments. In order 
that the War Department might have a program to follow 
in the shipment of personnel and material to insure the 
gradual building up of a force at all times balanced and 
symmetrical, a comprehensive statement covering the order 
in which the troops and supplies should arrive in France, 
was prepared and forwarded, in the form of a schedule of 
priority of shipments, to the War Department, on October 
7, 1917. 

10. Training Project. Soon after his arrival in 
France, General Pershing made a careful study of the meth¬ 
ods used by the French and British to train combat troops. 
He observed that they continuously maintained a system of 
schools and training centers where noncommissioned officers, 
inexperienced officers, and officers to be prepared for ad¬ 
vancement were given both theoretical and practical in¬ 
struction. 

a. General Pershing's training doctrine. (1) On Au¬ 
gust 27, 1917, General Pershing announced his initial train¬ 
ing project. It was based upon sound American doctrine that 
was contemplated to develop a self reliant infantry by 
thorough instruction in the use of the rifle, and to prepare 
an integral American force trained in maneuver which 
would be able in every respect to take the offensive. 

(2) To coordinate the training in America with train¬ 
ing to be given in France, General Pershing cabled Wash¬ 
ington that the training of troops in stabilized warfare, or 
the so-called “trench warfare," should be limited to troops 
in France, and that the training of troops in America should 
be confined to instruction in maneuver, or the so-called 
“open warfare," and that, accordingly, the importance of 


AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE 215 

target practice and musketry training should be empha¬ 
sized in the instruction at mobilization camps. 

(3) He had observed that the long period of trench 
warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and 
British that they almost entirely dispensed with training 
for war of maneuver or open warfare. To make sure that 
the American forces would avoid that result he directed 
that the earlier divisions which were training in close as¬ 
sociation with the French should be instructed as follows: 

“Trench warfare naturally gives prominence to the defensive 
as opposed to the offensive. To guard against this, the basis of 
instruction should be essentially the offensive both in spirit and 
in practice. The defensive is accepted only to prepare for 
future offensive.” 

(4) And, in October, 1917, to inculcate the offensive 
spirit, he directed compliance with his now celebrated 
American doctrine as follows: 

“1. * * (a) The above methods to be employed must remain 
or become distinctly our own. 

(b) All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a 
vigorous offensive. This purpose will be emphasized in every 
phase of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought. 

(c) The general principles governing combat remain un¬ 
changed in their essence. This war has developed special features 
which involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas 
enunciated in our Drill Regulations and other service manuals 
remain the guide for both officers and soldiers and constitute the 
standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as 
modified in detail by instructions from these headquarters. 

(d) The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of 
the infantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill 
as a marksman, both on the target range and in field firing. 
An aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels 
himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle. 

(e) All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time 
in our history has discipline been so important; therefore discip¬ 
line of the highest order must be exacted at all times. The 
standards for the American Army will be those of West Point. 
The rigid attention, upright bearing, attention to detail, uncom¬ 
plaining obedience to instructions required of the Cadet will be 
required of every officer and soldier of our Armies in France. * *” 

b. Division training areas . (1) Based on the assump¬ 
tion that divisions would arrive from the United States with 
their.basic training completed, a three months’ training pro¬ 
gram was prescribed for them in France, as follows: 

First month: Instruction of small units from battalion 
down. 


216 . MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Second month: Battalions in quiet sectors on the front. 

Third month: Field practice in open warfare tactics 
by divisions, including artillery. 

(2) Division training areas were selected and divisions 
assigned to them in rear of the Lorraine front, where Gen¬ 
eral Pershing was later to strike the American blow. 

(3) During the first two months, the division artillery 
units were to train in special localities such as Valdahon, 
Coetquidan, Meucon, and Souge, where the instruction was 
carried on in conjunction with French artillery. In the 
third month, the artillery was to be assembled with its 
own division and its training was to be carried out in 
cooperation with the division infantry, in field practice. 

c. Schools. (1) With the assistance of Marshal Haig 
and General Petain, who placed officers and men at his 
disposal for use as instructors, and by using experienced 
American officers, General Pershing started a system of 
schools, coordinate through the G-5 Section of the General 
Staff, to teach the application of the doctrine enunciated by 
him, to strategy, tactics, and technique. 

(2) A General Staff College was organized in Novem¬ 
ber, 1917, at the great French school center at Langres. 
This college graduated 537 officers. At the same place, 
Langres, a Line School, which graduated 488 officers, was 
organized. 

(3) At corps centers of instruction for units of all 
arms and for noncommissioned officers, 12,891 officers and 
21,330 noncommissioned officers were graduated. 

(4) From the Candidates' Schools, where carefully se¬ 
lected enlisted men sought to win commissions, 11,000 men 
were graduated and commissioned for assignment as com¬ 
manders of infantry platoons and companies. Similarly, 
Candidates' Schools were to be conducted for each arm, with 
a prospective promotion through the agency of those Candi¬ 
date Schools of 7,000 men each month. 

(5) Special Service Schools were organized for each 
arm where, in well coordinated curriculums, the doctrine of 
tactics and technique for the particular arm was taught. 


AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE 


217 


(6) In addition, American officers were sent to Allied 
technical schools with a view of preparing American ex¬ 
perts in the technique and tactics of new weapons. Upon 
return those officers were used as instructors in similar 
American schools or in their organizations. 

11. Principles of War. Principle of security. Gen¬ 
eral Pershing by organizing a complete service of supply 
for the American forces, gained freedom of action. Based 
on the security thus obtained, he was able, later, to organize 
the decisive blow whose delivery brought the war to an end. 


CHAPTER XII 


All Fronts to End of 1917 


Page 

- 1. Balkan Front. 218 

a. Greece joins the Allies. 218 

b. Operations.219 

2. Italian Front.219 

a. Situation.219 

b. Spring offensive. 220 

c. Summer offensive.220 

3. Western Front..._. 220 

a. Situation. 220 

b. British offensive against submarine bases...221 

4. Russian Front.223 

a. Situation.223 

b. Russian offensive. 224 

c. German counter offensive in Galicia.224 

d. German victory at Riga.226 

e. Bolsheviki revolution.227 

/. Armistice of Brest-Litovsk.227 

g. Roumania.227 

5. Western Front.227 

a. Situation on French front.227 

b. Third Battle of Verdun.228 

c. Capture of Malmaison.228 

6. Italian Front.:.229 

a. Situation.229 

b. Central Powers’ plans.229 

c. Battle of Caporetto.230 

7. Supreme War Council.231 

8. Western Front.232 

a. British plans, November, 1917..232 

b. Battle of Cambrai.233 

c. German counter attack.234 

9. Syrian Front.234 

a. Situation and plans. 234 

b. Second Battle of Gaza.235 

c. Capture of Jerusalem.236 

10. Diplomatic Attempts to End the War.236 

11. Principles of War.237 

a. Principle of the objective.237 

b. Principle of security.238 

c. Principle of the offensive.238 

d. Principle of cooperation.239 


1. Balkan Front. (Map 53.) a. Greece joins the 
Allies. (1) The Allies discovered that King Constan- 
218 













































ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 219 

tine of Greece had been maintaining secret wireless com¬ 
munication with the Kaiser of Germany and had permitted 
the establishment of submarine bases by the Central Powers 
on the coast of Greece. They held him responsible for pre¬ 
venting General SarraiFs cooperation with the Roumanian 
Army in 1916. France, Great Britain, and Russia as the 
protectors of Greek representative constitutional govern¬ 
ment, forced Constantine to abdicate the throne, June 10, 
1917, to renounce the right of the Crown Prince (a Ger- 
manophile) to the throne, and to take the Crown Prince 
with him into exile. 

(2) Constantine’s second son, Alexander, was crowned 
King of Greece at once. He recalled M. Venizelos to power 
as Prime Minister. Greece, then functioning with a repre¬ 
sentative constitutional government, declared war on the 
Central Powers on July 2, and began the reorganization of 
the Greek army, which was to consist of ten divisions 
(about 200,000 men). All officers in the government ser¬ 
vice who were known to hold German sympathies, were at 
once dismissed, and all Germanophiles were imprisoned or 
expatriated. 

b. Operations. (1) During 1917, prior to King Con¬ 
stantine’s abdication, General Sarrail had conducted an 
offensive along the whole line which, although it did not 
accomplish a penetration, it did hold a large Central Powers’ 
force in his front. 

(2) After Greece joined the Allies the blockade of 
Greece was raised. General Sarrail’s many detachments 
in Greece returned to the front, and the Greek army took 
its place on the line, subject to orders of the commander of 
the Allies on the Balkan front. Preparations were begun 
at once for the delivery of a major offensive operation 
against the Bulgarian army. 

2. Italian Front. (Maps 57 and 65.) a. Situation. 
(1) The general plan of General von Arz, the new 
Austrian Chief of Staff, dictated by Marshal von Hinden- 
burg, was a strategic “in readiness” for all of Austria’s 
forces, but “passive defense” on the Italian front. 

(2) The Austrian dispositions were: 


220 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Eleventh Army (General Conrad): in the Trent salient. 

Tenth Army (General Krobatkin): on Dolomite and Carnic 
Alps front. 

Second Army (General Boroevic) : on the Isonzo front. 

(2) (a) General Cadorna estimated that the Aus¬ 
trians would launch an early spring offensive from the Trent 
salient; and, contrary to the Inter-Allied general plan for 
an offensive on all fronts, took up an attitude of strategical 
“in readiness.” By the end of April, General Cadorna saw 
his mistake and hastened to resume the offensive in the 
Carso against Trieste. General Cadorna’s general plan was 
to defend except on the line of the Isonzo; to attract the 
Austrian attention by local attacks north of Goritzia and 
to deliver the main attack south of that place. 

(3) The Italian dispositions were: 

First Army: covering the Trent salient. 

Fourth Army: covering the Dolomite Alps. 

Second Army: north of Goritzia. 

Third Army: south of Goritzia. 

The rest of the front, from Tolomino to Toblach, was held 
by detachments. 

There was no strategical reserve. 

b. Spring offensive ( May 11^-26). (1) General Ca¬ 

dorna launched the Second Army in a diverting attack north 
of Goritzia on May 14, and continued the attack until May 
23, when the near side of the plateau of Bainsizza was cap¬ 
tured. 

(2) On May 23, he suddenly launched the main attack, 
south of Goritzia, by the Third Army in a three days’ se¬ 
vere battle. He penetrated the Austrian first line to a depth 
of ten to fifteen miles on a front of eight miles along the 
road to Trieste, and captured the west slopes of the natural 
fortress Hermada, east of Monfalcone. 

c. Summer offensive {Aug. 19-Sept. 1). On August 
19, General Cadorna renewed the offensive on the line from 
Plava to the sea with forty-eight divisions operating on a 
thirty-eight mile front. By September 1, he had captured 
the plateau of Bainsizza which dominates the whole plain 
of Goritzia. Farther south, he had captured a part of the 
high ground Hermada. By that time siege conditions ob¬ 
tained. He captured 30,000 prisoners and 150 cannon. 

3. Western Front. (Maps 57, 58, 66 and 67.) a. 
Situation. (1) The relief of General Nivelle as Comman- 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 221 

der-in-Clnef of the French troops on the Western front. 
May 15, 1917, returned the initiative for the operation of 
the British armies on that front to Marshal Haig. Coordi¬ 
nated action thereafter between the Allies on that front 
was secured by cooperation. 

(2) The submarine campaign by Germany was ex¬ 
ceeding y effective against shipping to and from England. 
Ostend and Zeebrugge were the principle bases for the sub¬ 
marine campaign and they became at once the objective of 
British operations in France. 

b. British offensive against submarine bases. (1) 
Marshal Haig’s general plan for the capture of Ostend and 
Zeebrugge was: in a preliminary maneuver, to capture the 
Messines Ridge, then pivoting thereon, to penetrate the 
German line, and, by cutting the German line of communi¬ 
cations. to force withdrawal from the Belgian coast at Os¬ 
tend and Zeebrugge. 

(2) (a) Marshal Haig had been much embarrassed by 
the Messines Ridge salient just south of Ypres, which gave 
the Germans observation over his line. For a long time, 
he had planned a limited objective maneuver for the reduc¬ 
tion of that salient. He now decided to capture that ridge 
before launching his main attack in Flanders against the 
submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge. He assigned 
the execution of that preliminary maneuver to the Second 
Army (General Plummer). 

(b) (Map 66.) The artillery bombardment began 
May 21, and, by May 23, had increased to maximum inten¬ 
sity, from 2400 cannon, one to every seven yards of front. 
At a signal given by the explosion of 1,000,000 pounds of 
high explosives placed in twenty mines under the German 
first position, twelve divisions, on a front of ten miles, with 
one corps in reserve, moved forward to the attack at 3:00 
AM, June 7. The attack was carried out as planned and 
that evening Marshal Haig not only occupied the ridge, but 
had reduced the whole salient and repulsed the German 
local counter attack. 

(3) (a) (Map 67.) Marshal Haig’s plan for further 
conduct of the maneuver was for the Fifth Army (General 
Gough), with ten divisions including army reserves, to pene- 


222 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

trate the German line on a front of seven and one-half 
miles, from Zillebecke to Boesinghe; to advance by bounds 
corresponding to German positions; and to protect the right 
flank with the Second British Army (General Plummer) 
at the Messines Ridge, from the Lys River to Hill 60 and 
the left flank by the French First Army (General Anthoine) 
to the line: Nordschoote—Luyghem. 

(b) The first phase, which was an aerial battle to se¬ 
cure observation, was successful and gave the artillery fire 
superiority. As a result, Marshal Haig delayed D day from 
July 25 to 28 in order to allow the artillery to displace for¬ 
ward to positions within range of the German artillery 
which had displaced backward. Because of poor visibility 
and inability to locate the German artillery, he again de¬ 
layed D day to July 31. 

(c) The artillery preparation, with an extensive use 
of gas, continued for two weeks before D day. Preceded 
by discharges of thermite and oil drums, and covered by an 
accurate rolling barrage, the infantry attack was launched 
at 3:50 AM, July 31. During the day, the troops ad¬ 
vanced per schedule and by night had reached the line: 
Bixchoote—St. Julian—Hollebecpue—Basse Ville. This line 
included the entire German first position, and, from hill 60 
north, all of the second position. From St. Julian north 
to the boundary with the French, a line along the Hanne- 
beck brook, beyond the German second position, was taken 
and held. 

(d) The second bound, delayed because of wet weather, 
was taken at 4:25 AM, August 16, to the north of the 
Ypres—Roulers route, and made a wide gap in the German 
third position, from St. Julian to near Nordschoote. 

(e) The weather again stopped the advance and the 
next bound was made at 5:40 AM, September 20, by nine 
divisions on a front of nine miles from Hollebecque on the 
south to the boundary with the French on the north. The 
day's fight gained some high ground, with good observa¬ 
tion. The limited objective of about one mile depth in the 
enemy zone was reached by some troops as early as 8:00 
AM; by others, not until night. 

(f) After reorganization, Marshal Haig took the next 
bound at 5:50 AM, September 26, when the limited objec- 



ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 223 

tive of the observation positions, Tover Hamlet and Zonne- 
becke, were taken in the usual way. 

(g) Then by bounds, October 9, 12, 26, carried out in 
the same way each time by artillery preparation and the 
advance of infantry to the limit of artillery range, the Bri¬ 
tish reached Paschendaele, a position which gave excellent 
observation to the front. Due to wet weather, the opera¬ 
tions were here stopped short of the objectives, and the line 
was stabilized. 

4. Russian Front. (Maps 57, 68 and 69.) a. Situar- 
tion. (1) The Anarchists and so-called Extreme Socialists 
had for a long time sought to overthrow the Czar's govern¬ 
ment. They took advantage of every weakness of the gov¬ 
ernment during the war to further their purposes. The 
effect of their machinations was increased by the German 
government, which through the psychological department 
of the General Staff, used the weapon of socialistic propa¬ 
ganda to strengthen the Russian revolution, and weaken 
the Russian power in the field. 

(2) The Czar was loyal to his allied treaty obligations, 
but through the intrigues of the monk Rasputin, and the 
mistaken pacific attitude of the German-born Czarina, the 
real facts of the Russian situation were kept from him. 
The Czar, believing that all was well, left the control of 
matters of state in other and, as is now known, treacherous 
hands, while he took personal command at the front. 

(3) The Russian court became very corrupt and, 
through fear and bribery, tractable to German intrigue. 

(4) The Douma desired to preserve the Czar's govern¬ 
ment and to continue the war, but it was enraged by the 
exhibition of court corruption. The assassination of the 
monk Rasputin, in December, 1916, did not relieve the situa¬ 
tion, as, suffering more from blockade even than Germany, 
the people of Russia were hungry. They believed that the 
war was the cause of their privations and that the Czar and 
his government would continue the war. 

(5) Food riots began in Petrograd in the beginning of 
March, 1917, and the army sided with the people. The 
Douma then organized a “Provisional Government" with M. 
Kerensky, as Minister of War, at its head. On March 16, 


224 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

the Czar abdicated in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke 
Michael. The latter, however, refused the throne. 

(6) The extremists, headed by German Socialists, 
among whom was the leader Lenine, claimed credit for the 
revolution, and the right to direct it through organizations 
of soldiers and workmen called “Soviets.” 

In the spring, under the leadership of Kerensky, the 
Congress of all the Soviets voted to continue the war. Ker¬ 
ensky appointed General Brussilloff Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armies and directed him to resume the offensive, not 
only as required by the Russian treaty with the Allies, but 
as a means of saving Russia from a complete relapse into 
anarchy. 

b. Russian offensive. (1) General Brussilloff’s gen¬ 
eral plan was to deliver local holding attacks against the 
Germans and, with the view of uniting Russia through the 
national hatred against Austria, to deliver the main blow 
on the Austrian front astride the Dneister River with the 
object of destroying the Austrians east of the Carpathians. 

(2) The Seventh Army, north of the Dneister, attacked 
north of Tarnopol and forced the Austrian line back toward 
Lemberg, July 1, 1917. On July 8, the Eighth Army (Gen¬ 
eral Kornilov) south of the Dneister River, attacked north 
of Stanislau, and on July 11, south of Stanislau and captured 
36,000 prisoners and 100 cannon. 

(3) However, the agitation by the Bolsheviki, under 
the German agent Lenine, had taken such a hold on the 
people at home and in the armies that the offensive could 
not be sustained for lack of an offensive spirit. The Bol¬ 
sheviki everywhere were continually advocating “Peace 
without delay.” Soon, the troops refused to receive orders 
from their superiors and men and organizations up to regi¬ 
ments abandoned the trenches and left for home to reap the 
harvest which was just then ripening in the fields and to 
share in the distribution of the land. 

c. German counter offensive in Galicia. (1) Marshal 
von Hindenburg and his predecessors had contrived the 
Russian Revolution and were not surprised when it broke. 
Marshal von Hindenburg’s plan was to secure a separate 
peace from Russia through the psychological Bolsheviki 
propaganda campaign, which was expected to influence Rus- 


225 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 

sia to the end that, believing she was acting on her own 
initiative, she would ask for peace. He desired particu¬ 
larly not to resume the offensive by arms as he feared that 
such action might crystallize a racial and national spirit that 
would be superior to the blandishments of peace at any 
price. However, when Kerensky assumed the olfensive, 
Marshal von Hindenburg decided at once to deliver a coun¬ 
ter offensive. His general plan was to penetrate the Rus¬ 
sian line at the base of the northernmost salient just made 
by General Brussilloff in front of Tarnopol. 

(2) Marshal von Hindenburg quickly sent six first- 
class divisions, two from the Guards, and, under emergency 
conditions, organized them with 136 batteries into a mass 
for the penetrating maneuver, which was to be under the 
command of Prince Leopold of Bavaria. 

(3) On July 19, Prince Leopold attacked on a front of 
twelve miles from south of Brody and toward Tarnopol. 
The Russian Second Army, forced to retreat, carried with 
it the Seventh and Eighth Armies, farther to the south. 
The Russian I Corps of the Guard abandoned Tarnopol 
without firing a shot, July 21. The Russian Stanislau sali¬ 
ent was then endangered and to reap the strategical ad¬ 
vantage of the tactical victory at Tarnopol, Marshal von 
Hindenburg ordered the immediate assumption of the offen¬ 
sive by the whole line south to the Danube. The Russian 
retreat became a rout and Kolomea was abandoned with¬ 
out resistance. 

(4) The Russian Provisional Government passed 
through a crisis and Kerensky emerged as Provisional Presi¬ 
dent of the Russian Republic. He dismissed General Brus¬ 
silloff for not enforcing discipline and appointed General 
Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies. The 
Russian resistance under the better discipline of General 
Kornilov soon stiffened and stopped the advance of the 
Group of Armies of Archduke Joseph on the boundary of 
Bessarabia. 

(5) The attack on the Roumanian army front by Gen¬ 
eral von Mackensen made practically no headway due to the 
assistance of the French mission under the command of 
General Berthelot. General von Mackensen ceased the of- 


226 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

fensive at the end of August, at which time the maneuver 
changed to the method of siege warfare. 

d. German victory at Riga . (1) Marshal von Hinden- 

burg estimated that he could not force a separate peace 
from Russia by operations in Galicia and decided to seek a 
decision by striking in the direction of Petrograd. His 
general plan was to concentrate the Eighth Army, heavily 
reinforced, at Chavli, under the command of General von 
Huttier whose mission should be the capture of Riga by a 
strategical and tactical surprise. The Russian position at 
Riga had been kept up since 1915 and was very strong. The 
Duna River was about 400 yards wide and in the vicinity 
of Uxhall contained many islands. 

(2) General von Huttier’s plan was to capture Riga by 
a converging maneuver, the eastern force to be the stronger. 
His plan for the eastern force which was to be composed of 
eight infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions was to 
penetrate the Russian line in the vicinity of Uxhall, then 
to deploy the mass of maneuver to envelop Riga by the east 
simultaneously with the western attack. 

(3) The Eighth Army was concentrated at Chavli, more 
than one hundred miles in rear of the line, in August, where 
it rehearsed the operation down to the most minute detail. 

(4) On September 1, after a violent three hours’ artil¬ 
lery preparation, including gas concentrations, by 157 bat¬ 
teries and 550 minenwerfers, three first-class divisions, on 
a front of less than three miles south of Uxhall, penetrated 
the line. The Russians threw their arms away and aban¬ 
doned the position without resistance. Under the cover of 
a heavy smoke screen, General von Huttier constructed 
bridges across the Duna. The northern force crossed at 
once, deployed and, covering its rear and flank, advanced 
against Riga. The Russians, however, at once evacuated 
Riga. The German troops occupied the city on September 
3. The Russian Twelfth Army retreated without resis¬ 
tance, and by September 21, General von Huttier had es¬ 
tablished a new line beyond Riga, which joined the old line 
at Jacobstadt. 

(5) Von Hindenburg then, for political effect to aid 
in forcing a peace with Russia, threatened Petrograd by 
transporting by sea an infantry division and a strong de- 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 227 

tachment of cyclist troops to a position on the German left 
in readiness, apparently, to march on Petrograd. At the 
same time, in cooperation, the German fleet captured the 
islands of Dagol and Oesel. This measure protected the left 
flank of the line at Riga, and as intended, was interpreted 
at Petrograd to be a preparation for an advance to Petro¬ 
grad. 

e. Bolsheviki revolution. Marshal von Hindenburg’s 
threat against Petrograd was successful and Kerensky 
moved the capital to Moscow. The Soviets no longer recog- 
nied Kerensky’s authority. General Kornilov with a few 
faithful regiments, marched toward Moscow. Kerensky at 
once named himself Dictator and arrested Kornilov as a 
rebel. The Soviet power increased rapidly and, on Novem¬ 
ber 12, Lenine and Trotsky, by revolution, seized the reins of 
power and proclaimed a Bolsheviki Government for Russia. 
The Ukraine, Courland, and Finland at once declared their 
independence. 

/. Armistice of Brest-Litovsk. Lenine and Trotsky on 
December 15, signed an armistice with the Central Powers 
at Brest-Litovsk, and a treaty of peace on December 23. 

g. Roumania. Roumania also ceased hostilities and 
asked for peace with the Central Powers on December 9. 

5. Western Front. (Maps 57, 58, 59, 70, 71.) a. 
Situation on French front . (1) In preparation for the 

Nivelle offensive, officers were instructed to arouse the en¬ 
thusiasm of the men, and for that purpose part of the plan 
of operation was communicated to them and the idea wa3 
propagated that it was to be the last great effort. The 
Poilu came to believe that it was the last blow. When the 
soldiers saw these promises of the end of the war vanish 
in defeat and realized that there were many weary months 
of fighting ahead of them there ensued a demoralization 
such as the French army probably had never before seen. 
Battalions, regiments, and even a division mutinied and, re¬ 
fusing to obey their officers, attempted to march on Paris. 

(2) General Petain succeeded General Nivelle as Com- 
mander-in-Chief of French forces on the Western front 
on May 15, 1917. It was his first duty to restore discipline 
and to revive the morale of the armies. As a result, he 
was forced to maintain a defensive attitude. His wise and 


228 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

patient efforts were successful and after several months he 
felt able to undertake operations with limited objectives. 

b. Third Battle of Verdun. (Aug. 20-26.) (1) Gen¬ 

eral Petain decided to recapture the heights which afforded 
hostile observation points in front of Verdun and gave that 
mission to the Second Army (General Guillaumat). The 
latter assembled 2,200 pieces of artillery (half heavy), and 
on the morning of August 20, after an artillery bombard¬ 
ment for seven days, launched twelve divisions in attack, 
astride the Meuse, on an eleven mile front. On the west 
bank, Dead Man’s Hill was easily taken. On the east bank, 
the troops easily ran over Talou Hill and hill 344. The at¬ 
tack was continued to August 26, when the high ground 
from which Verdun could be observed had been captured. 

(2) Although the advance had not reached the original 
first position of February, 1916, it had reached the line, 
Avocourt—Samogneux—Bezonvaux—Damloup, the limited 
objectives given for the operation. This success greatly 
improved the morale of the French troops. 

c. Capture of Malmaison. (Oct. 23-26.) (1) General 

Maistre, commanding the French Tenth Army, estimated 
that the capture of the high ground in the German Alli- 
mant salient would force German withdrawal from the 
Chemin des Dames (Ladies Road on Map 71) as the latter 
was observed and controlled by the former. Permission 
was secured for the execution of the maneuver as an opera¬ 
tion with a limited objective. The French troops to partici¬ 
pate in the operation were carefully trained and rehearsed 
the maneuver down to the most minute detail on other but 
similar ground. 

(2) After an artillery preparation of six days and 
nights that destroyed all works on the surface of the ground 
and interdicted all roads to the rear of the German salient, 
General Maistre launched the infantry attack before day¬ 
light on October 23, with eight divisions, preceded by five 
groups of tanks, on a ten mile front. The objectives, Alli- 
mant, Vaudesson, Chavignon, were reached that day and im¬ 
mediately organized. The next day, the Crown Prince 
evacuated the high ground near Pinon, and, by November 2, 
had abandoned the Chemin des Dames and retired to the 
north of the Ailette. 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 229 

(3) This operation which was based on surprise, cap¬ 
tured with comparative ease, what General Nivelle failed 
to capture with nearly a million and a half men. It worked 
marvels in the restoration of confidence and the rehabilita¬ 
tion of the French soldiers’ morale. 

6. Italian Front. (Maps 57 and 72.) a. Situation. 
When siege conditions obtained at the end of August on 
the Russian front, von Hindenburg estimated that Italy 
would force Austria to a separate peace, unless Germany 
should help the latter to a victory over the hated Italians 
sufficiently brilliant to hold the races of the Dual Monarchy 
loyal to the alliance. He decided not only to do that but 
to launch a strategical and tactical offensive against Italy 
that would force her to a separate peace. He directed 
General Ludendorff to prepare the offensive against Italy. 

b. Central Powers' plans . (1) General Ludendorff 

had a careful reconnaissance of the whole Italian theater 
made. He discovered that the junction between the Isonzo 
and the Alpine fronts was weakly held and that General 
Cadorna did not have a general reserve. 

(2) After a careful estimate, he decided on the follow¬ 
ing general plan for the operation: 

(a) To launch immediately a psychological campaign 
through fraternization at the front, and through agents of 
the German psychological department in Italy, as had been 
done in Russia, with the view of fixing in the Italian sol¬ 
dier’s mind the idea that it was a sin to kill his brother, 
that the Austrians and Italians were brothers, and that if 
they each refused to fight there would be no war. The 
psychological campaign having been well started, he planned 
to reduce the Udine salient by a surprise strategical and 
tactical converging operation that would destroy the Italian 
armies. 

(b) Before D day, the line was to remain unchanged. 

(c) The eastern and principal blow was to be struck 
by a specially trained German Fourteenth army under the 
command of General von Below, whose mission was to pene¬ 
trate the Italian line at the weak point, Caporetto, and to 
exploit the penetration by the destruction of the Italian 
army. 


230 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(d) The western blow was then to be delivered from 
the Trent salient by General Conrad against the left flank 
of the Italian line with the view of completing the destruc¬ 
tion of those armies when they arrived at the Piave River 
in their retreat. 

c. The Batttle of Caporetto. (1) The psychological 
campaign was so successful that there was a great demand 
in Italy for a separate peace, and many Italian soldiers at 
the front fraternized with the Austrians and agreed not to 
fight them. 

(2) General von Below’s German Fourteenth Army 
was secretly assembled in the vicinity of Villach. It com¬ 
prised about 100,000 men, selected with the greatest se¬ 
crecy and care, and trained secretly to the greatest detail 
of the operation, by rehearsal. 

(3) Following a formidable artillery preparation by 
emission of asphyxiating gas, General von Below launched 
his attack at 2:00 AM, October 24. In the advance, the 
troops avoided the mountains and infiltrated up the valleys. 
The army crossed the Isonzo at Plezzo, Caporetto, and Tol- 
mino. Two Italian brigades, throwing their arms away, 
fled in a panic which, inside the Second Army, was com¬ 
municated to the right and left. In spite of the heroic con¬ 
duct of a brigade which sacrificed itself, General von Below 
captured the summit of Matajur, the Thermopylae Pass of 
that front, the next day, October 25. The penetration was 
complete and reached Cividale, October 26. 

(4) General Cadorna, on October 25, ordered the evac¬ 
uation of Bainsizza. He then, to avoid the envelopment of 
the Second and Third Armies, ordered them to retreat at 
once to the west. On October 28, he abandoned Goritzia 
and Monfalcone. The Third Army destroyed most of its 
artillery and provisions and crossed to the west bank of 
the Isonzo. October 29, General Cadorna’s headquarters, 
by a sudden flight from Udine, barely missed capture. 

(5) The Italian rout quickly extended to the left and 
the detachments at the passes of Plezzo and Pleocken 
abandoned their stations and fell back toward the Taglia- 
mento, followed by the Austrian Tenth Army under Gen¬ 
eral Krobatin. 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 231 

(6) On October 30, General Cadorna began to retire 
across the Tagiiamento at Codroipe, Dignano, and Pinzano. 
His forces, although protected by rear guards, were under 
great pressure from General von Below's Fourteenth Army 
and General Boroevic’s Second Army. 

(7) On October 31, General Boroevic captured the 
bridgeheads at Codroipe and at Bignano and, thus envelop¬ 
ing the left flank of the Italian Third Army, captured 
60,000 prisoners and 300 cannon. 

(8) On November 3, General Krobatin forced the Tag¬ 
iiamento at Gemona. The Italian Fourth Army being forced 
by this maneuver to the Piave, carried all the troops on the 
right to the Piave River. General Cadorna decided, No¬ 
vember 5, to hold the line, Piave—Mont Grappa—Lake 
Garda. 

(9) On November 9, General von Arz's forces reached 
the Piave, from Suzegane to the coast. General Cadorna pre¬ 
pared all the bridges for destruction and defended the west 
bank of the river. 

(10) General Conrad, on November 9, according to the 
plan, launched his enveloping attack from the Trent salient 
against General Cadorna's left. 

(11) By the end of November, French and British re¬ 
inforcing divisions, under emergency orders, had arrived 
and siege conditions obtained on the line, Piave—Mont 
Grappa—Lake Garda. General Fayolle was relieved from 
command of the Central Group on the Western front and 
placed in command of the British and French troops in Italy. 
Some of the reinforcing troops were interspersed with 
Italian troops to stiffen the line, other divisions took over 
the Mont Grappa Sector, and others were held in rear as 
a strategic reserve. 

7. Supreme War Council. (1) The Caporetto dis¬ 
aster completely disorganized the Italian army and for a 
short time its escape was doubtful. The British and French 
Governments rushed to Italy's assistance the troops which 
they had refused before. General Foch, the French Chief 
of Staff, visited the Italian General Headquarters and ar¬ 
ranged for a complete rehabilitation of the Italian army. 

(2) In order to secure better coordination in waging 
the war, the heads of the British, French, and Italian gov- 


232 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

ernments met at Rapollo, Italy, and there, in conference, 
November 7, drew up and signed a scheme of organization 
for a Supreme War Council, which was to meet at Versailles 
and which was to consist of the Prime Ministers and one 
other member of the government of each of the Great 
Powers whose armies were fighting on the Western front. 
There was also to be a military representative from each 
of those powers. A clause provided a way for extending 
the scope of the council to other fronts. 

8. Western Front. (Maps 57 and 73.) a. British 
plans, November, 1917. (1) Responding to General 
Cadorna’s appeal for help, Marshal Haig decided to launch 
an offensive of sufficient force and effect to hold German 
troops on the Western front. 

(2) His general plan was for the Third Army (Gen¬ 
eral Byng) to penetrate the German line toward Cambrai, 
in a surprise maneuver, and to exploit the penetration by 
cutting the German line of communications which was only 
eight miles away. 

(3) Estimating that German reinforcements could not 
come up in less than forty-eight hours, he prescribed 
that the infantry, tanks, and artillery should penetrate all 
the enemy lines the first day. As soon as the enemy third 
line, which was his last line, should be penetrated, the 
cavalry corps was to pass through and cut the enemy lines 
of railroad communication near Cambrai. 

(4) A special reserve of three infantry divisions at 
Bapaume was provided to fold back to the north the inner 
flank of the dislocated German right wing. 

(5) (a) To secure surprise, the orders were furnished 
only in greatest confidence to the minimum number who 
really should understand the maneuver. Outside of the su¬ 
perior officers in the British Army, only the French High 
Command knew of the operation. 

(b) There was to be no change before H hour in dis¬ 
positions, reconnaissance, or fire on the front line. Increase 
of circulation due to movements of new troops and trans¬ 
portation was confined to the hours of darkness. There was 
to be no artillery preparations whatsoever. Even registra¬ 
tion by new batteries coming to the operation was forbid- 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 233 

den. All the troops were specially trained for the operation 
and reheased their parts on other, but similar terrain. 

(c) The night before the operation, the French sent Gen¬ 
eral Degoutte’s detachment of two infantry divisions and 
two cavalry divisions, secretly, by motor trucks and by 
train to Peronne, to report to General Byng. General De- 
goutte himself knew nothing of the operation on the mor¬ 
row. 

b. Battle of Cambrai. (1) November 20, at 6:20 AM, 
General Byng launched the attack with five divisions in the 
front line and two in reserve, on a front of six miles between 
the legs of the triangle, Peronne—Cambrai and Bapaume— 
Cambrai. Three hundred and sixty tanks led tthe way. 
At the instant when they crossed the line of departure, 300 
pieces of heavy artillery and 7,000 pieces of light artillery 
began firing counter battery and a rolling barrage. Also, 
at H hour, demonstrations with gas, smoke and artillery 
took place on practically all the rest of the British front. 

(2) The attack was a complete strategical and tactical 
surprise, and under a heavy smoke barrage, promptly 
rolled over the first two German positions. By night, the 
infantry had crossed the Escaut River at Masnieres and 
occupied the German third and last position, but the tanks 
and cavalry, for lack of bridges, could not cross. During 
the day, at Flesquieres, the advance was retarded by one 
German officer who, alone, as the last survivor of his bat¬ 
tery, with a single cannon, hit and destroyed ten tanks be¬ 
fore he was killed. 

(3) The next day, the line was built up to the German 
third position, in which lodgments had been made, and the 
cavalry, passing through the breaches, reached the outskirts 
of Cambrai. When General Haig’s forty-eight hours ex¬ 
pired, he was not satisfied with the penetration and did not 
give the orders for exploitation. He did not order the Ba¬ 
paume force to fold back the inner flank of the German north¬ 
ern wing, and he gave no orders at all to General Degoutte’s 
force at Peronne. He knew that heavy German reinforce¬ 
ments were due, and contented himself with limiting his 
future action to the capture of the high ground at Bourlon. 
By the 23d, this had been accomplished. However, he had 


234 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

failed to organize the salient in depth, or even arrange his 
troops in that manner. 

c. German counter attack. (1) As soon as possible 
after the launching of Marshal Haig’s offensive, German 
local counter attacks were delivered and troops from local 
reserves on the Western front, and from the general reserve, 
even divisions designated for the Italian front, were ordered 
to Cambrai. The reinforcements began to arrive at Cambrai 
on November 22. 

(2) The Crown Prince of Bavaria first utilized all 
available troops to stop Marshal Haig. He then planned 
to reduce the British salient by a converging maneuver 
with four divisions in the northern force and seven divisions 
in the southern force. The converging attacks were deliv¬ 
ered by surprise and in mass formation, on the morning 
of November 30. The northern attack was held, but the 
southern made headway and pushed the base of the salient 
in beyond the original line and to Gouseaucourt. General 
Byng delivered a counter attack with one infantry corps, 
one cavalry corps, and sixty tanks and recaptured Gouseau¬ 
court. 

(3) After two days of inaction, the Crown Prince of 
Bavaria renewed the attack by the northern force, and, 
after a five days’ battle pushed the British line back to 
Flesquieres. 

9. Syrian Front. (Maps 56, 57 and 74.) a. Situation 
and plans . (1) (a) General von Falkenhayn, after the 

first battle of Gaza, constructed a deep defensive position 
from Gaza to Beersheba, strengthened by groups of very 
strong earth fortifications, without gaps. The line was 
held by a total force of 180,000 men, organized into nine 
infantry divisions and one cavalry division. 

(b) In rear of and parallel to the defensive position, 
he constructed an excellent motor road from Gaza to Beer¬ 
sheba. The water problem was solved by piping water from 
the wells at Beersheba. 

(2) (a) General Allenby relieved General Murray 
aftei the first Battle of Gaza. Although his infantry, in 
spite of some reinforcements, was not equal to that of von 
Kressenstein, he decided to assume the strategic and tactical 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 235 

offensive and to seek a decision in Palestine. His general 
plan for the maneuver against the Gaza—Beersheba line 
was to deliver a holding attack against Gaza with the left 
of his army, with a naval squadron (under Rear Admiral 
T. Jackson) cooperating, and to envelop the Turkish east 
or left flank by a surprise attack with his light mobile col¬ 
umn. 

(b) The British force totaled seven infantry divisions 
and four mounted divisions. The infantry divisions were 
grouped into two corps, and the cavalry into a mounted 
corps. The whole force, including laborers, totaled 470,000 
men and 160,000 animals. The air service, reinforced to 
three squadrons, secured complete control of the air. 

b. Second Battle of Gaza. (1) On October 27, General 
Allenby began the land bombardment of Gaza. The bom¬ 
bardment lasted four days, on the last day of which the 
fleet joined in with all its guns. 

(2) On the first day, von Kressenstein sent out a re¬ 
connaissance in force to discover General Allenby’s inten¬ 
tions. 

(3) The British enveloping force, consisting of the cav¬ 
alry corps reinforced by two divisions and a brigade of in¬ 
fantry, the Imperial Camel Corps, and a regiment of cav¬ 
alry, assembled after dark on October 30, and, by a night 
march, reached the enemy advanced defenses at Beersheba 
by daybreak. The force holding Beersheba was surprised 
and the place captured that day. 

(4) On November 2, at 3:00 AM, the frontal holding 
attack was delivered against Gaza and continued with great 
violence. 

(5) As soon as Beersheba was captured, General Al¬ 
lenby sent the cavalry north and captured the Jerwal (1540) 
Ridge, November 4 and 5. 

(6) From that ridge and from El Kalasa, a successful 
attack was delivered against the Turkish left. The cavalry 
quickly reorganized and cut the Gaza line of communica¬ 
tions, at Sheria, at daybreak November 7. 

(7) The second holding attack against Gaza was de¬ 
livered at daylight, November 7, and found only rear guards 
that were protecting the evacuation of the place. By the 


236 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

end of November 7, General Allenby had occupied the whole 
line. 

c. Capture of Jerusalem. (1) The greater part of the 
Turkish army retired north toward Jaffa, while a smaller 
part retired toward Hebron. General von Falkenhayn sent 
reinforcements to Hebron, and von Kressenstein occupied 
the position, Hebron—Ramleh—Ludd, while rear guard 
delaying actions were being fought. 

(2) (a) General Allenby decided to contain the south¬ 
ern Turkish flank and to envelop the northern flank. His 
cavalry captured the junction of the Gaza—Jaffa railway 
lines, November 15. He occupied Jaffa November 16, and 
thus acquired a new base port and a much shorter line of 
communications. 

(b) General Allenby, relieved of the care of supplying 
his main coastal forces, which he based at once on Jaffa, used 
the old line of communications through Rafa for supply of 
the more mobile columns. He decided to capture Jerusalem 
by a double envelopment. The operation succeeded because 
of rapidity of action. The main column enveloping from 
the north, cut the road to Nablus on December 9, and the 
same day, by a synchronized effort, the southern mobile 
column cut the road to Jericho. 

(c) The Turkish army evacuated Jerusalem and es¬ 
caped to the north. December 11, 1917, General Allenby 
received the surrender of Jerusalem. The possession by 
the Allies of the two holy cities, Mecca and Jerusalem, at 
the end of the year, had a depressing effect on Turkish pres¬ 
tige in Asia Minor. 

10. Diplomatic Attempts to end the War. — a. Von 
Scheidman, a socialistic agent of the German Chancellor, 
von Bethmann-Hollweg, invited the socialists of England 
and France to a conference at Stockholm in June, 1917, to 
discuss peace. The Allied governments refused passports 
to the socialistic delegates and nothing was accomplished. 

b. On July 19, the German Reichstag adopted a reso¬ 
lution in favor of “peace of conciliation without annexation 
or indemnities. Von Hindenburg opposed this proposition 
and claimed that peace should be based on territory con- 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 237 

quered during the war. The chancellor was superseded by 
Dr. Michaelis, who supported von Hindenburg’s program. 

c. The Pope, on August 1, proposed a peace conditioned 
on a return to the status prevailing before the war. The 
Allies refused. 

d. Mr. Wilson, in December, proposed fourteen points 
as a basis for peace. Germany declined the proposal and 
claimed a “German-made Peace.” 

11. Principles of War. (Maps 57, 66, 67 and 72.) a. 
Principle of the objective. (1) The object of German sub¬ 
marine warfare, launched February 1, 1917, was to destroy 
British resources and thus force Great Britain to a separate 
peace. The first evidence of the attainment of that object 
undoubtedly would have been the lowering of British battle 
efficiency on the Western front. The defeat of Great Britain 
then could and probably would have been brought about by 
the decisive defeat of the British armies in France. There 
is little doubt that following the defeat of the British, Ger¬ 
many could have defeated the French. So the objective of 
the German submarine navy in destroying British resources 
was the British army in France. 

(2) (a) Early in 1917, submarine warfare consti¬ 
tuted the greatest menace to Great Britain, and its defeat 
became her first and main object. The methods of com¬ 
batting submarine warfare on the sea called for an exhibi¬ 
tion of the highest intelligence and skill in their application. 

(b) The bases from which most of the submarines 
issued were Zeebrugge and Ostend. The capture, destruc¬ 
tion, or obstruction of those bases was a part of the British 
objective and the British armies in France were a part of 
the weapon to be used to attain that objective. 

(c) Thus it appears that while the German submarine 
navy was used to defeat the British army in France by 
destroying its resources, the British army in France tried 
to defeat the German submarine by destroying its bases. 
The attainment of that objective was attempted in the 
Second Battle of Flanders, when the British tried to capture 
Ostend and Zeebrugge. 

(3) (a) In 1917, the result of the German policy of 
destroying Russian resources and preventing Russia from 


238 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

resupplying from abroad became apparent in the lack of 
ability of Russia to make war, because of insufficient means 
and because of lack of discipline as a result thereof. In a 
long war, in which one of the combatants conducts success¬ 
ful operations against the enemy resources, results similar 
to the Russian debacle may be expected. 

(b) It is notworthy that, after the capture of Riga, 
Germany secured a separate peace from Russia by merely 
making the Russians believe that the Russian capital was 
the German objective. It was not necessary for Germany 
to conduct an offensive operation toward Petrograd, be¬ 
cause, by merely threatening Petrograd, she attained the 
ultimate or absolute objective of causing Russian public 
opinion to demand peace. 

(4) The outstanding comment on the Central Powers' 
land operations on the Western front is that their objec¬ 
tive on that front, in 1917, was the defeat of Italy so that in 
1918 the Allies in France would have been forced to de¬ 
fend both north and south of Switzerland. 

b. Principle of security. When General Cadorna 
did not provide a general reserve for use on the Italian front 
against a possible surprise hostile operation, he violated 
the principle of security. In consequence when he was 
surprised on October 24, he was defeated. 

c. Principle of the offensive. (1) (a) At the be¬ 

ginning of 1917, Marshal von Hindenburg assumed an 
attitude of “in readiness" pending an expected victory by 
submarine warfare. During the summer, it became appar¬ 
ent that although the submarine was an effective weapon, 
the Allies had devised means sufficiently effective to avoid 
defeat. Marshal von Hindenburg then placed his reliance 
in compliance with the principle of the offensive for the 
further conduct of land warfare. 

(b) As most of the German and Austrian troops were 
immobilized on the long frontage held by the method of 
position warfare, Marshal von Hindenburg was guided in 
that offensive warfare by compliance with the principle of 
economy of force. Under that principle, he took the max¬ 
imum advantage of obstacles and fire power in order to 


ALL FRONTS TO END OF 1917 239 

defend with the least possible number of troops everywhere 
except at the point of attack. 

(c) By compliance with the principle of economy of 
force, he succeeded in assembing a greatly superior force 
at the point of attack, and complied with the principle of 
mass, which was composed not only of men but also of 
superior weapons, and fire power. 

(d) He complied also with the principle of surprise 
in secretly assembling that mass either without the enemy’s 
knowledge or before the enemy could prepare to meet it. 

(e) By launching that mass in an unexpected terrific 
blow, which advanced at a maximum rate of speed along 
the decisive direction, he illustrated the principle of move¬ 
ment. 

(2) Marshal von Hindenburg having gained the mili¬ 
tary energy for an offensive by complying with the prin¬ 
ciple of economy of force , then in conformity with the prin¬ 
ciple of mass, surprise , and movement conducted three 
successful offensive operations in 1917, but only one at a 
time as is also required under the principle of simplicity. 
In this manner complying with the principle of the offen¬ 
sive, he won the great victories of July 19, against the 
Russians in Galicia; September 1, against the Russians at 
Riga; and October 24, against the Italians at Caporetto. 

d. Principle of cooperation. (1) When the Allied 
Powers organized the Supreme War Council at Rapollo, 
Italy, November 7, 1917, to coordinate Allied plans and 
effort, they illustrated the principle of cooperation. 

When Marshal Haig, in response to General Cadorna’s 
appeal for help, organized and launched November 20, a 
major offensive operation on the Cambrai front, that drew 
to his front hostile troops that had been designated for the 
Italian front, he illustrated the principle of cooperation. 


CHAPTER XIII 


Western Front to Include German 
Offensive of March 21, igi 8 


Page 

1. Situation at the Beginning of 1918.241 

а. Theaters of operations...241 

б. German defense against Bolshevism.241 

c. Unity of command versus cooperation.242 

d. Submarine warfare. 242 

2. Progress in the Organization of the American Expeditionary 

Force....•.243 

a. Inherent difficulties...243 

b. Opposition of the Allies to General Pershing’s plan.243 

(1) British.243 

(2) French. 244 

c. General Pershing adheres to plan for distinctively American force..246 

(1) The decision.246 

(2) Headquarters moves to Chaumont......... 246 

(3) Reports on necessity of American decisive action.....246 

(4) The I Corps organized.247 

(5) The II Corps organized.247 

3. Plans of Campaign for 1918.248 

a. General plans.248 

(1) The Allies..™.248 

(2) The Central Powers.248 

b. Plans, Western front.248 v 

(1) The strength and dispositions of the Allies.248 

(a) The French.248 

(b) The British.249 

(c) The Belgians.249 

(d) The Americans ....249 

(2) The strength and dispositions of the Central Powers...249 

(a) Duke of Wurtemburg’s Group ......249 

(b) Von Gallwitz’s Group.250 

(c) German Crown Prince’s Group.250 

(d) Bavarian Crown Prince’s Group.250 

(3) Von Hindenburg’s penetration doctrine. 250 

(a) Surprsie.250 

(b) Short artillery preparation.250 

(c) Rehearsals.250 

(d) Advance by infiltration.250 

(e) Constant artillery support..251 

(f) Pressure maintained by passage of lines.251 

(g) Exploitation... 251 

(4) Von Hindenburg’s estimate and plan.251 

(a) The estimate.251 

(b) The plan.252 


240 












































GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 241 

4. The German Offensive of March 21st . 252 

a. March 21.252 

b. March 24... 

c. March 25.””"”"””"”"”””'””"”".””""253 

d. March 26. 

e. Unity of Allied and American command centered in General Foch253 

f. March 27.253 

(1) The capture of Montdidier. 253 

(2) Counter-measures by General Foch.254 

(3) American participation.254 

g. March 31.254 

(1) The Allies’ line reorganized.254 

(2) The German attack is stopped.255 

5. The Principles of War.255 

a. Principle of security.255 

b. Principle of the offensive.257 

c. Principle of simplicity.258 


1. Situation at the Beginning of 1918. (Map 75.) 
a. Theaters of operations. (1) By January 1, 1918, the 
Central Powers had decisively defeated Russia and Rou- 
mania and concluded separate peace treaties with them. 
That reduced the number of fronts upon which actual hos¬ 
tilities were being waged to five, i.e.: 

The Western front 
The Italian front 
The Balkan front 
The Syrian front 
The Mesopotamian front 

(2) After Italy's defeat at Caporetto, and due to rail¬ 
road communication, the Western and Italian fronts had 
many interests in common: for instance, the elimination of 
Italy from the war would have created a French front south 
of Switzerland, subject to attack by the Central Powers. For 
these reasons, and on account of the geographical relations 
of the two fronts, the Italian front is sometimes considered 
as a part of the Western front. 

b. German defense against Bolshevism. The defeat of 
Russia and Roumania released many Central Powers' troops 
from that front for use on other fronts in 1918. The Ger¬ 
man General Staff, however, was so afraid of the psycho¬ 
logical weapon of Bolshevism, with which they had palsied 
the Russian martial spirit, that they did not dare to uncover 
the Russian front, and accordingly, maintained a reduced 



















242 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

force on that front to prevent the spread of Bolshevism 
from Russia to the people of the Central Powers. 

c. Unity of command versus cooperation. (1) In the 
application of the principle of simplicity to command, the 
Central Powers began operations in 1918 with unity of com¬ 
mand still centered in the Emperor of Germany as the All 
Supreme Commander. He continued the delegation of au¬ 
thority to make all strategical and tactical decisions to his 
Chief of Staff Marshal von Hindenburg who was authorized 
to issue such decisions “By order of his Majesty.” 

(2) In the application of the principle of cooperation , 
the Allies began operations in 1918 with the Supreme War 
Council in Versailles as a coordinating agency. 

d. Submarine warfare. (Maps 1 and 75.) (1) The 

unrestricted submarine warfare was waged ruthlessly in 
1917 as announced in the German ultimatum of January 
31, 1917. The Allies and the United States, however, met 
the submarine warfare by increased shipbuilding and the 
evolution of a defense against the submarine that included 
visual detection of a submarine by airship, aural detection 
by hydrophone, limitation of radius of activity by mine field 
and net, avoidance of torpedo hits by use of the convoy zig¬ 
zag system, capture of the submarine by nets, and destruc¬ 
tion of the submarine by the use of depth charges. These 
methods of defense made the operation of submarines so 
dangerous that crews for submarines could be obtained only 
by forced detail. The crews of submarines at Kiel were 
in such terror of the operations of the Allies against sub¬ 
marines, that on January 17, 1918, they mutinied and killed 
thirty-eight of their officers. The mutiny was promptly 
suppressed by force. 

(2) The German plan to use submarine warfare to 
starve England into a separate peace, and thus defeat the 
Allies, having failed, the Central Powers were forced to 
seek the desired decision by land warfare. 

(3) However, unrestricted submarine warfare was not 
discontinued. Although not decisive, it was exceedingly 
irritating and effective. To secure temporary relief, the 
British navy executed successful blocking expeditions 
against the submarine bases Zeebrugge April 23, and Ostend 


GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 243 

May 10, 1913, by sinking ships athwart their harbor chan¬ 
nels. 

2. Progress in the Organization of the American 
Expeditionary Force. (Maps 1, 75 and 76.) a. Inherent 
difficulties. General Pershing’s undertaking to organize an 
integral American force in France, with a submarine in¬ 
fested 3000-mile wide Atlantic between his base in America 
and his base ports in France, and a more than 300-mile line 
of communications from his base ports to the American 
front, was not at best an easy task. 

b. Opposition of the Allies to General Pershing's plan. 
General Pershing’s difficulties were not confined to limited 
receipts of men and material from America; on the con¬ 
trary, the Allies actively opposed his effort to build up a 
distinctly American force, and sought to secure the Ameri¬ 
cans to increase their respective forces. 

(1) British, (a) The original British Commission to 
Washington began its effort to secure the Americans for 
the British forces when General Bridges of the British Mis¬ 
sion, on May 5, 1917, wrote to the American Chief of Staff 
requesting that 500,000 untrained men be sent at once to 
England for training there; these men to be drafted later 
into the British armies in France for use in the 1917 cam¬ 
paign. He stated that this request represented the view of 
Marshal Haig, the British Commander in Chief in France, 
and of General Robertson, Chief of the British Imperial 
General Staff. 

(b) On December 2, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George begged 
Colonel House to consider favorably a proposition to replace 
one company in British battalions by one American com¬ 
pany, or if not that, then to replace one battalion in each 
British brigade by one American battalion. 

(c) (i) A very frank discussion of the British pro¬ 
posals took place at a conference at the Trianon Palace, 
Versailles, on January 29, 1918, at which were present the 
Premier, Mr. Lloyd George; the Imperial Chief of Staff, 
General Robertson; the British Commander in Chief in 
France, Marshal Haig; the British member of the Supreme 
War Council, General Wilson; General Pershing; and the 


244 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 
American member of the Supreme War Council, General 
Bliss. 

(ii) Mr. Lloyd George urged that, in the then existing 
situation, the placing of American soldiers in British units 
was a necessity. 

(iii) General Pershing expressed the opinion that the 
submergence of Americans in the British forces would 
antagonize American national sentiment; would create a 
general opposition against the direction of the war, with 
bitter criticism of the President; would raise the question 
of the competence of American officers, and also the ques¬ 
tion of whether we were in the war to fight for Great 
Britain. He reminded the conferees that troops of one 
nationality do not amalgamate with those of another, and 
cited the fact that, at the beginning of the war, the British 
had not amalgamated with the French, and that, at no time 
during the war, had they amalgamated the Canadian forces 
with the British forces. 

(d) On the initiative of General Pershing, the British 
retired from their attitude of absorbing American replace¬ 
ments, and the so-called “six-division plan” was agreed to, 
under which, with later modifications, the British, without 
interfering with General Pershing’s priority project, under¬ 
took to furnish their own transportation for the troops of 
six American divisions. Under the training part of that 
plan, American high commanders, staff, infantry, and 
auxiliary troops were to be given experience with British 
divisions, beginning with battalions and progressing to 
regiments. The artillery was to be trained with French 
materiel under American direction. It was agreed that, 
when the units were sufficiently trained, they were to be 
assembled as divisions under their own officers. The period 
of training was estimated to be about ten weeks. 

(2) French, (a) The French also, beginning with 
the original mission to the United States, were insistent 
that America should be a reservoir for the recruitment of 
the French armies. 

(b) General Petain, in December, 1917, called General 
Pershing’s attention to the fact that Russia’s disloyalty and 
Italy’s defeat at the Piave had changed the situation, and 


GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 245 

urged General Pershing to accept the plan of incorporating 
one American regiment in each French division. General 
Pershing, in reply, stated that the difference in language, 
in military methods, and in national characteristics would 
seriously hinder complete cooperation in battle. He also 
stated that: 

“The American people would not approve of giving up the 
integrity of our organization and scattering it among French and 
British units. Such a plan would prevent the final building up of 
a cohesive, aggressive, self-reliant American force which must 
be depended upon to deliver the final blow necessary to end the 
war.” 

(c) The French Ambassador then called on the Secre¬ 
tary of War and read to him a dispatch from M. Clemenceau 
to the effect that General Pershing, after conference with 
General Petain, had reported himself and General Petain 
in substantial agreement on the question of attaching 
American units to French divisions before committing a part 
of the line to an American division. The Secretary of War 
cabled a copy to General Pershing. General Pershing, on 
January 5, 1918, wrote to M. Clemenceau, who was President 
of the War Council, quoting the War Department cable, and 
stating: 

“May I not suggest to you, my dear Mr. President, the in¬ 
expediency of communicating such matters to Washington by 
cable? These questions must all be settled here eventually on their 
merits, through friendly conference between General Petain and 
myself, and cables of this sort are likely, I fear, to convey the 
impression in Washington of serious disagreement between us 
when such is not the case.” 

(d) (i) When both the French and British failed to 
secure General Pershing’s approval to the amalgamation of 
American units with their respective forces, their govern¬ 
ments took an appeal direct to Washington over General 
Pershing’s head, and on December 25, 1917, the War De¬ 
partment cabled General Pershing that: 

“Both English and French are pressing upon the President 
their desire to have your forces amalgamated with theirs by 
regiments and companies and both express belief in imnending 
heavy drive by Germans somewhere along the lines of the Western 
front. We do not desire loss of identity of our forces, but regard 
that as secondary to the meeting of any critical situation by the 
most helpful use possible of the troops of your command. The 
difficulty of course is to determine where the drive or the drives 
of the enemy will take place; and in advance of some knowledge 


24G MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

of that question, any redistribution of your forces would be diffi¬ 
cult. The President, however, desires you to have full authority 
to use the forces at your command as you deem wise in consulta¬ 
tion with the French and British Commanders-in-Chief. * * * 
The President’s sole purpose being to acquaint you with the 
representations made here and to authorize you to act with entire 
freedom in making the best disposition and use of your forces as 
appears possible to accomplish the main purposes in view. 

(ii) General Pershing, in reply, cabled the War De¬ 
partment : 

“Do not think emergency now exists that would warrant 
our putting companies or battalions into British or French divi¬ 
sions, and would not do so except in grave crisis.” 

c. General Pershing adheres to plan for distinctively 
American force. (1) The decision. General Pershing 
understood that Germany was training her forces for war 
of maneuver. He knew that the Allies were still training 
their forces in trench warfare, and that their reserves and 
morale were so low that only defensive warfare could be 
expected from them. He estimated that the American 
forces constituted the balance of power on the Western front 
and that the best chance for victory lay in the delivery of 
a distinctly American blow against Germany. Accordingly, 
with a mental reserve for the contingency of a great emer¬ 
gency, General Pershing adhered to his plan of building a 
distinctive American force trained for war of maneuver, 
with the object of using it for the delivery of a decisive 
blow against Germany in Lorraine. 

(2) Headquarters moves to Chaumont. As soon as 
General Pershing had completed his original plans, he moved 
his headquarters, in September 1917, from Paris to Chau¬ 
mont, in the center of the training areas on the Lorraine 
front. The offices of his General Headquarters were in¬ 
stalled in the barracks of the 109th French Infantry Regi¬ 
ment, and the officers were billeted in the dwellings of the 
citizens of the town. 

(3) Reports on necessity of American decisive action. 
(a) The War Department’s response to General Persh¬ 
ing’s request of July 6, 1917, for 1,000,000 men by May, 
1918, was a plan to send twenty-one divisions (each of 
20,000 men) and 200,000 replacements and service of sup¬ 
ply troops making a total of 650,000 by June 15, 1918. 


GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 247 

(b) On December 2, 1917, General Pershing cabled to 
the War Department: 

“The Allies are very weak and we must come to their relief 
this year, 1918. The year after may be too late. It is very 
doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 unless we give them a lot 
of support this year. It is therefore strongly recommended that 
a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the 
needs of the War Department * * * be regarded as immediate.” 

* * He * j|c * * 

“It is of the utmost importance to the Allied cause that we 
move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to 
have in France by the end of June 1918 is four army corps of 
twenty-four divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear.” 

(c) On December 20, 1917, General Pershing called 
the attention of the War Department to the fact that the 
schedule of arrival of troops in France was not being main¬ 
tained, and stated: 

“It cannot be too emphatically declared that we should be 
prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30.” 

And, calling attention to the fact that, as the number 
of troops in France increased, the necessity for supply also 
increased, he stated further: 

“It is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage 
should be obtained at once.” 

(d) By the end of 1917, General Pershing had received 
in France four divisions, i.e., the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d, 
which, with Service of Supply troops, made a total of 
176,655 men. However, none of the divisions was ready 
to take over any part of the line. So small an American 
contingent, eight months after America's declaration of war, 
was a great disappointment to General Pershing and to the 
Allies, who were almost in despair. However, within the 
United States, morale was very high, the war was popular 
with the people, and all in the Army at home were disap¬ 
pointed because they could not get to France. 

(4) The I Corps organized. On January 15, 1918, 
General Pershing created the American I Corps, Major 
General Hunter Liggett commanding, with Headquarters 
at Neufchateau and with administrative control over the 
1st, 2d, 26th and 42d Divisions. 

(5) The II Corps organized. To supervise the ad¬ 
ministration and training of American divisions with the 


248 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

British forces, under the six-division plan, General Persh¬ 
ing, on February 20, 1918, organized the II Corps, detailed 
a corps staff, with Colonel George S. Simonds, as Chief of 
Staff, and retained command of the corps in himself until 
June 14, 1918, when he assigned Major General Geo. W. 
Read to its command. The corps staff was assembled at 
British General Headquarters at Montreuil. March 9, 
1918, the II Corps Headquarters, consisting of a few staff 
officers, moved to Chateau Bryas, near St. Pol. 

3. Plans of Campaign for 1918. (Map 75.) a. 
General plans. (1) The Allies. The Allies estimated 
that Marshal von Hindenburg would use the troops released 
from the Russian and Roumanian fronts in a major offen¬ 
sive on the Western and Italian fronts. Their plan of cam¬ 
paign, for 1918, was to assume the strategical and tactical 
defensive on the Western and Italian fronts, while await¬ 
ing American troops with which to assume the offensive. 
On the Balkan, Syrian, and Mesopotamian fronts, the offen¬ 
sive or position defensive attitude was to be maintained,, 
according to the estimate of the situation by the local com¬ 
mander, but the Allied troops on those fronts were considered 
as reservoirs of reserves from which replacement troops 
might be taken for the mighty struggle expected on the 
Western front. 

(2) The Central Powers. Marshal von Hindenburg’s 
plan of campaign for 1918 was, before the United States 
could make its effort felt, to destroy the Allied armies in 
France by a major offensive; to pin the Allies to the Italian 
front by a later Austrian major offensive, and to assume 
the strategic and tactical defensive on the other fronts. 

b. Plans , Western front. (Maps 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 
and 81.) (1) The strength and dispositions of the Allies.. 

On March 20, 1918, the Allied order of battle, from south 
to the north, was as follows: 

(a) The French (General Petain, with General Head¬ 
quarters at Compeigne) disposed of 99 divisions, of which 
39 were in reserve, i.e., the Reserve Group of Armies south 
of Compeigne, the Third Army west of Compeigne and the 
XXXVI Army Corps at Dunkirk. 


GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 249 

The divisions on the line were grouped as follows: 

The Eastern Group, from Switzerland to the Aisne: 

The Seventh Army 
The Eighth Army 
The First Army 
The Second Army 

The Northern Group, from the Aisne to the Oise: 

The Fourth Army 
The Fifth Army 
The Sixth Army 

(b) The British Marshal Haig, with General Head¬ 
quarters at Montreuil, disposed of 59 British and 2 Portu¬ 
guese divisions of which 19 were in reserve. 

The divisions on the line were grouped from the French, 
■on the right, to Ypres (inclusive) as follows: 

The Fifth Army 
The Third Army 
The First Army 
The Second Army 

(c) The Belgians (the King, with General Headquar¬ 
ters at Hauthem) disposed of 12 divisions of which 3 were 
in reserve. 

The divisions on the line extended from Ypres (exclu¬ 
sive) to the sea. 

(d) The Americans (General Pershing, with General 
Headquarters at Chaumont) disposed of 4 divisions of 
which 2 were with French troops in the Eastern Group and 
2 were in camps of instruction. 

A total of 172 divisions, of which 61 were in reserve. 

(2) The strength and dispositions of the Central 
Powers. Marshal von Hindenburg moved his General Head¬ 
quarters from Kreuznach to Spa. By taking every avail¬ 
able German from all the fronts, a strategical reserve of 
100,000 men was built up. The armies were regrouped 
along dynastic lines for political effect and to increase the 
effectiveness of maneuver. On March 20, 1918, the German 
order of battle from south to north was as follows: 

(a) Duke of Wurtemburg’s Group , from Switzerland 
to the Moselle: 

Army Detachment B 
Army Detachment A 
The Nineteenth Army 


250 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) Von Gallwitz’s Group, from the Moselle to the 
Aisne: 


Army Detachment C 
The Fifth Army 

(c) German Crown Prince’s Group,. from the Aisne 
to the Sambre: 

The Third Army 
The First Army 
The Seventh Army 
The Eighteenth Army 

(d) Bavarian Croivn Prince’s Group, from the Sambre 
to the sea: 

The Second Army 
The Seventeenth Army 
The Sixth Army 
The Fourth Army 

The total strength of the German forces was 195 in¬ 
fantry divisions, of which 80 were in reserve. 

(3) Von Iiindenburg’s penetration doctrine. Marshal 
von Hindenburg had evolved a new doctrine for penetrating 
a defensive line which he taught to the armies for use in 
the 1918 decisive offensive, i.e.: 

(a) Surprise. The attack must be a strategical sur¬ 
prise secured by preserving the order of battle without 
change until just before the attack, when the attacking 
troops are to come up by night marches and take their 
places under cover. 

(b) Short artillery preparation. The artillery pre¬ 
paration must secure tactical surprise, hence it must be 
very brief. It must also include a great distribution of 
gas in enemy rear areas. 

(c) Rehearsals. The troops for the penetrating attack 
must be carefully trained and, upon similar terrain must 
rehearse the exact maneuver down to the smallest detail. 

(d) Advance by infiltration. The infantry attack 
should be delivered at break of day and be executed by in¬ 
filtration or by groups of successive thin lines, accompanied 
by machine guns, trench mortars, and pieces of light artil¬ 
lery. The advance must be covered by gas, smoke, and 
artillery fire, and, when possible, advantage should be taken 
of fog. 


i 


GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 251 

(e) Constant artillery support. The light artillery 
must follow the infantry closely and be prepared to sup¬ 
port it at all times and at all costs. 

(f) Pressure maintained by passage of lines. No ob¬ 
jectives can be prescribed, but instead, divisions must 
march on lines of direction; and, without loss of time, fresh 
divisions must be ready, by passage of lines, to carry on the 
advance as other divisions fall out. Every means of trans¬ 
portation must be used without stint to expedite the ad¬ 
vance. 

(g) Exploitation. The inner flanks of the dislocated 
enemy wings must be forced back at once, and then the mo¬ 
bile forces for strategical exploitation must pass through 
as rapidly as possible. 

(4) Von Hindenburg 1 s estimate and plan, (a) The 
estimate, (i) Marshal von Hindenburg estimated that the 
defeat of either the British or the French armies would 
encompass the defeat of France and force her to a separate 
peace; that the British armies, not being so well trained, 
could be defeated more easily than the French armies; 
that the terrain and tactical considerations invited action 
on the British front; that, because of divided command, 
penetration would be easier along the British-French boun¬ 
dary line than elsewhere; and, because the British Fifth 
Army held a wider frontage than any other army, that it 
should not be difficult to push it back and away from the 
French boundary line. 

(ii) He estimated that the cutting of the British line 
of communications at Amiens, and at Hazebrouck—Be- 
thune, would be decisive strategically, and accomplish the 
surrender or destruction of the British armies in France, 
as the first would separate them from their French Allies, 
and the second would practically separate them from Eng¬ 
land. 

(iii) He estimated that, by such an operation, he would 
extend his lines to the Somme, which for the remainder of 
the war, would reduce by about twenty divisions the strength 
of the forces necessary to hold the front. 

(iv) He also estimated that the cutting of the Paris— 
Verdun railroad would force the evacuation of Verdun and 


252 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

win the line of communications: Metz—Verdun—Rheinis* 
—Amiens. 

(b) The plan, (i) Marshal von Hindenburg’s plan 
for the operations required compliance with his new doc¬ 
trine for penetrating attacks against fixed lines. 

(ii) It contemplated penetrating the Allied line be¬ 
tween the British and French forces and cutting the British 
line of communications in the vicinity of Amiens by the 
Eighteenth Army (General von Huttier, the victor of Riga), 
the Second Army (General von Marwitz, the victor at the 
Cambrai counter attack) and the Seventeenth Army (Gen¬ 
eral von Below, the victor of Caporetto), on the front:. 
La Fere—Croisilles (the Cambrai salient excluded) and in 
the general direction of Amiens. It contemplated, also, 
diversions on the Lys and from the Aisne; and long dis¬ 
tance artillery fire in connection with aerial bombing on 
Paris: this to induce the French to prepare for the defense 
of Paris instead of going to the help of the British. The 
Crown Princes of Bavaria and of Germany were charged 
with this maneuver. 

(iii) A contingent second phase, following the penetra¬ 
tion, provided for a dislocation of the British line near the 
Channel followed by a double envelopment of the dislocated 
British armies and their destruction. While the opera¬ 
tions against the British were going on, the French were 
to be struck hard enough to prevent them from assisting 
the Allies. The Crown Princes of Bavaria and of Germany 
were also charged with this maneuver. 

(iv) A contingent third phase was the decisive opera¬ 
tions to be carried on against the French. 

4. The German Offensive of March 21st. a. March 
21. (1) The artillery preparation began at 4:30 AM, 

March 21, and, including gas, continued until 9:45 AM, 
when the attack was launched as planned, in a heavy mist, 
by forty divisions on a front of forty miles, against twenty- 
one divisions in the front line of the British Third and 
Fifth Armies. 

(2) That day, General von Below (Seventeenth Army) 
captured the British first position, and General von Huttier 


GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 253 

(Eighteenth Army) threw the British Fifth Army back 
against the Crozat Canal, between St. Simon and Targnier. 

(3) General Petain at once sent reserves, consisting of 
the V Army Corps and three regiments of heavy artillery, 
to assist the British at Noyon. 

b. March 21*. (1) By March 24, the Germans had 

captured the Cambrai salient, the British third positions, 
and had nearly routed the British Fifth Army. The British 
Third Army had kept its organization and slowed down the 
attack. 

(2) General Petain sent the French Third Army from 
his strategical reserve to the British Army area and, on 
Marshal Haig’s request, the French Third Army Com¬ 
mander (General Humbert) took over the direction of the 
defense south of the Somme. 

c. March 25. By March 25, Bapaume, Combles, and 
Nesle had been captured; Montdidier and Amiens were 
threatened, and a penetration of the very thin line between 
the British and French Third Army was imminent. 

d. March 26. On March 28, General Petain sent the 
Reserve Group of Armies (General Fayolle) forward, with 
instru tions to maintain the line between the Oise, connect¬ 
ing with the French Sixth Army and the British Fifth 
Army. The group consisted of the Third Army (six divi¬ 
sions) already on the line, and the First Army (General 
Debeney) (six divisions en route by train from Lorraine to 
extend the left of the Third Army). Pending the arrival 
of the First Army, three cavalry divisions were put in to 
maintain connection between the Third Army and the right 
of the British Fifth Army. 

e. Unity of Allied and American command centered in 
General Foch. That same day, March 28, a conference of 
the Allies at Doullens, acting on General Pershing’s idea of 
unity of command, selected General Foch to coordinate the 
action of the Allied armies on the Western front. 

General Foch immediately sent out the following order: 
“Hold—hold at all costs—every man where he is.” 

/. March 27. (1) The capture of Montdidier. The 
Crown Prince captured Montdidier in the evening of March 
27, and penerated the Allied line on a front of eight miles 


254 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

between the French Third and First Armies, but did not 
push a penetrating force through or take any action to fold 
back the inner flanks of the dislocated wings. 

(2) Counter measures by General Foch. General Foch 
gave emergency orders for the closing of the gap and fol¬ 
lowed these at once by orders for the assembly of a suffi¬ 
cient force in front of the Crown Prince to stop him. The 
XXXVI Corps was brought from Dunkirk to Amiens by 
emergency railroad transportation, and its first elements 
detrained at Amiens that day, March 27. He ordered the 
French Fifth Army (General Micheler) from the Rheims 
sector to be “in readiness” near Beauvais, and the Com¬ 
mander (General Maistre) and Staff of the Tenth Army 
from Italy, to form a mass of maneuver in the vicinity of 
Hornoy in rear of the British front. He reinforced the 
Fifth army with the American 1st Division from Lorraine. 

(3) American participation. (Map 76.) (a) Gen¬ 

eral Pershing considered the events near Amiens to be an 
emergency that should delay the proper organization of the 
American Expeditionary Forces, and so, on March 27, he 
hurried to Bombon and stated to General Foch: 

“I have come to tell you that the American people would 
consider it an honor for our troops to be engaged in the present 
battle. I ask you for this in their name and my own. Infantry, 
artillery, aviation—all that we have is yours. Use it as you wish. 
More will come in numbers equal to requirements.” 

(b) The four available American divisions were dis¬ 
posed as follows: The 1st Division was put into the line 
north of Montdidier. The 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions took 
over quiet sectors and thus relieved three French divisions. 

g. March 31. (1) The Allies' line reorganized. By 

March 31, General Foch had reorganized the line by extend¬ 
ing the sector of the French Northern Group from the Oise 
to the Somme. The reorganized order of battle of the Al¬ 
lied front around the Amiens salient that night from south 
to north was: 

The French Sixth Army (General Duchesne), to the Oise. 

The French Third Army (General Humbert), from the Oise 
to vicinity Montdidier (exclusive). 

The French First Army (General Debeney), from vicinity 
of Montdidier (inclusive) to Luce River (exclusive). 

The British Fifth Army (General Gough), from Luce River 
(inclusive) to Albert (inclusive). 


GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 255 

The British Third Army (General Byng), from Albert (ex¬ 
clusive) to Arras (inclusive). 

Reserves: 

£ rench XXXVI Corps, en route from Dunkirk to Amiens. 

French Fifth Army (General Micheler) en route from 
Rheims to Beauvais. 

General Maistre and Staff en route from French Tenth 
Army in Italy to vicinity of Hornoy north of Beau¬ 
vais to organize a Tenth Army. 

(2) The German attack is stopped. The Crown 
Prince’s attack was stopped on the night of March 31, by 
General Foch’s reorganized line by local counter attack, 
and siege conditions obtained on the line: Noyon—Orvil- 
lers—Moreuil—Albert—Vimy ridge. 

5. The Principles of War. a. The principle of se¬ 
curity. (Maps 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80 and 81.) (1) The 

Allies on the Western front, in the spring of 1918, had as¬ 
sumed the strategical and tactical defensive attitude and 
purposed to maintain that attitude until, by accretion of 
American forces, they would be superior to the German force 
on that front, when, under the principle of mass, they 
hoped to organize and launch a decisive operation under 
the principle of the offensive. 

(2) (a) In the meantime, however, the fundamental 
principle of war which should have controlled the attitude 
and method of operation of the Allies was security. An 
examination of the situation, just preceding the German 
offensive of March 21, shows that the French held the line 
from Switzerland to the Oise River and that the British 
(with the exception of a small sector in Flanders, held by 
the Belgians) held from the Oise to the sea. 

(b) The French base was Paris and the French line 
of communication led back to Paris. 

(c) The British base was England, with base port 
(principal) at Calais and the British line of communica¬ 
tions led back to the British Channel. 

(3) These Allies, since the Nivelle defeat on the Aisne 
in the spring of 1917, had been operating separately and 
coordinating their combined effort under the principle of 
cooperation. The British and the French were not able 
to rise to the plane of unity of command under the principle 
of simplicity, as the British were afraid that a French 
commander-in-chief would sacrifice the British base on the 



256 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Channel to secure the protection of Paris, and the French 
were afraid that a British commander-in-chief would sacri¬ 
fice Paris to protect the British base on the Channel. 

(4) (a) They made a really excellent effort to carry 
on the war under the principle of cooperation by the crea¬ 
tion of the Supreme War Council. The Supreme War Coun¬ 
cil and every one (including the Germans) was fully aware 
that the weakest point on the Allied line was at the junction 
of the French and British forces. The line was known to 
be insecure (and naturally so) at that junction. General 
Foch pointed out to the Supreme War Council that the inse¬ 
curity at that junction could and should be corrected by an 
Allied general reserve in rear of that point of junction. 

(b) The Supreme War Council, however, being limited 
to the idea of cooperation, could not agree on a commander 
for that Allied general reserve, because that commander 
would not be subject to the orders of either the French or 
the British commanders-in-chief in respect to the operation 
of his Allied general reserve. 

(c) As a result of that deadlock in the Supreme War 
Council, it was agreed, under the principle of cooperation, 
that the French and the British Commanders-in-Chief 
should respectively maintain reserves which they should 
use under the principle of cooperation to protect that junc¬ 
tion point. 

(d) The insecurity of the junction point was actually 
proven by the German drive through that point March 21. 

(5) (a) The inadequacy of reliance on operations un¬ 
der cooperation between Allies was fully proven when the 
French, after the German attack of March 21, made the 
defense of the lines of communication to Paris and the de¬ 
fense of Paris their first consideration, while maintenance of 
contact with the British was made only the second con¬ 
sideration. Similarly, the British made the defense of their 
lines of communication to the Channel and the defense of 
the base ports at the Channel their first object while main¬ 
tenance of contact with the French was secondary. 

(b) When confronted with the terrible possibility of 
decisive defeat, the Allies saw the error of considering 
cooperation as the controlling principle, and turned to unity 


GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21, 1918 257 

of command under the principle of simplicity to gain se¬ 
curity. 

(6) Freed from the limitation of the principle of co¬ 
operation, General Foch, in whom was fixed unity of com¬ 
mand under the principle of simplicity, as soon as he had 
the authority, ordered that the first and main mission of 
both the French and the British was to maintain contact 
with each other. That order, which it was impossible to 
give under the principle of cooperation, was easy to give 
with unity of command under the principle of simplicity, 
and complied with the controlling idea of the Allied situa¬ 
tion, i.e., security. 

(7) This is but one case, but it points the way to a 
conclusion; that, when Allies join together defensively in 
war, they should not attempt to operate under the principle 
of cooperation; but, under the principle of simplicity, they 
should select a Commander-in-Chief and confer on him the 
power of unity of command. 

b. The principle of the offensive. (1) Strategically, 
the offensive seeks the direction to a vital part called a 
decisive strategical area. In the effort to progress in that 
direction, it seeks the weakest part of the enemy’s line, that 
is, the line of least resistance. 

(2) And so, having chosen the British army as the 
first great objective of his March 2 operation, Marshal von 
Hindenburg correctly selected the junction of the French 
and British sectors as the weakest part of the line, the line 
of least resistance, and launched his blow along that direc¬ 
tion toward the decisive strategical railroad center— 
Amiens, the possession of which would separate the British 
from the French and render easy the defeat of the British. 

(3) In the preparation and launching of that offensive, 
Marshal von Hindenburg complied with the principle of 
security by securing freedom of action through diversion 
and secrecy. He complied with the principle of mass by 
assembling a force that was greatly superior to his enemy 
in command, in fire power, and in numbers. He complied 
with the principle of surprise by launching an unexpected 
major and almost decisive operation against the Allies on 
March 21. He complied with the principle of movement, 


258 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

in a partial way, by advancing against the enemy with 
mass and speed. The 'principle of movement , however, 
requires that mass (which includes fire of all weapons as 
well as numbers) must be hurled at the decisive moment 
along the decisive direction to secure a decision. That deci¬ 
sive moment was the night of March 27-28. The decisive 
direction was through the eight mile gap north of Mont- 
didier toward Amiens. No force was hurled that night 
along that decisive direction. The next day it was too late, 
as the Allies had brought up troops and were secure. Un¬ 
less an illustration of mass and movement can be given at 
the decisive time and place for which the whole operation 
has been preparatory, the offensive will fail. And so it was. 
Marshal von Hindenburg had the situation, i.e., an eight 
mile gap north of Montdidier on the night of March 27-28, 
that his whole preceding operation was intended to produce; 
but, through lack of information or because of fatigue or 
inability, he took no advantage of it and his offensive failed. 

c. The principle of simplicity. (1) General Pershing 
saw, soon after arrival in France, that the Allied attempt to 
win the war by cooperation would fail. He advocated unity 
of command. His suggestion was not taken. When con¬ 
fronted with defeat, the Allies haltingly turned toward sira- 
plicity, and thus avoided defeat. 

(2) General Pershing, however, gave the best illustra¬ 
tion of compliance with the principle of simplicity when he 
said to General Foch: “Infantry, artillery, aviation. All 
that we have is yours. Use it as you wish.” 


CHAPTER XIV 


IVestern Front—March to 

June, igi8 


1. Situation after the German Offensive of March 21.260 

2. Plans.260 

а. Plans of the Allies.260 

(1) Unity of command.260 

(2) Emergency use of American troops in France.261 

(3) Emergency transportation of American troops to France....262 

б. German plan.263 

3. Operations.263 

a. German offensive toward Amiens, April 4.263 

b. German offensive on the Lys, April 9.263 

c. German offensive toward Amiens, April 25.265 

4. Situation after the Lys and Amiens Offensives.266 

a. Allies implore American assistance.266 

(1) The London Agreement, April 21.266 

(2) Abbeville Conference, May 1-2.266 

(3) Allies attempt to override General Pershing’s authority.267 

(4) American troops in France by May.267 

(a) Creation of III Corps.267 

(b) Other American troops in France...268 

(c) Total American forces in France in May.268 

b. French disregard General Pershing’s authority.268 

c. General Pershing’s superior vision.268 

5. The American 1st Division Captures Cantigny...„.269 

a. Situation that required the battle.269 

b. Plan.270 

c. Operation.270 

d. Results.271 

6. The German Offensive of May 27.271 

a. Situation leading up to the offensive of May 27.272 

b. Order of battle May 27, 1918.272 

c. Von Hindenburg’s plan.274 

d. Operation.275 

(1) General description.275 

(2) America’s part in German repulse.276 

(a) 2d and 3d Divisions to French Sixth Army.276 

(b) 3d Division prevents German crossing of the Marne ..277 


7. The American 2d Division Counter Attacks .279 

a. Situation.279 

b. The American 2d Division captures Belleau Woods and Bou- 

resches. 280 

c. The American 2d Division captures Vaux.280 


259 










































260 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

8. German Estimate of Quality of American Troops. 281 

9. General Pershing Commends the 1st and the 2d Divisions.-.281 

10. General Foch’s Plan for use of American Forces...- .282 

11. The Principles of War.282 

a. Principle of offensive and its relation to other principles...282 

b. Mass.282 

c. Surprise.283 

d. Movement.283 

e. The offensive spirit.284 


1. Situation After the German Offensive of 
March 21. (Maps 75, 77 and 81.) Von Hindenburg had 
expected that the offensive of March 21, would pene¬ 
trate the Allied line and win a decision. The failure of that 
operation kept the Allied cause alive, but brought out 
clearly the fact that the margin between defeat and vic¬ 
tory was very small. The morale of the German forces 
suffered because they had expected a victory that would 
end the war. The morale of the Allied troops also suffered 
through contemplation of the narrow margin by which they 
were saved and the fear of defeat by another German blow. 

2. Plans. The unexpectedness of the result both to 
Germany and to the Allies required a reconsideration of 
plans. 

a. Plans of the Allies . (1) Unity of command . (a) 

The Allied plan had been based on reliance on the principle 
of cooperation. They recognized that cooperation was not 
strong enough to control the then existing situation. 
Hence, they completely changed the whole basis of making 
war on the Western front by turning to unity of command , 
under the principle of simplicity , for the control of that 
situation. 

(b) As the power conferred on General Foch at Doul- 
lens on March 26, to coordinate the operations of the Allied 
armies, was not sufficiently broad to grant authority except 
when those armies were in action, a second conference was 
called at Beauvais on April 3. At this conference, General 
Pershing urged that the Allies should comply with the 
principle of unity of command , stated that they could not 
do so without a Supreme Commander, and proposed that 
Allied Supreme Command be conferred on General Foch. 












WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 261 

After much discussion, General Foch was selected. His 
appointment as of April 3,1918 (approved by the President, 
April 16) was as follows: 


“Beauvais, April 8 , 1918 . 

General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American 
Governments with the coordination of the action of the Allied 
Armies on the Western front; to this end there is conferred on 
him all the powers necessary for its effective realization. To the 
same end, the British, French, and American Governments con¬ 
fide in General Foch the strategic direction of military operations. 

The Commander-in-Chief of the British, French, and Ameri¬ 
can Armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direc¬ 
tion of their armies. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the 
right to appeal to his Government, if in his opinion his Army 
is placed in danger by the instructions received from General 
Foch. 

(Signed) 


G. Clemenceau 
Petain 
F. Foch 
Lloyd George 
D. Haig, F.M. 

Henry Wilson 

Tasker H. Bliss, General and Chief of Staff 
John J. Pershing, General , U.S.A.” 

(2) Emergency use of American troops in France . 
(Map 76.) (a) By March 31, approximately 300,000 

American troops had reached France. These troops included 
the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions (each equal in strength 
to two French divisions) that had been assigned to the I 
Corps (General Liggett) for administrative control. In ad¬ 
dition, one regiment of the 93d Division was with the French 
in the Argonne, the 41st Depot Division was in the Service 
of Supply, and the 3d, 32d, and 5th Divisions were arriving. 

(b) (i) Under the emergency created by the German 
offensive of March 21, and under General Pershing's offer 
of March 27 to General Foch, the American troops in France 
became effective, from the combat point of view, as follows: 

The 1st and 2d Divisions (Generals Bullard and Bun¬ 
dy) were in the line on the south and north face of the St. 
Mihiel salient respectively; 

The 26th and 42d Divisions had just been withdrawn 
after one month of training in trench warfare; 

The 42d Division (General Menoher) at once relieved 
two French divisions in quiet sectors; 


262 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

The 26th Division (General Edwards) relieved the 1st 
Division (General Bullard) which was sent, on April 8, to 
the Fifth French Army (General Micheler) which was in 
reserve near Beauvais, between Paris and Amiens. 

(3) Emergency transportation of American troops to 
Ei 'ance. (a) The German offensive consumed such a large 
part of the Allied reserve that the Allies estimated that 
they could not continue a successful defense unless some 
way could be found immediately to accelerate the arrival 
of American troops and to increase their numbers. 

(b) The military representatives of the Supreme War 
Council prepared their joint note, Number 18, on March 
27, in which they asked that, until further notice, only 
American infantry and machine gun units be sent to France 
for temporary service in Allied army divisions and corps. 
Though the note was in general terms, it referred more 
particularly to American troops due under the British six- 
division plan. 

(c) The President, in approving the request, April 2, 
issued instructions as follows: 

“The purpose of the American Government is to render the 
fullest cooperation and aid, and, therefore, the recommendation 
of the Military Representatives with regard to the preferential 
transportation of American infantry and machine gun units in 
the present emergency is approved. Such units, when trans¬ 
ported, will be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief 
of the American Expeditionary Forces, and will be assigned for 
training and use by him in his discretion. He will use these 
and all other military forces of the United States under his com¬ 
mand in such manner as to render the greatest military assis¬ 
tance, keeping in mind always the determination of this Govern¬ 
ment to have its various military forces collected, as speedily 
as their training and the military situation permits, into an in¬ 
dependent American Army, acting in concert with the Armies 
of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him 
for their temporary training and service will be made with that 
end in view.” 

(d) General Pershing at once made arrangements for 
the training of American units with the French and British 
forces and for the early employment of such infantry units 
as might be assigned to each. 

(e) The Allies, however, under the President’s instruc¬ 
tions, claimed indefinite continuation of the infantry and 
machine gun priority, with complete absorption of those 
Americans to make up their losses, so General Pershing 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 263 

settled ihe matter by cabling the War Department on April 
o, that the infantry and machine gun priority should be 
limited to four divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that 
the necessity of any priority in the future should be de¬ 
termined later. 

b. German plans. (Maps 79, 80, and 81.) (1) Marshal 
von Hindenburg did not accept, as final, the failure of his ini¬ 
tial operation of March 21 to separate the British forces 
from the French forces. 

(2) Estimating that the Allies were badly shaken, he 
believed that a second strong blow toward Amiens might 
succeed. In any event, he estimated that such a second 
blow along the same direction line, toward Amiens, would 
attract practically all the British reserves away from the 
northern part of the line. 

(3) He consoled himself over the failure of the great 
offensive of March 21 with the hope that he might, by hard 
successive blows at sensitive points, batter and shake down 
the Western front, as he had battered and shaken down the 
Russian front. So he decided to strike again toward 
Amiens, and to deliver the northern converging blow that 
had been planned to follow the penetration toward Amiens. 

3. Operations. (Maps 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, and 82.) 
a. German offensive toward Amiens , April U . Marshal 
von Hindenburg secretly assembled a superior force near 
the nose of the Amiens salient, and with it launched a 
surprise attack of great violence, on April 4, with twenty- 
five divisions on a twenty mile front, from Grivesnes to the 
Somme, with the original object of forcing apart the French 
First Army and British Fifth Army. The attack made 
some progress, but was stopped by violent Allied counter 
attacks with the reserves that General Foch had placed in 
rear of that part of the line to protect that exceedingly 
sensitive area. 

b. German offensive on the Lys, April 9. (1) In pur¬ 

suance of the original plan, the Bavarian Crown Prince was 
charged with the duty of penetrating the Allied line between 
the British and Belgian forces with a mass of twenty-seven 
divisions from the Fourth Army (von Arnim) and the 
Sixth Army (von Quast) under the von Hindenburg pene- 


*64 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

trating attack doctrine, with the object of cutting the Bri¬ 
tish line of communications in the vicinity of Hazebrouck. 

(2) (a) On the night of April 7, the Bavarian Crown 
Prince bombarded the British First Army with gas shell. 
At 4:00 AM, April 9, he resumed the bombardment with 
the greatest intensity with both gas and high explosive 
shell. 

(b) At 7:00 AM, in a heavy fog, the German Sixth 
Army attacked La Basse to south of Armentieres, against 
a front held principally by two Portuguese divisions. The 
Portuguese at once abandoned their trenches and retired 
rapidly to the Lys River, which was held by a thin line of 
British troops. 

(c) The next day, April 10, the German Fourth Army 
joined the attack and forced the British back from Mes- 
sines Ridge. 

(d) April 11, the attack was continued in the general 
direction of Hazebrouck and Aire. 

(3) Marshal Haig, now thoroughly alarmed, called on 
General Foch for assistance. General Foch directed Mar¬ 
shal Haig to hold Mount Kemmel and the high ground of 
Flanders in that vicinity at all costs, and sent the following 
reinforcements to him: 

(a) The II Cavalry Corps (General Robillot) started 
at noon April 12 from the vicinity of Neufchatel and pro¬ 
ceeding by forced marches, reached St. Omer by noon April 
15. It covered sixty-five miles in the first twenty-four 
hours, and forty-six in the next twenty-four hours. 

(b) Two divisions coming from Alsace for the Fifth 
Army were sent direct to Marshal Haig. On the 11th of 
April, the Tenth Army was moved from vicinity of Neuf¬ 
chatel to the vicinity of Amiens, and there held in readiness. 

(4) The German attack continued with great violence 
on April 13 and General Foch moved the Tenth Army to 
vicinity of Doullens, and ordered the Belgians to help the 
British left flank. 

(o) (a) On April 17, General Foch created the Nor¬ 
thern Army Detachment, composed of all the French troops 
sent to Marshal Haig, and placed General de Mitry in com- 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 265 

mand of it. He directed General de Mitry to report to 
General Plummer of the British Second Army. 

(b) In addition to troops already on the battlefield, 
General Foch sent the 39th Division by train from Abbe¬ 
ville, and the 34th and 154th Divisions from the Tenth Army 
in the vicinity of Doullens. 

(6) (a) The Bavarian Crown Prince paused from 
April 19 to 24 for resupply and reorganization. He had 
not succeeded in penetrating the Allied line, and decided 
to capture Mount Kemmel, the best observation station in 
Flanders, as a limited objective. 

(b) The next morning, April 25, after a short but 
terrific artillery preparation, including gas, he launched a 
converging attack on Mount Kemmel by nine divisions and 
promptly captured it, thus gaining perfect observation of 
the British Ypres salient. 

(c) He attempted to exploit the advantage of the good 
observation at Mount Kemmel by executing the penetra¬ 
tion, but the superior Allied strength stopped him. Mar¬ 
shal von Hindenburg ordered the action stopped, as he did 
not want it to degenerate into a battle of attrition. 

c. German offensive toward Amiens , April 25. (1) 

Marshal von Hindenburg believed that the Lys offensive had 
attracted most of the British reserves, and, although the 
penetration had not been effected near Amiens, decided to 
go ahead with the attack that should have folded back the 
British right; and thus cut the British line of communica¬ 
tion at Amiens. After three hours of heavy artillery 
preparation, the Bavarian Crown Prince, on April 25, sent 
five divisions forward in a dense fog, preceded by German 
tanks, against the extreme right flank of the British at the 
Somme. 

(2) The German light tanks penetrated the line and 
the German infantry began to pass through rapidly, but 
they were driven back by heavy tanks and a counter attack. 
However, they captured Villers-Bretonneux and brought 
Amiens under artillery fire. Marshal Haig launched a 
counter attack by three infantry brigades that night, which 
at dawn recaptured Villers-Bretonneux. 


266 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

4. Situation After the Lys and Amiens Offen¬ 
sive. a. Allies implore American assistance. After Marshal 
von Hindenburg’s Lys offensive, the British were thoroughly 
alarmed. He had nearly accomplish the destruction of the 
British forces. Their losses had been heavy and they were 
not able to replace them entirely. Accordingly, the British 
began to make extraordinary efforts to increase the shipping 
available for American troops, as they considered that the 
Western front could be saved only by increasing the num¬ 
ber of American troops. 

(1) The London Agreement, (a) On April 21, Gen¬ 
eral Pershing went to London, where it was agreed that 
during May, American troops should be sent to Europe in 
British ships in the following order: infantry, machine 
guns, engineer, signal and headquarters troops to include 
units up to divisions for training with the British army in 
France, but only up to the total of six divisions. Any ex¬ 
cess shipping was to be used to make the American divisions 
complete. The divisional artillery and corps troops were 
to follow immediately. The artillery was to train with 
French materiel and to join its own divisions as soon as 
trained. 

(b) The following concessions by the British were new: 

“(d) That it is contemplated American divisions and corps, 
when trained and organized, shall be utilized under the American 
Commander-in-Chief in an American group. 

“(e) That the American Commander-in-Chief shall allot 
American troops to the French or British for training, or train 
them with American units, at his discretion, with the understand¬ 
ing that troops already transported by British shipping, or in¬ 
cluded in the six divisions mentioned in par. (a), are to be trained 
with the British Army, details as to rations, equipment, and 
transport to be determined by special agreement.” 

(2) The Abbeville Conference May 1-2. (a) When 
Marshal von Hindenburg actually interdicted Amiens with 
artillery fire on April 25, the Allies fully realized the ex¬ 
treme gravity of the situation and the necessity of providing 
at once all possible tonnage for transportation of American 
troops. 

(b) The French interpreted the London Agreement as 
an indefinite assignment of American infantry to British 
units, and at once wanted some American infantry to be 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 26? 

assigned indefinitely to French units. Accordingly, at the 
meeting of the Supreme War Council at Abbeville, May I 
and 2, the entire question of the amalgamation of Ameri¬ 
cans with the French and British was reopened. The 
French started the conference with the statement that the 
first business was the allotment of American troops to the 
Allies. Both French and Italian representatives made ur¬ 
gent appeals for American replacements or units to serve 
with their Armies. After prolonged discussion, the Su¬ 
preme War Council finally acknowledged that the Allies 
could not win the war without the assistance of an inde¬ 
pendent American Army. The Abbeville Agreement was 
as follows: 

“It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, hi 
order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American 
Army should be formed as early as possible under its own com¬ 
mander and under its own flag. In order to meet the present 
emergency, it is agreed that American troops should be brought to 
France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, 
and that, as far as consistent with the necessity of building up 
an American Army, preference be given to infantry and machine 
gun units for training and service with French and British 
armies with the understanding that such infantry and machine 
gun units are to be withdrawn and united with their own artil¬ 
lery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discre¬ 
tion of the American Commander-in-Chief after consultation 
with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France.” 

i , 

(3) Allies attempt to override General Pershing's 
authority. The French and British who were parties to 
the Abbeville Agreement of May 1-2, however, almost at 
once appealed to the President, through their Ambassa¬ 
dors in Washington, to increase the infantry and machine 
gun priority to compensate for the critical steady drain on 
the limited number of available French and British re¬ 
placements. The President decided that General Pershing 
and General Foch should adjust that in conference. 

(4) American troops in France by May. (Map 83.) 
(a) Creation of the III Corps. The 3d, 32d, and 5th Divi¬ 
sions were practically complete and were placed under the 
administrative control of the III Corps which General 
Pershing created May 16, the command of which he re¬ 
tained temporarily, with corps headquarters near Chatillon- 
sur-Seine. 


268 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) Other American troops in France, (i) The Bri¬ 
tish, under the stimulus of the German offensive against 
Amiens and Hazebrouck, had gathered a great number of 
vessels for transportation of American troops to France 
under the agreements described above. Accordingly, at 
the end of May, the 28th and 77th Divisions had arrived, 
and the 4th, 27th, 30th, 33d, 35th, and 82d Divisions were 
arriving in the British area, to be trained by the British, 
under the administrative control of the II Corps, the com¬ 
mand of which General Pershing still retained. 

(ii) On the French portion of the front, besides the 
III Corps, the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions were still 
under the administrative control of the I Corps (General 
Liggett). The 41st Depot Division was in the Service of 
Supply. 

(c) Total American forces in France in May. The 
total American force in France, at the end of May, 1918, was 
about 600,000 men. 

b. French disregard General Pershing's authority. 
The French were slow to recognize General Pershing's 
authority over American troops. For instance, the 26th 
Division (General Edwards) was serving with the French 
Eighth Army on the Nancy front. On May 2, the French 
Eighth Army Commander changed the sector of the 26th 
Division without informing the American Commander-in- 
Chief. General Pershing at once wrote to the Chief of the 
French Military Commission that: 

“Inasmuch as the final decision as to the American divisions 
to be sent to the battle front must be made by these headquarters, 
it is suggested that in the future I be informed as to the pro¬ 
posals of the French Command before any action is taken.” 

c. General Pershing's superior vision. (1) It is ap¬ 
parent from the foregoing that the Allies estimated that 
the war could not be won without a tremendous increase 
in the number of American infantry, including machine 
gun units, and that these troops should serve in the French 
and British forces. 

(2) The attitude of the Allies with respect to the train¬ 
ing and future use of the Americans is well explained in a 
memorandum on instruction of attached American units 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 269 

issued from Headquarters of the French Commander-in- 
Chief on May 1 , 1918, in which General Petain stated: 

“It should be borne in mind that they have an extremely 
highly developed sense of ‘amour propre’ based on their pride 
in belonging to one of the greatest nations in the world. Conse¬ 
quently an attitude of superiority over them should be assidu¬ 
ously avoided, a fact which in no way prevents the absolute 
subordination required by the service, for carrying out the rules 
of hierarchy. * * * In case of necessity, 1 rench officers should 
not hesitate to exercise their authority * * *. Americans dream 
of operating in open country, after having broken through the 
front. This results in too much attention being devoted to this 
form of operations.” 

(3) The difference of conception indicated in the 
French instructions existed and therein lies one of the quali¬ 
ties of General Pershing’s greatness. The Germans were 
teaching their armies to fight in the open, in the expecta¬ 
tion of breaking through the Allied line and winning the 
war in open warfare. The Allies were teaching trench 
warfare of defense. General Pershing, however, saw 
clearly that the only way to win the war was to break 
through the German lines and then to defeat the Germans 
in open warfare. He had the vision and the courage to 
teach that to the American forces. And that was the way 
to victory. 

5. The American 1st Division Captures Cantigny. 
(Maps 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, and 86.) a . Situation that required 
the battle. The situation was so grave after the German 
thrusts at Amiens, Hazebrouck and Bethune, that, although 
more than 100,000 Americans arrived in April, and they were 
arriving in May at the rate of more than 200,000 a month, the 
Germans belittled the possibility of Americans fighting well, 
and the Allies really did not know just how much reliance 
could be placed on American fighting ability. They con¬ 
sidered the situation grave, did not share General Persh¬ 
ing’s belief that a really effective American force could be 
built up in time to prevent defeat, and planned to test 
American combat efficiency, under General Pershing’s doc¬ 
trine, on the battlefield. The French Government selected 
the 1st Division (General Bullard), then on the line of the 
First French Army (General Debeney) in front of the 
apex of the German Amiens salient for that test. 


270 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

b. Plan . (1) The task assigned was to capture and 

hold the fortified town of Cantigny. Cantigny was an im¬ 
portant objective because it constituted a salient west of 
Montdidier, marked the point farthest west reached by the 
German Amiens drive, gave excellent observation, domi¬ 
nated the left bank of the Avre River, and was on the line 
of advance to recapture the southern branch of the Amiens 
—Compiegne railroad. That part of the line was very 
active and the German artillery took a daily toll of forty or 
fifty casualties. The Germans had intrenched, constructed 
strong points, armed the town with machine guns, and had 
reserves and artillery in the woods back of the town. 

(2) The division commander (General Bullard) se¬ 
lected the 28th Infantry (Colonel Hanson Ely) for the task. 
It was to be supported by a battalion of the 18th Infantry 
(Colonel Frank Parker), one company of 1st Engineers, 
by the division artillery (General Summerall), and by 
French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers. The 
front of attack was one and two-tenths miles. The regi¬ 
ment formed with three battalions on the line. The 2d and 
3d Battalions each had three companies on the line and 
one in battalion reserve. The 1st Battalion had two com¬ 
panies on the line, with two companies in regimental re¬ 
serve. One of these companies was to go to the right of 
the line and be on the south flank of Cantigny, while the 
other was to remain in regimental reserve in rear. 

c. Operation. (1) After an hour of artillery prepara¬ 
tion, the infantry, accompanied by tanks and flame 
throwers, attacked at 6:45 AM, May 28, under cover of a 
rolling barrage that advanced one hundred meters every 
two minutes for a period of six minutes, thereafter one hun¬ 
dred meters every four minutes. The advance was also pro¬ 
tected by heavy destruction and interdiction fire on the 
German rear areas. 

(2) To be sure of a record of the American perform¬ 
ance, the French photographed the American advance. 
That picture shows the American line advancing under 
the protection of French tanks with the accuracy of a field 
exercise in America. The objective was captured with 
great skill and the new line intrenched. The French assis- 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 271 

tance was then withdrawn and sent in all haste to partici¬ 
pate in the defense against the German offensive which 
von Hindenburg had launched on May 27 from the Aisne. 

(3) The Germans counter attacked twice on May 28, 
and kept up the attempt to recapture Cantigny all the next 
day, but all the German attacks were repulsed. 

d. Results. (1) General Bullard, in a commendatory 
order describing the work of the division, said: “The moral 
effects to flow from this proof of the reliability in battle 
of the American soldier far outweigh the direct military 
importance of the action itself.” 

(2) General Pershing congratulated General Bullard 
at once and soon the Commanders of the neighboring French 
divisions, corps, and armies, the French Commander-in- 
Chief, and the Premier, M. Clemenceau, appeared and ex¬ 
pressed to General Bullard profound admiration for the 
success of the American troops. 

(3) The demonstration at Cantigny greatly impressed 
the French, and soon the French Commander-in-Chief sent 
the following citation: 

“General Headquarters 
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE EAST 

Staff 

Personnel Bureau 
Decorations 

General Order No. 11.875 “D” 

After approval of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the A. 
E.F., in France, the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the 
French Armies of the East, cites in Army Orders: 

28th Regiment of U.S. Infantry 

‘A regiment inspired by a magnificent offensive spirit under 
command of Colonel H. E. Ely, this regiment rushed forward 
with irresistible dash to attack a strongly fortified village. It 
reached all its objectives and held the conquered ground in spite 
of repeated counter attacks.’ 

General Headquarters , 

The Marshal of France , 
Commander-in-Chief of the French 
Arynies of the East. 
(Signed) Petain.” 

(4) The Allies accepted the fact at once that Ameri¬ 
cans could be depended upon, and they began to talk of soon 
assuming the offensive and enforcing a victorious peace. 

6. The German Offensive of May 27. (Maps 89, 


272 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

90, and 91.) a. Situation leading up to the offensive of 
May 27. The Allies were still on the defensive after stop¬ 
ping von Hindenburg’s Amiens and Lys offensives. They 
considered the situation exceedingly grave and were buoyed 
up only by the hope that Americans could and would fight, 
and would arrive in sufficient numbers before it should be 
too late. The welcome news from Cantigny, that Ameri¬ 
cans were reliable in battle did not come until after Marshal 
von Hindenburg had launched the great offensive of May 
27. The Allies expected the next German offensive would 
be delivered against the British front. The French had 
extended their front from the Oise to Amiens, about sixty 
kilometers, to meet the German offensive of March 21; and, 
during the German offensive on the Lys they had sent 
heavy reinforcements to the British. As a result, the cen¬ 
ter of gravity of French reserves was to the left and north 
of Paris. 

b. Order of battle May 27, 1918. (1) Allied. Gen¬ 

eral Foch was in command with General Headquarters at 
Versailles. Divisions on the line, from south to north, were 
grouped as follows: 

(a) French Eastern Group from Switzerland to Ver¬ 
dun salient: 

The Seventh Army. 

The Eighth Army, including 2 American divisions). 

The Second Army (including 1 Italian division). 

Reserves—12 divisions including 1 American and 1 Italian 
division. 

(b) French Northern Group from Verdun salient (ex¬ 
clusive) to the Oise (exclusive) : 

The Fourth Army. 

The Sixth Army (including 3 British divisions). 

Reserves—7 divisions (including 2 British divisions). 

(c) French Reserve Group, from the Oise (inclusive) 
to the Somme (exclusive) : 

The Third Army. 

The First Army (including 1 American division). 

Reserves—8 divisions (including 1 American division). 

(d) British Group, from the Somme (inclusive) to the 
Ypres salient (including French Northern Detachment that 
had 3 divisions in reserve) : 

Reserves—26 divisions, of which 2 were Portuguese. 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 273 

(e) Belgian force from Ypres salient (exclusive) to 
the sea: 


Reserves—3 divisions. 

(f) General Allied reserves: 

Fifth Army near Beauvais (7 divisions in reserve). 

Tenth Army in British Sector in rear of Arras (4 divisions 
in reserve). 

(2) German. Marshal von Hindenburg in command, 
with General Headquarters at Spa. Divisions on the line, 
from south to north, were grouped as follows: 

(a) Duke of Wurtemburg's Group from Switzerland 
to the Moselle (inclusive) : 

Army Detachment B. 

Army Detachment A. 

The Nineteenth Army. 

Reserve—2 divisions. 

(b) General von Gallwitz's Group, from the Moselle 
(exclusive) to Verdun salient (inclusive) : 

Army Detachment C. 

The Fifth Army. 

(c) Crown Prince of Germany's Group, from Verdun 
salient (exclusive) to the line of the Sambre (extended) : 

The Third Army. 

The First Army. 

The Seventh Army. 

The Eighteenth Army. 

Reserves—13 divisions. 

(d) Crown Prince of Bavaria's Group, from line of 
the Sambre (extended) to the sea: 

The Second Army. 

The Seventeenth Army. 

The Sixth Army. 

The Fourth Army. 

(e) General reserves for Western front, in vicinity of 
Hirson, 48 divisions. 

(3) Relative strength. Relative strength in division 
units may be stated as follows: 


274 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 


Nations 

Total 

In Line 

In Reserve 

France 

105 

67 

38 

British 

61 

37 

24 

Belgium 

12 

9 

3 

United States 

4 

3 

1 

Italian 

2 

1 

1 

Total Allies 

184 

117 

67 

Germans 

207 

124 

'83 

German superiority 

23 

7 

16 


c. Von Hindenburg’s plan. (1) Von Hindenburg's 
plan, to penetrate between the British and the French, had 
failed; and the blow of the northern force that was in¬ 
tended to penetrate between the British and the Belgians, 
also had failed. Von Hindenburg believed that heavy blows 
at the British line, like blows against a wall, would shake 
and shatter it. In that also, he had so far failed. He had 
delivered five powerful blows against the British front, and, 
although he had forced it back, it was still intact. He had 
also failed to cut the British line of communications at 
Amiens and at Hazebrouck, but had succeeded in interdict¬ 
ing those points by artillery fire. 

(2) The original plan called for the destruction of the 
British army before a major offensive should be launched 
against the French army. The British had not been de¬ 
stroyed, but the plans for the offensive against the French 
had been prepared by the Crown Prince. 

(3) It would take some time to prepare plans and as¬ 
semble material for the delivery of another blow against 
the British army. If operations were stopped in order to 
prepare for the next blow in Flanders, von Hindenburg 
believed that he might lose the initiative and give General 
Foch a chance to strike against the very vulnerable German 
salients. 

(4) However, he had advanced far enough to lay the 
great railroad lines of communication behind the British 
lines under his interdicting fire. He estimated that he had 
nearly destroyed the British army, and that he would have 
destroyed it had it not been reinforced by the French. He 
decided to deliver another and, he believed a decisive blow 
against the British in Flanders; and, while that blow was 
being prepared, to retain the initiative by delivery of the 





WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 275 

blow against the French originally planned for delivery 
after destruction of the British army. Although he would 
not have the troops available to deliver as powerful a blow 
as would have been the case had the first two phases de¬ 
stroyed the British army, still he planned the blow to be 
sufficiently powerful to cut the French line of communica¬ 
tions between Paris and Verdun, and intended, in the event 
of promising tactical success, to penetrate the French line, 
and in any event to prevent the French from going to the 
assistance of the British in Flanders, where he then planned 
to strike the decisive and last blow of the war. 

(5) His plan of maneuver against the French was to 
deliver a blow, in the general direction: Soissons—Fismes, 
that would threaten Paris; to cut the Paris—Epernay rail¬ 
road ; and then, under the protection of the interruption in 
the French line of communications, to thrust a powerful 
penetrating blow through the vicinity of Epernay—Cha¬ 
lons, and exploit the penetration against the inner flanks of 
the two dislocated wings of the French forces. 

d. Operation . (1) General description. (a) The 

preparation was carried out strictly according to the Hin- 
denburg doctrine. This was quite easy, as the French be¬ 
lieved the line of the Aisne to be so strong that it would not 
be attacked, hence the line had been weakened there by the 
withdrawal of the Fifth Army to help the British. Forty- 
two German divisions and 4,000 pieces of artillery were 
secretly assembled for the attack. The French did not sus¬ 
pect any attack until the evening of May 26, and had only 
eleven divisions on that front. 

% 

(b) At 4:00 AM, May 27, after a short, violent artil¬ 
lery preparation, the Crown Prince attacked by rapid in¬ 
filtration with nineteen divisions, preceded by tanks, on a 
front of twenty-five miles, from Berry-au-Bac to Anizy. 
By 8:00 AM the French were pushed back across the 
Chemin des Dames. At noon, the attack had crossed the 
Aisne, and by evening the Vesle. 

(c) On May 28, the advance was resumed at dawn, 
continued all day, and reached the line: Chery-Chartreuse 
—Mont Courville. 


276 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(d) During this time, Paris was being bombarded by 
long range artillery and people were already leaving the 
city. General Foch sent reinforcements by train, by truck, 
and by marching to the Northern Group. Six divisions, 
without much coordination, were thrown into the line on 
May 28; and the Fifth Army, called from the General Re¬ 
serve, was sent to the high ground of Rheims, on the east 
face of the salient forming at Chateau-Thierry. 

(e) Soissons was captured by the Germans at dawn 
May 29. By the 30th, the attack reached the Marne at 
Jaulgonne. General Foch called the Tenth Army from Doul- 
lens in the British Sector and put it in between the Sixth and 
the Third Army against the west face of the salient rapidly 
forming at Chateau-Thierry. At the same time, General 
Foch decided to counter attack by a converging operation 
against the German salient; so he ordered the assembly of 
three fresh divisions on the high ground of Rheims to attack 
in the direction of Fismes, and four fresh divisions in the 
vicinity of Attichy to attack in the direction of Soissons. 
By the 1st of June, after a four days’ advance, the attack 
had created a great salient from Rheims (exclusive) — 
along the Marne from Dormans to Chateau-Thierry—along 
east side of Villers-Cotterets Forest—Fontenoy—Pontoise. 
Allied and American reinforcements were then arriving 
rapidly, and the attack was slowed up. 

(f) General Foch had now organized the new front 
from east to west as follows: 

The Fifth Army from Rheims (inclusive) to Dormans (inclu¬ 
sive) . 

The Sixth Army from Dormans (exclusive) to Faverolles 
(inclusive). 

The Tenth Army from Faverolles (exclusive) to Moulin- 
sous-Touvent (exclusive). 

The Third Army from Moulin-sous-Touvent (inclusive) to 
continuation of old line. 

General reserves—six divisions near junction of the Ourcq 
and the Marne. 

(g) By June 3, von Hindenburg’s advance against the 
Paris—Verdun line of communications came to a stop; and, 
although he was not astride that railroad, he held it under 
his interdiction fire. 

(2) America's part in German repulse. (Maps 81, 82, 
83, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, and 95.) (a) 2d and 3d Divisions to 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 277 

French Sixth Army. On May 30, General Pershing placed 
the 2d Division (General Bundy), from the I Corps, and 
the 3d Division (General Dickman), from the III Corps, at 
the disposal of the French commander of the Northern 
Group (General d’Esperey) to assist in resisting the Ger¬ 
man offensive of May 27. The group commander placed 
them at the disposal of the French Sixth Army (General 
Duchesne). 

(b) Third division prevents German crossing of the 
Marne, (i) The Sixth Army commander, General Du¬ 
chesne, in emergency orders, sent the 3d Division (General 
Dickman) to assist the French XXXVIII Corps (General 
Marchand of Fashoda fame) to defend the line of the Marne 
near Chateau-Thierry. 

(ii) The division motorized machine gun battalion was 
sent ahead at top speed, and, amidst the cheers of the French 
soldiers, arrived in time to assist materially in defending 
the crossings of the Marne at Chateau-Thierry, May 31. 
The French were much impressed by the American march¬ 
ing and fighting ability, and General Marchand, in corps 
orders, commended the 7th Machine Gun Battalion. Also, 
General Duchesne, in the Sixth Army order of the day, 
commended the 7th Machine Gun Battalion as follows: 

“Prevented the enemy from crossing the Marne. In the 
course of violent combats, particularly on May 31 and June 1, 
this battalion disputed the northern suburbs of Chateau-Thierry 
foot by foot, inflicted severe losses on the enemy, and covered 
itself with glory by its bravery and ability.” 

(iii) The crossing at Chateau-Thierry being prevented 
by American machine gun fire, the Germans crossed the 
Marne near Jaulgonne, June 1, with the intention of cutting 
the French communications between Paris and Epernay. 
By that time, the 5th Brigade (General Sladen) and 6th 
Brigade (General Crawford) of the 3d American Division, 
after a long forced march, had reached the battlefield; and, 
cooperating with the French, soon secured fire superiority 
over the Germans and assisted materially in forcing them 
to recross the Marne. 

(c) The 2d Division stops German advance toward 
Paris, (i) The French Sixth Army commander (General 
Duchesne), also in emergency orders, sent the American 2d 


278 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

Division (General Bundy) to the French XXI Corps (Gen- 
eral Degoutte), as a reinforcement of the effort to stop the 
German advance along the direct road to Paris. The divi¬ 
sion had been designated to relieve the First Division near 
Montdidier, but, on the evening of May 30, the orders were 
received at Chaumont-en-Vexin to proceed by emergency 
truck transportation to Meaux to help stop the German 
advance from the Aisne. 

(ii) When General Bundy reported to General Degoutte 
on the morning of June 1, he found the situation to be as 
follows: The German advance forces then occupied Chateau- 
Thierry and hill 204 (just west of Chateau-Thierry) and 
controlled the north bank of the Marne and also the direct 
road west through Vaux toward Paris. The XXI Corps, 
besides its artillery, had available to oppose the German 
advance toward Paris only two depleted divisions that had 
been worn out by five days’ continuous battle. General 
Degoutte did not have any infantry reserves. 

The French XXXVIII Corps on the right of the XXI 
Corps held the line with one French division from La 
Nouvette Farm to the Marne. The French VII Corps on the 
left of the XXI Corps held from hill 142 to the left. The 
defense of the interval from the left of the XXXVIII Corps 
to the right of the VII Corps involved the stopping of the 
German advance on the direct road to Paris. 

Opposite that interval, on June 1, the advancing Ger¬ 
man line ran along the line: Chateau-Thierry—Vaux— 
Bouresches—Belleau Woods—Torcy—Bussieres. 

(iii) General Degoutte directed General Bundy to put 
the 2d Division in line as soon as possible, and to hold the 
line: La Nouvette Farm—the southern edge of Bois de la 
Marette—Le Thiolet on the Paris road—Bois de Clerem- 
bauts—Lucy-le-Bocage—hill 142. 

(iv) General Bundy assigned the 3d Brigade (General 
Lewis) to defend the line south of the Paris road, and the 
4th Brigade (General Harbord) to defend the line north of 
the Paris road. By noon, the greater portion of the two 
brigades were in line. That night, the 23d Infantry, rein¬ 
forced by a battalion of marines, Companies C and D, 5th 
Machine Gun Battalion, and Company C, 2d Engineers, all 


I 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 279 

under the command of Colonel Malone, was sent in great 
haste to fill a gap of several kilometers reported between 
Gandelu and Montigny on the front of the French VII Corps 
on the left. 

(v) The appearance of the 2d and 3d American Divi¬ 
sions (equal to four full strength fresh French divisions) on 
the line buoyed up the morale of the French, and the word 
spread to the right and left along the line at once that the 
Americans had entered the line in large force. The line 
held. The German advance was stopped. On the night of 
June 3, the two depleted French divisions were withdrawn 
from the line for reorganization, and the Malone detach¬ 
ment was returned to the line. On June 4, the American 
force, unaided except by French artillery, successfully re¬ 
sisted the German attack. On June 5, the French turned 
over the further defense of the sector astride the Paris road 
to the 2d Division. 

7. The American 2d Division Counter Attacks, a . 
Situation. (1) After the 2d Division (General Bundy) 
had closed the gap in the French line and stopped the Ger¬ 
man advance on the direct road to Paris, the Germans, who 
had not believed in the possibility of any effective American 
military action, smarting under the blows given by the 1st 
Division at Cantigny and the 3d Division at Chateau-Thierry, 
decided that it was necessary to destroy the growing pres¬ 
tige of the Americans in order to dispel German fear and 
also in order to destroy the growing confidence of the Allies 
in the Americans. Also, they wanted to push the Americans 
out of the way so that, in the approaching great offensive, 
they could cut the French railroad line of communications 
near Chateau-Thierry. 

(2) Accordingly, two first-class divisions were sent to 
defeat the 2d Division. The Germans selected a strong 
position in Belleau Woods and in Bouresches village, 
strengthened it, and, preceding offensive action, prepared 
it for defense under a well coordinated plan that called for 
use of all of the existing weapons, and the use of machine 
guns in nests that were both self-supporting and interlaced 
by fire, so that the victors over one machine gun nest would 
be destroyed at once by other supporting machine gun nests. 


280 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

b. The 2d Division captures Belleau Woods and Bour- 
esches. The challenge of the Germans was promptly ac¬ 
cepted, and the 2d Division (General Bundy) was given 
the mission of advancing the line to include Belleau Woods 
and Bouresches village. General Bundy, on June 4, at¬ 
tacked and captured Bouresches village. On the 10th and 
11th, he captured the greater part of Belleau Woods, and, 
on the 14th and 19th, repulsed the German counter attacks. 
On the 21st, he resumed the attack and with the 4th Brigade 
captured the remaining part of Belleau Woods. That ac¬ 
tion was commended by General Duchesnes in the French 
Sixth Army order, as follows: 

“Thrown into the thick of the battle in a sector violently at¬ 
tacked by the enemy, the brigade gave immediate proof of first- 
class fighting qualities. In liaison with French troops, this bri¬ 
gade broke up a powerful German attack at a very important 
point of the position and afterwards carried out a series of 
attacks. Thanks to the bravery, fighting spirit and tenacity of 
the men, who stoically bore fatigue and losses, thanks also to the 
activity of the officers, as also to the personal influence of its 
Commander, General J. Harbord, the efforts of the 4th Brigade 
were entirely successful. Acting in close cooperation, the two 
regiments and machine gun battalion of the brigade advanced 
from 1500 to 2000 yards on a 2 h mile front, after twelve days 
of incessant fighting (from June 2 to 13, 1918), over very diffi¬ 
cult ground, capturing a large quantity of material and 500 
prisoners, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, and carrying two 
very important positions, the village of Bouresches and the forti¬ 
fied Belleau Wood.” 

c. The 2d Division captures Vaux. (1) The mission 
of capturing Belleau Woods and Bouresches had been exe¬ 
cuted by the 4th Brigade. The Germans still held Vaux 
in front of the 3d Brigade. 

(2) General Lewis, commanding the 3d Brigade, was 
charged with the duty of capturing Vaux. 

(3) The plan for the attack provided for destructive, 
interdiction, and harassing artillery fire on areas shown 
by letters on the map. The artillery preparation was to 
precede the attack by several hours. 

(4) The infantry attack was formed with regiments 
abreast, the 9th Infantry on the right and the 23d Infantry 
on the left. Each infantry regiment was to advance in 
column of battalions under a barrage that rolled forward 
one hundred meters in three minutes, for twenty-four 
minutes. The attack was launched about noon, July 1, and,. 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 281 

by evening, had captured the village of Vaux, the Wood of 
La Roche and had repulsed the German counter attack. 

(5) The attack was a brilliant success and captured 
500 prisoners with many machine guns. Although the 
French on the right failed to capture hill 204 which domi¬ 
nated Vaux, the 2d Division held Vaux. 

(6) The French High Command commended the 3d 
Brigade as follows: 

“During the operation north of the Marne between July 1 
and July 2, 1918, this brigade, stimulated by the energy of its 
commander, General Lewis, and brilliantly led by its officers, 
careless of the heavy losses sustained, advanced valiantly and 
carried Vaux in a fierce hand to hand combat, also the Wood of 
La Roche, giving a splendid sample of aggressive spirit, abnega¬ 
tion, and contributing in no small measure to the victory which 
caused the enemy to evacuate French territory and eventually 
constrained him to ask for an Armistice.” 

8. German Estimate of Quality of American 
Troops. The Germans, after the defeat of their two first- 
class divisions by the 2d U.S. Division, recognized their 
mistake in estimating the combat value of the American 
troops, and published a new estimate to the German army 
as follows: 


“The Second American Division must be considered a very 
good one and may even perhaps be reckoned as a storm troop. 
The different attacks on Belleau Woods were carried out with 
bravery and dash. The moral effect of our own gun fire can 
not seriously impede the advance of the American Infantry. 
The Americans’ nerves are not yet worn out. 

The qualities of the men individually may be described as 
remarkable. They are physically well set up, their attitude is 
good, and they range in age from 18 to 28 years. They lack at 
present only training and experience to make formidable ad¬ 
versaries. The men are in fine spirits and are filled with naive 
assurance; the words of a prisoner are characteristic: ‘We kill 
or we get killed .’ ” 

9. General Pershing Commends the 1st and the 
2d Divisions. After these operations, General Pershing 
published the following commendatory order: 


“G.H.Q. 

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

France, July 9 , 1918. 


General Orders! 
No 112 f 


The Commander-in-Chief desires to record in the General 
Orders of the American Expeditionary Forces his appreciation of 
the splendid courage, service and sacrifice of the officers and men 


MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

of the First and Second Divisions of these forces during the 
recent operations in which these divisions participated, and m 
which the enemy was checked by the resolute defense and counter 

offense of the allied armies. . , „ 

These divisions, subjected fully for the first time to all the 
drastic tests of modern warfare, bore themselves always with 
fine valor; their cooperation with their brothers-in-arms of the 
unified command was prompt, and efficient and brought from 
their allied comrades many expressions of sincere appreciation. 
The conduct of these brave men and that of their fallen comrades, 
who made the supreme sacrifice, has established a standard of 
service and prestige which every division of the American Expe¬ 
ditionary Force will strive to emulate and preserve. 

This order will be read to all organizations at the first 
assembly formation after its receipt. 

By command of General Pershing: 


JAMES W. McANDREW, 

Chief of Staff. 

Official : 

ROBERT C. DAVIS, 

Adjutant General.” 

10. General Foch’s Plan for Use of American 
Forces. By June 17, there were more than 1,000,000 
American troops in France. General Pershing, on that day, 
informed General Foch that the United States planned to 
have 3,000,000 men in France by March, 1919, and asked 
General Foch to consider the necessity of uniting the Ameri¬ 
cans into an American Army. General Foch replied that 
the morale and fighting spirit of the Americans was so high 
that their contact with French troops improved the morale 
of the French troops, and finally announced his plan for 
use of Americans as follows: 


“To build up the British Army in manpower, and second, to 
build up the morale of the French Army and in August to as¬ 
semble the American Army.” 

11. The Principles of War. (Maps 79, 80, 81, 82, 
83, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, and 95.) a. Principle of offen¬ 
sive and its relation to other principles. With combatants 
that are fairly well balanced in numbers, weapons, train¬ 
ing, and morale, compliance with the principle of the offen¬ 
sive requires compliance with several other principles. 

b. Mass. Under the principle of economy of force suffi¬ 
cient troops must be gained from other places of contact 
with the enemy, without violating the principle of security , 
to give a superiority under the principle of mass, at the 
time and place of the offensive blow. 


WESTERN FRONT—MARCH TO JUNE, 1918 283 

(1) Marshal von Hindenburg did that for the offen¬ 
sive operations of April 4 toward Amiens, of April 9 on 
the Lys, and of May 27 from the Aisne. 

(2) (a) In the operation of April 25 toward Amiens, 
he believed that, by the use of tanks, he was superior and 
was complying with the 'principle of mass. 

(b) The Allies, however, met his attack with a more 
powerful force of tanks which gave them sufficient su¬ 
periority, under the principle of mass , to defeat the Ger¬ 
man attack. 

c. Surprise. (1) Having attained mass, it is essen¬ 
tial, ordinarily, that the mass shall be hurled at the enemy 
under the principle of surprise. 

(2) (a) Marshal von Hindenburg did that in the offen¬ 
sive operation of April 9 on the Lys, and of May 27 from 
the Aisne. 

(b) In the operation of April 4 toward Amiens, he be¬ 
lieved that he had complied with the principle of surprise, 
but he did not actually effect a surprise. The surprise, on 
that direction line, was effected bjr the operation of March 
21. General Foch had estimated that the junction line be¬ 
tween the Allies (including Amiens) was the most sensitive 
of all the Allied strategical areas, so, by assembling ample 
reserves there, he complied with the principle of security. 
The Allies, without much difficulty, repulsed the German 
attack. 

d. Movement. (1) Having attained mass and sur¬ 
prise, it is essential, under the principle of movement, that 
the forward impetus of the mass should continue at the 
decisive movement and place. The offensive must be organ¬ 
ized on broad enough lines to accomplish this, else it will 
fail. 

(2) The decisive moment came on April 19, in the Lys 
operation. The Bavarian Crown Prince did not have mass 
ready with which he could continue movement, so the opera¬ 
tion failed. 

(3) The decisive moment came on May 31, and on June 
1, in the operation from the Aisne, when, taken by surprise 
at the appearance of the Americans in their front, the 
German Crown Prince did not have mass ready with which 
he could continue movement, so the operation failed. 


284 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

e. The offensive spirit. (1) Compliance with the 
principle of mass, surprise, and movement is not sufficient 
to insure the success of an offensive. 

(2) To be successful, an offensive ordinarily must be 
based on an offensive spirit. If the troops do not have a 
well developed offensive spirit, an offensive has but little 
chance of success. Other conditions being equal, the side 
which has developed the keener edge to its offensive spirit 
will win. 

(3) One of General Pershing’s greatest contributions 
to the victory, and possibly the deciding one, was the in¬ 
culcation of the offensive spirit into the American force. 


\ 


CHAPTER XV 


German Offensive at the Second 
Battle of the Marne 


Page 


1. Situation after the German Offensive of May 27.„.285 

a . General situation on Western front..._.285 

b. Dependence of Allies upon America to secure victory.286 

c . Employment of American troops.286 

2. German Offensive Against Compiegne.287 

a . Plans.287 

(1) German plans.287 

(2) Allied and American plans.287 

b. Operations.288 

3. The Second Battle of the Marne .289 

a . General situation.28$ 

(1) Events leading up to the battle. 289 

(2) Morale situation.290 

(3) Allied and American situation.290 

(4) German situation.290 

b. Plans of maneuver.291 

(1) German plans.291 

(2) Allied and American plans..292 

c . The German offensive of July 15.294 

(1) German preparations.294 

(2) Operations east of Rheims.294 

(3) Operations west of Rheims.297 

4. The Principles of War .302 

a . The principle of security.302 

b. The principle of the offensive.303 


1. Situation After the German Offensive of May 
27. (Maps 75, 78, 81, 82, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, and 99.) a. 
General situation on Western front. (1) As a result of 
the German offensive against the British, the French line 
had been extended from the Oise to the Somme. The Marne 
salient still further lengthened the French line by forty- 
five kilometers. This extension of front reduced the French 
reserves to an extremely low point. The center of gravity 
of the remaining French reserves was north of Paris, near 
Compiegne. 


285 





























286 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(2) The British reserves had practically all been used 
to defend against the German operations toward Amiens 
and on the Lys. 

(3) The American troops had met and defeated the 
Germans at Cantigny and near Chateau-Thierry and the 
morale of the American army was high. In America, all 
army units were praying to get to France and the people 
were determined to win the war without regard to cost. 
The President expressed their sentiments exactly when he 
replied to the challenge of the German 1918 offensive, as 
follows: 

“The United States will use Force—Force to the utmost— 
Force without stint or limit, to make right the law of the 
World.” 

(4) Marshal von Hindenburg’s failure to include Com- 
piegne in either the Ameins or the Marne salient, or Rheims 
in the Marne salient, left the forty divisions in the Marne 
salient dependent for supplies on the single railroad line 
from Laon to Sossons. That line of communication 
was not sufficient. The capture of Rheims would open the 
trunk line to Mezieres and give sufficient facilities, but the 
original German plan called for the next great offensive to¬ 
ward Chalons, and von ITindenburg did not want to attract 
attention to Rheims before the delivery of that attack. 

b. Dependence of Allies upon America to secure vic¬ 
tory. As a result of a conference at Versailles, June 1 and 
2, attended by General Pershing and representatives of the 
Allied Powers, the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, 
France, and Italy cabled the Allied thanks to Mr. Wilson 
for expediting the shipment of American troops, and stated: 
that Germany had 200 divisions on the Western front to the 
Allies’ 162; that the British and French could not maintain 
their then present force; that ultimate victory was impos¬ 
sible unless America should maintain 100 divisions in France 
as soon as possible, and that, in order to avoid Allied de¬ 
feat by exhaustion of reserves, the maximum number of 
infantry and machine gunners should be shipped from 
America in the months of June and July. 

c. Employment of American troops. On June 3, 
General Pershing, after consultation with Marshal Haig, 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 287 

relieved five of the ten American divisions then in the II 
Corps (General Read) and ordered them to duty on the 
French portion of the front, as follows : 

The 77th and 82d were to release the 42d and 26th 
for employment on a more active portion of the front. The 
3oth was to enter the line in the Vosges and the 4th and 
28th were to move to the vicinity of Meaux and Chateau- 
Thierry as reserves. 

2. German Offensive Against Compiegne. a. Plans. 
(1) German plans, (a) The Germans were greatly handi¬ 
capped by the insufficient line of supply for the troops in 
the Marne salient. It was estimated that the capture of 
Compiegne would open the great trunk line from Liege and 
solve the supply problem. Also, it was estimated that an 
operation against Compiegne would be interpreted by the 
Allies as an advance toward Paris and would tend to hold 
Allied reserves west of the Marne salient, where they would 
not be readily available for quick movement to the east of 
Chateau-Thierry, when the decisive offensive should be 
launched toward Chalons to penetrate the French line. 

Accordingly, it was decided to reduce the Compiegne 
salient, thus securing direct supply from Liege for the 
troops in the salient, and securing increased facility for 
transfer of troops between the Amiens and the Marne 
salients. 

(b) The plan of maneuver called for a converging 
operation by the Eighteenth Army (von Huttier) and the 
Seventh Army (von Boehn). Von Huttier’s blow from the 
north was to be prepared in all haste, regardless of allied 
observation; von Boehn’s blow from the east was to be 
launched later, as a surprise. 

(c) Von Huttier’s mission was to capture Compiegne 
and the railroad line from Compiegne to Montdidier. The 
mission of the Seventh Army was to capture the railroad 
line from Soissons to Compiegne. 

(2) Allied and American plans, (a) General Foch 
estimated that the direct route of any German advance 
against Paris would be astride the great trunk railroad: 
Liege—Compiegne. He estimated that the German re¬ 
serves were not yet exhausted. 


288 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) General Pershing pointed out the fact that the 
line of communications for all German troops in the Marne 
salient ran through Soissons, and that Soissons was so close 
to the edge of the salient that it could be captured and 
requested permission to execute that operation with Ameri¬ 
can troops. General Foch agreed with General Pershing 
but was not prepared, then, to approve the latter's request. 

(c) General Foch estimated that the single railroad 
through Soissons was not sufficient for supply of the Ger¬ 
man troops in the Marne salient. He estimated for that 
reason, and because of the exposed situation of Soissons, 
that the Marne salient was not secure. 

(d) He estimated that the German capture of Com- 
piegne would protect Soissons and by opening up the main 
trunk line railroad: Compiegne—Liege, would correct the 
insecure supply situation in the Marne salient. 

(e) Accordingly, he estimated that Compiegne was 
just then his most sensitive strategical area, and, as its 
defense was also essential to the defense of Paris, he de¬ 
cided to remain on the defensive and hold the mass of his 
strategical reserves in the vicinity of Compiegne. 

b. Operations. (1) (a) (i) After an artillery pre¬ 
paration of the greatest intensity which lasted several 
hours, and included a new kind of poisonous gas, von Hut- 
tier attacked at 4:30 AM, June 9, with thirteen divisions 
on a front of twenty miles, from near Montdidier to the 
Oise. So much asphyxiating gas was used in this opera¬ 
tion that it befogged the air like a mist. 

(ii) On the east flank, fourteen assaults failed to cap¬ 
ture Little Switzerland. 

(iii) In the center, the attack progressed easily and 
ran over and completely disorganized the French artillery 
system. 

(iv) On the west flank, after many attacks, the Ger¬ 
mans failed to pass le Frestoy. 

(v) The next day, June 10, von Huttier captured 
Ribecourt and forced the French to fall back to the line: 
Molin-sous-Touvent—rBailly. 

(b) General Fayolle, commanding the Reserve Group, 
ordered General Mangin to counter attack in the direction 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 289 

of Ressons and concentrated five divisions, three by train 
and two by truck, by the night of June 10, in the vicinity 
of Maignelay—St. Just-en-Chaussee. The supplies and 
ammunition having been provided under emergency right of 
way, General Mangin formed a mass of maneuver on the 
night of June 10, and, without any artillery preparation, 
launched the attack of the five divisions on a front of six 
miles, as a surprise, at 11:00 AM, June 11, against the flank 
of von Huttier’s army. The attack was supported by all the 
heavy and light artillery that could be assembled, and ad¬ 
vanced with 160 tanks on the line. This counter attack cap¬ 
tured Mery and Belloy and, by June 13, had stopped von 
Huttier’s advance. 

(2) Von Boehn (Seventh Army) delivered his attack 
as a surprise, with three new divisions on a front of six 
miles, from St. Pierre l’Aigle to the Aisne, in the direction 
of Pierrefonds, at dawn, June 12, and, during that day, 
reached the Retz brook. He was unable to advance beyond 
that point and lost part of his gains on account of hostile 
counter attacks. 

3. The Second Battle of the Marne. (Maps 7, 10, 
11, 13, 15, 30, 45, 79, 80, 81, 82, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 98, 
99, 100, 101, 102, 103 and 104.) a. General situation. (1) 
Events leading up to the battle, (a) The failure of the 
German offensive of March 21 to obtain a decisive victory 
over the British and a consequent inability to defeat the 
French, left the German line occupying two extensive sali¬ 
ents, i.e., the Amiens and the Marne. The line of supply 
for the Marne salient was inadequate and insecure. To 
correct its deficiencies, the unsuccessful operation of June 
9, against Compiegne, was undertaken. The failure of the 
latter undertaking brought about the decision to correct the 
supply situation by the capture of Rheims and to deliver a 
decisive blow against the French between Paris and Ver¬ 
dun, all in one operation. 

(b) So, after four years of war and many victories, 
Germany attempted again the solution of the problem which 
she failed to solve in the First Battle of the Marne. If she 
had won the First Battle of the Marne she would have been 


290 TT ' * RY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

the victor in the war. Similarly, if she had won the Second 
Battle of the Marne she would have won the war. 

(c) (i) The two situations, however, were not quite 
the same. In the First Battle of the Marne, the western 
French flank rested on Paris and the western German flank 
was in the air. In the Se ond Battle of the Marne, the 
western flanks of both forces rested on the sea. 

(ii) In the First Battle of the Marne, the Allies oper¬ 
ated on interior lines. In the Second battle of the Marne, 
the Germans operated on interior lines. 

(iii) In the First Battle of the Marne, no American 
unit was present. In the Second Battle of the Marne, 
America participated as an associate of the Allies. 

(2) Morale situation. In view of the fact that the 
Germans had forced the Allied line back almost to the break¬ 
ing point in the three previous offensives toward Amiens, 
in the two offensives on the Lys, and in the offensive from 
the Aisne, the Allied successful defense against the German 
Compiegne offensive, June 9, lowered the German morale 
and the German soldiers’ confidence in victory and, in 
exactly the reverse ratio, raised the Allied morale. 

(3) Allied and American situation. Under the plan 
to defend until the arrival of American troops would give 
a preponderance of force on the Western front, the chief 
effort of the Allies and the United States was to expedite 
in every way the transportation of American troops to 
France. By July 14, there were more than 1,000,000 Ameri¬ 
can troops in France and they were arriving at the rate of 
10,000 a day. To insure an ample supply of American 
troops to turn the balance of power on the Western front 
against Germany, the President of the United States pre¬ 
scribed a second draft for military service on June 25. 

(4) German situation. The failure to capture the 
railroad to Compiegne in the offensive of June 9 was a hard 
blow to the Germans. There were already forty divisions 
in the Marne salient depending on the single railroad line 
through Soissons for supply. The Germans were so short 
of gasoline that truck transportation was not available in the 
Marne salient, except in an emergency, and, as a result. 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 291 

those forty divisions were largely dependent on animal 
transportation. 

b. Plans of maneuver. (1) German plans, (a) Mar¬ 
shal von Hindenburg estimated that the British had been 
so badly hurt that Marshal Haig would not be able to send 
any help to the French. Also, that he could not adequately 
supply the troops in the Marne salient for any considerable 
period of time by means of the single rail line through Sois- 
sons. He also estimated that the capture of Epernay and 
Chalons would accomplish the capture of Rheims and thus 
solve the supply situation, would force the evacuation of 
Verdun, would penetrate the French line and permit him 
to fold the left flank of the dislocated French right wing 
back on the eastern French fortified line and Switzerland, 
and permit him to fold the right flank of the dislocated 
French left wing back on Paris. 

(b) He decided to launch the offensive against Cha¬ 
lons in a maneuver astride Rheims. The Third Army (von 
Einem) and the First Army (Fritz von Below) was to at¬ 
tack east of Rheims. The Seventh Army (von Boehn) was 
to attack west of Rheims. The inner flanks of the two 
forces were to meet near Epernay, when the whole force 
would advance the attack in the direction of Chalons. The 
whole maneuver was to be under the direction of the Ger¬ 
man Crown Prince. 

(c) In the hope of lulling the French to a fancied sense 
of security, von Hindenburg, contrary to his custom be¬ 
fore the other offensive operations, did not demonstrate 
on other parts of the line, but instead, he maintained sub¬ 
normal activity, and, hoping that the French would be deep 
in the celebration of the French national holiday, July 14, 
fixed the time of attack as about 4:30 AM, July 15. 

(d) The problem presented to the Third and First 
Armies was to break through an elaborately constructed 
and perfectly organized deep zone of defense dug into a 
chalk terrain. The problem of the Seventh Army was to 
accomplish a river crossing in the face of the enemy, and 
then to advance in the direction of Epernay. 

(e) The German order of battle from east to west on 
the Champagne—Marne front was: 


292 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

The Third Army (von Einem), to Rheims salient (exclu- 

sive). . . 

The First Army (Fritz von Below), opposite the Rheims 
salient. 

The Seventh Army (von Boehn), to Braisnes (exclusive). 

As von Boehn would be busy with the operation toward 
Epernay, the Ninth Army Headquarters (von Eben) were 
brought from Roumania to assist the Seventh Army to pro¬ 
tect the western base of the Marne salient. The Ninth 
Army sector extended west to include the Oise. 

With available reserves, Marshal Hindenburg disposed 
of eighty-five divisions on the Champagne—Marne front, 
which gave him a preponderance of fifteen divisions over 
the Allied and American force on that part of the Western 
front. 

(2) Allied and American plans, (a) After repulsing 
the German offensive of June 9 toward Compiegne, General 
Foch estimated that the German reserves had not yet been 
exhausted. He estimated that Marshal von Hindenburg 
would not voluntarily give up the initiative, and that the 
latter, in order to preserve it and in an effort to secure a 
decision, would launch another offensive operation either 
in Champagne against the French or in Flanders against 
the British. 

(b) General Foch estimated that the time had not yet 
arrived to make the attempt to seize the initiative and de¬ 
cided to await defensively the expected German offensive. 
He had a detailed plan prepared for emergency transporta¬ 
tion of large bodies of French troops to the British sector, 
or of large bodies of British troops to the French sector; 
and he accumulated a strategic reserve in the vicinity of 
Compiegne. 

(c) For defense against the next German offensive, 
he directed that the first battle position be held by light 
outposts only and that the enemy be received at the second 
battle position, which he named “The Position of Resis¬ 
tance.” 

(d) He estimated that the next German offensive 
would practically exhaust the German reserves and that 
the proper time to assume the initiative would be after re¬ 
pulsing that German offensive. 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 293 

(e) At the beginning of June, he informed the Allied 
commanders that he would resume the offensive. He 
adopted General Pershing’s idea that the Marne salient was 
not stable, and that it should be attacked from the general 
direction of Compiegne toward Soissons and, on June 7, 
ordered plans prepared for a counter offensive against the 
German Marne salient. The attack was to be directed to¬ 
ward Soissons, with the objective of capturing the single 
railroad that supplied the German forces in that salient. 
The plans were ready on June 16. 

(f) By July 10, General Foch estimated that Marshal 
von Hindenburg would attack in Champagne. He instructed 
General Gouraud, commanding the Fourth Army, to pre¬ 
pare for defense at about three kilometers in rear of his 
first battle position, as indicated in preceding instructions. 
Also, in order to change the center of gravity of French 
troops slightly to the east, he organized a new army, the 
Ninth (General Mitry), south of the Marne near Fere-Cham- 
penoise and held it in readiness to place on the line. 

(g) On July 13, he estimated that Marshal Hinden- 
burg’s attack in Champagne would be launched July 15, and 
that it would be repulsed. He approved the June 7 plan 
for counter attack toward Soissons and fixed July 18 as 
the day of execution. 

(h) General Foch made the following dispositions: 

Between the Oise and the Argonne he had seventy 

divisions, of which fifty-seven were French, seven Ameri¬ 
can, four British, and two Italian. 

He set aside one-third of that force, i.e., twenty-seven 
divisions, for the counter offensive against the western face 
of the German Marne salient. 

He also requested Marshal Haig to prepare operation 
plans for regaining control of the Paris—Ameins railroad. 

(i) The Allied order of battle on the Champagne— 
Marne front, from east to west, was: 

The Fourth Army (General Gouraud), east of Rheims; 

The Fifth Army (General Berthelot), to Chatillon-sur- 
Marne (inclusive); 

The Sixth Army (General Degoutte), to Faverolles (in¬ 
clusive) ; . 

The Tenth Army (General Mangin), to the Oise (inclusive); 

The Ninth Army (General Mitry), being assembled in re¬ 
serve near Fere-Champenoise. 



294 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

c. The German offensive of July 15. (1) German 

preparations. The Germans prepared for the July 15 offen¬ 
sive on a collossal scale. A tremendous amount of supplies, 
an unheard of amount of artillery, and nearly the whole 
available German reserve man power were assembled on 
the Marne front. To preserve secrecy, all movements were 
made at night and an effort was made to leave no mark or 
sign of the preparation that could be observed by an Allied 
eye or registered by an Allied camera. Marshal von Hin- 
denburg and the German Government believed that the 
Chalons offensive of July 15 would break the French line 
and force France to a separate peace. 

(2) Operations east of Rheims. (a) General Gour- 
aud commanded the French Fourth Army in Champagne. 
Champagne is a chalk country, and lends itself easily to 
excavation. The Fourth Army had prepared its defensive 
zone perfectly with three positions: i.e., the first battle posi¬ 
tion, which was not to be held in force, the intermediate 
position, where energetic resistance was to be offered, and 
the second battle position, which was to be held at all costs. 
General Gouraud carried out the instructions of General 
Foch with respect to holding the first battle position lightly, 
and to prepare to receive the German attack on the inter¬ 
mediate and second positions. The 42d Division (General 
Menoher), the 369th, 371st and 372d regiments of infantry, 
serving with French divisions, and a part of the 30th Bri¬ 
gade, coast artillery corps, were American combat units 
serving in the French Fourth Army. 

(b) To prepare the troops for a decisive repulse of the 
expected German attack, General Gouraud gave a fine ex¬ 
ample of the psychological preparation of a command for 
a defensive battle in the issue of the following exhortation: 

“TO THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS OF THE 

FOURTH ARMY 

We may be attacked at any moment. 

You all know that a defensive battle was never engaged in 
under more favorable circumstances. We are awake and on our 
guard. We are powerfully reinforced in Infantry and Artillery. 
You are fighting on a terrain that you have transformed by your 
work and your perseverance into a redoubtable fortress. This 
invincible fortress and all its passages are well guarded. 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 295 

The bombardment will be terrific. You will stand it with¬ 
out weakness. The assault will be ferocious, in a cloud of smoke, 
dust, and gas. 

But your positions and your armament are formidable. In 
your breasts beat the strong hearts of free men. None shall 
look to the rear, none shall yield a step. Each shall have but 

one thought: To kill—to kill a-plenty—until they have had their 
nil. 

Therefore, your General says to you: You will break this 
assault, and it will be a happy day. 

Gouraud.” 

0 

(c) (i) To verify the estimate of the coming attack, 
General Gouraud sent a raiding party into the German lines 
on the evening of July 14. It captured a large number of 
prisoners from the German assaulting troops then awaiting 
H hour. He learned from them that the German artillery 
preparation would begin at midnight and the infantry at¬ 
tack would be launched about 4:30 o'clock, the next morn¬ 
ing, July 15. 

(ii) General Gouraud gave out this information to his 
army at 10:45 PM July 14, and reported the information 
to General Foch. He also ordered the artillery counter 
preparation fire to be laid down on the assembled German 
assaulting units at once and ordered all to their battle posi¬ 
tions. 

(d) (i) At midnight, July 14-15, the Germans opened 
along the whole front east of Rheims with an artillery 
preparation including gas, of previously unheard of inten¬ 
sity. The foreground clear to Chalons, fifteen miles away, 
was illuminated, and even Paris saw the light. 

(ii) The German assault units of the First and Third 
Armies were surprised and seriously injured by the counter 
preparation which General Gouraud’s artilery fired before 
midnight July 14-15. The infantry attack however, was 
launched at dawn from Rheims (exclusive) to Ripont. 

(iii) The troops in the first battle position, with the 
exception of a light outpost, had been withdrawn to the 
intermediate and to the second battle positions. The Ger¬ 
man fire attack had been directed principally at the first 
battle position , and the infantry attack was launched against 
the first battle position . As that was not occupied in great 
force, the casualties were not great and the blow was in 
the air. The French and the American artillery then 


296 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

literally slaughtered the German attack waves as they ap¬ 
proached the first battle 'position , when they were in that 
position, and in their advance to the intermediate position. 
The French and American infantry with their auxiliary 
arms in the intermediate battle position also had a “field 
day” firing at the approaching Germans. The soldiers in 
the American infantry were good rifle shots and picked off 
their men by aim, as at target practice. 

(iv) The obstacles before the intermediate position 
were so effective and the superiority of French and Ameri¬ 
can fire so great that the German troops were stopped in 
front of the intermediate position at about 7:00 AM and 
held there along the whole army front. 

(v) Three battalions of the American 42d Division 
were in the intermediate position , and repulsed a number of 
attacks. 

The 2d Battalion (Major Anderson) of the 165th In¬ 
fantry (Col. McCoy) was engaged for about six hours on 
the 15th in violent battle action and also repulsed several 
attacks on the morning of July 16. 

At about 11:30 AM, July 15, the 83d Brigade (Gen¬ 
eral Lenihan) sent forward a battalion of the 166th Infantry 
(Col. Hough) to reinforce the 170th French Division on the 
intermediate position. Two companies of the 168th Infan¬ 
try (Colonel Bennett) were sent forward to support the 
French 13th Division, and two companies of the 167th In¬ 
fantry (Colonel Screws) engaged in a counter attack. 

The 42d Division Artillery, i.e., the 67th Artillery Bri¬ 
gade (General McKinstry), was engaged throughout the 
whole action. It was composed of the 149th Artillery 
(Colonel Reilly), the 150th Artillery (Colonel Tyndall) and 
the 151st Artillery (Colonel Leach). 

(e) The German losses were so heavy that Marshal von 
Hindenburg decided to abandon the operation east of 
Rheims, and by noon of the 16th, orders to that effect had 
gone to the First and Third German Armies, and siege 
conditions were resumed east of Rheims. 

(f) General Ludendorff says that “A continuation of 
the offensive east of Rheims would have cost us too much.” 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 297 

Von Hindenburg hoped, however, by the success of the 
Seventh Army to accomplish the capture of Rheims, and 
thus retain the initiative. 

(g) (i) General Gouraud, July 16, congratulated the 
Fourth Army on its great victory and said: 

“It is a great day for France. I count on you to do the 
same every time that he dares to attack you, and from my heart 
as a soldier, I thank you.” 

General Gouraud did not then know that the Germans 
had lost so many men that their offensive east of Rheims 
was stopped. 

(ii) The French greatly admire the performance of the 
American 42d Division in that battle. They say: 

“It had the honor of rivaling its French comrades in courage 
and daring. Its men went under fire as if to a football game, in 
shirt sleeves rolled up over sinewy biceps. In one trench where 
they worked with our chausseurs one could count 60 bodies in 
less than 750 feet. Oh! the Germans who have seen them at 
work can’t any longer doubt that they are here, or even as our 
soldiers say, ‘quite a bit here.’ ” 

(3) Operations west of Rheims. (a) As the railroad 
line from Chalons to Rheims was under German artillery 
interdiction fire near Prunay, in the general vicinity of 
Rheims, the rail supply line of communications to Rheims 
was reduced to the small line from Epernay. This small 
railroad crossed the Heights of Rheims. The average 
distance from the German line on the east face of the Marne 
salient to the Epernay—Rheims railroad was about ten 
miles. The French Fifth Army, however, had prepared the 
Heights of Rheims for defense against an attack from the 
west with the same care and perfection of detail that the 
Fourth Army had used in preparing for defense against an 
attack from the north. 

(b) The German blow, however, from the Marne sali¬ 
ent was not directed merely to the cutting of the Epernay 
—Rheims railroad. It was to accomplish the actual cap¬ 
ture of Epernay, and joining with the force that was to 
deliver the converging blow from the north (and discount¬ 
ing the capture of Rheims by that time as an accomplished 
fact), it was to participate in the penetration of the French 
line in the vicinity of Chalons. 


298 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(c) The Marne, flowing from Chalons past Epernay in 
territory held by the French, became the southern boundary 
of the German Marne salient from near Chatillon-sur- 
Marne to Chateau-Thierry. Between these points the river 
is about 75 meters wide and about four meters deep. The 
banks are from one to two meters high. The river is 
flanked on both sides by commanding bluffs about 175 
meters high. The terrain is generally wooded. The Paris 
—Epernay railroad line formed an excellent line of defense 
on the south side. 

The German Seventh Army blow against Epernay was 
to be astride the Marne River. Ten divisions were desig¬ 
nated as a special force for that part of the operation which 
should be conducted south of the Marne. 

(d) As the Marne River ran along only a part of the 
line between the German and Allied lines, the Sixth Army 
(General Degoutte), which was defending the Marne River 
crossings, treated the Marne as an obstacle and defended 
at the river line, with the express approval of General Pe- 
tain, the group commander. General Degoutte humorously 
referred to his defending the river line by saying that he 
“fought with one foot in the water.” 

(e) All bridges had been destroyed. However, forests 
north of the Marne offered good concealment for river cross¬ 
ing preparations and there were many practicable routes 
from the north that led to possible places for the launching 
of boats and the building of bridges. 

(f) (i) The American 3d Division (General Dick- 
man) held the sector extending from opposite Jaulgonne 
(exclusive) to opposite Chateau-Thierry (exclusive). 

(ii) The 5th Brigade (General Sladen) contained the 
4th Infantry (Colonel Dorey) and the 7th Infantry 
(Colonel Anderson). 

(iii) The 6th Brigade (General Crawford) contained 
the 30th Infantry (Colonel Butts) and the 38th Infantry 
(Colonel Me Alexander). 

(iv) The 3d Artillery Brigade (General Cruikshank) 
contained the 10th Field Artillery (Colonel Lloyd), the 18th 
Field Artillery (Colonel Farr) and the 76th Field Artillery 
(Colonel Rivers). 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 299 

(v) The 6th Engineer Regiment was commanded by 
Colonel Hodges. 

(g) The Allied front along the Marne River was or¬ 
ganized into two positions. The first position was to be 
defended by combat divisions (supported). 

The second position was well to the rear and along re¬ 
verse slopes. This was the army position and was to be 
held for general reserves. 

Neither position was completely organized before the 
German attack of July 15. General Dickman, however, had 
succeeded in perfecting the defenses of the American 3d 
Division sector sufficiently so that the division could occupy 
them and conduct a coordinated defense. 

(h) (i) In accordance with the general plan for de¬ 
fense of the line of the river, General Dickman organized 
the first position in his division sector into: an outpost line, 
a main line of resistance, and a reserve line. The outpost 
line consisted of an outpost line of observation and an out¬ 
post line of resistance. The outpost line of observation was 
along the river. It was sparsely held by riflemen in pits 
and by machine gun men in emplacements. Close behind 
that line, along the Paris—Epernay railroad, was the out¬ 
post line of resistance. This was held by a fairly strong 
line capable of developing considerable small arms fire. The 
outpost line was called the railroad line. 

The main line of resistance was along the forward 
slopes of the line of hills south of the Marne where there 
was a broken line of strong points. This was called the 
Aqueduct Line and was to be held in case of attack. 

The reserve line followed the military crest of the second 
line of hills to the south and was known as the Wood Line. 

(ii) The basic idea of the 3d Division defense was to 
actually prevent, by the use of rifle, machine gun, and artil¬ 
lery fire, any German crossing in its front, and, in the event 
of a German crossing, to counter attack and force such 
Germans to recross the river. General Dickman grouped 
his machine guns in the center of the division sector and 
in front of the reserve line. 

(iii) The division artillery and supporting artillery 
was grouped on the reserve line of the first position , on the 


300 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

army line and between the two lines. It was prepared to 
cover the Marne River and its northern bank with a thick 
heavy barrage in the division sector, and to drop an S.O.S. 
barrage in front of the line of resistance south of the river , 
or on a line farther to the south. 

(iv) General Dickman divided the division sector into 
four regimental sub-sectors, which from left to right were 
occupied by the 4th, 7th, 30th and 38th Regiments of In¬ 
fantry. In general, the arrangement of the infantry regi¬ 
ments was in column of battalions. 

(v) After receiving information of the time of the 
German attack, General Degoutte directed all troops to take 
up their final fighting positions before the attack and that 
there should be no maneuvering under fire. He delivered 
a gas shell attack on the enemy position at 8:00 PM, July 
14, and ordered the general counter preparation fire to be 
delivered at 11:30 PM. 

(i) (i) The river crossing maneuver of the German 
Seventh Army (von Boehn) on July 15, was covered by an 
artillery preparation fired by 500 batteries. The Germans’ 
plan called for the crossing of the 10th Division, parts of the 
36th Division, and the 10th Landwehr Division, on the 
front of the American 3d Division, and for driving the 3d 
Division back to the southwest to the line: Blesmes— 
Courboin. Under cover of that preparation and of a fog 
and smoke screen, Germans crossed in boats and on ponton 
bridges, from the east of Gland to the east of Dormans. 
With rifles and hand grenades, the outpost of the 3d Divi¬ 
sion sunk many German boats and nearly prevented the 
Germans crossing in its front. The Germans, however, 
effected a lodgment on the south bank, crossed and cap¬ 
tured the Paris—Epernay railroad, which was their line 
of departure for the attack toward Epernay. The attack 
advanced but was slowed up by the resistance and violent 
counter attacks of French and American troops. 

(ii) General Dickman decided to drive them back into 
the Marne by a counter attack. When he reported his in¬ 
tention, the Commander of the French Corps in which the 
3d Division was serving informed him that he should wait. 
General Dickman replied: 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 301 

“We regret being unable on this occasion to follow the counsel 
of our masters, the French; but the American flag has been 
forced to retire. This is unendurable, and none of our soldiers 
would understand their not being asked to do whatever is neces¬ 
sary to remedy a situation which is humiliating to us and un¬ 
acceptable to our Country’s honor. We are going to counter 
attack.” 

The counter attacks were executed and General Dick- 
man reported that: 

“Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some 
of our first-line positions causing the infantry and machine gun 
companies to suffer, in some cases a 50% loss, no German soldier 
crossed the road: Fossoy—Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, 
and by noon of the following day (July 16) there were no Ger¬ 
mans in the foreground of the Third Division sector except the 
dead.” 

/ 

(iii) Referring to the magnificent work of the 38th 
Infantry (Col. McAlexander) against the 10th and 36th 
German Infantry Divisions, General Pershing in his Final 
Report states that: 

“On this occasion, a single regiment of the 3d Division wrote 
one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It pre¬ 
vented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either 
flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. 
Our men firing in three directions, met the German attacks with 
counter attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two 
German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 pris¬ 
oners.” 

(iv) The French expressed the greatest admiration for 
the efficient battle action and gallantry of the 3d Division 
and were amazed at the accuracy of its rifle fire. 

(j) (i) Although Marshal von Hindenburg accepted 
the defeat of the operation east of Rheims by the night of 
July 15-16, and stopped that operation by noon of the 16th, 
he still hoped to capture Rheims through the operation of 
the Seventh Army. Although, under the changed plan, the 
Seventh Army could not join hands with the First Army at 
Epernay, Marshal von Hindenburg gave the mission to the 
Seventh Army of cutting the railroad communication be¬ 
tween Rheims and Epernay, by the capture of Epernay if 
possible, but in any event, by the interruption of traffic 
on the small railroad from Rheims to Epernay. 

(ii) The Seventh Army made every effort, on July 16 
and 17 to push the ten divisions that were south of the 
Marne to Epernay, but progress was stopped by counter 


302 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

attacks on the night of the 17th. The ten German divisions 
south of the Marne, without artillery support and with 
their bridges over the Marne under constant interdiction 
fire and aerial bombing, could not maintain their position 
and were ordered to recross the river on the night of July 
19-20. 

(iii) Even after acceptance of the failure of the divi¬ 
sions south of the Marne, Marshal von Hindenburg hoped 
that Rheims could be captured by cutting the rail line from 
Rheims to Epernay and continued the effort to the evening 
of July 17. 

(iv) On the night of July 17, he accepted defeat. He 
hoped to retain the initiative and planned to rest the troops 
and, with reinforcement and resupply, to soon resume the 
local attack against the Rheims—Epernay railroad. 

(k) General Ludendorff was ordered north to prepare, 
with the Bavarian Crown Prince, “The Great Peace Battle 
of Flanders,” early in August, and the shipment north of 
heavy artillery and divisions of the second line was at once 
begun. 

4. The Principles of War. a. The principle of se¬ 
curity. (1) (a) The end of the German offensive of May 
27 uncovered the fact that the Marne salient was not stable 
in that its forty German divisions were wholly dependent 
for supply on the one railroad line through Soissons, and 
in that Soissons lay so close to the edge of the salient that 
it was a source of weakness and invited attack. The salient 
could have been made stable from the supply point of view 
only by the capture of Compiegne or Rheims, or both. 

(b) The continued occupation of the salient violated the 
principle of security. The violation became more pro¬ 
nounced after the German failure, June 9, to improve the 
supply situation by capture of Compiegne. 

(c) The launching of the attack to the south of the 
Marne, July 15, by ten divisions that were based on that 
unstable salient accentuated the violation of the principle 
of security. 

(d) The retention of the German forty divisions in that 
salient after the failure to capture Rheims, July 15, con¬ 
tinued the violation of the principle of security. Security 


SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 303 

for freedom of action is an essential to decisive operations, 
unless a commander is willing to commit the fortunes of 
his country to a gambler’s chance. 

(2) (a) In the operation of July 15, Marshal von 
Hindenburg had a double objective, i.e., the capture of 
Rheims (which would have gained security from a supply 
point of view and given freedom of action), and the pene¬ 
tration of the French line. 

(b) If the capture of Rheims had been a first phase , 
to be followed by an exploitation that called for a penetra¬ 
tion of the French line there would have been no violation 
of the principle of economy of force or of the principle 
of simplicity. But the plan proceeded on the assumption 
that Rheims would be captured, and called for direction 
lines of advance from the beginning that contemplated the 
dealing of a mortal blow to France. 

Marshal von Hindenburg and the German government 
expected the July 15 offensive to defeat France decisively. 
As Marshal von Hindenburg did not have security for free¬ 
dom of action looking toward a decisive operation and 
could not gain that freedom of action until Rheims should 
be captured, Ids simultaneous pursuit of the double opera¬ 
tion of capturing Rheims and of penetrating the French 
line violated the principle of simplicity. 

(c) He should have had but one objective, at the most, 
at a time. He very nearly captured the Rheims—Epernay 
railroad line. It is not at all impossible that under the 
principle of economy of force , had he not pursued the 
objective of penetrating the French line, he would have had 
sufficient troops with which to isolate or capture Rheims. 

(3) The principle of security for freedom of action 
on the Marne—Champagne front required Marshal von 
Hindenburg to concentrate his whole available force to cap¬ 
ture Rheims. When he failed to do that, he violated the 
principle of security. 

b. The principle of the offensive. (1) A combatant 
before launching an offensive should comply with the re¬ 
requirements of security. When possible he should also pro¬ 
vide mass. In the launching of the offensive he should at¬ 
tempt surprise. 


304 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(2) In the German offensive of July 15, the offensive 
blow from the Marne salient was not based on security, 
and neither the Marne salient blow nor the Champagne 
blow complied with the principle of surprise, hence the 
offensive failed. 

(3) (a) An essential element to the success of an of¬ 
fensive, where the combatants are nearly balanced, is that 
the troops engaged in the offensive must be inspired and 
exalted by the offensive spirit. 

(b) General Pershing undertook as a part of his great 
mission to teach that offensive spirit to the American 
forces. 

(c) The illustration by the American 3d Division of 
the possession of that offensive spirit explains how it could 
defeat, in the defense of the south bank of the Marne, a 
superior German force. 


CHAPTER XVI 


All Fronts Except the Western 
Front to the End of the War 


Page 


1. Italian Front to June 23, 1918.305 

a. Situation.305 

b. Plans.306 

c. Operations.308 

2. Turkish Theater..308 

а. Surrender of the Turkish Mesopotamian Army.308 

б. Syrian front.310 

(1) Situation.310 

(2) Plans.310 

(3) Decisive defeat of Turkey. 311 

3. Balkan Front.312 

a. Situation.312 

b. Order of battle.*.312 

c. Plans. v .313 

d. Decisive defeat of Bulgaria.314 

e. New situation in the Balkans.316 

/. New Balkan plans... 316 

g. Operations against Central Powers’ dislocated northern wing.317 

h. Operations against Central Powers’ dislocated southern wing.318 

i. Covering connecting group.318 

j. Operations in Hungary.318 

4. Italian Front after June 23d.319 

a. Situation.319 

b. Plans.320 

c. Decisive battle of Vittorio-Veneto.321 

5. Russian Front.322 

a. Situation.322 

b. Allied plans.323 

c. Operations. 324 

(1) Arctic Ocean front...324 

(2) Pacific Ocean front.324 

6. Principles of War .—The principle of the offensive .325 


1. Italian Front to June 23, 1918. (Maps 37, 72, 
75, 105 and 106.) a. Situation . (1) (a) The offensive 

of the Central Powers in Italy, in 1917, was finally stopped 
on the line of the Piave. The 1918 plan of campaign re- 


305 




































306 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

quired Emperor Charles to be ready to launch an offensive 
against Italy on call in 1918, with a view of pinning the 
Allied forces to the Italian front during the German offen¬ 
sive in France. 

(b) The capture, by Austria, of the line of the Brenta- 
Bachiglione River, would give her Padua and Vicenza,and 
cut Italy off from railroad communications with Venice. 

(2) (a) After the 1917 operations, General Diaz (the 
successor of General Cadorna) organized the Italian front 
for defense in great depth, with the first defensive system 
on the line of the Piave. The second system, in rear and 
parallel to it, extended from the sea to Lake Garda. The 
third system was still farther to the rear. It paralleled 
the second system and extended from the sea to Switzer¬ 
land. From Lake Garda to Switzerland it constituted the 
second system. A fourth system was on the line of the 
Brenta-Bachiglione River. The fifth system was on the line 
of the Po, from the sea to the north of Lake Garda. The 
fifth system was prepared for inundation for a distance of 
about seventy-five miles from the sea. 

(b) On May 1, Italy recognized General Foch as Allied 
Commander-in-Chief on the Western and Italian fronts for 
purposes of coordination. 

(3) (a) After Marshal von Hindenburg failed to de¬ 
feat the British, the Kaiser sent for Emperor Charles, and 
at Spa, on May 12, perfected with him a plan for an im¬ 
mediate major Austrian offensive against Italy. 

(b) The separate peace with Russia and Roumania had 
freed many Austrian troops, so they were available for 
operations on the Italian front. 

b. Plans. (1) Italian, (a) Under the Allied plan 
of campaign for 1918, General Diaz maintained a passive 
defensive attitude and held himself in readiness to send 
reinforcements to France. 

(b) Italian dispositions. During the calm after the 
1917 operations, General Diaz had reorganized his forces, 
eliminated the pacifists and the socialists, and trained the 
organizations and restored morale. His order of battle 
from east to west was: 



ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 307 

The Third Army (Duke of Aosta), on the Piave to the Tre- 
vise railroad. 

The Eighth Army, from the Trevise railroad along the Piave. 

The Fourth Army, between the Piave and the Brenta. 

The Sixth Army, to which was attached French and English 
divisions, upon the plateau of Asiago. 

The First Army, to the Adige. 

The Seventh Army, to the west of Lake Garda. 

The Ninth Army, in general reserve near Padua. 

Also, nine infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions, in 
general reserve, were stationed near Verona. 

(2) Austrian, (a) General von Arz's general plan 
for the Austrian offensive against Italy in 1918 was to exe¬ 
cute a converging attack against the remaining Venice 
portion of the Udine salient. He did not hold out any avail¬ 
able strategic reserves under his own control. 

(b) Austrian dispositions. General von Arz disposed 
his troops in two groups, as follows: 

Boundary between groups: the Piave River. 

Armies from east to west. 

General Boroevic’s Group: 

The Fifth Army (von Wurm) with eleven divisions in 
front line on the lower Piave; four divisions in re¬ 
serve. 

The Sixth Army (Archduke Joseph) before Montello and 
upon the Piave, four divisions in front line; two 
divisions in reserve. 

The Fourth Army was in group reserve. 

General Conrad’s Group: 

The Eleventh Army (General Schouschenstall), astride 
the Brenta with fifteen divisions in front line; eight 
divisions in reserve. 

The Tenth Army (General Krobatin), Trent and to the 
west, eight divisions in front line; two divisions in 
reserve. 

Four divisions in group reserve. 

(c) (i) The Austrian plan of maneuver was to demon¬ 
strate against the west boundary of the Trent salient, from 
Lake Garda to Tonnello Pass, three days before the general 
attack, in order to attract reserves to the west of Lake 
Garda. 

The converging attack was to be executed by a maneu¬ 
ver of the groups under Generals Boroevic and Conrad 
toward Padua, with protection of the right flank by the 
capture of Verona. 

(ii) The maneuver was to be a strategical and tactical 
surprise, and w T as organized according to Marshal von Hin- 
denburg’s penetrating attack doctrine. 


308 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

c. Operations. (1) On June 12, General Conrad exe¬ 
cuted a diversion by the Tenth Army against the passes 
through the west side of the Trent salient. 

(2) On June 15, at 3:00 AM, the Austrian artillery 
preparation opened with great violence. The attack was 
not a surprise. General Diaz had estimated the exact hour 
of the attack, and met the artillery preparations by a vio¬ 
lent, accurate counter preparation fire that was very dis¬ 
concerting to the Austrian attack and caused many casual¬ 
ties among the assembled Austrian troops. 

(3) The Austrian attack was scheduled for 4:00 AM. 
It actually started after 7:00 AM, on a front of ninety 
miles, from the Adige to the sea. The Austrian attack 
struck the line in great force at five places from east to 
west: i.e., from the sea to Santa Dona Di Piave; between 
Santa Dona Di Piave and the railroad Treviso—Norvesa; 
on the plateau of Montello; on the two sides of the Brenta; 
and on the plateau of the Seven Communes. The attacks 
did not advance far, being met at all points by well organ¬ 
ized counter attacks. 

(4) By June 20, although all the reserves had been 
fed into the line, the advance had not made appreciable 
progress at any of the points of attack. The attacks along 
the Piave were the most successful, but were brought to a 
halt. The Piave, because of rains, suddenly rose and car¬ 
ried away most of the Austrian bridges. General Diaz at¬ 
tacked continually, by aerial bombardment, the troops at¬ 
tempting to build new bridges. 

(5) At 3:00 AM, June 23, the Austrians west of the 
Piave began the retreat, which General Diaz, by energetic 
pursuit, turned into a rout. 

(6) General von Arz abandoned the further execution 
of the maneuver, and General Diaz resumed the passive de¬ 
fense on the line of the Piave, in order to be ready, if neces¬ 
sary, to send troops to the French front. 

2. Turkish Theater. (Maps 43, 74, 75,107, 108,109.) 
a. Surrender of the Turkish Mesopotamian Armij. (1) On 
March 11, 1917, General Maude captured Bagdad. By Sep¬ 
tember, he occupied Bakouba on the Diala, Samara on the 
Tigris, and Ramadijeh on the Euphrates. 


ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 309 

(2) General Maude planned to advance to Mosul to 
prevent Turkish movements into Persia and Afghanistan, 
and to protect India. He rejected the route straight up 
the Tigris in favor of the route up the valley of the Diala 
to Kifri, thence via Tawk and Erbil to Mosul. He began 
the advance at the end of October, 1917, and reached Kara- 
Tepe by December. Here General Maude died of fever. 
His successor, General Marshall, at once stopped the opera¬ 
tion and began operations up the Euphrates to protect the 
left flank. 

(3) The enemy was at Hit, on the Euphrates. Gen¬ 
eral Brooking, in charge of the operation, by enveloping 
the Turkish southern flank, drove the Turks out of Hit and 
to a position about fifteen miles beyond Bagdadijeh. Gen¬ 
eral Brooking then sent his cavalry brigade (General Cas- 
sek) by a desert detour to a place in rear of the enemy 
position where it blocked the road. He then, at 5:00 AM, 
February 18, 1918, drove the Turks out of their position. 
The Turk’s retreat was precipitate, and when they found 
the cavalry brigade astride the road in their front, with 
the remainder of the British force pursuing, they broke up 
and dispersed in disorder. 

(4) General Brooking occupied Bagdadijeh and at once 
resumed the advance on Mosul by the Tigris route. The 
advance was really a pursuit, skillfully conducted, but Ger¬ 
man engineers had constructed a deep defensive zone at 
the Fatha Gorge, below the junction of the lesser Zab and 
the Tigris, with a second defensive system at the junction 
of these rivers, and a third farther up the river near a 
crossing. All Turkey believed, and the German engineers 
agreed, that the country to the right and left was impas¬ 
sable, and that the defensive zone was so strong that it could 
not be taken. General Marshal demonstrated in front of 
the Turkish defense with infantry divisions, and, with cav¬ 
alry and infantry, reached its flank and rear. As a result, 
he forced the surrender, on October 30, of Ismail Hakki and 
the Turkish Mesopotamian Army. The road to Mosul lay 
open, and General Marshall was only twelve miles from 
that city, on November 1, when he was notified of the Turk¬ 
ish armistice. 


310 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

b. Syrian front. (Maps 75, 108, 109.) (1) Situation . 

(a) After General Allenby captured Jerusalem, on Decem¬ 
ber 11, 1917, he pursued the Turkish forces a short dis¬ 
tance to the north, and established a new base at Jaffa. 
His line ran straight from the coast to the River Jordan, 
where it bent a little to the south to the Dead Sea, for 
flank protection. The Turkish forces, under General Liman 
von Sanders, faced him. 

(b) The Turkish lines of communication extended 
from Haifa to the main line at Derat; thence back, via 
Damascus, to Aleppo, with a branch reaching to the sea 
at Beirut. To the east of the Hedjaz railroad was the 
great Syrian Desert. 

(2) Plans, (a) (i) General Liman von Sanders was 
still in command of the Turkish forces at the front. Under 
von Hindenburg’s plan of campaign, he was required to 
maintain a strictly passive defensive attitude. With the 
exception of a few model units, all German troop organiza¬ 
tions had been withdrawn to the Western front. He or¬ 
ganized an average defensive zone of two principal posi¬ 
tions. 

(ii) The Turkish order of battle was: 

The Eighth Army, holding the sector from the sea to include 
Tul Reran. 

The Seventh Army, from Tul Reran to the Jordan. 

The Fourth Army, east of the Jordan. 

The Second Army Corps, at Ma’an. 

A strategical reserve in rear of the east flank at Damascus. 

The whole totaled 104,000 men, armed as follows: 32,- 
000 rifles, 4,000 sabers, 400 cannon. 

(b) (i) Such a large portion of General Allenby’s 
force was recalled to the Western front to help meet the 
German offensive, that he was forced to the defensive. The 
troops recalled to France were replaced by Indian troops. 

(ii) In accordance with General Foch’s request to 
prepare for an offensive General Allenby spent July, Au¬ 
gust, and the greater part of September in preparing his 
1918 operation. His army was made up of two cavalry 
divisions, two divisions of mounted infantry, two Indian 
divisions, and French, Italian, Jewish, West Indian, Ar¬ 
menian, and Cape troops. The whole totaled: 57,000 rifles, 


ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 311 

12,000 sabers, 540 guns. Thus he had a superiority over 
General von Sanders of: rifles, 75%, sabers, 300%, guns, 
25%. 

(iii) Inspired by Napoleon’s plan for the invasion of 
Syria, General Allenby’s plan for the maneuver was to dis¬ 
locate the enemy right from the sea by a surprise attack; 
then, by enveloping it, to cut his line of communications 
and retreat to the north. All preparatory movements were 
to be at night, and to be conducted secretly. 

(3) Decisive defeat of Turkey, (a) General Chaytar, 
on the right, executed diversions along the Jordan; and, 
early on the night of September 18-19, delivered a holding 
attack on the right. 

(b) General Allenby massed five of his seven divisions 
and 383 of his 540 guns on his left for the dislocating effort. 

In rear on the left, he held two cavalry divisions and 
one mounted infantry division in readiness to advance as 
soon as the enemy’s flank should be dislocated. 

(c) After a fifteen minute intensive artillery prepara¬ 
tion, General Allenby launched the attack on the left with 
five divisions, at 4:30 AM, September 19, 1918, and suc¬ 
cessfully passed the enemy barrage lines before the bar¬ 
rage fell. The attack overcame the first position, and, after 
a severe fight, captured the second position. The attack¬ 
ing line then wheeled to the east. 

(d) The cavalry command, under General Chauvel, was 
near the left of the line, well forward and in readiness. 
As soon as the infantry dislocated the enemy line from the 
sea, General Chauvel passed his whole command through 
the opening, and, by noon, they were eighteen miles north 
of the original front. 

(e) The infantry wheeling maneuver was beautifully 
executed, and that day folded the Turkish line back nearly 
to Raffat. The next day, September 20, the right of the 
line attacked while the left continued its wheel to the east. 

(f) The second day, the cavalry, by a bound of forty 
miles in the direction of Lake Tiberias, cut the enemy line 
of railroad communication at El Fuleh and Beisan. 

(g) The next day, September 21, the cavalry held the 
crossings of the Jordan, south of Lake Tiberias, thus com¬ 
pletely cutting the enemy line of retreat to the north, and 


312 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

captured Nazareth, the Turkish Headquarters. General 
von Sanders fled to Damascus in an automobile. That day, 
the King of Hedjaz sent his army north from Ma’an (which 
he had captured) and destroyed such remnants of the Turk¬ 
ish army as crossed to the east of the Jordan. 

(h) By September 28, the Turkish Seventh and Eighth 
Armies had been destroyed, and General Allenby had occu¬ 
pied the line Acre—Derad. 

<i) On October 1, General Allenby entered Damascus. 
On October 27, the cavalry captured Aleppo, the junction 
of the Bagdad and Medina railroads. The Sultan of Tur¬ 
key capitulated on October 30. 

3. Balkan Front. (Maps 41, 75, 110, 111 and 112.) 
a. Situation. The Allied line in the Balkans, at the end of 
operations in 1917, extended from the Aegean Sea, along 
the Stroumitza River, nearly to the boundary of Greece, 
thence to the Vardar at the Greek boundary, thence west, 
north of Monastir and via Lake Ochrida, to the Adriatic 
Sea north of Vallona—a distance of more than two hundred 
miles. The country is very mountainous, particularly west 
of the Vardar, where numerous mountains rise to 5,000 
feet. The Berlin—Bagdad railroad runs through the penin¬ 
sula from Budapest via Belgrade—Sofia—Adrianople to 
Constantinople. Branch railroads from Nich and Sofia run 
to Uskub, and one from Mitrowitza, via Uskub, runs to 
Saloniki. Another railroad runs from Saloniki, via 
Dedeagatch, to Adrianople. 

b. Order of battle. (1) Central Powers, (a) In or¬ 
der to concentrate as many German troops as possible for 
the offensive in 1918 on the Western front, nearly all Ger¬ 
man soldiers were recalled from the Balkans. As a result, 
the Allied Salonika Army was contained by Bulgarian 
forces under the command of General Todaroff, with a large 
number of German officers in staff and line. 

(b) The order of battle from east to west was: 

The Bulgarian Fourth Army, from the Aegean Sea to Seres, 
The Bulgarian Second Army, to the boundary, 

The Bulgarian First Army, to Gradsko (inclusive), 

The German Eleventh Army, with a German staff and com¬ 
mander, to Lake Ochrida, 

The Austrian XIX Corps, to the Adriatic Sea. 


ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 313 

(c) The whole force totaled about half a million men. 
It occupied a mountainous terrain which German engineers 
had organized into a deep defensive zone, with trenches 
blasted out of the rock. Most of the reserves were in rear 
of the Bulgarian left. 

(d) Although the Germans had withdrawn troops, they 
furnished the Bulgarians with cannon, ammunition, ma¬ 
chine guns, and all kinds of equipment in large quantities. 

(2) (a) The Allied order of battle from east to west 

was: 

/ 

The Greek Army, along the Stroumitza River facing the Bul¬ 
garian Fourth and Second Armies. 

The British Army, to the boundary. 

A French-Greek detachment, to the Vardar. 

The Serbian First and Second Armies, to vicinity Monastir. 

The French Army, to vicinity of Lake Ochrida. 

The Italian Army, to the Adriatic Sea. 

(b) These so-called armies were really detachments. 
The strategical reserves were mainly Greeks. The Serbians 
formed the largest contingent of the Allied forces. 

c. Plans. (1) Marshal von Hindenburg, in the 1918 
plan of campaign, prescribed the passive defense for the 
Balkan front; but, to forestall an Allied attack on that front, 
had a psychological campaign carried on, by propaganda 
from Berlin, to the effect that the Central Powers would 
conduct an offensive against the Saloniki force. 

(2) (a) The Serbian Commander, General Mischitch, 
believed that he could penetrate the Bulgarian line in his 
front and requested authority to do so. In view of the very 
difficult mountainous terrain in front of the Serbians, Gen¬ 
eral Sarrail disapproved the recommendation. General 
Mischitch then appealed to General Foch, who recalled Gen¬ 
eral Sarrail and sent General d’Esperey to command in the 
Balkans, with instructions to approach the Serbian plan 
with an open mind. General d’Esperey approved the Ser¬ 
bian plan. The plan of maneuver was for the Serbians, by 
their own system of mountain warfare, to surprise and to 
penetrate the Bulgarian line in their front in the general 

direction: Gradsko—Uskub. 

(b) The Serbian force, comprising six small divisions, 
was to be supported by two French divisions and forty 
batteries of heavy artillery. 


314 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(c) The inner flanks of the dislocated enemy wings 
were to be folded back by two special groups. On the right, 
the French-Grecian group of General Anselm was to fold 
back the right flank of the dislocated Bulgarian left wing. 
This force was to consist of one cavalry and two infantry 
divisions, and was to be supported by ten batteries of heavy 
artillery. On the left, the French army of General Henry, 
consisting of one cavalry and five infantry divisions, and 
supported by seventeen batteries of heavy artillery, with 
its left flank covered by Allied detachments, was to fold 
back the inner flank of the dislocated Bulgarian right wing. 

(d) The British army, with seven divisions, rein¬ 
forced, and supported by twenty-one batteries of heavy 
artillery, was to execute the secondary maneuver of pene¬ 
trating the Bulgarian line along the Vardar. 

(e) The Greek army, on the right, was to protect the 
right flank and hold the Bulgarian Fourth Army and part 
of the Second on its front. 

(f) The Italian army was to protect the left flank, and 
hold the Austrian corps in its front. 

(g) The second phase provided for exploitation (with 
the Serbians leading) by all the troops from the Stroumitza 
to the region of the Lakes. 

(h) General Foch instructed General d’Esperey to ar¬ 
range that the maneuver should be simultaneous with that 
on the Western front in September. 

d. Decisive defeat of Bulgaria. (1) On September 
15, after an artillery preparation of twenty-four hours, the 
Serbian force, reinforced by French divisions, advanced 
and penetrated the enemy line on a nine mile front. The 
Serbians then captured the fortified mountain defenses in 
their front. The east breach widening group (General 
Anselm) captured the mountains in its front and extended 
the gap to the east. 

(2) (a) By September 18, the breach had been 
widened to fifteen miles, and the Serbians had advanced ten 
miles. The maneuver that day, in front of the Serbians, 
took on the character of a pursuit by cavalry and attack 
aviation. 


ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 315 

(b) General d’Esperey ordered the secondary attack 
by the British. It did not make much progress against the 
Bulgarians. 

(c) On September 18, General d’Esperey directed the 
exploitation of the penetration to be carried out as rapidly 
as possible in order to forestall the arrival of German rein¬ 
forcements. 

(3) On September 19, the Serbian pursuit was ac¬ 
centuated and the maneuver of folding back the inner flanks 
of the dislocated wings proceeded. 

(4) By September 20, the Serbians and the Allied cav¬ 
alry had advanced twenty-eight miles, and the breach widen¬ 
ing groups had opened the gap to twenty-five miles. 

(5) By September 21, the advance was taken up by 
the breach widening groups, and on the 22d the whole front, 
from Monastir to the Vardar—a front of nearly one hun¬ 
dred miles—advanced. The Bulgarian retreat now became 
a rout, with abandonment of arms, equipment, supplies, and 
even trains. On the evening of September 22, the Serbians 
cut the line of communication of the German Eleventh Army 
at Gradsko. 

(6) By September 24, the Vardar had been crossed 
everywhere. 

(7) By September 26, the enemy line of communica¬ 
tion Gradsko—Prilep—Monastir had been cleared entirely 
of the enemy, while the British on the right had captured 
the fortified heights of Beles, had crossed the Stroumitza, 
and were advancing in Bulgarian territory in the direction 
of Sofia. In ten days, the Serbians had advanced sixty 
miles. 

(8) The Bulgarian First, Second, and Fourth Armies 
retreated into Bulgaria, but the Eleventh German Army, cut 
off by the rapidity of the Serbian penetration, was forced 
to the west, where it defended itself and awaited German 
reinforcements. 

(9) General Henry, commanding the left breach widen¬ 
ing group, pushed his cavalry through Uskub, reinforced it 
heavily at once, and, by rapid marches and with the assis¬ 
tance of the Italians on his left, gained Uskub. The 
Eleventh German Army then, barred by the impassable 


316 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

mountain Tchar, and cut off from the railroad and all lines 
of communication, surrendered on September 29, as follows: 
5 general officers, 1600 officers, 77,000 men, 500 cannon, 
10,000 horses, and an immense amount of arms and provi¬ 
sions. 

(10) The Second Serbian Army practically destroyed 
the First Bulgarian Army, and, crossing the Bulgarian 
frontier, advanced on Sofia. 

(11) On September 25, Czar Ferdinand requested a 
suspension of arms for forty-eight hours to allow for arri¬ 
val of Bulgarian delegates at General d’Esperey’s headquar¬ 
ters to agree on an armistice. General d’Esperey refused 
to suspend hostilities but agreed to receive the delegates. 
They arrived on September 28, and, on September 29, 
signed, without question, the armistice that was placed be¬ 
fore them. 

(12) On October 3, Czar Ferdinand abdicated the 
throne of Bulgaria. 

e. New situation in the Balkans. Thus the Allied effort 
to penetrate the line of the Central Powers, begun at the 
Dardanelles in 1915, was finally executed from Saloniki, in 
1918, by General d’Esperey under the direction of Marshal 
Foch. 

/. New Balkan plans. (1) Central Powers, (a) As 
early as September 18, von Hindenburg appreciated the 
fact that the Allies were attempting to deliver a mortal blow 
against him in the decisive direction Saloniki—Uskub— 
Belgrade — Budapest — Vienna — Berlin, and, although 
pressed to the limit for troops on the Western front, where 
General Pershing had just reduced the St. Mihiel salient, he 
decided that German reinforcements must be sent with all 
haste to General Todaroff from the Russian front (which 
was still held against Bolshevism), from Roumania, which 
was still held by General von Mackensen, and from the 
Western front; that Austria-Hungary must be relieved of 
furnishing any troops for the Western front and must send 
help at once to General Todaroff. Due to the speed of Gen¬ 
eral d’Esperey’s pursuit, these reinforcements did not ar¬ 
rive in time to save Bulgaria. 


ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 317 

(b) Von Hindenburg then decided that the line of the 
Danube must be held defensively, and gave the necessary 
instructions to General von Mackensen who was in Rou- 
mania, and to General von Arz, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Austrian troops. 

(2) Allied Powers. General d’Esperey, acting under 
the direction of Marshal Foch, appreciated the full value 
of the strategical penetration in the Balkans and estimated 
that, to secure the greatest result, exploitation must be ex¬ 
pedited with all possible speed. His general plan was to 
fold the Central Powers’ dislocated northern wing back by 
a rapid advance along the Nich—Budapest railroad, and to 
fold the Central Powers’ dislocated southern wing back by 
a rapid advance through Thrace against Constantinople, and 
also to protect those two forces by occupying the Dobruja. 

g. Operations against Central Poivers’ dislocated nor - 
them wing. (1) The operation was conducted as a pur¬ 
suit, with the Serbian First Army, reinforced by the French 
cavalry, as the advance guard. By aggressive and rapid 
offensive action, General d’Esperey captured the Austrian 
forces that threatened his left from a flank position in 
Albania. 

(2) The Serbian First Army, by mountain fighting, 
passed the defiles of Vrania and Leskovats. After an ener¬ 
getic pursuit, it reached the vicinity of Nish, and in a three 
days’ battle, captured that city on October 12, and stood 
astride the Central Powers’ railroad line of communication 
with Turkey. 

(3) The right flank group (French) advanced via 
Kastendil, occupied Sofia on the Berlin—Bagdad railroad, 
proceeded by train to Pirot, and reached the Danube near 
Lem-Palanka—Vidin, on October 24, where it captured a 
large convoy of barges en route to Turkey. 

(4) The Serbian First Army, inspired by the joy of 
returning to their native land, was superior to cold, snow, 
and ice, and rapidly advanced to Semendria. On Novem¬ 
ber 1, it entered Belgrade, having advanced more than three 
hundred miles in forty-five days. To do that, it was neces¬ 
sary to cut loose from the supply trains and live off the 
country, although the retreating enemy had devastated it 
as much as his limited time permitted. 


318 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

h. Operations against the Central Powers ’ dislocated 
southern wing. (1) To force back the inner flank of the 
dislocated southern wing, General d’Esperey constituted a 
detachment composed of: three British divisions, three 
Greek divisions, one French division, and one Italian bri¬ 
gade. 

* (2) He designated General Milne, the senior British 

officer with the Saloniki forces, to command, and gave him 
the first task of clearing the railroad: Dedeagatch—Adri- 
anople, and the second task of capturing Constantinople in 
order to force the surrender of Turkey. The detachment 
advanced in two columns, the northern by the Sofia—Adri- 
anople railroad; the southern, which included the cavalry, 
by the highway along the coast of the Aegean Sea. 

(3) The detachment had arrived at the frontier, and 
was ready to advance on Constantinople on October 31, 
when General Milne was informed that Turkey had sur¬ 
rendered that day. 

i. Covering connecting group. (1) In order to pro¬ 
tect the right flank of the forces operating toward Belgrade, 
and the left flank of the forces operating toward Constanti¬ 
nople, General d’Esperey constituted a covering connecting 
group of two infantry divisions (one French and one Bri- 
tish> and one French cavalry division, placed General Ber- 
thelot (called from the Western front) in command, and 
instructed him to prevent General von Mackensen from 
attacking either column from the Dobruja. 

(2) On November 1, the advance guards crossed the 
Danube at Nicopolis, Sistova, and Giorgevo, and organized 
bridgeheads north of the Danube. That day, Roumania 
again declared war against the Central Powers and or¬ 
dered the mobilization of her forces. 

(3) General von Mackensen gave up the defense of the 
north bank of the Danube and began a rapid retreat through 
Transylvania to join the German forces in Germany. 

j. Operations in Hungary. (1) General d’Esperey de¬ 
cided to prevent General von Mackensen’s return to Ger¬ 
many by cutting his line of communications. 

(2) Under the terms of the Austrian armistice of No¬ 
vember 4, the Allies had the right to operate through Aus- 


ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 319 

tria against Germany. So General d’Esperey constituted 
a Hungarian Detachment” which advanced toward Buda¬ 
pest. The end of the war stopped this maneuver, which, 
as a parallel pursuit, is most interesting. 

4. Italian Front After June 23d. (Maps 37, 75, 
106, il2, 113 and 114.) a. Situation. The Austrian of¬ 
fensive against Italy collapsed on June 23, 1918. After 
Marshal Foch was placed in command of the Western 
front, General Diaz, during the early days of the fall of 
1918, was not able to take the offensive, as he was con¬ 
fronted by an Austrian superiority of twelve infantry di¬ 
visions and a twenty per cent predominance in artillery. He 
held himself in readiness to send troops to France. 

(2) General d’Esperey penetrated the Bulgarian line 
in the Balkans, and, by October, was menacing Austria- 
Hungary from the south. 

(3) The United States declared war against Austria- 
Hungary on December 7, 1917, which greatly heartened 
Italy after the nearly fatal disaster of Caporetto. Italy, 
following the lead of France and Great Britain, asked for 
American troops on her front, both for reinforcement in 
strength and in morale. Italy’s request was approved in 
part, and, on June 26, 1918, just after the battle of the 
Piave, General Pershing designated General Eben Swift 
as Commanding General of American troops in Italy, and 
detailed the 332d Infantry (Colonel Wallace) from the 83d 
Division, with certain auxiliary troops, as a detachment 
for reinforcement of the Italian armies. The arrival of this 
detachment created great enthusiasm in Italy. The detach¬ 
ment at first was placed in General Headquarters Reserve 
and the officers were taken to the various parts of the line 
to be seen by the Italian troops as a measure for helping 
morale. 

(4) Austria-Hungary was tremendously agitated af¬ 
ter the Second Battle of the Marne, and the various races 
in that Dual Monarchy were talking very loudly of racial 
aspirations and apparently cared very little as to what be¬ 
came of the Hapsburg Monarchy. 

(5) The Austrian army in the Udine salient was de¬ 
pendent on two railroad lines: one running north, and the 
other running almost east from near Venice. 


320 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

b. Plans. (1) Austrian. General von Arz main¬ 
tained a strictly passive defense on the Italian front. He 
had withdrawn many troops from the Italian front to op¬ 
pose General d’Esperey’s offensive from the Balkans, and 
to prevent domestic disorder, and did not hold out a strate¬ 
gical reserve on the Italian front. 

(2) Italian, (a) General Diaz’s order of battle, from 
the south to the north, was as follows (Map 113) : 

The Third Army 
The Tenth Army 
The Eighth Army 
The Twelfth Army 
The Fourth Army 

The Sixth Army (Allied detachments), in front of Seven 
Communes 

The First Army, to Lake Garda 
The Seventh Army, to Switzerland. 

(b) His general plan was to destroy the Austrian 
forces by a surprise strategical and tactical penetration, 
and an exploitation of the success. 

(c) His plan for the maneuver was that, after a strong 
attack by the Fourth Army to draw Austrian reserves to 
its front, the Twelfth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies, as a 
group, advancing side by side, should penetrate the enemy 
front and fold the inner flanks of the dislocated wings back 
from all lines of communication. The direction of the main 
blow was to be along the boundary between the Austrian 
Fifth and Sixth Armies. 

(d) To gain mass for this attack, the Third, First, and 
Seventh Armies were reduced to the lowest limit, the troops 
thus gained being sent to the group of the Tenth, Eighth, 
and Twelfth Armies. As a result, that group was raised 
to forty-one divisions, with twenty-two in line and nineteen 
in reserve, while the opposing Austrian line was held by 
only twenty-three divisions, of which ten and one-half were 
in reserve. In addition, General Diaz succeeded in concen¬ 
trating 4800 guns on that part of the front, thus giving him 
a great superiority in artillery fire. 

(e) General Diaz held the Ninth Army near Padua, 
in strategical reserve. 


ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 321 

The Tenth Army was to lay three bridges, the Eighth 
was to lay seven bridges, and the Twelfth Army, with its 
right wing, was to lay one. 

The Twelfth Army was to attack nearly due north, 
astride the Piave. 

The Tenth Army was to cross the Piave and form a 
defensive flank to protect the principal blow by the Eighth 
Army toward Vittorio. 

c. Decisive Battle of Vittorio-Veneto. (1) Bridging 
began with the fall of darkness on October 26. Due to 
the swift current of the river and the accuracy of the enemy 
fire, the Eighth Army laid only two of its seven bridges. 

(2) General Diaz began his bombardment half an hour 
before midnight. 

The infantry advanced at 6:45 AM, October 27. The 
attack was a complete surprise. Austrian airmen were very 
active in bombing the bridges, but by night (October 27) 
all bridges were installed. 

(3) On October 29, the Eighth and Twelfth Armies 
penetrated the Austrian front, and, by October 30, the 
penetration had been completetd and the troops in front 
of the Eighth and Twelfth Armies had been driven north 
past their line of communications. 

(4) (a) Late in the evening of October 30, the Aus¬ 
trian command issued the following: 

“Taking into account the resolve so often expressed to bring 
about the conclusion of an armistice and peace, putting an end 
to the struggle of nations, our troops fighting on Italian soil will 
evacuate the occupied region.” 

(b) The Austrians began a general retreat. The 
whole Italian cavalry force passed through the breach, and, 
with the assistance of attack and bombing planes, turned 
the retreat into a rout. The bombing planes devoted their 
attention especially to bridges in front of the Austrian re¬ 
treating forces. 

(5) In that retreat, the American 332d Infantry was 
with the Tenth Army and was stopped on November 3, at 
the Tagliamento River, by a desperate Austrian rear guard 
action. It received an order, at 3:15 AM, November 4, 
to cross the river. Before 9:00 AM that day, the regi- 


322 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

ment had crossed the river, had defeated the enemy rear 
guard, and had captured all its stores. 

(6) The Austrian armies disintegrated. The various 
races of Austria-Hungary, except the Austrians and the 
Magyars, were in revolt. The Czechs and the Slovaks had 
already proclaimed their independence. 

(7) On November 3, a small detachment of Italian 
troops, under protection of the Italian navy, landed at 
Trieste and occupied the city without any appreciable oppo¬ 
sition. 

(8) At Pola, the Austrian naval base, the sailors rose 
against their officers, in a mutiny headed by Croatian offi¬ 
cers under the orders of the Jugo-Slav National Council; 
and the dying Hapsburg Monarchy handed the fleet over 
to the new Jugo-Slav State. 

(9) Austria’s request for an armistice was granted. 
The armistice went into effect at 3:00 PM, November 4. 
Under that armistice, Austria placed all her territory at 
the disposal of the Allies for military operations against 
Germany. The armistice was followed by the abdication of 
the Hapsburg dynasty. 

(10) Under the terms of that armistice, and in accor¬ 
dance with the directions of Marshal Foch, General Diaz 
began preparations for an advance via Innsbruck, east of 
Switzerland, against Germany’s southern frontier, in co¬ 
operation with General d’Esperey’s advance through Aus- 
tri-Hungary from the Balkans. 

(11) After 3:00 PM, November 4, 1918, Germany 
stood alone against the Allied powers and the United States. 

5. Russian Front. (Maps 1, 75, 114, 115, and 116.) 
a. Situation. (1) (a) The Northern Slavs or Czechoslo¬ 
vaks were a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy be¬ 
fore the war. Their racial aspiration for national recogni¬ 
tion had not been granted, as had that of the Magyars in 
Hungary, and their loyalty to the Central Powers during 
the World War cannot be said to have been enthusiastic. 

(b) Asa result, many thousands deserted to their racial 
brothers, the Russians, and, at the end of 1917, more than 
120,000 of them were serving in the Russian army. 


ALL FRONTS EXCEPT WESTERN FRONT 323 

(2) In December, 1917, Finland, under the doctrine of 
national self-determination, asserted her independence of 
Russia. 

(3) (a) On March 2, 1918, Germany forced Russia 
to sign the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, and at once entered upon 
a policy of exploiting Russia and the states that had separ¬ 
ated from her. 

(b) One of the features of her policy was the German 
domination of Finland, for whose throne she nominated 
Duke Adolph Friedrick of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The 
German Government had a secret understanding with the 
de facto government of Finland by which the Murman Coast 
in the north, and the Murman railway were to be annexed 
to a dependent Finland, and a submarine base established 
by Germany on the ice-free Murman Coast. Accordingly, 
a German force of 20,000 men occupied Helsingfors, the 
Finnish capital, and took charge of the country. 

(4) At that time, many millions of tons of munitions 
and warlike supplies, that had been imported by Russia and 
Roumania, were stored at Kola and Archangel, and, under 
the German-Finnish understanding, were to be turned over 
to Germany by Finland. 

(5) (a) After the peace of Brest-Litovsk the Czecho¬ 
slovak Legion, about 120,000 strong, refused exchange back 
to Austria, and, retaining their arms, started for the West¬ 
ern front via Vladivostock and America. At first, they ad¬ 
vanced with Russian permission, but, when that was with¬ 
drawn, they continued their advance by force of arms. 

(b) They seized Samara, on the Trans-Siberian Rail¬ 
road, and then captured the Russian state treasury at Ka¬ 
zan, where they seized $315,000,000. They then drove the 
Bolsheviki out of Tcheliabinsk, the European terminal of 
the Siberian Railroad. 

b. Allied, plans. The Allies were fearful, at this time, 
that they might not be able to defend successfully against 
the German offensive in France. Accordingly they planned 
to reconstitute an Eastern front against the Germans of 
at least sufficient strength to prevent Germany from secur¬ 
ing the munitions and supplies at Kola and Archangel, 
and also to deter Germany from diverting any more troops 
from Russia to the Western front. 


324 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

c. Operations. (1) Arctic Ocean front, (a) General 
Ironside, of the British Army, was selected as Allied Com- 
mander-in-Chief on the White Sea front, and, in July, 1918, 
an Allied expedition under his command was sent to that 
front, where it was welcomed by the inhabitants who im¬ 
mediately seceded from the Bolsheviki Government of Rus¬ 
sia and established an independent government. The Allies 
at once seized Kola and Archangel, and advanced down the 
Kola railroad to the point where the Germans were plan¬ 
ning to connect with the Finnish railroad at Uleaborg. 

(b) (i) General Pershing selected Brigadier General 
Wilds P. Richardson to command the American Detach¬ 
ment which consisted of the following troops: 

339th Infantry 

1st Battalion, 310th Engineers 
337th Field Hospital Company 
337th Ambulance Company 

(ii) General Richardson was given the mission of 
guarding the ports and as much of the surrounding country 
as might develop threatening conditions. 

(iii) Under General Ironside, this American detach¬ 
ment operated over a front of four hundred and fifty miles 
and participated in a series of minor engagements. It was 
all withdrawn before the United States made peace with 
Germany. 

(2) Pacific Ocean front. (a) Also, the Allies an¬ 

nounced, in July, 1918, that they had determined to send 
an Allied force to Vladivostock, under the command of 
General Otani of the Japanese army, to aid the Czecho¬ 
slovakian army, to break up the armed bands of German 
and Austrian prisoners who were, at that time, the main 
part of the Bolsheviki forces, and, also, to protect the great 
supply of munitions that had been imported by Russia and 
stored at Vladivostock. 

(b) Major General William S. Graves was selected to 
command the American detachment, which consisted of the 
27th and 31st Infantry Regiments from the Philippine 
Islands and administrative and auxiliary troops from the 
United States. The whole force totaled 10,000 men. 

(c) The Czecho-Slovakian troops were rescued and the 
Bolsheviki were prevented from using the munitions at 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 349 

126, 127.) After stopping the German offensive of July 15, 
General Foch seized the initiative by launching a counter 
offensive, on July 18, toward Soissons, and retained it by the 
ensuing offensive operation which reduced the Marne salient. 

a. German situation. Marshal von Hindenburg knew that 

he could not expect any material assistance on the Western 
front from the other fronts. The morale of the German troops 
had been lowered. More than ten divisions had been broken 
up for replacements. Some units had shirked their duty at 
the front and others had mutinied. General Ludendorff 
pronounced the situation ‘Very grave.” The German dis¬ 
couragement at the front was shared by the people back in 
Germany and by the German Government. The German 
Chancellor, Count von Hertling, said, “At the beginning of 
July, 1918, I was convinced, I confess, that before the first of 
September our adversaries would send us peace proposals. 
* * * We expected grave events in Paris for the end of 

July. That was on the 15th. On the 18th, even the most 
optimistic among us understood that all was lost. The history 
of the world was played out in three days.” 

b. Allied and American situation. The removal of the 
German threat of operations against Paris dismissed the fear 
which had controlled the French at home and at the front and 
the French morale at once rose to the point known as enthus¬ 
iasm for the war. The British also dismissed their fear for the 
safety of the Channel ports and wanted to drive the Germans 
entirely away from the Channel. The Americans had done 
exactly what they had expected to do, and their morale re¬ 
mained at its high point. They had gone to Europe to defeat 
Germany and all they asked for was the chance. American 
troops were arriving in France at the rate of more than 250,000 
a month. 

2. Plans, a. German 'plans. (1) Marshal von Hinden¬ 
burg estimated that he had lost the initiative, and that in 
view of the fact that he had used a large part of the reserves 
intended for the great peace drive in Flanders he was not 
strong enough to recover it at that time. He definitely aban¬ 
doned the plan of destroying the British army and decided 
to rest and refresh the troops which had recently been in action, 
and to await some mistake of the enemy or a favorable oppor¬ 
tunity to attempt a reseizure of the initiative. He estimated 
that the Allied and American troops had suffered as much as 


350 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

the German troops and that they would not be able to assume 
the offensive for some time. 

(2) He decided to hold the line he then occupied. He 
definitely assumed the strategical and tactical defensive atti¬ 
tude and made no material change in the order of battle except 
that he planned to place General von Boehn on the line as 
commander of a new group, consisting of the Ninth, Second, 
and Eighteenth Armies, between the Groups of the German 
and Bavarian Crown Princes. 

b. Allied and American plans. (1) As soon as General 
Foch saw that he had actually seized the initiative on July 
18 and was retaining it, he decided to hold it, and called a con¬ 
ference of the Commanders-in-Chief, for July 24, at his Head¬ 
quarters at Bombon for the purpose of considering operations. 

(2) At this conference, it was estimated that due to the 
arrival of the Americans, the Allies finally had acquired an 
equality of combatant strength on the line and a superiority 
of reserves, artillery, tanks, and aviation. Each Commander- 
in-Chief presented proposals for the employment of the armies 
under his command. 

(3) All shared in the opinion of General Foch that the 
time had come to pass from the strategical and tactical defen¬ 
sive to a maintained strategical and tactical offensive. 

(4) General Foch’s final decision, upon which all plans 
were based, was that the Allied armies must retain the offen¬ 
sive by such aggressive action that the Germans would find 
no rest and that von Hindenburg would find no opportunity 
to seize the initiative. 

(5) General Foch divided the proposed offensive into two 
periods as follows: 

(a) The first period was to consist of surprise offensives 
with limited objectives and was to be initiated at once. Accord¬ 
ingly, there was to be an offensive to free the Paris—Amiens 
railroad route by reduction of the Amiens salient; an offensive 
to recover the mining area: Bruay—Bethune by reduction of 
the Hazebrouck salient; and an offensive to free the Paris— 
Avricourt railroad route near Commercy by reduction of the 
St. Mihiel salient. The exploitation of the success of reducing 
the Marne salient (considered in the preceding chapter) was 
also to continue. 

(b) The second period was to be a general offensive that 
would end the war. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 351 

3. Reduction of the Amiens Salient, a. Plans. (1) 
German plans. The Germans had no specific plan for the de¬ 
fense of the Amiens salient except that of defense of lines then 
held. They had been so filled with the idea of victory that they 
had not well responded to the loss of initiative. They seemed 
to be stunned by the result of the Second Battle of the Marne. 
There was hesitation on the part of the High Command in 
informing the troops that the defensive attitude had been 
assumed, and, as a result, the German lines in the Amiens 
salient were not as well prepared for defense, by intrenchment 
and otherwise, as they should have been. 

(2) Allied plans, (a) General Foch’s plan for the reduc¬ 
tion of the Amiens salient proposed to attract the Germans' 
attention to Flanders, then to execute a surprise converging 
attack against the salient. 

(b) The northern force under Marshal Haig with left 
flank on the Somme was to attack on August 8 with the British 
Fourth Army (General Rawlinson) north of the line: Amiens— 
Roye and with the French First Army (General Debeney) 
south of that line. The British Fourth Army was to deliver 
the main attack without artillery preparation and with its 
main reliance on tanks for pushing through the enemy lines. 
The French XXXV Corps, attached to the French First Army, 
was to attack south of Montdidier, on August 9, in the direc¬ 
tion of Roye, to force evacuation of Montdidier. 

The southern force, i.e., the French Third Army (General 
Humbert), was to attack in the general direction of Lassigny—• 
Roye, on August 10, for the purpose of striking the retreating 
German forces in flank. 

(c) To exploit the success, Marshal Haig concentrated 
east of Amiens at zero hour, a special mobile force consisting of: 

1 cavalry corps (3 cavalry divisions). 

2 motor machine gun brigades. 

1 Canadian cyclist battalion. 

b. Operations. (1) The diversion in Flanders. To secure 
surprise by attracting the German attention to Flanders, 
Marshal Haig issued detailed instructions for a Flanders attack, 
put Canadian troops on the Mount Kemmel front, where they 
were identified, established dummy corps headquarters, erected 
casualty clearing stations in conspicuous positions, maintained 
great wireless activity in the First Army area, exhibited tanks, 
concentrating in the St. Pol area, and carried out infantry and 


352 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

tank combined maneuvers in that area on days when the visi¬ 
bility was good. These measures succeeded in deceiving the 
Germans. 

(2) August 8. (a) On August 8, at 4:20 AM, without any 
artillery preparation, the British Fourth Army, accompanied 
by 400 tanks, and supported by an intense artillery concentra¬ 
tion which crushed the German artillery, advanced 
to the attack with seven divisions in line and four in support, 
on a front of eleven miles. The French First Army artillery 
preparation began at 4:20 AM and, at 5:00 AM, its left corps 
advanced, keeping pace with the British. 

(b) The whole attack was a surprise and penetrated the 
German lines. The Germans quickly fell back. The attack 
halted for two hours upon reaching its first objective. The 
mobile force was reinforced with light tanks and armored cars 
and was passed through the breach in the line. That night, 
the attacking infantry had advanced seven miles. The mobile 
force was well out to the front, and continuing the advance 
during the night, it cut telephonic communication between 
the German troops and their headquarters and captured several 
division headquarters by surprise. The air service also con¬ 
tinued to operate all night with attack and bombing planes. 

(c) Rumors quickly spread in the German line that the 
Allied cavalry and tanks were in their rear, and the retreat on 
that part of the line nearly became a rout. The Germans blew 
up their dumps, and, in their rush to the rear, left behind 
13,000 prisoners and more than 300 guns. Because of the sur¬ 
prise, there were no German troops for local counter attacks. 
The necessary guns for such counter attacks had been captured. 
If Marshal Haig had then pushed forward to the line of the 
Somme, there would have been no formed bodies of German 
troops to stop him. 

(d) General Ludendorff calls August 8 the blackest day 
of the war. The German soldiers lost confidence in the ability 
of their commanders to win victories and whole bodies of 
soldiers surrendered to single Allied troopers or isolated squad¬ 
rons and there were cases of retiring troops, when meeting fresh 
divisions going into action, calling out to them, “black leg” 
and, “You are prolonging the war.” General Ludendorff 
asked to be relieved, and asked for conferences with the Ger¬ 
man Government at Spa at once. There, he reported that it 
was no longer possible to force the Allies to peace, that peace 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 353 

could not be won by a defensive policy, and that he recom¬ 
mended that the war be terminated by means of diplomacy. 

(e) Von Hindenburg considered the situation very grave 
and gave orders at once for emergency concentration of twenty- 
four divisions against Marshal Haig. These divisions were to 
come from the Verdun front, from Flanders, from Lille, from 
the Ypres front, and from the general reserve. 

(3) August 9-10. (a) On August 9, the French XXXV 

Corps delivered a surprise attack south of Montdidier and 
reached the railroad station at Faverolles. The Germans 
evacuated Montdidier and thus cleared the Paris—Amiens 
railroad. The general advance continued without meeting 
any serious opposition, and reached the line: Morlancourt— 
Proyart—Rouvray—Montdidier. 

(b) The British III Corps, advancing north of the Somme 
to cover the left flank of the British Fourth Army, was stopped 
by the Germans at the Chipilly ridge. 

(c) The American 131st Infantry Regiment (Colonel J. 
B. Sanborn) took its place in the line of attack on the night of 
August 9-10. The American infantry, outstripping the British 
on the flank, swept everything before them, and on August 10, 
captured the ridge in front of the 58th British Division. 

(d) The French Third Army, attacking with tanks on 
August 10, struck the retreating Germans in the flank and 
attained all of its objectives. 

(4) August 11-15. After August 10, by Marshal Foch’s 
order, the pursuit took an easternly direction, and meeting 
more and more resistance from counter attacks by German 
reinforcements coming into the line, was practically stopped 
on August 15, on the old German 1916 line: Albert—Lihons— 
west of Roye—Ribecourt. 

c. Exploitation of success in reducing the Amiens salient. 
(1) Marshal Foch’s plan. (a) On the night of August 10, 
Marshal Foch decided to exploit the success by broadening 
the front of attack and by this means execute a converging 
maneuver against the German reinforcements that were being 
rushed to the Amiens salient. 

(b) His general plan for the maneuver was to have the 
armies already engaged continue the converging operation in 
the following directions: 



354 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

French Third Army (General Humbert), toward the Noyon area. 
French First Army (General Debeney), toward the Ham 

Guiscard road. . _ 

British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), toward the Somme 

north of Ham. , 

General Petain was to extend the offensive to the south, and to 
direct the French Tenth Army (General Mangin) to drive the Ger¬ 
mans north of the line: Oise—Aillette. 

Marshal Haig was to extend the offensive to the north, and, by 
combined operations of the British Third and First Armies, was to 
penetrate the German front on the axis: Arras—Cambrai. 

(2) Operations, (a) French operation. General Fayolle 
(reserve group) by a preparatory local action, August 17-19, 
rectified the Tenth Army line and secured a better line of 
departure from Fontenoy (exclusive) to Nampcel (inclusive). 
On August 20, he delivered the main attack on a thirty-mile 
front from the Oise to Soissons with fourteen divisions, and by 
August 22, reached his objective, namely, the line of the Oise 
and the Ailette, from which he menaced the left of von Huttier’s 
XVIII Army (north of the Oise) and the German position east 
of Soissons. General Fayolle also advanced the French Third 
Army across the Divette to make the line of the French Tenth 
and First Armies continuous. 

(b) British operation, (i) Marshal Haig likewise divided 
his maneuver into two phases, a preliminary attack and the 
main attack. 

(ii) The preliminary attack. The objective of the pre¬ 
liminary attack was to isolate the strong position Thiepval 
and to recover the line of the Amiens—Arras railroad as a 
line of departure. He delivered the attack at 4:55 AM, August 
21, with four divisions, supported by tanks, on a nine-mile 
front, north of the Ancre from Thiepval (exclusive) to Moyenne- 
ville (inclusive). After capturing the German position, he 
passed three divisions through the lines, continued the advance 
with tanks, and, by the night of August 22, had captured the 
general line of the railroad, including Albert. 

(iii) The main attack. The plan of maneuver for the 
main attack required the British Third Army and that portion of 
the British Fourth Army north of the Somme to advance 
toward the line: Cambrai—St. Quentin, with the mission of 
flanking the German position east of the Somme. The right 
flank was to be covered by that part of the British Fourth Ar¬ 
my that was south of the Somme. That portion of the British 
First Army which was south of the River Sensee was to cover 
the left flank and to flank the German line east of Arras. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 355 

At dawn August 23, Marshal Haig launched the main at¬ 
tack on a front of thirty-three miles, from the north of Lihons to 
Mercatel, with the British Third and Fourth Armies reinforced 
by one hundred tanks. By the 26th, Thiepval was captured 
and the line had passed Bray. The operation was rapidly 
recovering the Arras—Bapaume railroad. 

By August 25, Marshal Haig estimated that the German 
line was so badly disorganized that the planned converging 
blow should be delivered. Accordingly, at dawn, August 26, 
the Canadians of the First Army delivered a surprise attack 
upon the right flank of the German Seventeenth Army, cap¬ 
tured the dominating position: Monchy-le Preaux. By the 
29th they had reached Fontaine Croisilles, which was on the 
old branch of the Hindenburg line from Drocourt to Queant. 
In this offensive, Marshal Haig penetrated the German line 
in several places, but by concentration of reserves, the Germans 
succeeded each time in closing the breach. 

Marshal von Hindenburg considered the Bavarian Crown 
Prince's position from Noyon to Croisilles untenable, and 
ordered a retirement to the line of the Sensee, the Somme, and 
the Canal du Nord. The retirement was successfully executed 
without disorder, but Marshal Haig captured Bapaume on 
August 29. 

4. Reduction of the Lys Salient, a. In addition to 
penetrating the Allied line at the junction of the British and 
Belgian sectors, in coordination with the similar but stronger 
blow toward Amiens, which was intended to destroy the British 
forces in France, the Germans had the included purpose of 
securing and working the mines in the Bethune mining area 
inasmuch as Germany needed metals. Accordingly, when the 
German offensive failed there was no reason for maintaining 
the Lys salient other than to profit from the use of the mines 
in that area. After the reduction of the Marne and Amiens 
salient, the Lys salient, projecting well out into the Allied 
territory, was very vulnerable, and its further retention invited 
disaster. Also, under the principle of economy of force, the 
Germans decided to evacuate the salient in order to gain 
troops for more effective use against the Allied and American 
offensive, then in progress. Orders were accordingly given 
for the German Sixth and Fourth Armies to evacuate the salient. 
Their instructions were to put the mines out of order and to 


356 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

devastate the country over which the retreat should be con¬ 
ducted. 

b. The evacuation of the salient was progressing slowly, 
until Marshal Haig decided to reduce the salient by pressure. 
In the battle before Mount Kemmel, while the British 
troops pushed against the salient, the American 27th 
Division (General O'Ryan) and the American 30th Division 
(General Lewis) of the American II Corps (General Read) on 
the left, struck the blow (August 31-September 2) in the 
decisive direction along the northern base of the salient in 
the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge that expedited the German 
withdrawal. The reduction of the salient was completed by 
September 6. 

5. German Retreat to the Siegfried Line. a. Situa¬ 
tion by September 1. By September 1, the Germans were driven 
back as far as the line: the Sensee—the Somme—Canal du 
Nord. General Ludendorff reported to the German Govern¬ 
ment that there was no further chance of a German victory. 

b. Plans. (1) German plans, (a) The Germans estimated 
that there was no chance of defeating the Allies and America. 
Orders were given for the repair of the Siegfried line, and in 
order to shorten the front, and thus gain troops, it was decided 
to retire to that line. The plan, however, contemplated a 
vigorous step by step defensive which would exact a high toll 
of casualties from the Allies and Americans for every mile 
gained. 

(b) Orders were likewise given for the reconnaissance 
and construction of a new second line (the Herman line) from 
a point on the Dutch frontier east of Bruges—thence along 
the Ecloo Canal south to the Lys—thence along the Lys to 
east of Courtrai—thence along the upper reaches of the Scheldt 
to the southwest of Valenciennes—thence via Solemes—Le 
Cateau—Guise—to the northeast of La Fere, where it would 
join the Hundig—Brunhilde position. 

(c) The plan of retreat called for a thorough demolition 
of railroads, roads, and mines. Supplies from Germany were 
cut down to absolute essentials and a large scale evacuation 
of heavy material to Germany was undertaken. It was also 
directed that fortresses in Alsace-Lorraine should be put into 
a state of defense and that all military material not required 




ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 357 

for immediate use should be removed from the region west and 
south of the Herman—Hundig—Brunhilde line. 

(d) On August 13, at a conference at the new German 
General Headquarters at Spa, to which place it had been 
moved from Avesnes on August 8, and over which conference 
the Kaiser presided, it was decided that Germany had no other 
alternative than to ask for peace. Marshal von Hindenburg 
however, recommended that no official steps in the direction 
of peace be taken until there should be some improvement in 
the military situation. He hoped to accomplish this by making 
the Allies and America pay so much for their gains that they 
would be inclined toward peace. 

(2) Allied plans. Marshal Foch planned to continue with¬ 
out relaxation the great converging maneuver then developing, 
under which the southern forces under General Petain would 
recapture the Chemin des Dames and the northern forces 
under Marshal Haig would penetrate the German line in the 
vicinity of Cambrai. 

(3) Operations. The operations which forced the 
Germans back to the Siegfried line were conducted by Marshal 
Haig on the north, who was exploiting the success of the re¬ 
duction of the Amiens salient, and by General Petain on the 
south, who was exploiting the success of the reduction of the 
Marne salient. These operations properly may be considered 
in two phases, namely, first phase, to September 7, and second 
phase, September 8 to 25. 

(a) The first phase (to September 7). (i) Marshal Haig’s 

maneuver. Marshal Haig's plan was to attack on the whole 
front of the British First, Third, and Fourth Armies to drive 
the enemy to the east and to hold him while delivering the 
main blow at the junction of the Siegfried and the Wotan lines, 
in the vicinity of Queant, with a view to enveloping the north 
flank of the dislocated southern wing of the German forces. 
The attack was launched at 5:00 AM, September 2, and pro¬ 
gressed all day. The German resistance was principally by 
machine gun fire. The force to deliver the main blow against 
the junction of the Siegfried and the Wotan lines was composed 
of two specially constituted units. The first unit was the 
Canadian Corps of the First Army, reinforced by forty tanks, 
Canadian cavalry, armored cars, and a mobile force of motor 
machine gun units. With three divisions on a four and one- 
half-mile front, it advanced to the attack, on September 2, at 


358 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

5:00 AM, and penetrated the Wotan line just north of the 
junction. At the same time, the XVII Corps of the British 
Third Army attacked and captured the triangle of fortifica¬ 
tions marking the junction of the Wotan and the Siegfried 
lines. This success menaced the right flank of the dislocated 
southern wing of the German armies. Marshal von Hinden- 
burg, at once, sent enough reserves to close the breach and gave 
the order for the step by step defensive retirement to begin 
from the Scarpe to the Vesle. The reduction of the Lys salient 
which really was a part of this operation has been described 
above. 

(ii) General Petain’s maneuver. The exploitation of the 
reduction of the Marne salient carried the operations north of 
Soissons. General Mangin, commanding the French Tenth 
Army, ordered a general attack at 5:25 AM, August 29, with 
the purpose of penetrating the German line in his front. While 
not succeeding in penetrating the German line, the Tenth 
Army crossed the Ailette on August 20, and by September 8 
had driven the German Ninth Army (General von Eben) back 
beyond Servais. The American 32d Division (General Haan) 
participated in this operation. Its objective was the capture 
of Juvigny. It attacked, on August 30, with brigades in column, 
the 64th Brigade in front, and the 63d Brigade in support. 
The infantry regiments of the 64th Brigade attacked side by 
side, the 127th on the right and the 128th on the left, each 
with two battalions in the front line and one in reserve. The 
division was reinforced by two companies of tanks, by a troop 
of Moroccan cavalry, and by French artillery. The division 
led the Allied divisions on its right and left and in a well 
executed attack captured Juvigny. This opened the road from 
Soissons to Chaulny. 

(iii) The French Sixth and Fifth Armies, farther to the 
east, crossed the Vesle on a frontage of thirty kilometers. The 
American 77th Division (Generals Duncan, Johnson, and 
Alexander) and the American 28th Division (General Muir), 
already north of the Vesle, by aggressive action in their sectors 
which reflected great credit upon American arms, drove the 
Germans northward to the Aisne. 

(iv) Combined operations in the center. From Bapaume to 
the Oise, the British Third and Fourth Armies and the French 
First and Third Armies aggressively pursued the Germans by 
rapid advances and tactical victories, up to September 7, 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 359 

when the Germans held between the Canal du Nord and the 
Oise on the line: Marauion—Trescaut—St. Simon—Crozat 

Canal, in order to gain time for the strengthening of the Siegfiied 
line. 

# (*>) The second phase (to September 25). (i) Marshal Foch 
desired to continue the operation with such vigor that Marshal 
von Hindenburg would not have any chance to attempt to 
seize the initiative. In pursuance of that plan, he issued 
instructions that there would be no pause in the operations. 

(ii) On September 12, the British Third Army with two 
corps, on a front of five miles, captured the villages of Trescourt 
and Havrincourt, and by a succession of small local attacks, 
continued to drive the Germans on that north pivot back 
to the Siegfried line. Also, by a local attack, the French 
Third Army (General Humbert) crossed the Crozat Canal 
and drove the German line back to Travecy on the Siegfried 
line. The French First Army (General Debeney) also, by 
local attacks, kept the initiative and made small advances. 
On September 14, due to shortening of the line, the staff of 
the French Third Army was sent to reserve and the troops were 
sent to the First Army. 

(iii) On September 18, Marshal Foch, by a combined 
British—French action, attacked the whole German force that 
was still in front of the Siegfried line. Marshal Haig attacked 
at 7:00 AM, in a heavy rain, with the British Third and Fourth 
Armies from Gouzecourt to Holnon, and by the 25th had forced 
the Germans on his front back to the Siegfried line. In this 
attack, dummy tanks were used with great success against 
the Germans. At the same time, the French First Army, 
by energetic attacks with limited objectives, forced the Ger¬ 
man line in its front back to the Siegfried line. The Tenth 
Army during this time attacked and advanced its right by 
capture of the high ground: La Malmaison—Pinon which 
controlled the Chemin-des-Dames (Maps 59, 71). 

6. Reduction of the St. Mihiel Salient. (Maps 25, 
35, 45, 63, 119, 128, 129 and 130.) a. Organization of the 
American First Army . (1) When the United States entered 

the war, the attitude of the Allies indicated a desire to utilize 
the American troops as a great reservoir from which to rein¬ 
force Allied troop units. Later, the Allies desired to make use 
of such reinforcements by absorbing American companies and 
battalions into Allied organizations. 


860 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(2) It was evident that American forces constituted the 
only hope of an Allied victory, and General Pershing insisted 
that the American forces could better assure such victory if 
formed into a distinctively American force which would deliver 
an American blow against Germany on a fixed part of the line. 

(3) In a conference between General Pershing and General 
Petain at Chantilly May 19, 1918, i.e., in the interval between 
the German Lys offensive (April 9) and the Marne offensive 
(May 27), it was agreed that the American army would soon 
take complete charge of a sector in the Woevre when four 
American divisions would be on that line. 

(4) Several American divisions had finished their training 
and were ready for active service against the Germans. How¬ 
ever, General Pershing waived such use of these divisions, for 
the present, and again placed all American forces at General 
Foch’s disposal to stop the German Marne offensive of May 27. 
They did stop it. 

(5) In pursuance of his plan to create an American force 
that could deliver a decisive blow against Germany, the next 
step was to group those divisions into American corps. This 
grouping was effected as follows: 

(a) The I Corps. The I Corps Staff and Headquarters 
was formed January 20, 1918, with the mission of taking over 
a sector on the Lorraine front with the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d 
Divisions. Major General Hunter Liggett was placed in com¬ 
mand with Headquarters at Neufchateau. 

(b) The II Corps. The II Corps Staff and Headquarters 
was formed February 20, 1918, with the immediate mission of 
supervising the administration and training of American divi¬ 
sions on the British part of the line. General Pershing, him¬ 
self, retained command of the II Corps until June 14, 1918, 
when Major General George W. Read was placed in command of 
the Corps. 

(c) The III Corps. The III Corps Staff and Headquarters 
was formed May 16, 1918, with the mission of administering 
the 3d, 5th and 32d Divisions. Major General Robert L. 
Bullard was placed in command. 

(d) The IV Corps. The IV Corps Staff and Headquarters 
was formed June 21, 1918, and Major General Joseph T. 
Dickman was placed in command. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 361 

(e) The V Corps. The V Corps Staff and Headquarters 
was formed about August 1, 1918, with Major General George 
H. Cameron in command. 

(f) The VI Corps. The VI Corps Staff and Headquarters 
was formed about September 1, 1918, with General Omar 
Bundy in command. 

(g) The VII Corps. The VII Corps Staff and Head¬ 
quarters was formed about September 1, 1918. 

(6) The American First Army was organized on the Vesle 
front. During August, the American I and III Corps were 
serving side by side in the Marne salient. Marshal Foch, on 
August 9, finally consented to the organization of the American 
First Army, with headquarters at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and 
agreed to its early transfer to the Woevre sector on a front 
extending from Nomeny, east of the Moselle, to the north of 
St. Mihiel. General Pershing arranged the details later the 
same day with General Petain. On August 10, General Persh¬ 
ing created the American First Army, retaining command 
thereof himself, with Brigadier General H. A. Drum as Chief 
of Staff. 

(7) General Pershing took over nominal control of a sector 
on the Vesle front but began the secret transfer of the First 
Army, at once, to the Woevre front, with headquarters at 
Neufchateau, under the mission of reducing the St. Mihiel 
salient, assigned to him by General Foch, at Bombon, on July 
24. 

(8) General Pershing was concentrating the elements of 
the First Army from the various places to which the units had 
been sent under emergency call to stop the German offensive, 
and was organizing the First Army under the plan that it 
would require eleven American divisions for the first opera¬ 
tion, i.e., the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, when he 
received a request from Marshal Foch, on August 23, for the 
detachment of five divisions, namely; the 27th and 30th to 
the British, and the 28th, 32d and 37th to the French, for 
reinforcement of their effort to continue the exploitation of 
the reduction of the Amiens and Marne salients. This request 
considerably inconvenienced the organization of the First 
Army and the preparation for the maneuver of reducing the 
St. Mihiel salient. Observing the French and English striving 
to obtain the use of American troops, the Italians likewise 
made a very determined effort to secure the use of from twenty 


382 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

to twenty-five American divisions but their request was not 
favorably received. 

(9) The foregoing are some of the obstacles which General 
Pershing had to overcome in order to create an American army. 
Finally, however, at Marshal FoclTs Headquarters at Bombon, 
on September 2, at a conference at which General Petain was 
present, Marshal Foch conceded General Pershing’s claim that 
the American Army should be used as a unit. 

b. Situation in the Woevre. (1) After General von Moltke’s 
defeat at the First Battle of the Marne, his successor, General 
von Falkenhayn, by way of diversion and to rectify the line, 
attempted to reduce the Verdun salient by a converging 
maneuver. The northern force under the German Crown 
Prince was stopped by the French Third Army on September 
24, 1914. The southern force under General von Strantz was 
not stopped until after it had pushed in the St. Mihiel salient 
and captured St. Mihiel. 

(2) The St. Mihiel salient thus formed was about twenty- 
four miles wide along the base, and about fourteen miles deep. 
It extended from Les Eparges, via St. Mihiel and Seicheprey, 
to Pont-a-Mousson, a distance of about forty miles. Its pri¬ 
mary strength lay in the natural defensive features of the terrain 
itself. The western face of the salient extended along the 
rugged, heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse. The 
southern face followed the heights of the Meuse for eight 
kilometers to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woevre, 
including within the German lines the detached heights of 
Loupmont and Montsec, which dominated the plain and 
afforded the Germans unusual facilities for observation. In 
this section, the fall rains begin about the middle of September, 
after which the Woevre plains become very difficult of passage. 

(3) The French First Army attempted, without success, 
to reduce the St. Mihiel salient during February, 1915, as an 
operation with a limited objective and with the mission of 
retaining the initiative. Also, during the period April 5 to 14, 
1915, the French High Command attempted, without success, 
to reduce the salient with four army corps and a cavalry corps 
in a converging maneuver intended to pinch off the salient 
along its base. 

(4) From a defensive point of view to the Germans, the 
salient covered the great German fortress of Metz and its 
very sensitive railroad center. It also covered the extensive 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 363 

mining region near Briey upon which Germany was dependent 
for iron. 

From an offensive point of view to the Germans, the salient 
interrupted the main Paris—Nancy railroad, and the Toul— 
Verdun railroad. It also threatened a penetration of the French 
defensive system and was a constant check on French freedom 
of action, particularly against any offensive that might be 
launched from Verdun, the Argonne, or Champagne, against 
the German line of communications Metz—Mezierres. 

(5) As the railroad from Verdun to St. Menehould was 
under German interdiction fire, the Germans in the St. Mihiel 
salient, at first, practically deprived Verdun of railroad com¬ 
munication. Verdun, in 1916, was saved by motor transport. 
But it was not until the French had built a new direct railroad 
from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, that Verdun became secure from a 
supply point of view. 

(6) In addition to utilizing the salient's natural strength, 
the Germans organized it for defense. The first line of defense 
consisted of two positions, namely, the Wilhelm position and 
the Schroerer position. The Wilhelm position paralleled the 
front line and was close to it. About five kilometers farther to 
the rear the Germans had constructed the strong Schroerer 
position which, at its bases, joined the Michel position. The 
latter extending along the base of the salient was a part of the 
German second line of defense. During a period of four years 
the Germans had perfected the defense of the salient by every 
artificial means. 

c. Plans. (1) German plans, (a) After General von 
Falkenhayn's defeat at Verdun, von Hindenburg had estimated 
that the French would reduce the St. Mihiel salient, and he had 
plans prepared for its evacuation to the Michel position. After 
the Allied successful exploitation of the reduction of the Amiens 
salient, he gave orders for a retreat to the Siegfried line. In 
like manner, on September 8, he directed the German forces 
in the St. Mihiel salient to withdraw to the Michel position. 
Because of the important industrial area in rear, guarded by the 
salient, and because of local confidence in ability to hold the 
salient, the execution of the order was not expedited either at 
the headquarters of General von Gallwitz’s group or at the 
headquarters of General Fuch's Army Detachment C. 


364 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) The St. Mihiel salient was garrisoned by Army Detach¬ 
ment C (General Fuch), which was a part of General von Gall- 
witz's Army Group and consisted of the following forces: 

The Bavarian I Corps on the south face with five divisions. 

The V Corps on the west face with three divisions. 

The first reserve line—one division in the lower third of the salient. 

The general reserves—four divisions in the heart of the salient. 

(2) General Pershing's plan, (a) General Pershing's gen¬ 
eral plan was to attract German attention to Belfort and then 
to reduce the St. Mihiel salient by the surprise delivery of a 
converging attack against the two faces of the salient; the 
stronger blow against the southern face, following an exceed¬ 
ingly intense but short artillery preparation. The two blows 
were to be accompanied by a holding attack against the nose 
of the salient. 

(b) The order of battle from right to left was as follows: 

(i) The southern force. The American I Corps (General 
Liggett), with right near Pont-a-Mousson, had divisions on the 
line as follows: 82d (General Burnham), 90th (General Allen), 
5th (General McMahon), and 2d (General Lejeune), with the 
78th (General McRae) in reserve. 

The American IV Corps (General Dickman), with right 
joining the left of the I Corps, had divisions on the line as 
follows: 89th (General Wright), 42d (General Menoher), and 
1st (General Summerall), with the 3d (General Buck) in reserve. 

(ii) Central force {French). The French II Colonial Corps 
(General Blondlet), with right joining the left of the American 
IV Corps, had French divisions on the line as follows: 39th, 
36th, and the 2d Cavalry Division (dismounted). 

(iii) The western force. The American V Corps (General 
Cameron), with right joining the left of the French II Corps, 
had divisions on the line as follows: 26th (General Edwards), 
4th (General Hines), and the French 15th. The left of the 
line was near Watronville. 

(iv) General Pershing held the 35th and 91st Divisions 
(Generals Traub and Johnston) in rear of the western face of 
the salient, in reserve, and a general reserve consisting of the 
80th Division (General Cronkhite) in rear of the western face 
and the 33d Division (General Bell) in rear of the southern face. 

(c) General Pershing's detailed plan, (i) General Pershing's 
plan for attracting the German attention to Belfort 
provided for the movement of the American VI Corps Head- 



ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 365 

quarters (General Bundy) to Belfort where it would establish 
itself and prepare detailed plans for an American offensive 
from that region toward Mulhouse, with the mission of insur¬ 
ing the destruction of the Rhine bridges and of establishing 
American lines along the Rhine. 

(ii) General Pershing’s detailed plan for the main opera¬ 
tion called for a four hours’ violent artillery preparation which 
would include interdiction of the extremely sensitive German 
road and railroad net back of the salient to include Metz. 

(iii) The southern force, pivoting on the Moselle, and with 
its left near Xivray, was to swing in toward Vigneulles at 
dawn, on September 12, with seven divisions on a twelve-mile 
front. The 1st Division, on the left of the IV Corps, was to 
execute the double mission of protecting its own flank and of 
advancing about twelve miles due north toward the heart of 
the salient to make contact with troops of the V Corps. 

(iv) The western force was to attack at 8:00 AM, on 
September 12, as follows: The 26th Division on the right of 
the V Corps was to make a deep advance southeast toward 
Vigneulles. The 4th Division was not to advance. The 
French 15th Division was to make a short advance to the 
edge of the heights to cover the left of the 26th Division. 

(v) The French II Colonial Corps, covering a front of 
twenty-five miles on the nose of the salient, was to follow up 
the retreat of the enemy. 

d. Concentration of troops. (1) The concentration for 
that operation, which was to be a surprise, involved the move¬ 
ment of approximately 500,000 troops which marched at night 
and remained concealed during the day. The American 
divisions, on September 1, were scattered on the line from 
Switzerland to the Oise, with the 27th and 30th Divisions in 
the II Corps still farther north in the British sector. The 
center of mass of the American divisions not on the line was 
south of Toul and east of Chaumont. 

(2) (a) The French were generous in giving General 
Pershing assistance in that operation. Their staff assistance 
was valuable and they also furnished troops and weapons. 
The French II Colonial Corps, consisting of two infantry 
divisions and one cavaly division, was to hold its place against 
the nose of the salient. A fourth French division was placed 
under General Pershing’s orders for use with the northern 
converging force near Les Eparges. 


366 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) The French also assisted materially toward the organ¬ 
ization of corps and army troops by furnishing the following: 

580 guns of 75-mm. caliber. 

793 heavy cannon and mortars of various calibers. 

182 trench mortars. 

273 tanks. 

An independent aerial division. 

(c) This air division, together with bombing squadrons 
furnished by the British and the American forces, composed 
the largest assembly of aviation ever engaged in one operation 
on the Western front. 

e. Operations. (1) Belfort diversion. Although the Belfort 
diversion did not succeed in making Marshal von Hindenburg 
believe that the expected American effort would be delivered 
at Belfort, it did create a sufficient doubt in his mind to cause 
him to reinforce General von Gundell’s Army Detachment 
there by three divisions. 

(2) Main operation, (a) After a violent artillery prepara¬ 
tion of four hours, the attack, assisted by light tanks, was 
launched against the southern face of the salient at 5:00 AM, 
on September 12, in a dense fog, and advanced under cover of 
a great volume of artillery fire. Under similar conditions, 
the attack was launched against the west face of the salient, 
at 8:00 AM. 

(b) The Germans, slow in executing the order to evacuate 
the salient, had apparently started to withdraw some troops 
on the eve of the attack, but had been unable to carry it 
through. They had no expectation that an American attack 
could be prepared so quickly and were taken completely by 
surprise. 

(c) The operation was carried out with entire precision. 
On September 12, the southern converging force reached and 
passed the line Faye-en-Haye—Thiaucourt—Nonsard; the 
western converging force passed the line Combres—Dommar- 
tin—Sussey; and the French II Corps captured St. Mihiel 
and Apremont. The next day, September 13, the two converg¬ 
ing forces joined at dawn near Hattonchatel and Vigneulles, 
and advancing, reached the line: Noroy—Hatton ville— 
Fresnes, which included all objectives. However, it was diffi¬ 
cult to restrain the Americans who finally had obtained their 
chance to fight under their own officers, and by the 15th they 
had reached the line north of Noroy—north to Noel—Fresnes* 




ALLIED AND AMERICAN OFFENSIVE 367 

That completed the operation for the time being and the line 
was stabilized to be held by a sinaller force. 

(d) Nearly 16,000 prisoners, about 440 cannon, and large 
stores of materiel and supplies were captured at a cost of less 
than 7,000 casualties. 

(e) Although the fighting was not as violent in the reduc¬ 
tion of the St. Mihiel salient as was the fighting by the 1st and 
2d Divisions in the offensive toward Soissons, July 18, the 
result of the St. Mihiel operation had a profound effect on the 
contesting parties in the war. The mere presence of an Ameri¬ 
can army in the line, capable of the effort described above, 
made a tremendous impression on all—both enemies and 
friends. The American troops had implicit confidence in their 
superiority. No propaganda could overcome the depress¬ 
ing effect on the German troops of that demonstration of 
American ability to organize a large American force and to 
drive it successfully through the German defenses. 

(f) The principal comment to be made on the St. Mihiel 
operation is that General Pershing here made the demonstra¬ 
tion that the tactical doctrine of open warfare, in which he had 
trained the American forces, was correct. 

7. The Principles of War. (Maps 63, 78 and 131.) 
a. The principle of security. (1) When General Foch, during 
the Second Battle of the Marne, decided to seize the initia¬ 
tive and to conduct offensive warfare, he divided that offen¬ 
sive into two periods. The offensive in the first period was 
to consist of several operations, each with a limited objective. 
He estimated that the attainment of those limited objectives 
would occupy the rest of the year 1918, and that in 1919 he 
could launch a general offensive for the purpose of gaining a 
decision. That general offensive was to be the second period. 

(2) When General Foch made that decision, Germany 
occupied the most advanced position that she had attained 
on the Western front. From the Marne salient she threatened 
Paris, and it was necessary to immobilize troops for the defense 
of that city. From the Amiens salient, she threatened a pene¬ 
tration between the French and the British forces, and it was 
necessary to immobilize troops to protect that junction. From 
the Lys salient, she threatened the British base ports on the 
Channel, and it was necessary to immobilize troops to protect 
those ports. From the St. Mihiel salient, she threatened the 
line of communications of the Verdun salient, and it was neces- 


368 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

sary to immobilize troops to protect those communications. 
Although Germany had failed in her great offensive she still 
occupied vantage points, from which, under favorable condi¬ 
tions, she might harm the Allied and American force. 

(3) The situation, at this time, immobilized a large part 
of the Allied and American forces, and, moreover, the fact that 
his lines of communication were interdicted, deprived General 
Foch of freedom of action. His mission, therefore, was not only 
to make secure those lines of communication, but also to win 
freedom of action for decisive operations. 

b. Through the offensives which, by September 25, 1918, 
reduced the Marne, the Amiens, the Lys, and the St. Mihiel 
salients, Marshal Foch observed the principle of security in 
that he gained freedom of action for the launching of an un¬ 
limited decisive general offensive operation. 


CHAPTER XIX 


Allied and American General Of¬ 
fensive to the End of the War 


1. Situation, September 25, 1918. 

a. Description of the battlefield. 

(1) Line from Switzerland to Metz... 

(2) Line from Metz to the Channel... 

b. German situation. 

c. Allied and American situation. 


2. Plans. 375 

a. German plans. 375 

(1) General plans. 375 

(2) Defensive system.375 

(3) German order of battle.377 

b. Marshal Foch’s plan.378 

c. General Pershing’s plans and preparation..'.379 

(1) The American sector.379 

(a) Its boundaries.379 

(b) Obstacles in front.380 

(i) Natural obstacles.380 

(ii) Artificial obstacles......380 

(iii) The Meuse-Argonne defile.381 

(c) Relation between American First Army and French 

Fourth Army.381 

(d) Enemy order of battle.382 

(2) General Pershing’s general plan.382 

(3) American order of battle.382 

(4) General Pershing’s plan of maneuver west of the Meuse ....383 

3. Phases of the Operation....384 

4. Operations—The First Phase (September 26-October 13)— 

Penetration of German First Line of Defense.385 

a. The southern converging blow.385 

(1) The American First Army.385 

(2) The French Fourth Army...387 

(3) The American 2d Division captures Blanc Mont.388 

(a) Situation.388 

(b) The 2d Division plan......389 

(c) The attack.389 

(4) The American 36th Division pursues to the Aisne.390 

b. Operations against the German center.390 

(1) Operations north of the Oise.390 

(a) Obstacles.390 

(b) Mission..390 

(c) Order of battle.391 

/- (d) Plan. 391 

(e) The attack on Cambrai.391 


Page 

...371 

...371 

...371 

...371 

...372 

...373 


369 











































370 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 


c. 

d. 


(f) Main blow by Fourth Army (U. S. II Corps). 

(i) The plan... 

(ii) Obstacles. 

(iii) The attack... 

(2) Operations east of the Oise. 

The northern converging blow..... 

Results of the first phase operation.—. 


391 

391 

391 

392 

393 

393 

394 


6. Operations—The Second Phase (October 13-20) —Driving the 


Germans Back to Second Line of Defense .395 

a. Plans..™.395 

(1) Marshal von Hindenburg’s plan.:.395 

(2) Marshal Foch’s plan.395 

b. The southern converging blow.. 395 

(1) General Pershing’s Group of Armies.395 

(2) The French Fourth Army...396 

c. The northern converging blow. 396 

d. Operations against the German center.396 

e. Results of the second phase operation.397 


6 . Operations.—The Third Phase (October 20-November 4)— 


Penetration of German Second Line of Defense.398 

a. Plans.398 

(1) Marshal von Hindenburg’s plan.398 

(2) Marshal Foch’s plan...398 

b. The northern converging blow.398 

c. Operations against the German center....399 

d. Southern converging blow.400 

(1) Situation.400 

(2) General Pershing’s attack, November 1.400 

(a) Situation, October 31.__.400 

(b) General Pershing’s plan..400 

(i) General plan.400 

(ii) Purpose.401 

(iii) Method.401 

(iv) Plan of maneuver.401 

(v) Order of battle..™.401 

(vi) Artillery plan.401 

(c) Operations.402 

e. Results of third phase operation.403 

7. Operations.—The Fourth Phase (November 4-11)—The Pursuit..403 

a. Plans.403 

(1) Marshal von Hindenburg’s plans.403 

( 2 ) Marshal Foch’s plan.403 

(3) General Pershing’s plan.403 

b. Operations.403 

(1) The Allied front.403 

( 2 ) The American front.404 

(a) The First Army.404 

(b) The Second Army.405 

8 . Armistice. 405 

a. German request for armistice.405 

b. Terms of the Armistice.405 

c. The advance into Germany. 405 

9. Return of American Forces to America.406 

10 . General Pershing. 406 

11. The Principles of War.—The Principle of the Offensive.407 






















































ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 371 

1. Situation, September 25,1918. (Maps 61,114,130,131, 
132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 
145, 146, 147, 148, 149 and 150.) a. Description of the battle¬ 
field. From the south to north, the battle line was approxi¬ 
mately in the form of the capital letter “S” with the center of 
the letter between the two loops, just east of Verdun. The 
situations within those two loops were not alike. 

(1) Line from Switzerland to Metz {inclusive), i.e ., the lower 
loop, (a) From Switzerland to the Moselle, near Metz, the line 
ran throughout its length in front of the German permanent 
line of fortifications. Conforming to the frontier, and to the 
fortification line, it constituted a French salient whose base 
was about one hundred miles long and whose depth was about 
fifteen miles. The eastern face lay west of the Rhine from 
Switzerland to Strasbourg (inclusive) and was exceedingly 
strong. The other face, from Strasbourg via Mohrange to Metz 
(inclusive), passed through exceedingly difficult and easily 
defendable terrain, which had been greatly strengthened both 
before and during the war. The French failed to penetrate 
that line in September, 1914. 

(b) An operation against the German line from Switzer¬ 
land to Metz would have to have been organized with the 
greatest care. As the center of gravity of troops, material, 
and tranportation, on September 25, was far to the west and 
northwest, a considerable period of time would have been 
required for the organization of such an offensive. If such an 
offensive had been organized, it would have been forced to 
operate through exceedingly difficult terrain, against a line of 
permanent fortifications, and would have been subject to a 
German converging counter offensive from the general direc¬ 
tions of Neuf Brisach and Mohrange. Operations against this 
line, if successful, would deliver a decisive blow against the 
southern flank of the German forces. 

(2) Line from Metz {inclusive) to the English Channel, (a) 
The line from Metz to the English Channel constituted the 
other or upper loop. It ran from Metz, in a general westerly 
direction north of Verdun and Rheims, to the heights of the 
Aisne, which was the commanding terrain of northeastern 
France. Passing thereafter between Soissons and Laon, it 
ran a little west of north to the sea. 

(b) A German salient, (i) In general terms, the battle 
line from Metz to the sea inclosed a German salient whose 


372 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

base line from Metz to Ostend was nearly one hundred and 
eighty miles, whose depth was about sixty miles, and whose 
front line was more than three hundred miles long. 

(ii) This salient, although apparently satisfactory for 
offensive operations, was inherently weak for defensive opera¬ 
tions. 

(iii) Its base line from Metz to Ostend rested upon a 
triangular area of French and Belgian occupied territory whose 
eastern face was the German frontier from near Metz north 
to Holland, and whose northern face, making practically an 
angle of 90 ° with the eastern face, extended along the southern 
boundary of Holland to the sea east of Bruges, and along the 
sea to include Ostend. 

(iv) Thus the northern face of the triangular area rested 
on a neutral country whose boundary could not be crossed by 
German forces without being interned and on the sea which 
the Allies and America then controlled. 

(v) The eastern face and the northern face of that triangu¬ 
lar area were each about two hundred miles long. 

(vi) Although a right angled base line is best, particularly 
in time of retreat, in this case it was a source of weakness to 
Germany because she did not control the northern leg of that 
base line, and would be entirely dependent on the eastern leg, 
i.e., from near Metz to Holland, for lines of communication 
and retreat. 

b. German situation. (1) By September 25, the Germans 
had been driven out of the St. Mihiel salient, and, on the rest 
of the French front, had been forced back to the line from which 
they launched their great offensive earlier in the year. 

(2) The shortening of the line and the strength of the 
Siegfried line had given an opportunity for some rest and to 
make an effort to build up a reserve. However, the Allied and 
American blows near the junction of the British and French 
forces had been delivered with such vigor, and so continually, 
that von Hindenburg was forced to create a new Group Head¬ 
quarters to attend to that special situation. Von Boehn was 
placed in command of the new group which consisted of the 
Second Army (von Carlowitz), the Eighteenth Army (von 
Huttier), and the Ninth Army (von Eben). Von Boehn's 
Group was placed between the Group of the Crown Prince of 
Germany and the Group of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 373 

# ( 3 ) 0n September 21, it was reported in Berlin that Bul¬ 
garia had asked for an armistice. As a matter of fact, she did 
not ask for the armistice until September 25. 

(4) German morale was very low. The Kaiser, although 
Supreme Commander on all the fronts of the Central Powers, 
retained personal command on the Western front, exercising 
it through Marshal von Hindenburg. 

(5) (a) The German lines of communication to the Western 
front north of Metz, and the lines of retreat therefrom, rested 
on two great trunk lines. One was the main railroad line from 
Germany to Paris via Liege. The other was the railroad 
system that came from the Rhine between Coblenz and Stras¬ 
bourg, both inclusive, and that fed the line through the Luxem¬ 
bourg—Metz net. 

(b) The Ardennes Forest, between those two trunk rail¬ 
roads, was so difficult of passage that no east and west railroad 
had been constructed in it. 

(c) The Liege line covered the front from St. Quentin 
(inclusive) north to the sea, and the Luxembourg—Metz net 
covered the front: St. Quentin (exclusive) to the Moselle 
(inclusive). A small cross line connected those two trunk 
lines between Luxembourg and Namur. However, the main 
cross supply line in France was the Metz—Mezieres—Valen¬ 
ciennes—Doual—Lille—Courtrai—Ghent (Gand) line. 

c. Allied and American situation. (1) (a) The Germans 
had been pushed back so far that rail communication had 
become much easier along the whole line. 

(b) On September 3, the United States, following the lead 
of the Allies, recognized Czecho-Slovakia as a belligerent nation, 
as a war measure, because such recognition tended to disrupt 
Austria-Hungary, with whom the United States had been at 
war since December 7, 1917, and also tended to raise up a 
hostile state on Germany’s border. 

(c) American troops were still arriving at the rate of 
about 10,000 a day. Also, on September 12, about 13,000,000 
more Americans were registered for military service under the 
second American Selective Service Act. 

(d) Although success had attended the Allied and Ameri¬ 
can execution of the limited objective operations called for in 
the first period of Marshal Foch’s plan, and it was apparent 
to all that the time had arrived for the general offensive called 


374 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

for in the second period of his plan, neither he or any of the 
Allied Commanders-in-Chief believed that a decision could be 
secured in 1918. 

(2) (a) General Pershing, with Allied approval, organized 
the American Expeditionary Force for delivery of a distinc¬ 
tively American blow in Lorraine. In emergency, Marshal 
Foch used the American forces. 

(b) Marshal Foch approved the organization of the Ameri¬ 
can First Army, but did not authorize its use as such except in 
the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. General Pershing de¬ 
sired the assignment of the American First Army to a sector 
in Lorraine. 

(c) The subject of an American sector was considered at a 
conference between Marshal Foch and General Pershing at the 
latter’s headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois on August 30. Mar¬ 
shal Foch announced that, in view of the success of the British 
at Amiens and the French at Chemin des Dames, he believed 
that the limited Allied offensive (i.e., first period) which was 
to prepare for the campaign of 1919 (i.e., second period) might 
be carried farther in 1918. He then proposed to split up the 
American forces as follows: 

First: To limit the objective in the reduction of the St. 
Mihiel salient to the line: Thiaucourt—Vigneulles, thus freeing 
the Paris—Avricourt railroad, and to reduce the American 
force used to ten or eleven divisions. 

Second: To reinforce the French Second Army with four 
to six American divisions for an attack between the Meuse 
and the Argonne. 

Third: To limit the American army to eight or ten divi¬ 
sions and to make a group of it with the French Fourth Army for 
a Franco-American attack extending from the Argonne west 
to the Souain Road. The attack was to be delivered by the 
American army astride the Aisne on the right, and by the 
French Fourth Army on the left. 

(d) General Pershing told Marshal Foch that he could 
not accept the latter’s proposals for the following reasons: 

First: It was contrary to the idea of a distinctly American 
army operating on a particular front for which an enormous 
amount of preparation had already been made in construc¬ 
tion of base ports, roads, railroads, regulating stations, etc., 
and for which idea General Pershing had been insistent from 
the beginning. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 375 

Second: The older American divisions had encountered 
so much difficulty, in their service with the French and British, 
that they were no longer willing to be incorporated in the Allied 
armies, even by larger units; and, if so incorporated, American 
morale would suffer further. General Pershing then very 
frankly told Marshal Foch that the strategical employment of 
the American First Army would be undertaken wherever 
Marshal Foch desired, but that the proposal of the latter to 
disrupt the American army for service with French armies 
would not be entertained. 

(3) A further conference was held, on September 2, at 
Marshal Foch's headquarters at Bombon, with General Petain 
present. After considerable discussion, Marshal Foch con¬ 
ceded a distinctively American sector on the line in Lorraine. 

2. Plans, a. German plans. (1) General plans. Von Hin- 
denburg realized that Germany could not win. He estimated 
that diplomacy and a bold defensive would secure a better 
peace than could be secured by surrender. His general plan for 
that bold defensive was, while defending the fortified line from 
Switzerland to Metz, to conduct a step by step defensive north 
of Metz from the great salient in France and Belgium to the 
German boundary, where, if necessary, the whole manhood of 
Germany should be called to the colors in a levee en masse to 
protect the Fatherland from invasion. The defense was to be 
conducted with the view of inflicting such great losses on the 
Allies and Americans as would incline them to more favorable 
peace terms than they then would be willing to give. 

(2) Defensive system. The German defense system may 
be divided into two parts, the permanent defenses and the tem¬ 
porary defenses. 

(a) Permanent defenses. Before the war, Germany forti¬ 
fied her side of the French frontier from Switzerland to Luxem¬ 
burg at great expense and in a most efficient manner. That 
line consisted of the fortified areas: Istein-Neuf Brisach— 
Strasbourg—Mohrange, and Metz—Thionville. The part from 
Switzerland to Strasbourg (inclusive) defended the line of the 
Rhine. The line from Strasbourg to Metz was strengthened 
by the extensive fortified area of Mohrange. It was there that 
the French offensive, in September, 1914, was stopped and 
turned back. The part of the line from Switzerland to Luxem¬ 
burg was exceedingly strong. 


376 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) Temporary defense lines . The lines of temporary 
defense, contemplated for this step by step defensive, including 
the line the Germans then occupied, were as follows: 

(i) First line of defense: Preuss position from English 
Channel to junction with Wotan position near Lille. Wotan 
position to junction with Siegfried position northwest of Cam- 
brai. Siegfried position from Cambrai passing west of St. 
Quentin to junction with Aisne—Vesle position west of Rheims 
—Apremont—Michel position—then to Switzerland. The first 
line of defense covered the following cross railroad line: Ostend 
—Courtrai—Lille—Douai—Valenciennes—Mezieres—Metz. 

(ii) Second line of defense: Lys position from Dutch 
frontier northwest of Ecloo to junction with Herman position 
north of Tournai. Herman position, via Valenciennes, to 
junction with Hundig position on the Oise north of Laon. 
Hundig—Brunhilde position, via Rethel, to junction with 
Kriemhilde position southeast of Vouziers. Kriemhilde posi¬ 
tion along east bank of the Aisne to south of Vouziers, thence 
east to junction with first line of defense east of the Meuse. The 
second line of defense covered the following cross railroad line, 
Ghent—Brussels—Mons—Avesnes—Mezieres—Metz. 

(iii) A switch line from the Dutch boundary, north of 
Ghent, extended via Ghent and along the Escaut River to 
junction with the second line of defense north of Tournai. It 
was intended to increase the defensive strength of the north line 
which rested on the Dutch border, and to protect the Ant¬ 
werp—Brussels—Mons—Avesnes cross railroad line. 

(iv) Third line of defense: Antwerp—Meuse position 
from Dutch boundary at mouth of Escaut—west of Antwerp— 
west of Brussels—Charleroi—east bank of Meuse to junction 
with the second and first lines of defense east of the Meuse and 
north of Verdun. The third line of defense covered the follow¬ 
ing cross railroad lines: Antwerp—Brussels—Namur—Mez¬ 
ieres—Metz, and the smaller cross railroad line further east: 
Namur—Luxemburg. 

(v) The fourth line of defense: The Grenz position along 
the German boundary via both sides of Luxembourg to junction 
with first line of defense at the Moselle. The fourth line of 
defense was not organized. It was contemplated that the 
manhood of Germany, called to the colors as a levee en masse , 
would defend the Fatherland at the Grenz position. 





ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 377 

(vi) Each of these lines was an exceedingly deep de¬ 
fensive zone, selected with the greatest care to take the 
maximum advantage of the defensive possibilities of the terrain. 
Various positions, particularly in the first line, were to be 
strengthened by reinforced concrete. The whole system 
was the most comphrehensive system for defense in history. A 
distinguishing feature of this system of temporary defense was 
the use of concrete for construction of strong points and places 
of shelter. 

(vii) The German pivot: Metz—Mezieres, was defended 
by the first, second, and third lines. The railroad line: Me¬ 
zieres—Valenciennes, was defended by the first and second 
lines. The railroad line: Valenciennes—Douai—Lille—Cour- 
trai—Ostend, was defended by the first line only. This 
reveals the German plan to hold the line in front 
of Carignan—Sedan as the pivot of the whole German 
defense system in France and Belgium. Germany’s whole 
plan for the step by step defensive was based on each 
line holding until the railroad which it was covering had done 
its work. Accordingly, sensitiveness increased from north to 
south, until the most sensitive line: Mezieres—Sedan—Car¬ 
ignan, was reached. This line was so sensitive that its pene¬ 
tration would force the surrender of German troops west of 
the line: Mezieres—Antwerp. 

(3) German order of battle. The German order of battle 
from Switzerland to the Channel was as follows: 

Duke of Wurtemburg’s Group, to Metz (inclusive): 

Detachement B (von Gunde 1). 

Detachment A (von Mudra). 

The Nineteenth Army (von Bothmer). 

Von Gallwitz’s Group, to the Meuse (inclusive): 

Detachment C (von Fuchs). 

The Fifth Army (von Marwitz). 

German Crown Prince’s Group, to the Aisne (inclusive): 

The Third Army (von Einem). 

The First Army (Fritz von Below). 

The Seventh Army (von Eberhardt). 

Von Boehn’s Group, to Cambrai (inclusive): 

The Ninth Army (von Eben). 

The Eighteenth Army (von Huttier). 

The Second Army (von Carlowitz). 

Bavarian Crown Prince’s Group, to the Sea: 

The Seventeenth Army (Otto von Below). 

The Sixth Army (von Quast). 

The Fourth Army (von Arnim). 

(4) (a) Germany had a total of 163 divisions on the line, 
with 68, of which only 28 were fresh, in the strategical reserve. 


378 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

In spite of a reduction of the line by about 120 miles, Germany 
was forced to use as many divisions on the line as on July 15. 

(b) To secure replacements, Germany had been forced to 
dissolve sixteen divisions and to reduce the battalions of fifty 
divisions from four to three companies each. 

(c) German General Headquarters were still maintained 
at Spa. 

b. Marhsal Foch’s plan. (1) In view of the success of the 
Allied and American limited objective offensive, Marshal Foch 
believed that the general offensive should be launched, although 
he did not expect it to end the war in 1918. 

(2) (a) His general plan for that general offensive was to 
launch a great surprise converging offensive against the great 
German salient in France and Belgium with the idea of deci¬ 
sively defeating the Germans and forcing them to ask for peace. 

(b) His plan conformed to the normal method of reducing 
a salient, i.e., to strike along the base of the salient on both 
of its faces while pressing the salient in by constant attack 
against its nose. 

(3) Marshal Foch selected General Pershing to deliver 
the principal blow, along the base of the salient from the south, 
with the American army on the Meuse-Argonne front. The 
object was to capture the pivot of the German defense system 
north of Verdun and to cut the German lines of communica¬ 
tion in the vicinity of Sedan. It was a plan for a strategical 
penetration. The American effort was to be supported by 
General Gouraud with the French Fourth Army, whose sector 
on the left of the American army extended to the River Suippe. 
Marshal Foch charged General Petain with the duty of co¬ 
ordinating the effort of these two armies. 

(4) Marshal Foch selected the King of Belgium to deliver 
the blow along the northern base of the salient, in the general 
direction of Ghent, with the Flanders Group, consisting of the 
British Second, French Sixth, and the Belgian Army, with the 
task of cutting the German line of communications near Ghent 
and forcing the Germans away from the English Channel. 

(5) To force the Germans back from the nose of the salient. 
Marshal Foch planned two maneuvers: first, that the French 
Fifth and Tenth Armies should drive the Germans beyond the 
Aisne, and, second, that the French First and the British 
Fourth, Third, and First Armies should attack in the direction 
of St. Quentin—Cambrai. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 379 

(6) These plans were announced to the Allied and Ameri¬ 
can Commanders-in-Chief at the conference at Bombon on 
September 2, the necessary orders being issued the next day. 

(7) The Allied and American order of battle, from Switzer¬ 
land to the sea was as follows: 

French Eastern Group (General Castelnau), to the Moselle: 

The Seventh Army (General De Boissoudy). 

The Eighth Army (General Gerard). 

American Group (General Pershing), to the Aisne: 

The First Army (General Pershing). 

French Center Group (General Maistre), to the Aisne west of 
Rheims: 

The Fourth Army (General Gouraud). 

The Fifth Army (General Berthelot). 

French Reserve Group (General Fayolle), to the Somme: 

The Tenth Army (General Mangin). 

The First Army (General Debeney). 

British Group (Marshal Haig), to the Lys: 

The Fourth Army (General Rawlinson). 

The Third Army (General Byng). 

The First Army (General Horne). 

The Fifth Army (General Birdwood). 

Flanders Group (King Albert), to the sea: 

The British Second Army (General Plummer). 

The French Sixth Army (General Degoutte). 

The Belgian Army (General Wilmans). 

(8) The following were Commanders-in-Chief: 

General Petain of French forces, with headquarters at Provins, east 
of Paris. 

Marshal Haig of British forces, with headquarters at Montreuil, 
northwest of Amiens. 

General Pershing of American forces, with headquarters at Chau- 
mont, on the Marne. 

King Albert of the Belgian forces, with headquarters at Hauthem, 
south of Dunkirk. 

Marshal Foeh was actually the Commander-in-Chief (but without 
the title) of the Allied and American forces on the French front. 

c. General Pershing's plan and preparation. (1) The 
American sector, (a) Its boundaries, (i) Most of the Allied 
troops were already in the sectors where they were to fight or 
in nearby reserves. The new element in the approaching great 
battle was the entry of the American forces on the line in an 
American sector. 

(ii) The decisive strategical direction, for delivery of a 
blow that would defeat Germany on the Western front, was 
from the Meuse-Argonne front toward the pivot of the German 
defense system north of Verdun, and toward the German line 
of communications near Carignan—Sedan. 

(iii) General Pershing believed that the war-worn Allied 
troops did not have the morale or offensive spirit necessary 


380 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

for delivery of a decisive blow. So, when Marshal Foch gave 
him the choice, on September 2, of the Champagne or the 
Meuze-Argonne, he chose the Meuse-Argonne sector at 
once, as the post of honor, where the Americans should deliver 
the decisive blow for which they were sent to France. 

(iv) The sector given to General Pershing, on September 2, 
extended from Port-sur-Seille, on the east bank of the Moselle, 
west to include the Argonne Forest, a frontage of about one 
hundred kilometers. That part of the new sector from Fresnes- 
en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, to the western edge of the 
Argonne Forest, while nominally under General Pershing's 
control, did not pass to his command until September 22, on 
which day he established his Army Headquarters at Souilly, 
southwest of Verdun. 

(b) Obstacles in front. (i) Natural obstacles. The Ar¬ 
gonne Forest was almost an impenetrable tangle. It was a 
thick growth on deep ridges and valleys ideally placed for 
defense. And, as at that time of the year, in that part of France, 
there is generally a cold, wet drizzle, the Argonne Forest was an 
exceedingly difficult place for offensive warfare. 

The terrain between the Argonne and the Meuse was 
heavily ridged, with a general trend east and west, which, with 
wooded areas, rendered it easily defendable. 

In the middle of the area, the heights of Montfaucon gave 
the Germans perfect observation and a strong natural position 
which they heavily fortified. 

(ii) Artificial obstacles. The whole defense system of the 
German forces in France and Belgium pivoted in front of the 
American sector. The actual point of the pivot was near the 
Bois de Consevoye, on the east bank of the Meuse; but, in 
approaching that pivot, the lines of defense came very close 
together. The vital importance of that portion of the German 
defense system was fully appreciated by the German High 
Command, who accepted such tremendous losses in 1916 in 
attempting to improve it by the reduction of Verdun. 

That front had been practically stabilized in September, 
1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German 
offensive in 1916, and the French counter offensive in 1917, 
had remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918. 

The net result of the four years' struggle on that ground 
was a German defense system of unusual depth and strength. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 381 

with a wide zone of utter devastation in front, which, in itself, 
was a serious obstacle to offensive operations. 

The German system of defense, making the best possible 
use of the terrain, was built up of four positions, with an inter¬ 
mediate position between the first and second positions, and a 
switch position from the third position down to the Aire 
River at Fleville. 

The result was that the terrain in front of General Persh¬ 
ing s Army was a practically continuous line of defenses of 
more than twenty kilometers in depth. 

(iii) The Meuse-Argonne defile. The dominating heights 
east of the Meuse not only protected the German left, but 
gave observation and positions from which the Germans 
could deliver oblique fire on the west bank of the Meuse. 
Also, batteries located in the elaborately fortified Argonne 
could cover the German right flank and cross their fire with that 
of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse, with the result that 
the problem presented to General Pershing practically was 
that of forcing a defile, and inasmuch as Montfaucon divided 
the defile into two nearly equal parts, giving crossfire both 
ways, the problem presented to General Pershing was prac¬ 
tically the forcing of two defiles. 

(c) Relation between American First Army and French 
Fourth Army, (i) There was an intimate relation between the 
approaching operations of the American First Army and the 
French Fourth Army (General Gouraud). The task of each 
was to force the Germans across the Meuse. The general 
direction of advance of the two was towards Sedan—Mezieres, 
the American army on the right. 

(ii) That part of the American First Army advancing in 
the Argonne needed protection of its west flank by the French 
Fourth Army. Also, the direction of the Aisne River was such 
that the French Fourth Army, when solving the problem of 
crossing that river, would be greatfy assisted by action of 
the American First Army against the German defending 
troops. 

(iii) The two armies were not a group and the American 
First Army was not included in the French Center Group. 
Marshal Foch, however, for the above reasons, and also for 
expedition of supplies, charged General Petain, the French 
Commander-in-Chief, with the duty of coordinating the 


382 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

operations of the American First Army and the French Fourth 
Army (General Gouraud). 

(iv) As General Gouraud’s Fourth Army did not extend 
to the Argonne, and as General Pershing’s army was limited 
to the Argonne, there was a gap between the two armies 
and General Petain constituted a connecting group of two 
infantry regiments, one French and one American (the Ameri¬ 
can regiment was the 368th Infantry), and a French artillery 
detachment. This connecting group, operating between the 
Argonne and the Aisne, was to connect the two armies and 
neutralize the western fringes of the Argonne Forest. 

(d) Enemy order of battle, (i) The American First Army 
faced General von Gallwitz’s Group. On the immediate 
front, from Fresnes-en-Woevre to the Argonne (inclusive), 
General von Gallwitz had eleven divisions on the line and 
five in reserve. 

(ii) The center of the German mass was near the Moselle 
in front of Metz. Apparently, von Gallwitz interpreted the 
reduction of St. Mihiel, and the American ruse east of the 
Moselle, to mean that General Pershing intended to operate 
against Metz. 

(2) General Pershing's general plan. General Pershing’s 
general plan, for the offensive of September 26, was to hold 
with his right to the east of the Meuse, but with ruses as far 
south as Luneville to deceive General von Gallwitz as to the 
direction of attack, and to attack with his left to the west of 
the Meuse. 

(3) American order of battle. American order of battle, 
from right to left, was as follows: 

The American IV Corps (General Dickman), from Port-sur Seille 
to Thiaucourt (inclusive). 

Headquarters Menil-la-Tour. 

Divisions in line: 

69th French Division, east bank of the Moselle. 

90th Division (General Allen). 

78th Division (General McRae). 

89th Division (General Wright). 

42d Division (General Menoher). 

In reserve: 

5th Division (General McMahon). 

En route to join: 

7th Division (General Barth). 

The French II Colonial Corps (General Blondlat) to Les Eparges 
with headquarters at St. Mihiel. In addition to its French troops 
this corps also included the American 26th Division (General Edwards) 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 383 


headqL e rte r rs n at h F?rt V R e greT PS (Genera ‘ ClaUdeI) ‘° the MeuSe * with 

headqul r teS e at C Rampont° rPS (Gen6ral BuUard) *° Malanc0urt ’ with 
Divisions in line: 


33d (General Bell). 

80th (General Bailey). 

4th (General John L. Hines). 
In reserve: 

3d Division (General Buck). 
The American V Corps (General 
headquarters at Ville-sur-Coussances. 
Divisions in line: 


Cameron) to Vauquois, with 


79 (General Kuhn). 

37th (General Farnsworth). 

91st (General Wm. H. Johnston). 

In reserve: 

32d Division (General Haan). 

The American I Corps (General Liggett) to the Argonne Forest 
(inclusive), with headquarters at Rarecourt. 

Divisions in line: 

35th (General Traub). 

28th (General Muir). 

77th (General Alexander). 

In reserve: 

92d Division (General Ballou). 

General Pershing held three divisions in general reserve as follows: 
1st Division (General Summerall), near Souilly. 

29th Division (General Morton), near Osches. 

82d Division (General Burnham), near Clermont. 

The French 5th Cavalry Division, in rear of the left, was placed 
at General Pershing’s disposal. 

The Army Artillery (General McGlachlin) included the heaviest 
artillery up to railway artillery of 400-mm. caliber. 

The corps and divisional artillery included 2,400 pieces, of which 
1,000 were of 75-mm. caliber. 

The artillery concentration, if made in line, would have placed a 
piece of artillery at every ten yards. 

General Pershing also had 821 airplanes and 189 tanks. 


General Pershing succeeded in secretly concentrating this 
force of men and materiel by the night of September 25. 
This gave him a preponderance of men, and superiority in guns, 
aviation, and tanks. In fact von Gallwitz had no tanks on 
that front. 

(4) General Pershing's plan of maneuver west of the Meuse . 
(a) General Pershing’s general plan of maneuver west of the 
Meuse called for a surprise penetration of the first three German 
positions on the axis: Montfaucon—Romagne—Buzancy. His 
plan was built upon the idea of capturing strong places by 
maneuver rather than by frontal attack. 

(b) The positions on the east bank of the Meuse, at 
Montfaucon, and in the Argonne were three such strong 
places. His plan called for a double penetration to pass Mont- 



384 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

faucon, and then to advance with left refused to help General 
Gouraud’s Fourth Army across the Aisne. 

(c) The troops were to be formed for the initial double 
penetration with divisions on a wide frontage opposite the 
obstacles and with a deep formation opposite the more easily 
passable terrain through which the penetrations were to be 
made. To insure the surprise, the French were to maintain a 
screen along the American front until the night before the 
battle. 

(d) Under the artillery plan, interdiction and harassing 
fire was to begin at 11:30 PM, September 25, and fire of pre¬ 
paration at 2:30 AM, September 26. 

The army artillery protective fire was to cover the east 
bank of the Meuse as far north as Dun-sur-Meuse, and on the 
west flank as far north as Grand Pre. The army artillery was 
to be ready to lay down a barrage 500 yards in advance of the 
infantry on the call of corps. The III Corps Artillery was to 
include the east bank of the Meuse in its target. 

The corps and division artillery had the usual mission of 
firing a barrage to the limit of range. 

3. Phases of the Operation, a. The general offensive, to 
be launched September 26, required a continuous line of battle 
from Metz to the sea, and placed no limit on the strategical 
objective except the defeat of Germany. Some authors have 
called that great battle: “The Battle of the Liberation of 
France”; others have called it “The Battle of France”; still 
others have called it “The Battle of 1918.” Following the 
lead of General Pershing, it will be referred to here as the 
“General Offensive of 1918.” 

6. Although the General Offensive of 1918 included many 
battles like the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne, the Battle of 
Champagne, the Battle of Cambresis, the Battle of Flanders, 
etc., each of those battles constituted merely a part of the 
whole, and cannot be well understood unless so considered. 

c. From this point of view, the battle divides itself into 
four great phases as follows: 

The first phase, from September 26 to October 13, in which 
the German first line of defense was penetrated; 

The second phase, from October 13 to October 20, in which 
the Germans were forced back to the second line of defense. 

The third phase, from October 20 to November 4, in which 
the German second line of defense was penetrated; and 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 385 

The fourth phase, from November 5 to 11, which covers the 
German retirement and the pursuit by Allied and American 
forces. 

4. Operations—The First Phase (September 26- 
October 13).—Penetration of German First Line of 
Defense, a. The southern converging blow . The southern 
converging blow was delivered by General Pershing with his 
First Army, supported on the left by General Gouraud's 
Fourth Army. 

(1) The American First Army . (a) General Pershing 
launched his attack as a strategical and tactical surprise at 
5:30 AM, September 26. Accompanied by tanks, and under 
cover of a fixed and a rolling barrage, the infantry advanced 
over the German positions to the line of Montfaucon, where, as 
planned, the V Corps held while the III and I Corps continued 
the advance on the right and left of Montfaucon, respectively. 
By evening, all divisions had passed the German first position. 

(b) By noon, September 27, the attack had captured 
Montfaucon, and the V Corps had resumed its advance. 

(c) The problem of restoring communication was an 
exceedingly difficult one, as there had been only four roads 
over "no man's land," and these had been destroyed during 
the previous four years of war. The roads were sufficiently 
reconstructed by the engineers so that all division artillery, 
excepting a few heavy batteries, were moved forward on the 
afternoon of September 27, and continued the support of the 
infantry advance. The advance continued steadily through the 
German network of defense. 

(d) However, on September 28, von Gallwitz reinforced 
his front line with six fresh divisions and began an exceedingly 
active defense, particularly on the front of the 28th and 35th 
Divisions, with machine guns supported by artillery fire, and 
with frequent counter attacks. The American fighting was 
of the direct frontal attack type and against strong hostile 
positions that were fully manned by a determined enemy. 

(e) Many divisions had suffered heavily, especially those 
in the center that were subjected to artillery cross fire, so, on 
the evening of September 29, the 37th and 79th Divisions were 
relieved by the 32d and 3d Divisions, respectively, and, on 
the following night, the 35th was relieved by the 1st Division. 

(f) In this first bound, the line had advanced about ten 
miles and had penetrated the German second position. Its 


m MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

right was opposite Sivry, at the bend in the Meuse. From there, 
the line extended to the left a little south of west to the Argonne 
Forest, where, due to the exceeding difficulty of the advance 
and to flank fire, the left w r as refused to the southwest. As 
rapidly as possible, von Gallwitz was reinforcing the line west 
of the Meuse from the mass which he had assembled for the 
defense of Metz. 

(g) General Pershing renewed the attack on October 4. 
The enemy had increased the strength of his front line from 
Fresnes to the Argonne by six divisions. The fighting was 
desperate and only small advances w T ere realized by the evening 
of the 5th, except by the 1st Division, on the right of the I 
Corps, which captured Fleville. 

(h) General Pershing then decided to extend the opera¬ 
tion to the east of the Meuse with the view of driving the 
Germans from those commanding heights and forcing von 
Gallwitz to weaken his line west of the Meuse. 

(i) The French XVII Corps (General Claudel) directed 
its attack toward the exact point on which the German armies 
must pivot in order to withdraw from Northern France, and 
realized an advance of six kilometers to a line on the edge 
of the Bois de Consevoye, by the evening of October 9. This 
relieved the situation west of the Meuse very noticeably. 
The fighting west of the Meuse was desperate, but, by October 
10, the converging attack on the Argonne Forest, by the Ameri¬ 
can First Army and the French Fourth Army, was successful 
and the Germans were pinched out of that forest. As a result 
of American assistance delivered as from a bridgehead east of 
the Aire, the French Fourth Army was able to reach the junc¬ 
tion of the Aisne and the Aire Rivers. 

(j) By October 13, General Pershing had captured all the 
positions of the German first line of defense and was in front 
of the Kriemhilde position in the second line of defense, which 
Marshal von Hindenburg was reinforcing very heavily with the 
intention of stopping the American advance at all costs. 
General Pershing was then confronted with a shortage of 
replacements. He needed 90,000 to replenish exhausted 
divisions, but only 45,0000 would be available by November 1. 
Marshal Foch and General Petain agreed with General Pershing 
that the latter's attack against the German pivot should be 
sustained, but were not willing to return to him the American 
divisions that were with the Allies. General Pershing then 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 387 

adopted the policy of breaking up newly arrived divisions to 
secure replacements. 

(k) (i) By October 12, the American First Army was hold¬ 
ing a front of more than 120 kilometers and had a strength of 
more than 1,000,000 men, so on that day General Pershing 
created the Second American Army (Major General R. L. 
Bullard Commanding; Brigadier General Stewart Heintzelman, 
Chief of Staff) and gave it the sector from Port-sur-Seille, 
east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, 
and fixed its headquarters at Toul. He gave to General Bullard 
the task of extending the operations to the east in the direc¬ 
tion of Briey and Metz. 

(ii) General Pershing assigned General Liggett to com¬ 
mand the First Army and, himself, assumed command of the 
American Group of Armies, with advanced Headquarters at 
Ligny-en-Barrios. With the organization of the Second Army 
and its association with the First Army in an American group 
which was to continue the American effort against the Ger¬ 
man line of communications, General Pershing’s status changed 
and the American effort to end the war found its full expression. 
While, in a general sense, as head of the American Expedition¬ 
ary Force, he had discharged his duties on a plane with the 
allied commanders, nevertheless, militarily speaking, General 
Pershing’s status on the Western front had not been equal 
to that of the commander of a group of armies. Now, how¬ 
ever, in addition to being the supreme military representative 
of the United States, he became the actual commander of a 
numerically strong, well appointed group of armies, which, 
actuated by a high morale and imbued with a determined 
offensive spirit, was operating on an American front, with its 
own mission, for the accomplishment of the ends of the Allies 
and of the United States. The American forces thus took 
their place in the common order of battle with those oi France, 
Great Britain, and Italy and their commanders, General 
Pershing, General Petain, Marshal Haig, and Geneial Diaz 

served as equals under Marshal Foch. 

(2) The French Fourth Army . (a) The French Fourth 

Army, which supported the American army, extended the 

line to the west from the Aisne to the Suippe. 

(b) The gap between the American First Army and the 
French Fourth Army was covered by a combined American and 
French provisional reinforced brigade. 


888 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(c) General Gouraud launched his attack synchronously 
with the American attack with twenty-seven divisions, in¬ 
cluding reserves. Each division was about half as strong as an 
American division. 

(d) (i) General Gouraud really had a double immediate 
mission that may be expressed as follows: Every kilometer 
gained by his right flank supported General Pershing's maneu¬ 
ver to clear the Argonne Forest, and every kilometer gained 
by his left flank assisted just that much in relieving the pres¬ 
sure on Rheims. 

(ii) Beyond his immediate mission, however, his task, 
also in support of General Pershing, was to cut the German line 
of communications in the vicinity of Mezieres. His strategical 
direction line was to the left of but parallel to General Persh¬ 
ing's decisive strategical direction line. 

(e) The obstacles in front of the French Fourth Army were 
not so great and the German defense not so strong as before 
the American First Army. However, as on the Meuse- 
Argonne front, the arrival of German reinforcements 
slowed down the advance, and, on the 30th of Sep¬ 
tember, General Gouraud's army was stopped on the line 
just north of Somme-Py. In its immediate front were the last 
and strongest trench lines of the position through which they 
had been advancing, and farther to the north was the high 
ground for which the French spent so many lives in 1917. 
The wooded height Blanc Mont, just northwest of Somme-Py, 
was a part of that high ground and the key to the German 
defense system before General Gouraud's army. 

(3) The American 2d Division captures Blanc Mont . (a) 

Situation, (i) The French troops of the Fourth Army, having 
been definitely stopped, General Gouraud turned to the Ameri¬ 
can 2d Division to carry the advance past Blanc Mont. 

(ii) The American 2d Division was in the French Fourth 
Army reserve about ten kilometers south of Somme-Py when 
it received orders, on October 1, assigning it to the French 
XXI Corps, and, from the latter, orders directing it to relieve 
the French 61st Division on the line in front of Somme-Py 
and facing the decisive tactical and strategical area: Blanc 
Mont—Meddeah Ferme, on the night of October 1-2. 

(iii) On October 2, and the following night, the 2d Divi¬ 
sion cleared out the Essen trench preparatory to the attack 
of October 3. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 389 

(iv) The division was reinforced by the artillery of the 
French 61st Division, and by the French 252d Aviation Squad- 
ron. The brigades were reinforced with tanks as follows: 

3d Brigade with 3d Battalion French Tanks. 

4th Brigade with 2d Battalion French Tanks. 

(v) The larger units of the 2d Division were commanded 
as follows: 

Division, Major General Lejeune. 

3d Brigade, Brigadier General H. E. Ely. 

4th Brigade, Brigadier General Neville. 

2d Artillery Brigade, Brigadier General Bowley. 

(b) The 2d Division plan . (i) The objective was the 

high ground: Meddeah Ferme—Blanc Mont, which was the 
most sensitive German area in front of General Gouraud's 
Fourth Army. 

(ii) The type of maneuver was the converging attack by 
brigades, the 3d Brigade on the right. Each brigade was to 
advance without regard to units on its right or left. Each 
brigade was to attack in column of regiments. The leading 
regiment in each brigade was to attack in column of battalions. 
The rear regiment in each brigade followed in reserve in the 
formation prescribed by the brigade commander. 

(c) The attack . (i) After an artillery preparation of five 
minutes, the infantry attack was launched at 5:50 AM, October 
3, and, supported by a rolling barrage, advanced at the rate 
of one hundred meters in four minutes. 

(ii) The attack met great machine gun resistance, and, 
as the French neighboring units on the outer flanks did not 
keep up, the right flank of the 3d Brigade and the left flank of 
the 4th Brigade were somewhat retarded by heavy fire from 
those flanks. The division objective, however, was reached at 
8:30 AM, and work of consolidation begun. 

(iii) Late in the afternoon of October 3, the rear regiment 
in each brigade passed through the line of the leading regiment 
and carried the advance forward to the general line: road 
fork about one kilometer southwest of Seay Ferme to point 
about one kilometer south of St. Etienne on the Blanc 
Mont—St. Etienne road. An outpost line was pushed out 
about one and one-half kilometers. 

(iv) On October 5, at 6:15 AM, the 4th Brigade, after a 
special artillery preparation during the night, attacked and 



390 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

captured machine gun nests on the left flank that had caused 
much damage, and thus brought the line up to that of the 3d 
Brigade. This success also permitted the French division on 
the left to advance. 

(v) General Gouraud, the commander of the French 
Fourth Army, reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
French forces that, as a result of the American 2d Division’s 
capture of Blanc Mont, the German forces as far west as 
Rheims were in full retreat. 

(4) The American 36th Division pursues to the Aisne. (a) 
The American 2d Division by local attacks on October 6, 
advanced its whole line to the front and to the left. It was 
relieved from front line duty, on the night of October 6-7, by 
the American 36th Division. The 36th Division had never 
been in action. On October 4, it was placed at the disposal 
of General Gouraud. One brigade sent ahead, was assigned 
to the 2d Division, and, on the night of October 6-7, relieved 
the 2d Division troops then in line. 

(b) The command of the division sector passed from the 
2d Division to the 36th Division (General W. R. Smith), on 
October 10. The 36th Division then participated in the ex¬ 
ploitation of the success of the 2d Division, pursuing the Ger¬ 
mans in its division sector to the Aisne (the German second 
line of defense), which was reached on October 13. 

(c) The 36th Division was exceedingly aggressive in this 
pursuit and easily demonstrated its superiority to the German 
troops in its front. 

b. Operations against the German center. (1) Operations 
north of the Oise, (a) Obstacles, (i) The principal obstacle 
to be overcome by Allied operations against the German center, 
north of the Oise, was the German first line of defense, which 
here extended over a depth of about six miles. 

(ii) The general trend of that line of defense from north 
to south was as follows: To protect Lille and the railroad from 
Lille to Douai, it extended southwest; to protect Cambrai, 
St. Quentin, and La Fere—the terminals of the trunk line of 
communications from Liege—it extended east of south to the 
Oise; but in front of Arras it extended nearlv southeast. 

(b) Mission., Marshal Haig was placed in charge of those 
operations and given the objective of breaking the German 
first line of defense on the Cambrai—St. Quentin front, and of 
exploiting that success by capturing the extremely sensitive 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 301 

German strategical area: the junction of the German two lines 
of communication near Avesnes. 

(c) Order of battle from north to south. 

The British Fifth Army (General Birdwood). 

The British First Army (General Horne). 

The British Third Army (General Byng). 

The British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), reinforced by the 
American II Corps (General Read). 

The French First Army (General Debeney). 

(d) Plan, (i) Marshal Haig's general plan called for a 
converging maneuver against the strategical area: Cambrai— 
St. Quentin, in which the British Third and First Armies, with 
the left flank protected by the British Fifth Army, were to 
deliver the northern and first converging attack. 

(ii) The British Fourth Army, reinforced by the American 
II Corps and supported by the French First Army on its right 
flank, was to deliver the southern and main attack. 

(e) The attack on Cambrai. (i) Marshal Haig launched 
the northern converging attack with his First and Third 
Armies at 5:20 AM, September 27, the day following the launch¬ 
ing of General Pershing’s attack, and supported it by tanks. 

(ii) The type of maneuver was that of a converging attack 
on Cambrai. By the evening of the second day (September 
28), the northern converging force had made a deep advance 
into the German first line of defense, contained Cambrai on 
the north and south, and thus had accomplished its first task, 
which was to protect the northern flank of the main attack by 
the Fourth Army. 

(f) Main blow by Fourth Army ( U. S. II Corps), (i) The 
plan. The British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), after 
its left flank should be protected by the capture or isolation 
of Cambrai, was to deliver the main blow against the German 
center toward the junction of the two German lines of com¬ 
munication near Avesnes. 

The American II Corps (General Read) was selected to 
deliver the spearhead attack. The British IX Corps was on 
its right and the British III Corps on its left. It was to be 
followed by an Australian corps and that in turn by British 
divisions so that there would be sufficient depth for penetra¬ 
tion, including passage of lines. 

(ii) Obstacles. In front of the British Fourth Army, the 
very difficult obstacle of the Cambrai—St. Quentin Canal 
made the German first line of defense there very strong. 


392 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

About 2,000 yards in front of the American II Corps, the 
canal, by means of the Bellicourt Tunnel, passed longitudinally 
through a well defined ridge that in itself was a considerable 
obstacle. The tunnel, however, strengthened the German 
defense very much. Its length, from south of Vendhuile to 
south of Bellicourt, is about 6,000 yards. Its depth below the 
surface of the ground is 45 to 65 feet. It is built of masonry 
and the two ends were prepared for defense. There was suffi- 
ient space in it to quarter about one division of troops in barges, 
and branch tunnels led to the surface defenses on the ridge. 
In short, it met many of the requirements of a fort, in that the 
troops were safe and comfortable and could reach their posts 
of defense without danger. 

(iii) The attack. After a heavy two-day bombardment, 
the Fourth Army, supported by the French First Army on its 
right, and accompanied by tanks, attacked at 5:50 AM, 
September 29, in a heavy fog. 

The American II Corps attacked with divisions abreast, 
the 30th Division (General Lewis) on the right, the 27th 
Division (General O'Ryan) on the left. Each division had one 
brigade in line and one in reserve. Each brigade on the line 
had regiments abreast. Each regiment on the line had two 
battalions on the front line and one battalion in reserve. 
Each brigade in reserve had its regiments in column, the leading 
regiment in line of battalion columns, and the rear regiment in 
column of battalions, each in line. 

The corps advanced under cover of artillery fire of con¬ 
centration and of a rolling barrage. On September 29, the II 
Corps captured the tunnel defenses and penetrated the Hin- 
denburg line, which, in front of the American II Corps, was the 
tunnel line, and, as planned, the Australian corps behind it 
passed through and consolidated the ground won by the II 
Corps, while the II Corps went to the reserve in the spearhead 
corps sector. 

On the night of October 5-6, the II Corps relieved the 
Australian corps, and disposed the troops as follows: 

Divisions in column, 30th in front. 

30th Division in column, 59th Brigade in front. 

On October 8, the British Fourth Army resumed the at¬ 
tack to support the II Corps in a penetration of the German 
line. The disposition remained unchanged and the 59th 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 393 

Brigade attacked at 5:10 AM, supported by heavy artillery 
fire of concentration and light artillery barrage fire. The 
attack was accompanied by one battalion of heavy tanks, and 
two companies of light tanks. A British cavalry corps was 
held in the II Corps area to push through after the penetration 
of the line and to exploit the success. 

The 59th Brigade, from H hour, had three German divi¬ 
sions on its front, the 20th, 24th, and 34th. These divisions 
were also reinforced during the day by two other divisions, 
the 2d Guard Division and the 21st Division, and also by two 
battalions of the 2d Cyclist Brigade. The 59th Brigade reached 
all its objectives, but, due to the German concentration in its 
front, did not penetrate the German line. 

The next morning, October 9, the 59th Brigade resumed the 
attack and continued it until afternoon when the 60th Brigade 
passed through and advanced the line to Busigny—Bohain. 

The 30th Division then, by passage of lines, continued to 
advance until the night of October 11-12 when it was relieved 
by the 27th Division and the line stood in front of Le Cateau— 
St. Souptet (both exclusive)—Bohain (inclusive). 

The 27th Division consolidated the position prepara¬ 
tory to a further advance by the corps. 

The British Fifth Army and the French First Army pro¬ 
tected the north and south flanks, respectively, of Marshal 
Haig's operation, and, by October 13, the German first line 
of defense, penetrated by the American II Corps, had been 
captured, and the advance carried past Cambrai and St. 
Quentin to the line of the Oise and the Selle. 

(2) Operations east of the Oise, (a) The French Tenth 
Army (General Mangin) and the French Fifth Army (General 
Berthelot) attacked on September 29. The Germans, menaced 
by the French First and Fourth Armies on the west and east, 
fell back rapidly to the northeast before the attack of the 
Tenth and the Fifth Armies. 

(b) By October 13, the Fifth and Tenth Armies were in 
front of La Fere, and had recaptured the high ground of St. 
Gobain, Laon, and the Chemin des Dames. 

c. The northern converging blow. (1) Having selected the 
King of Belgium to deliver the northen converging blow, 
Marshal Foch created the Flanders Group of Armies on Septem¬ 
ber 19, and placed it under the command of the King of Bel¬ 
gium. From north to south, it consisted of the Belgian Army, 


394 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

the Sixth French Army (General Degoutte), and the Second 
British Army (General Plummer). 

(2) The mission was to force the Germans away from the 
coast and to cut their line of communications near Ghent. 
King Albert attacked, on September 29, from the Lys to the 
sea, and also effected a strategical and tactical surprise. On 
the first day, he captured a part of the high ground of Flanders. 
The advance, as in the other operations, continued rapidly 
until it was retarded by arrival of German reinforcements. 
By October 13, the King had advanced twenty kilometers 
but had met severe German resistance at the Lys. 

d. Results of the first phase operation. (1) By October 13, 
Marshal Foch had captured the German first line of defense 
and had pressed Marshal von Hindenburg so hard that the 
latter had used all his fresh reserves and had been forced to 
fall back to his second line of defense in front of the southern 
converging blow. 

(2) On September 30, the German Chancellor, von 
Hertling, resigned, and was succeeded by Prince Max of Baden. 
In September, Germany offered peace to Belgium. 

(3) On September 29, General Ludendorff, having lost 
all hope, pronounced the situation exceptionally grave, and, 
on October 1, pressed the new Chancellor to demand an armis¬ 
tice through Mr. Wilson as an intermediary, and to make 
peace at any price, as he stated that he would no longer be 
responsible for the solidarity of the troops. A request for an 
armistice was sent to Mr. Wilson on the night of October 4-5, 
in which a peace, based on Mr. Wilson's fourteen points, was 
accepted as far as Germany was concerned. On October 1, 
Marshal von Hindenburg left the front and followed the Kaiser 
to Berlin to be near him in the event of revolution. 

(4) On October 3, Marshal von Hindenburg proposed to 
the leaders of the government that a levee in mass should be 
proclaimed, in order to secure one last reserve for the defense 
of the frontier at the Grenz position. The attempt was a 
failure. 

(5) On October 9, the German government had Mr. 
Wilson's reply, which was to the effect that, from a military 
standpoint, a condition precedent to the conclusion of any 
armistice was the evacuation of the occupied territory in 
France and Belgium. 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 395 

(6) On October 12, the second German note was sent to 
Mr. Wilson, in which Germany reiterated with emphasis her 
request for peace on the basis of the fourteen points enumerated 
by Mr. W ilson on January 8, 1918, as necessary to peace. 

5. Operations. The Second Phase (October 13-20)— 
Driving the Germans Back to Second Line of Defense. 
a. Plans. (1) Marshal von HincLenburg’s plan, (a) Marshal 
von Hindenburg’s general plan was to continue the bold step 
by step defensive while the new German government should 
secure a peace by diplomacy. 

(b) His plan called for holding the second line of defense, 
and for such an aggressive defense of territory held in front of 
that second line of defense, on the west face of the salient, that 
time would be gained to strengthen it. The second line of de¬ 
fense in front of the American sector was to be held at all 
costs. 

(c) He directed the outer defense to be made by inter¬ 
depending groups of resistance that would make a maximum 
use of the machine gun. He directed all commands not to 
retreat until further defense of positions was hopeless, and to 
conduct the defense so that the Allied and American forces 
would have to pay so dearly for advances that they would be 
inclined toward peace. 

(2) Marshal Foch’s plan. Marshal FoclTs plan, as pub¬ 
lished in his directive of October 10, was that the converging 
operation being conducted by General Pershing on the south 
should continue vigorously, but that the principal effort would 
be made to reduce the La Fere salient, the Lille salient, and the 
Flanders—Channel salient, and thus force the Germans back 
on the western face of the great salient to the second line of 
defense, as had been done by the southern converging opera¬ 
tion. and by the British Fourth Army with the assistance of 
the American II Corps in the operation against the center. 

b. The southern converging blow. (1) General Pershing's 
group of armies, (a) The American First Army (General 
Liggett) was in front of the German second line of defense, 
which, in that sector, was called the Kriemhilde position. 
West of the Meuse, it was based on the hills around Romagne, 
Bantheville, Landres, and the bends in the Meuse and 
Aire Rivers. Its position was about two and one-half miles 
deep and it was perfectly organized. 


396 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

(b) General Pershing's plan was to hold with the Second 
Army (General Bullard), which was organizing on the right, 
and to attack with the First Army (General Liggett) on the 
left. 

(c) The plan of maneuver for the American First Army 
was for the French XVII Corps (General Claudel), east of 
the Meuse, to continue the attack toward the actual Ger¬ 
man pivot near Consevoye, and, west of the Meuse, for the 
III Corps (General John L. Hines) and the V Corps (General 
Summerall) to attack in conjunction with General Gouraud's 
Fourth Army to help the I Corps (General Dickman) across 
the Aire, and to advance the whole line. The 42d and the 
5th Divisions relieved the 1st and the 80th Divisions. 

(d) (i) The attack of the American First Army encountered 
the most determined resistance, but Romagne, Cunel, and 
adjoining territory were captured, and, by the 20th of October 
the I Corps had crossed the Aire River and captured Grand Pre. 

(ii) The fighting east of the Meuse also was violent, 
especially on October 18. Marshal von Hindenburg reinforced 
the line with six divisions, in his attempt to prevent the Ameri¬ 
can First Army's advance. 

(2) The French Fourth Army. General Gouraud attacked 
synchronously, but was held before the German second line 
of defense at the Aisne, where the American 36th Division 
did especially fine work. By October 20, General Gouraud 
had captured Vouziers. 

c. The northern converging blow. On October 14, King 
Albert of Belgium resumed operations in the direction of 
Bruges and Ghent with great success. The Germans fell back 
on the north flank rapidly, to keep from being forced into 
Holland. By October 20, they had been forced back off the 
coast to their second line of defense. 

d . Operations against the German center . (1) The British 
Fourth Army (General Rawlinson) attacked at 5:20 AM, 
October 17, astride the St. Quentin—Liege railroad, for the 
purpose of capturing the junction of that railroad and the 
Mezieres—Valenciennes railroad. The Fourth Army was sup¬ 
ported by attacks by the French First Army on its right and 
the British Third Army on its left. 

(2) Again, the American II Corps (General Read) was 
the spearhead of the attack. The II Corps, supported by 
tanks, attacked with divisions abreast, the 30th on the right 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 397 

and the 27th on the left, in a heavy fog, with cavalry behind 
ready to exploit a penetration of the line. The British IX 
Corps on the right did not keep up, so the 30th Division's 
right flank was exposed to fire. 

(3) The attack was resumed the next day with the same 
situation on the right flank, caused this time by the fact that 
the French First Army did not keep up. By the evening of 
October 19, the II Corps had captured the high ground that 
overlooked the Sambre canal, which was the German second 
line of defense, when, due to its very heavy losses, it was re¬ 
lieved for rest and replacement. 

(4) The French First Army (General Debeney) and the 
French Tenth Army (General Mangin), by a converging 
attack, had reduced the La Fere salient by October 20. 

(5) The French Fifth Army (General Berthelot), supported 
by the Fourth Army on its right and the Tenth Army on its 
left, drove the Germans back to the second line of defense. 

(6) The British Third Army, in conjunction with the con¬ 
verging action by King Albert's Group, attacked the south 
face of the Lille salient, and, with the support of the British 
Fifth and First Armies' attack against its face, forced the 
Germans to retire from that salient. By October 20, the Brit¬ 
ish forces had passed Lille and Douai and were approaching 
the German second line of defense. 

e. Results of the second 'phase operation . (1) The results 

following Marshal Foch's instructions of October 10, were that 
the Germans had been forced back to the second line of defense, 
by October 20, all along the line, except in the vicinity of Tour- 
nai, and that they were defending the second line with the 
greatest desperation. 

(2) (a) On October 20, the German government replied 
to Mr. Wilson's note, and, in an appeal for peace, promised 
to abandon submarine warfare. 

(b) The second phase ended on October 20, with Marshal 
von Hindenburg defending his second line of defense. As a 
result of the shortening of the line, the von Boehn Group was 
discontinued. The Second Army went to the Group of the 
Crown Prince of Bavaria, the Eighteenth and Ninth Armies 
to the Group of the Crown Prince of Germany. The Ninth 
Army however, was immediately amalgamated with the Seventh 

Army. 


398 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

6. Operations—The Third Phase (October 20—No¬ 
vember 4)—Penetration of German Second Line of De¬ 
fense. a. Plans. (1) Marshal von Hindenburg’s plan. Mar¬ 
shal von Hindenburg’s plan was to hold the pivot in front of 
the American sector and the second line of defense on the 
southern face of the salient, at all costs. He planned to hold 
the second line of defense, on the western face of the salient, 
until the third line of defense could be prepared, and until 
material in front of the third line of defense could be sent to the 
rear. 

(2) Marshal Foch’s plan. Marshal Foch’s plan, as given 
in his directive of October 19, was as follows: 

(a) The southern converging operation was to be continued 
without change of objective. However, in order to assist the 
French Fourth Army (General Gouraud) to cross the Aisne, 
General Pershing’s First Army (General Liggett) and General 
Petain’s Fifth Army (General Berthelot) were to converge 
their attacks in the direction of Buzancy and Rethel, respec¬ 
tively, while General Gouraud should attack in the direction 
of Le Chesne. 

(b) The King of Belgium was to continue the northern 
converging operation with his Group of Armies in the general 
direction of Brussels. 

(c) The operations against the center were to continue as 
follows: 

Marshal Haig, with the British armies, except the Second, 
was to make the principal effort between the Sambre and the 
Scarpe for the purpose of cutting the German line of communi¬ 
cations: Namur—Charleroi, and of forcing the German troops 
against the impassable Ardennes Forest. 

At the same time, Marshal Haig was to protect the south 
flank of the Group of the King of Belgium and to help him, by 
flank action, to cross the rivers on his front. 

(d) General Petain was to support the British right, and 
also the left of the southern converging operations, by an effort 
to break the Hundig position on the line of the Serre, with the 
French First and Tenth Armies, respectively. 

b. The northern converging blow. (1) On October 21, the 
King of Belgium attacked with his Group of Armies along the 
whole front. He penetrated the Lys position, but, on October 
26, was stopped in front of the high ground between the Lys 
and the Scarpe Rivers, whereupon Marshal Foch requested 




ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 390 

General Pershing to send immediately two American divisions 
to help the Sixth French Army (General Degoutte). General 
Pershing sent the 37th Division (General Farnsworth) and the 
91st Division (General Wm. H. Johnston). 

(2) The order of battle of the French Sixth Army from 
right to left was: VII Corps, XXX Corps and XXXIV Corps. 
The American 87th Division was assigned to the XXX Corps 
and placed on the right. The American 91st Division was 
assigned to the VII Corps and placed on the right. 

(3) As a result, the French 128th Division was between the 
two American divisions, as was the Moroccan division be¬ 
tween the 1st and 2d Divisions in the operation against Soissons, 
on July 18. 

(4) The attack was resumed at 5:30 AM, October 31, 
and there, as at Soisscns, the two American divisions at once 
became the spearhead of the attack. On the first day, the 
37th Division captured the Cruyshautem Ridge, and the 91st 
Division captured the hill Spitaals Boschen with great gallantry. 

(5) These two divisions, then taking the lead in the ad¬ 
vance, drove the Germans back to the Scarpe, where the 37th 
Division made an effective river crossing in the face of the 
enemy, and the 91st captured the important town of Audenarde. 
They had advanced fourteen kilometers in three days, had 
carried the line forward with them, and, having attained all 
objectives, were relieved from front line duty, for rest and 
replacement, on the night of November 3-4. 

(6) As a result of the operations of these two American 
divisions, King Albert’s Group of Armies, by November 4, 
was in front of the German switch position, which extended 
from Holland through Ghent and along the east bank of the 
Scarpe to the Herman position north of Tournai. This switch 
position was very strong, and was defended with great vigor. 

c. Operations against the German center. (1) Marshal 
Haig’s attack proceeded vigorously along the railroad toward 
Charleroi, but met great resistance. However, this resistance 
weakened after November 1, the date of General Pershing’s 
attack, and, November 4, Marshal Haig had penetrated the 
Herman position on the German second line of defense near 
Valenciennes, and had reached the line of the Scarpe and the 
Sambre. 

(2) General Petain attacked with the French First and 
Tenth Armies, and, supporting Marshal Haig on the left, 


400 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

advanced the First Army to the line of the Sambre-Oise 
Canal, and crossed the Serre with the Tenth Army. By 
November 4, he had penetrated the Hundig position in the 
vicinity of Guise on Marshal von Hindenburg's second line 
of defense. 

d. Southern converging blow. (1) Situation, (a) Marshal 

von Hindenburg's defense against the southern converging 
attack was so strong that, except for local successes, the attack 
made no progress until November 1. The general description 
of that operation is as follows.: 

(b) The converging attack of the French Fifth Army did 
not succeed. General Pershing's attack did succeed, so he 
held out a hand to General Gouraud and helped him across 
the Aisne. 

(2) General Pershing's attack November 1 . (a) Situation 

October 31. (i) By October 31, Marshal von Hindenburg had 
effected a heavy concentration of troops in front of General 
Pershing in order to protect his pivot and his vital line of com¬ 
munications through Carignan—Sedan. 

(ii) For the first time, the American army was preparing 
for the attack under normal conditions. That is, it was to 
attack on a front already held. American personnel were in 
control of the communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and 
water service. The American divisions were either on the line 
or close in rear. 

(iii) The French artillery, aviation, and technical troops, 
which had previously made up the American deficiencies, had 
been largely replaced by American organizations; also, the 
army, corps, and division staffs had had sufficient experience 
to function without Allied aid. 

(iv) Considering the obstacles to be overcome, the situa¬ 
tion presented was somewhat similar to that before the attack 
of September 26. The terrain, with the Meuse on the right 
and the Bourgogne woods on the left, practically made a defile, 
though the heights of Barricourt were not as strong as those 
of Montfaucon. 

(b) General Pershing's plan. (i) General plan. On 
October 21, General Pershing issued instructions that the army 
should prepare thoroughly for a general attack on October 28, 
that would be decisive. The date was postponed to November 
1, to coordinate with General Gouraud's Fourth Army on the 
left. General Pershing's general plan, for the operation as a 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 401 

whole, was to hold with the Second Army and to attack with 
the First Army. 

(ii) Purpose. Though the ultimate purpose of his whole 
operation remained unchanged, i.e., to cut the Carignan— 
Sedan—Mezieres railroad line, the immediate purpose of the 
November 1 attack was to help General Gouraud over the 
Aisne, as though the American army were a bridgehead for 
that French army, and to establish contact with General 
Gouraud’s army north of the Bourgogne Woods. 

(iii) Method. His decision, as before, was based on the 
idea of the capture of strong places by maneuver against the 
flank and rear of those places. The Bourgogne Woods and the 
Heights of Barricourt were exceedingly difficult obstacles, so 
the type of maneuver chosen by General Pershing was the 
single penetrating maneuver launched from a frontal attack. 

(iv) Plan of maneuver. The plan of maneuver, to carry 
out this decision, provided for a frontal attack on November 1, 
with the corps in line from right to left as follows: III, V, and 
I. The left of the V Corps and the right of the I Corps were 
to be the spearhead of the attack. Success was to be exploited 
by advancing the left, where contact was to be established with 
General Gouraud's Fourth Army. 

(v) Order of battle. The order of battle west of the Meuse, 
from right to left, was as follows: 

III Corps (General J. L. Hines). 

Divisions on front line: 

5th (General H. E. Ely). 

90th (General H. T. Allen). 

Divisions in reserve: 

3d (General Preston Brown). 

32d (General W. G. Haan). 

V Corps (General C. P. Summerall). 

Divisions on front line: 

89th (General W. M. Wright). 

2d (General J. A. Lejeune). 

Division in reserve: 

1st (General Frank Parker). 

I Corps (General J. T. Dickman). 

Divisions on front line: 

80th (General Adelbert Cronkhite). 

77th (General Robert Alexander). 

78th (General J. H. McRae) 

Divisions in reserve: 

42d (General C. T. Menoher). 

Army Artillery (General E. F. McGlachlin). 

(vi) Artillery plan. In the American sector, the whole 
remaining German last line of defense, west of the Meuse, was 
within range of the American artillery. Under the artillery 


402 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

plan, the whole Kriemhilde position was to be put under 
neutralizing fire, beginning October 21. In order to secure 
maximum range, the army artillery was placed well forward. 
The Bourgogne Woods and the high ground east of the Meuse 
were to be neutralized in order to protect the attacking troops 
from cross fire. The advance the first day was to be protected 
by a heavy and deep rolling barrage. Artillery was to be dis¬ 
placed forward to cover the second day’s advance with accurate 
fire. The American artillery reached its maximum efficiency 
in the American operation that was launched November 1, 
1918. 

(c) Operations . (i) After a two hours’ violent artillery 

preparation, the infantry advanced on November 1, in a heavy 
mist, under cover of a perfectly coordinated dense barrage 
and of concentration and neutralizing fires. It was closely 
followed by accompanying guns, and, by nightfall, the V Corps 
had captured the heights of Barricourt and the III Corps had 
advanced. The advance on that day broke through the last 
position in the German second line of defense, captured the 
German artillery positions, and forced the retreat of the 
Germans about to be isolated in the Bourgogne Woods north 
of Grand Pre. 

(ii) As expected, the German resistance weakened in 
front of General Gouraud’s Fourth Army on the Aisne, so 
General Gouraud’s Fourth Army crossed the Aisne, on Novem¬ 
ber 2, and the two armies effected a junction on that day as 
planned. 

(iii) After helping the French Fourth Army across the 
Aisne, General Pershing, supported by that French army, 
resumed the advance along the decisive strategical direction 
that led to the cutting of the Carignan—Sedan railroad line— 
the principal German line of communications. 

(iv) On November 2 and 3, he sent the III and V Corps 
forward rapidly against severe resistance, and he sent the I 
Corps forward so rapidly that some pursued by motor truck. 

(v) By November 3, he had attained a point from which 
he attempted interdiction fire with his heavy railroad artillery 
on that line of communications. 

(vi) By the evening of November 4, he had reached La 
Neuville on the Meuse, opposite Stenay, had swept through 
the Forest of Dieulet to the outskirts of Beaumont, and, on 

the left, had advanced to Le Chesne. 

* 



ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 403 

b. Results of third phase operations. Though Germany's 
second line of defense had been penetrated, by other armies 
than the American on other parts of the front, the outstanding 
and decisive accomplishment of the third phase was the fact 
that General Pershing had penetrated the German second line 
of defense close to its pivot with the Antwerp—Meuse line 
(i.e., the third line of defense) and was in a position which tock 
in flank and rear all the German forces west of the Antwerp 
—Meuse line of defense. 

7. Operations—The Fourth Phase (November 4-11). 
The Pursuit, a. Plans. (1) Marshal von Hindenburg’s plans. 
(a) On October 25, the new German government relieved 
General von Ludendorff, holding him responsible for the de¬ 
feat. Marshal von Hindenburg estimated, on November 4, 
that the strain had become almost intolerable, and that any 
convulsion in the army, or in Germany, would make collapse 
inevitable. His authority, as well as that of the German 
government, over the troops was much reduced because of their 
low morale. 

(b) General Pershing's penetration of the Kriemhilde 
position also penetrated the German second line of defense, at 
the pivot. As a result, Marshal von Hindenburg practically 
ceased resistance in front of the Antwerp—Meuse line, i.e., 
the third line of defense. The only German plan deducible, 
amid the confusion existing in the German army, at that time, 
is that Marshal von Hindenburg was trying to hold General 
Pershing in front of his third line of defense while the German 
troops in France and Belgium could retreat thereto. 

(2) Marshal Foch’s plan. Marshal Foch's plan was very 
simple, i.e., to attack and pursue the Germans along the whole 
front without respite, with the idea of securing a decision. 

(3) General Pershing's plan. General Pershing planned to 
make the success of the American Group of Armies the deci¬ 
sive blow of the war, so he gave instructions for the pursuit 
to be expedited. The III Corps was to turn east and cross the 
Meuse, while the Second Army, east of the Meuse, was to 
attack in the general direction of the Briey iron basin. 

b. Operations. (1) The Allied front. Except in the Ameri¬ 
can sector, the Germans were retreating as rapidly as possible 
to the Antwerp—Meuse line, and the Allied troops were en¬ 
gaged merely in pursuit. 



404 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 


(2) The American front, (a) The First Army, (i) The 
divisions on the front line advanced in an irresistible reach 
for victory. The III Corps (General J. L. Hines) turned to 
the east. The 5th Division (General H. E. Ely), in a brilliant 
operation, crossed the Meuse, and, on November 3-4-5, es¬ 
tablished a bridgehead on the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse. 
This forced a general German withdrawal from the strong 
positions held so long on the hills north of Verdun. The 
American troops thus, by November 5, had penetrated the 
Antwerp—Meuse line (i.e., the German third and last line 
of defense) and were prepared to take the whole German force 
in France and Belgium in reverse. 

(ii) The 5th Division at once began an aggressive advance 
toward the Carignan—Sedan railroad line, which was the 
German main line of communications and had been the main 
objective of the Allied and American general offensive. When 
stopped by the armistice, the 5th Division was within artillery 
range of the German line of communications. 

(iii) The 32d Division (General Haan) crossed the Meuse 
south of the 5th Division and, advancing, joined with that 
part of the First Army that had been operating on the east 
bank of the Meuse. 

(iv) On the left of the 5th Division, the 90th Division 
(General Allen) crossed the Meuse, and, by November 11, 
was within artillery range of the German line of communica¬ 
tions. 

(v) The corps artillery of the III Corps (Colonel Lanza) 
held the German line of communications under interdiction 
fire after November 8. 

(vi) In the V Corps, the 89th Division (General Wright), 
in an excellent operation planned by Colonel R. H. Allen, 
Infantry, and the 2d Division (General Lejeune) crossed the 
Meuse, and, by November 11, the V Corps also had the 
German line of communication within artillery range. 


- - (vi) In the I Corps, the 77th Division (General Alexander) 
had the German line of communications within artillery range 
by the llth; -; - • 


(viii)-’ The First Division (General Frank Parker) and the 
42d-.Division (General Menoher) reached the heights above 
Sedan pn November 7, and held that fortress and the railroad 
objective under easy fire control. At this time, the boundary 
between the American First Army and the French Fourth 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 405 

Army was changed so that Sedan was included within the zone 
of action of the latter. The American 1st and 42d Divisions, 
therefore, were withdrawn from Sedan, in order to give the 
French their right of way. 

(b) The Second Army. On the 8th, the Second Army 
attacked along its whole front in the direction of the Briey 
iron basin, and maintained the advance until stopped by the 
armistice. 

8. The Armistice, a. German request for armistice. On 
November 6, the day after American forces had penetrated the 
last German line of defense and had the German main line 
of communications within their grasp, the German govern¬ 
ment announced that parlementaires had left to arrange terms 
of armistice with Marshal Foch. These parlementaires pre¬ 
sented themselves near La Chapelle at 8:00 PM, November 7, 
to the advance troops of the French First Army (General 
Debeney). Marshal Foch received them that evening at 
Rethondes, east of Compiegne, dictated the terms of a proffered 
armistice to them at once, and gave Germany seventy-two 
hours, i.e., until 11:00 AM, November 11, for reply. At 
5:00 AM, November 11, the parlementaires signed the armis¬ 
tice, and, at 11:00 AM that day, hostilities ceased. 

b. Terms of the armistice. Under the terms of the armis¬ 
tice, Germany surrendered all her submarines and disarmed 
her surface men of war, which were to be interned in neutral 
ports or taken over by the Allies, and also surrendered great 
quantities of arms and transportation. She renounced the 
peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk and also of Bucharest. She 
agreed to repair damage done, and to indemnify the Allies as 
agreed to later by negotiations, to evacuate all foreign occupied 
territory, and to permit a neutral zone ten kilometers deep on 
the east bank of the Rhine from Switzerland to Holland, with 
Allied and American bridgeheads at Mayence, Coblenz, and 
Cologne, each with a radius of thirty kilometers. 

c. The advance into Germany. (1) (a) The center bridge¬ 
head was assigned to the United States. Before the armistice, 
General Pershing had planned to create a Third Army. On 
November 14, he designated the Third Army (General J.T. Dick- 
man, Commanding, Brigadier General Malin Craig, Chief 
of Staff) as the Army of Occupation and assigned to it the III 
and IV Corps staffs and troops (less artillery, except the 66th 
Field Artillery Brigade) and the following divisions: 1st, 2d, 


406 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

3d, 4th, 32d, and 42d. Later, the VII Corps with the 5th, 
89th, and 90th Divisions was added. 

(b) This was truly an army organized on the march, for 
the advance began November 17, at 5:00 AM, only six days 
after the armistice, and three days after the order was issued 
to organize the army. 

(2) All of the Allied and American troops from Holland 
to Switzerland moved forward simultaneously in the wake of 
the retreating Germans. Upon arrival at the frontier, a halt 
was made until December 1, when the leading elements of all 
Allied and American armies crossed the line into Germany. 

(3) The American Third Army headquarters was estab¬ 
lished at Coblenz, and an advance general headquarters at 
Treves. Steps immediately were taken to organize the bridge¬ 
heads for defense, and dispositions were made to meet a possible 
renewal of hostilities. 

(4) The advance to the Rhine required long arduous 
marches, through cold and inclement weather, with no oppor¬ 
tunity for troops to rest, refit, and refresh themselves after 
participation in the final battle. The Army of Occupation 
bore itself splendidly and exhibited a fine state of discipline, 
both during the advance and throughout the period of occupa¬ 
tion. 

(5) The zone of march of the American Third Army, and 
its line of communication after reaching the Rhine, lay through 
Luxembourg. After the passage of the American Third Army, 
the 5th and 33d Divisions of the American Second Army were 
designated to occupy Luxembourg (except the city of Luxem¬ 
bourg) for the purpose of guarding the American lines of com¬ 
munications. 

9. Return of American Forces to America, a . The 
First and Second American Armies were dissolved and returned 
to America after the armistice. The Army of Occupation 
(the Third Army), reduced from time to time, finally was 
returned to America in 1923, when the United States turned 
the Coblenz bridgehead over to France. 

b. The American forces, upon return to the United States, 
were mustered out of the service as rapidly as possible, and the 
regular forces were reduced to a peace basis. 

10. General Pershing. In recognition of General Persh¬ 
ing’s great service to his country, the United States commis¬ 
sioned him “General of the Armies of the United States” on 


ALLIED AND AMERICAN GENERAL OFFENSIVE 407 

September 3, 1919, and, on September 29, 1919, presented to 
him “The Thanks of Congress.” 

11. Principles of War. The principle of the offensive, a. 
When two combatants are nearly balanced in skill in the making 
of war, but one of them has a decided preponderance of force, 
that combatant should seek to make his preponderance effec¬ 
tive in the securing of a decision through the agency of offen¬ 
sive warfare. From September 25, 1918, to the end of the war, 
Germany operated on interior lines on the Western front and 
was equal to the Allies and to America in skill in making war. 
However, the Allies and America had a great preponderance of 
force on the Western front, and a vast preponderance of re¬ 
sources. Marshal Foch could have chosen to deliver a deci¬ 
sive blow along a decisive direction line while holding on all 
the rest of the front. 

b. (1) This might have been successful. Such an offen¬ 
sive belongs to the annihilating type. It was the type of offen¬ 
sive that Marshal von Hindenburg used in all of his offensive 
operations on the Western front in 1918. It is especially well 
fitted for the use of a force that, on a whole front, is inferior 
to the enemy, but which seeks a decision through an offensive 
which illustrates the principles of mass , surprise , and move¬ 
ment at a particular time and place. 

(2) If Marshal Foch had attempted to win the war with 
an offensive of that type, it is barely possible that Marshal 
von Hindenburg, operating on interior lines, might have 
defeated it, as he did General Nivelle’s offensive in 1917. 

c. (1) Under the conditions existing on the Western front 
on September 25, 1918, the limitation of the Allied and Ameri¬ 
can effort to a blow along one or even two direction lines would 
not have given a sufficient opportunity to take full advantage 
of the Allied and American preponderance of force and re¬ 
sources. This is especially true as the German flanks rested 
on impassable obstacles. 

(2) The advantage from interior lines enjoyed by the Ger¬ 
mans could be neutralized, and the opportunity gained to use 
the Allied and American preponderance, by extending the of¬ 
fensive effort to include the whole front from Metz to the sea. 
That is just what Marshal Foch did. 

d. By directing General Pershing to strike at the German 
pivot and at the German line of communications, Marshal 
Foch complied with the basic idea of the offensive of annihila- 


408 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR 

% 

tion. However, when he involved the whole front in the battle, 
he also complied with the basic idea of the offensive of exhaus¬ 
tion . 

e. (1) Marshal Foch's illustration of the type of the offen¬ 
sive called the offensive of exhaustion was not limited to the 
Western front. 

(2) Through unity of command, he illustrated that type 
of the offensive by the operations on all the fronts, and in a 
way very similar to the manner in which General Grant illus¬ 
trated the offensive of exhaustion in his 1864 and 1865 opera¬ 
tions that defeated the Confederacy by exhaustion: thus— 

(a) The Allied Mesopotamian and Syrian operations, 
against the Central Powers' resources, corresponds to General 
Bank's operation against Mobile and the Confederate line of 
communications to that seaport. 

(b) The Allied operation against the Central Powers' re¬ 
sources in the Balkans corresponds to General Sherman's 
operation against Confederate resources. 

(c) The Allied operations in Italy, toward Innsbruck and 
toward the German line of communications to the Western 
front, corresponds to General Crook's operations from West 
Virginia against General Lee's line of communications via 
Lynchburg to Knoxville. 

(d) The Allied and American operation on the Western 
front corresponds to General Grant's operation against Gen¬ 
eral Lee in front of Richmond. And, in that operation, Gen¬ 
eral Pershing’s cutting of the German line of communications 
and of retreat corresponds to General Sheridan's cutting of 
General Lee’s line of communications and retreat at Appo- 
matox. 

/. From the above, it may be deduced that, when, after 
a long war, one of the combatants operating on exterior lines 
is vastly surperior to the other in men and resources, it may be 
well for him not to limit his offensive operation to a single 
direction line, or even to two direction lines, but, instead, to 
take full advantage of his superiority by involving the whole 
force in an offensive of exhaustion. 

g. It was that type of the offensive which brought the two 
greatest of modern wars to an end: i.e., the World War under 
the direction of Marshal Foch, and the American Civil War 
under the direction of General Grant. 

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